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Introduction
Brexit and beyond
Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger
On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) went to the polls to decide 
whether Britain should remain in, or leave, the European Union (EU). The 
success of the ‘leave’ vote, by a 51.89 per cent majority, stunned not only 
the British public but also the major political parties, the polling organi-
sations, and the media, not to mention most political scientists. It also 
flabbergasted their continental counterparts. Despite the multiple crises 
in which the Union finds itself embroiled, neither publics nor authori-
ties had fully comprehended the probability of ‘Brexit’. Unprecedented in 
nature, the vote shook whatever remained of the once preponderant telos 
of European integration – encapsulated in the symbolic, if legally vacu-
ous, Treaty commitment to ‘ever closer’ union’ – to the core.1
The process of Britain withdrawing from the EU, with which it 
has been deeply intertwined over the past four decades, will occasion 
a significant impact on virtually all aspects of the country’s political, 
juridical and economic life. From immigration policy to agriculture sub-
sidies, criminal justice measures to environmental standards, financial 
services regulations to nuclear power technology, university student 
fees to employment laws and aviation, Brexit requires rethinking and re- 
legislating a vast number of policy areas. It also promises to keep authori-
ties (and other stakeholders) busier than ever until withdrawal day, and 
most likely beyond. Negotiating the terms of Brexit, along with new trade 
deals previously covered by EU agreements, requires immense capac-
ity and will stretch the civil service to its limits. In addition, amending, 
repealing or improving existing EU legislation, once transposed into UK 
law via the Withdrawal Bill (formerly the ‘Great Repeal Bill’), is ‘one of 
the largest legislative projects ever undertaken in the UK’ (Simson Caird 
2017, 5).2 Expect the Courts, too, to continue to arbitrate on questions of 
executive competences, and for the devolution settlement to be thorny 
and contested.
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But the effects of Brexit will not stop at Britain’s borders. As the 
second largest economy, the third most populous Member State, and 
a significant net contributor to the EU budget, the UK’s departure 
will send ripples across the continent. As UK nationals and political 
representatives, including the 73 British Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) leave the institutions, the balance of power among 
the remaining Member States will shift. So, too, will voting patterns 
and alliances, the ideological make- up of the institutions, and, poten-
tially, future policy directions. Beyond their relative position in the 
Union, Member States’ domestic politics will be affected, too, not least 
where they face home- grown Eurosceptic forces. Indeed, the rise of 
populism is a continent- wide phenomenon, and poses a broader chal-
lenge to the Union from both the left and the right of the political 
spectrum. Moreover, Brexit has prompted a fundamental rethink of 
the EU’s global role, given that the UK’s intelligence, military, diplo-
matic and soft power capacities will no longer be part of the Union 
(even if they were never placed fully in the service of European goals). 
And, crucially, it is the very idea of Europe, the pace and parameters 
of European integration, the place of the nation- state betwixt and 
between globalising and domestic pressures, and the business of doing 
politics in twenty- first- century Europe, which will come under intense 
scrutiny in the years ahead.
The core, underlying claim of this volume is that Brexit is not 
simply a British phenomenon, but rather a specific manifestation of 
more general, Europe- wide tensions that have characterised European 
integration since the 1950s. Viewed from a European perspective, the 
challenges of Brexit may appear unique in their intensity, but they can 
also be understood, in more familiar terms, as the latest in a long line 
of existential crises to have beset the Union since its foundation, as the 
periodic resurgence of national interests and identities have challenged 
the ideal of ‘ever closer Union’ and exposed the tensions underlying the 
European project. Indeed, the forces behind the Brexit campaign and 
subsequent vote, as well as many of the issues raised by the decision 
itself, are reminiscent of two distinct conceptual problems that have 
characterised politics in Europe since the early days of integration. 
The first is the tension between supranational control and the defence 
of national sovereignty, and the conceptual conflict this embodies 
between a Europe des patries (Europe of states) committed to pursu-
ing common national interests, versus a fully fledged United States 
of Europe (see Moravcsik 1993). The second is the tension between, 
on the one hand, the dictates of market efficiency and the form of 
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technocratic, depoliticised governance developed in service of this – the 
so- called ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994) – and, on the other hand, the 
ever- increasing calls for greater popular contestation and democratic 
control of the policy agenda (Hix & Follesdal 2006).
This edited volume brings together some of the most notable 
scholars on European, British and global politics to examine the likely 
effects of Brexit for the future – or, more accurately, possible futures – 
of Europe and the EU. Substantively, its sets out to answer three ‘big 
questions’ looming over the continent as the Brexit process plays out. 
First, how did we get here? What constellation of events, actions, ideas, 
practices and socioeconomic factors were involved in bringing about 
the vote, and how are we to understand the role played by each of these 
causal factors? Second, what exactly is taking place? How are we to 
understand the nature of contemporary European and British politics – 
and what, if anything, is Brexit a case or instance of? Third, what does 
the future hold for the EU, the UK and EU– UK relations? Why, and how, 
might different scenarios come about, and with what consequences? 
And, normatively speaking, what should be the future direction of 
Europe and the EU?
At a time when politics is moving particularly fast, and where 
questions of such complexity and import must be addressed on both 
sides of the channel, there has never been a greater need for academ-
ics, policymakers, and the public to engage with one another. This book 
aims to further this cause in three simple respects. First, it addresses 
most of the major policy areas, actors, institutions, relations and ques-
tions across the continent, in order to give insight into the comprehen-
siveness and complexity of the topic at hand. Second, while rooted 
in long- standing academic research by the foremost experts in their 
respective fields, the chapters are short and jargon- free, written in a 
style that is accessible to those not steeped in the individual disciplines 
themselves. Third, in line with the (laudable) concern at UCL  – and 
UCL Press – to achieve the broadest possible dissemination of academic 
knowledge, the book is open access: freely available for anyone to read 
and download.
Setting the scene: Britain’s decision to leave the EU
As a point of departure, let us briefly recall the context in which the 
referendum on British withdrawal came about. The referendum itself, 
whilst rooted in the immediate, specific context of the internal politics 
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of David Cameron’s Conservative Party, was also the product of a more 
general discontent with the European project that stretches back decades. 
Indeed, Britain’s relationship to what is now the EU was never a straight-
forward one. When Winston Churchill championed the cause of European 
integration after World War II – in a speech delivered in Zurich – he did 
not envision the UK being a part of this new Europe, but rather its ‘friend 
and sponsor’. Indeed, when ‘the six’ European states – France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg – agreed to the creation of 
a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and to the sub-
sequent European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, Britain declined 
to participate in either venture. The UK also placed itself on the sidelines 
when the other West European states negotiated the abortive European 
Defence Community (EDC), agreeing only to an associated role in the pro-
posed organisation.
Spurred on by changing political and economic circumstances, 
however, the UK twice applied to join the EEC in the 1960s. Politically, 
the disastrous Suez Campaign of October 1956 had demonstrated, to 
the world, that Britain’s claim to be a global  – rather than European 
or regional – power lacked credibility. Economically, moreover, it had 
become clear by this point that, outside the EEC, the UK would remain 
the ‘sick man of Europe’. And yet, Britain’s changing perceptions of 
the value of EEC membership coincided with the rise of Gaullism in 
France, and the corresponding rise of anti- American sentiment in the 
upper- echelons of French politics. Fearing British accession to the EEC 
as an Anglo- Saxon ‘trojan horse’, de Gaulle vetoed applications from 
Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government in 1963 and Harold 
Wilson’s Labour government in 1967. When de Gaulle lost power in 
1969 – replaced by his more moderate successor, Georges Pompidou – 
Wilson once again made the case for joining the EEC, and the Labour 
government was on the verge of negotiating accession in 1970 when 
they lost the general election to the Conservatives. It was thus left to 
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath to take the UK through 
the accession process and ensure passage of the 1972 European 
Communities Act through Parliament, paving the way for British mem-
bership of the EEC on 1 January 1973.
The Labour Party, however, and to some extent the Conservative 
Party, remained deeply divided on the question of British membership of 
the Common Market. When Labour returned to power in 1974, Wilson 
made good on his pledge to re negotiate the terms of membership secured 
by Heath, and to put this to the British people in the form of an in– out 
referendum. While Wilson’s renegotiation was not substantial, and served 
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principally to confuse and irritate other European leaders in Brussels, the 
result proved sufficient to secure the support of the Labour Cabinet and, 
subsequently, for Wilson to obtain a majority of 67.23 per cent in favour 
of remaining in the EEC in the referendum, held on 6 June 1975. The 
campaign itself demonstrated splits within both major parties, Labour and 
Conservative, although both party leaders – Harold Wilson and Margaret 
Thatcher – campaigned to remain in the Common Market. Whilst Labour 
opponents regarded the EEC as a capitalist project designed to weaken 
the bargaining power of labour and undermine domestic protection, 
Conservative sceptics emphasised the threat to national sovereignty and 
the challenge to British identity posed by European integration.
Labour lost power again in 1979, following a period of sign-
ificant industrial unrest  – the ‘Winter of Discontent’  – leading to a 
Conservative government under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. 
Thatcher regarded herself as a classical (Gladstonian) liberal, rather 
than a traditional Conservative as such, and her zealous belief in the 
free market and the removal of barriers to trade contributed to her 
general support for the European project (Van Parijs, Chapter 27). 
Thatcher was a proponent of further liberalisation of the EEC, sup-
porting the Single European Act of 1986 – which introduced qualified 
majority voting (QMV) in the Council for the first time  – in order to 
further this aim. Over the course of the late- 1980s, however, Thatcher 
became increasingly hostile to developments in the EEC. Having sup-
ported further market integration, she vocally opposed the direction 
the Community was taking under the entrepreneurial leadership of 
Commission President Jacques Delors, famously arguing that the 
European Community should be a ‘willing and active cooperation 
between independent sovereign states’ (Thatcher 1988), and pit-
ting herself against the dominant trend towards further integration. 
Thatcher’s hardening opposition to further integration  – and in par-
ticular to the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the proposed single 
currency  – led directly to the resignation of Geoffrey Howe and the 
leadership challenge from Michael Heseltine that heralded her fall 
from power in November 1990 and resulted in John Major replacing 
her as Conservative leader and prime minister.
The passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 occasioned a sig ni fi-
cant split in Conservative ranks between pro- Europeans and those who 
feared the (substantial) supranational elements of the Treaty (includ-
ing proposals for a common currency and a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP)). Major was able to head off opposition by tying 
the passing of the Treaty in Parliament to a vote of no confidence in the 
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government (Huber 1996, 269), but the split between pro- Europeans 
and Eurosceptics remained (and festered), re- opening when David 
Cameron became prime minister in 2010 at the head of a Conservative– 
Liberal Democrat coalition. Seeking to settle the issue once  and  for  all, 
and to head off opposition from the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) which was threatening Conservative majorities in marginal 
constituencies, Cameron announced an in– out referendum on Britain’s 
EU membership in his Bloomberg Speech in January 2013, contingent 
on a Conservative victory in the 2015 general election. When Cameron 
received his majority he duly announced the referendum the following 
February, after negotiating a deal with the EU to reform the UK’s relation-
ship to the Union, setting off the starting gun on four months of intense 
campaigning by both sides.
Events in British politics moved swiftly following the vote of 23 
June 2016 and the 51.89 per cent majority for ‘Leave’ which resulted. 
David Cameron resigned the next day, triggering a leadership election 
in the Conservative Party, in which Theresa May beat sole challenger 
Andrea Leadsom to become party leader and prime minister. Cameron 
left it to his successor to trigger Article 50 – the paragraph in the Lisbon 
Treaty setting out the procedure for withdrawing from the Union – and 
the letter indicating the UK’s intention to leave was delivered on 29 
March 2017 by the newly appointed Permanent Representative to the 
EU, Sir Tim Barrow. This followed the passage of the necessary legis-
lation through Parliament on 13 March, the government having lost a 
legal challenge against its presumed right to trigger Article 50 by Royal 
Prerogative.3 May’s vision for Brexit, set out in a speech at Lancaster 
House in January 2017 and published shortly thereafter as a White Paper 
(HM Government 2017a), promised no ‘back door’ membership of the 
EU. Arguing that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, May defined her key objectives as 
access to – but not membership of – the Single Market, a bespoke agree-
ment with the EU without membership of the Customs Union, an end to 
‘free movement’, and an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice (CJEU). Following shortly after snap elections on 8 June 2017 – 
during which the Conservative Party lost its slim majority but remained 
in power thanks to an agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) – negotiations between the UK and the EU began on 19 June 2017. 
With the EU represented by Commission chief negotiator Michel Barnier, 
on the basis of directives received from the Council, the negotiations are 
expected to comprise two distinct rounds (on settling outstanding issues, 
and on future arrangements), and to last until the end of March 2019, 
unless extended by the Council.4
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Brexit and the future(s) of Europe: five fault lines
Let us return, then, to the key question animating this volume, namely, 
the effects of Brexit on Europe and the EU, and how we are to concep-
tualise the future(s) of Europe after this seismic event. An adequate 
understanding of Brexit, of course, requires attention to a myriad 
of different questions and debates, not all of which can be addressed 
in a single volume. Nevertheless, to set the stage for the subsequent 
discussion, we suggest that five questions in particular loom large in 
debates over the future of Europe  – in the popular imagination, in 
academic discourse, and in the contributions to this book. In what fol-
lows below, we discuss these five claims in greater detail, positioning 
each of the chapters in relation to these broader debates to which the 
authors all speak.
1. How representative is Brexit?
Whether Brexit is idiosyncratically British or representative of a broader 
regional tendency towards populism represents one timely question. 
Is the vote best understood as the consequence of Britain’s historically 
awkward ‘with but not of’ stance, its rabidly Eurosceptic press, or the 
vicissitudes of its majoritarian democratic system? Or is it better concep-
tualised as the product of a broader, Europe- wide discontent associated 
with the fallout from the eurozone crisis, the perceived deficiencies of the 
EU institutions, and the rise of populism across the continent? In other 
words, did the Brexit vote represent the ‘perfect storm’ of contingent fac-
tors, or were there deeper, more structural factors at play? The question 
is an important one since it influences our assessment of the likelihood 
that we will witness further attempts by Member States to leave the EU in 
the near future, and thus touches at the viability of the EU itself.
For some contributors to this book, Brexit is best understood as 
the cumulative outcome of dynamics that are particular to the UK. 
Britain’s imperial history, its (laissez-faire) economic preferences, and 
the distinctiveness of its legal and political systems, have  – accord-
ing to this view  – shaped the ‘awkward’ role the country has played 
in European integration to date. De Búrca  argues, for instance, that 
the UK’s decision to join the EEC in 1973 represented a pragmatic 
economic choice rather than a political commitment to the European 
project, and that deep resistance to the ‘federalist’ ideal has been 
a near constant in British attitudes to Europe. Correspondingly, she 
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notes, it ‘seems plausible to assume that if a popular referendum on UK 
withdrawal from the EU had been held on any number of occasions 
over the four decades of EU membership, the outcome of the vote may 
well have been the same as in June 2016’ (De Búrca, Chapter 4). Hill 
also discusses the pragmatism of this relationship in his chapter, argu-
ing that Britain’s European engagement has been always and above 
all strategic in nature, and weighed against other commitments, nota-
bly the Anglo- American ‘special relationship’ and the Commonwealth 
(Hill, Chapter 20). Patel similarly notes the role played by Britain’s 
imperial history in animating the discourse around Britain’s post- EU 
future, predicting trouble ahead as this history becomes more politi-
cally salient (Patel, Chapter 12).
Other contributors regard Brexit as representative of more general 
dissatisfaction with politics on the continent. Bickerton sees Brexit as the 
‘tip of the iceberg’, reflective of a much broader popular disenchantment 
with the EU’s policies which is rooted in the negative effects of economic 
and monetary integration on national growth models, which have exac-
erbated the differences between these models whilst simultaneously 
making reform more difficult (Bickerton, Chapter 14). Van Middelaar, 
too, attacks the tendency to view Brexit as ‘insular British doggedness’, 
pointing instead to the Union’s failure to achieve an adequate balance 
between (economic) freedom and protection as the real driver behind the 
persistent sense of malaise on the continent (van Middelaar, Chapter 8). 
Moreover, the effects of a broader discontent is also evident in the contri-
bution by Glencross, who regards the vote as symptomatic of a wider gulf 
in Europe between elite views on integration and the rejection by voters 
of the status quo, citing the examples of the French and Dutch opposi-
tion to the Constitutional Treaty, the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Greek bailout, and the Dutch rejection of the Association Agreement 
with Ukraine (Glencross, Chapter 1).
2. How should we understand European integration?
The ‘what’ of European integration is another key area of contemporary 
debate. Why do states decide to pool sovereignty, and how does integra-
tion proceed over time? What, in other words, does the Union represent? 
These questions are important for an assessment of where Europe will 
go next: how we define integration tells us much about where we might 
look for an assessment of the EU’s future. Whether we believe the EU 
is at base a collection of sovereign states, an international organisation, 
or a sui generis political system, our expectations of its future course are 
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bound to differ. Furthermore, it also matters how we conceive of the pol-
itics of Europe. Are the EU’s aims of cross- border market liberalisation 
and the protection of pan- European social standards compatible? Do the 
institutions entrench certain ideological principles – or are they designed 
specifically to de- politicise conflicts? And what should the EU become if it 
wishes to maintain, or gain, legitimacy? On these questions the authors 
in this volume represent a significant heterogeneity of opinion.
For some, it is national interests and intergovernmental bargain-
ing that shape, or should shape, the EU’s priorities. Gillingham, scath-
ing about the direction integration has taken in the past two decades, 
argues that the only alternative to ‘more Europe’ is consensus among 
and leadership of the 27 Member States, to whom authority should 
be devolved, effectively doing away with the ‘EU policy machinery’ 
and preserving only the Single Market (Gillingham, Chapter 21). 
Emphasis on the Member States as the driving force is especially 
strong in discussions of foreign policy, which, as Hadfield reminds 
us, ‘overall remains traditionally intergovernmental’, even as other 
policy domains have become increasingly communitised (Hadfield, 
Chapter 19). Indeed, while different in outlook, and emphasising the 
importance of geo- strategic factors in drawing the European states 
together, the chapters by Hill, Paterson and Drake serve to highlight 
the context- dependent and historically specific importance of Member 
States in shaping the direction of EU policy – be they British, German 
or French, respectively.
Other contributors regard the EU as a far ‘denser’ institution, one 
in which sovereignty and national interests are significantly curtailed 
by the competences afforded the community institutions, which have 
overtaken the Member States in shaping the EU’s agenda. In his chap-
ter, Hix  – whom, it should be noted, first argued that the EU consti-
tuted a ‘political system’ in its own right (Hix 1997) – contends the EU 
has become increasingly centralised with the advent of supranational 
forms of decision- making, offering Member States little discretion over 
policy once decisions have been made (Hix, Chapter 7). Bickerton also 
sees the EU as having moved beyond a mere assemblage of Member 
States, emphasising the growing centralisation of the EU, the significant 
differences between ‘nation statehood’ and ‘Member Statehood’, and the 
endurance of the latter through the deep Europeanisation of the British 
state (Bickerton, Chapter 14).
And what of the politics of the Union? Some contributors see the EU 
as an essentially social democratic project, driven by a desire to regionalise 
the European social model and regulate globalisation, and as such these 
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authors deplore recent moves in the direction of neoliberalism (since 
the 1980s) and austerity (since the recession of 2007/ 8). Van Parijs, for 
example, argues that the push to create the Single Market in the 1980s 
represented a Hayekian ‘trap’ since it entailed the loss of the monopolis-
tic position held by cartels, unions and professional associations at the 
national level without any corresponding transfer of regulatory compe-
tences to the transnational level (Van Parijs, Chapter 27). Van Middelaar 
offers a similar assessment, arguing the EU has historically been based on 
a balance between economic freedom and social protection that has, in 
recent years, become skewed towards economic freedom, at the expense 
of protection (van Middelaar, Chapter 8). Innes agrees, noting that the 
EU has itself increasingly become associated with a (damaging) supply- 
side philosophy in recent years, although she also contends that the EU 
has unfairly become a scapegoat for the social polarisation that resulted 
from the UK’s supply- side reforms in the 1980s (Innes, Chapter 15). By 
contrast, others regard the Union as a historically liberalising (and there-
fore liberating) project. Gillingham, for instance, disagrees with both the 
diagnosis (of a social democratic Europe) and the prescription (of lessen-
ing its free- market credentials), blaming the ‘sad story of EU decline’ on 
its move away from the removal of economic barriers (‘negative integra-
tion’) towards the attempt to construct a more comprehensive political 
community (‘positive integration’) (Gillingham, Chapter 21).
3. what is wrong with the EU?
Something is rotten in Europe  – this much almost all the contributors 
seem to agree on. Where they disagree is on the principal drivers of 
Europe’s predicament. A  number of different diagnoses are offered in 
the volume, each of which leads to a divergent prescription for solving 
the problem. Together the contributions highlight three areas where the 
EU’s problems are most evidently manifest: (1) Euroscepticism and the 
legitimacy crisis, (2)  structural problems with the eurozone, and (3) 
the migration and refugee crises. In practice, these different problems 
blend into one another to contribute to the present ‘omni- crisis’ in 
Europe, although some contributors ascribe greater significance to cer-
tain factors over others.
Euroscepticism and the legitimacy crisis:  In the years since the 
Maastricht Treaty, Euroscepticism has moved from the political mar-
gins to the centre of political attention. In his chapter, Hix attributes the 
EU’s unpopularity to its becoming involved in redistributive debates over 
national tax and spending in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/ 8 
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and the ensuing eurozone crisis, since these actions served to politicise 
the activities of the community institutions and undermine the EU’s 
credentials as an apolitical regulatory state (Hix, Chapter 7). In a simi-
lar vein, Isiksel regards the EU’s legitimacy crisis as the inevitable con-
sequence of the substitution of principled support for integration with 
economic pay- offs, since little in the way of long- term public engage-
ment and identification could ever be expected to emerge from the claim 
that ‘you’re better off thanks to the EU’. For this reason, she argues, the 
EU’s institutions ‘experience every crisis of competence, every economic 
slump, as an existential crisis’ (Isiksel, Chapter 26). Staiger similarly 
identifies the sources of the EU’s legitimacy crisis in the failure of its insti-
tutions to establish the trust of the electorate and to purposively chan-
nel debate and dissent in constructive ways; this being the only way, she 
argues, to avoid the ‘destructive excess’ that has characterised populist 
movements across Europe and which was a significant contributor to the 
Brexit vote (Staiger, Chapter 25). Nugent agrees with this assessment, 
noting the popularity of Eurosceptic parties in Austria, France, Greece, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK in 2015– 16, and the 
concomitant decline in the EU’s ‘output legitimacy’. In an era of public 
distrust, he suggests, calls for ‘more Europe’ are no longer feasible 
(Nugent, Chapter 5). This concern, finally, is also echoed by Shackleton, 
who argues that the EU struggles to obtain legitimacy either through 
fostering a common identity or delivering for its citizens, since there 
is widespread distrust of Brussels at the national level and significant 
diversity in the policy priorities held by the Member States (Shackleton, 
Chapter 22).
Structural problems with the eurozone: Deeply entwined with con-
cerns about the EU’s legitimacy is its most serious problem to date: the 
ambitious and flawed project of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
which, Gillingham argues, has ‘plunged the continent into a decade of 
depression; cheated a generation of young people out of jobs … impover-
ished southern Europe; driven a thick emotional wedge between creditor 
and debtor nations … and embittered the public from north to south and 
east to west’ (Gillingham, Chapter 21). For Isiksel, the problem is that 
EMU has amplified  – rather than cushioned  – the effects of the global 
financial crisis, whilst at the same time succeeded in imposing rigid con-
straints on domestic fiscal policies which have ‘deprived national legisla-
tures of key levers of social policy [and] further attenuated democratic 
control of policymaking at the domestic level’ (Isiksel, Chapter 26). In 
his chapter, Nugent suggests that the problems with the eurozone lie in 
its incomplete nature, since a currency union must be accompanied by 
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both fiscal and banking union, as well as political union strong enough 
to make authoritative decisions. The absence of each of these, he argues, 
meant the euro was ‘not built on solid foundations’ (Nugent, Chapter 5). 
Somewhat more optimistically, however, Schelkle notes that the EU has 
been able to overcome some of the more fundamental problems of the 
eurozone through post- crisis reforms in banking supervision and fiscal 
coordination, and thus predicts that the euro will continue to strengthen 
against the pound after Brexit (Schelkle, Chapter 13).
Migration and refugee crises: Many of the contributors also empha-
sise the role played by the mismanagement of migration across Europe. 
For some the problems arise with regard to internal migration  – that 
is, the movement of persons from one Member State to another. Hill 
regards the downward pressure on wages in the UK resulting from 
high levels of immigration after the 2004  ‘big bang’ accession, com-
bined with the emergence of the so- called ‘gig economy’, as a significant 
contributory factor in the rising tide of populism and Euroscepticism 
that culminated in the Brexit vote (Hill, Chapter 20). Others consider 
the EU’s mismanagement of the refugee crisis to be the greater problem. 
Morgan, for instance, regards the risk of ‘large- scale domestic terrorism 
as a consequence of the implosion of Middle Eastern and North African 
states and the failure to integrate existing Islamic minority populations’ 
as a significant risk, although he contends the problem would be exac-
erbated, not solved, by Brexit (Morgan, Chapter 3). Nugent locates the 
problem in the interaction between the internal and external faces of EU 
migration, since Schengen, which was designed to allow for free move-
ment within the Union, was not able to deal – justly or administratively – 
with the influx of thousands of external migrants into the zone (Nugent, 
Chapter 5).
4. can sovereignty and democracy function in a globalised world?
Another key strand of debate concerns the democratic implications of 
globalisation and supranational governance. The status of sovereignty 
and democracy under conditions of transnational interdependence, such 
as those characterising the relations between the EU Member States, has 
been brought to the fore by Brexit, not least given the Leave campaign’s 
emphasis on ‘taking back control’. Arguments over the meaning of ‘control’ 
touch at the very heart of what democracy and sovereignty mean, and – as 
is always the case with essentially contested concepts – open up a host of 
important questions about how these terms should be understood and 
applied. Within Europe – home to the world’s most significant experiment 
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in post- sovereign governance  – questions relating to the legitimacy of 
transnational governance and the compatibility between national and 
supranational models of democracy are of paramount importance. Again, 
the contributors to this volume represent a number of diverse perspectives 
on the crucial questions of the EU’s democratic credentials and the extent 
to which British membership of the Union, and its impending withdrawal, 
will affect democracy in the UK.
The authors hold different views on the question of whether there 
exists a ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU. Shackleton regards the issue prin-
cipally as a conceptual one, outlining three models of legitimacy in his 
 chapter – drawn from van Middelaar (2013) – to help frame the debate. He 
distinguishes between a German model of democratic legitimacy based 
on a common identity, a Roman model based on the provision of tangible 
benefits to citizens, and a Greek model based on citizen participation in 
decision- making (Shackleton, Chapter 22). Nicolaïdis accepts that the 
Union is ‘democratically challenged, in spite of all its mechanisms for rep-
resentation, delegation and checks on power’, arguing the solution lies 
in grounding the EU’s activities in the demands of its citizens – and the 
emerging European demos – whilst capitalising on the Union’s ability to 
remain partially shielded from the short- termism of electoral democracy 
(Nicolaïdis, Chapter 23). Bellamy, in contrast, regards the extension of 
national models of democracy to the supranational level as a non- starter, 
since the trade- off between democracy, sovereignty and economic glo-
balisation makes this ideal unfeasible. Rather than attempt to replicate 
domestic democracy on a European level, he argues that the EU should 
offer space for countries to collectively regulate transnational processes, 
such that they are able to control the externalities of their democratic 
decisions (Bellamy, Chapter 24). Van Parijs makes a similar argument, 
noting that all states stand to lose their democratic legitimacy if they fail 
to regulate their actions under conditions of interdependence, since ‘the 
democratically made decisions of one state [can] undercut those of other 
states’ (Van Parijs, Chapter 27).
The contributors disagree over the effects of Brexit on British 
democracy and the UK’s (uncodified) constitution. Some do not regard 
Brexit as a particular threat to the UK’s democratic credentials. De Búrca, 
for instance, argues that the vote did not represent an attempt either 
‘to remove domestic constitutional checks and balances within the UK, 
or to promote popular rule over constitutional government’ (De Búrca, 
Chapter 4). Others are more sceptical, including Weale, who argues that 
the referendum has strengthened the British executive at the expense 
of Parliament and the other representational elements of the British 
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constitution, since the government has come to regard itself as holding 
a mandate from ‘the people’ which can override both Parliament and the 
judiciary if need be (Weale, Chapter 2). Eeckhout agrees that Brexit has 
not removed constitutional checks and balances in the UK, but argues that 
the process of Brexit – and in particular the Miller case – highlights the 
threadbare nature of the British constitution, since parliamentary sov-
ereignty is the only principle that stands, regardless of how its exercise 
infringes established rights and legislation (Eeckhout, Chapter 18). From 
a broader constitutional perspective, Wright identifies Brexit as a poten-
tial threat to the asymmetric form of devolution that has come to char-
acterise British politics since the 1990s, with the risk of a ‘hard border’ 
between the EU and the UK across the border between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic challenging an important foundation of the Belfast 
(Good Friday) Agreement and exposing Westminster’s overall control of 
the Brexit process (Wright, Chapter 11).
Others, including Glencross, Bellamy and Innes, argue that certain 
aspects of the Brexit vote may prove problematic for British democracy 
in other respects. Glencross, for instance, notes that the Brexit vote rep-
resents a broader (and problematic) trend for politicians to legitimise 
their policies through referendums, since they can, by doing so, delegate 
decisions back to the sovereign peoples and therefore avoid taking politi-
cally risky decisions (Glencross, Chapter 1). Bellamy argues that British 
democracy will be harmed as a result of the diminished capacity of the 
UK to deal with problems outside its borders, since Brexit will result in 
the ‘inability to tackle problems that require cooperation between states’, 
thereby undermining the capacity of democratic decision- making at 
home, rather than enhancing it (Bellamy, Chapter 24). Innes, similarly 
emphasising the threat to the state’s capacity, is concerned about the 
likely intensification of supply- side thinking after Brexit, which threat-
ens the integrity of the state by instrumentalising its powers for private 
and party- political gain whilst withdrawing the protections it previously 
offered the public (Innes, Chapter 15).
5. what does the future of Europe look like?
The future of Europe is of paramount concern in capitals and homes 
across the continent. Whilst prediction is a dangerous game, not least 
in the complex and ever- changing post- Brexit political environment, 
indicative future scenarios based on readings of the current situation 
abound. Some believe that Brexit will be good for Britain and good for 
the EU, although this is something of a minority position. More common 
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is the claim that Brexit will be damaging both for Britain and for Europe. 
Others see the outcome as likely to favour one side, either the UK or the 
EU, depending on the outcome of the negotiations and the ability of 
either side to best navigate the internal and external challenges that lie 
ahead. Positions on this question, of course, cannot be separated from 
the questions addressed above. Whether integration is regarded as a 
success that can deliver for its Member States, for instance, will influence 
whether one regards the EU’s future as a viable one, and whether one 
sees the consequences of Brexit as damaging for Britain.
A number of contributors are, to begin with, somewhat sceptical 
about the long- term prospects for the EU after Brexit. Cini and Verdun 
summarise this view – which, in the most extreme case, sees the disinte-
gration of the EU – in their discussion of the ‘centripetal trajectory’, which 
envisages gradual disengagement from the EU as the Union’s inability to 
solve the various crises on its doorstep become clear and as the various 
political divides widen (Cini & Verdun, Chapter 6). Gillingham in par-
ticular is unconvinced about the EU’s viability, arguing that ‘Europhoric 
values’ are not enough, and that the Commission and other institutions 
are too discredited to take a leadership role, meaning the only way 
forward is for a (difficult to imagine) consensus between the 27 post- 
Brexit Member States (Gillingham, this volume). Nicolaïdis is also some-
what sceptical of the idea the EU can continue in its present form, arguing 
that flexibility, differentiation and opt- outs must become the new norm, 
since ‘a mosaic EU is more appealing than pushing half of its states to the 
brink of exit’ (Nicolaïdis, Chapter 23).
The alternative scenario laid out by Cini and Verdun – the ‘centrif-
ugal trajectory’  – imagines a more positive future for Europe once the 
‘stumbling block’ of British membership has been removed, since the UK 
has historically blocked – or taken no part in – important moves towards 
greater integration, and since the lesson of Brexit may be that leaving 
the EU is seen to have very significant costs (Cini & Verdun, Chapter 6). 
While few contributors foresee increased pressure for integration at the 
present time, some authors, such as Hix, do suggest additional compe-
tences could be afforded the EU, in a restricted set of policy areas, in 
return for the Member States being afforded a greater degree of flexibility 
when it comes to implementation (Hix, Chapter 7). Drake, in her chap-
ter on Anglo- French relations after Brexit, argues that much depends on 
Emmanuel Macron’s efforts to place the European continent back on its 
political footing, since European integration has always depended upon 
the key Franco- German access. If Macron succeeds in reconciling France 
with the EU, and helps construct a ‘Europe that protects’, Drake argues, 
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then the future of the EU will be all the more secure (Drake, Chapter 10). 
Moreover, several authors note the beneficial effects of increased debate 
around the consequences of Brexit, which have galvanised the EU to a 
certain extent. In her chapter on citizenship rights, for instance, Shaw 
notes that Brexit has ‘given rise to unprecedented civic mobilisation 
around demands for the protection of acquired rights’, highlighting 
the extent to which EU citizenship has  – in perception, if not neces-
sarily in law – evolved into a ‘transnational citizenship practice’ (Shaw, 
Chapter 17).
The authors also disagree over the consequences for the UK. Some, 
such as Gillingham, are optimistic about Britain’s prospects outside the 
Union, arguing the ‘Brexit naysayers have … been wildly off the mark’ and 
suggesting that British withdrawal may not only be non- disruptive, but 
also positively beneficial (Gillingham, Chapter 21). Other contributors, 
whilst attuned to the risks of Brexit for the UK, note specific instances 
in which the negative consequences have perhaps been overblown in 
existing debates. Hadfield, for example, notes that little will change in 
UK– EU foreign and defence relations. Indeed, she even suggests that the 
UK ‘could dispose of its awkward reputation within the EU and become 
a more consistent partner from without’ (Hadfield, Chapter 19). Patel, 
moreover, notes that the Algerian and Greenlandic experiences sug-
gest withdrawal may not lead to ‘a complete unwinding of ties’, and that 
the key to Britain after Brexit will lie in longer- term trajectories (Patel, 
Chapter 12). Curtin’s chapter is also instructive in this respect, since she 
finds a strong precedent in the EU’s negotiation of bespoke arrangements 
on information- sharing with Denmark to suggest that continuity in some 
policy areas – especially those underneath the political radar – may well 
be possible after Brexit. Indeed, she concludes, on something of a posi-
tive note, that: ‘where there is a will, it seems, there may well be a way’ 
(Curtin, Chapter 16).
In contrast, other contributors are decidedly less optimistic about 
the UK’s prospects outside the Union. Schelkle suggests in her chapter 
that the UK’s economy will likely suffer, as the pound will continue to 
fall against the euro, and since the loss of ‘passporting’ rights will con-
vince many City firms to relocate to the continent (Schelkle, Chapter 13). 
Morgan also argues that Britain faces a number of significant risks out-
side the EU, not least the break- up of the UK as a political community 
and its exclusion from favourable trade, security and research arrange-
ments (Morgan, Chapter 3). Hill regards the idea of British success 
outside Europe as anachronistic, claiming the UK will quickly discover 
that ‘the notion of being able to opt in and out of European endeavours 
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is an embarrassing mirage’, since – in spite of the wishes of Brexiters – 
‘the historical clock cannot be wound back’ (Hill, Chapter 20). Paterson 
is similarly sceptical of how realistic the UK’s aim of becoming a ‘great, 
global Britain’ is, noting that other countries will prioritise trade agree-
ments with the EU and that Brexit is unlikely to stay Germany’s inexora-
ble upwards rise within Europe (Paterson, Chapter 9).
The structure of the book
The book is divided into two parts. Part One discusses effects of Brexit 
on the actors, institutions and relationships that comprise the complex 
political environment of Europe, with a particular emphasis on the UK, 
the community institutions and the EU27. Section I examines Brexit from 
the British perspective, contextualising the vote and inquiring as to the 
principal issues it raises for the future of the UK. Section II considers 
the likely effects of Brexit on the functioning of the EU itself, examin-
ing how it will impact the politics of the community institutions  – the 
Commission, Council, Parliament, Court and Central Bank – as well as 
how their own failings may have contributed to Brexit itself. Section III 
considers the effects of Brexit from the perspective of key Member States, 
examining how the vote will affect the UK’s key bilateral relationships 
within Europe  – with Germany, France and Ireland  – and considering 
previous cases of ‘exit’ represented by Greenland and Algeria.
Part Two is divided thematically between key issue areas, each of 
which is likely to experience different effects and dynamics as a conse-
quence of the decision. Section IV examines the political economy of 
Europe after Brexit, considering how the different economic models 
in Europe and the UK will be affected, and what the likely impact of 
Brexit will be on the eurozone. Section V examines the effects of Brexit 
from a legal perspective, looking at the likely impact of the decision on 
key areas of EU law – including information- sharing and citizenship 
rights – and addressing the likely consequences for the British consti-
tution. Section VI adopts a global perspective, asking about the likely 
consequences of Brexit for the EU’s global role, and looking in detail 
at how the decision will affect foreign, security and defence policy in 
Europe. It examines, in particular, how Brexit feeds into Europe’s assess-
ment of its geostrategic situation, and how it may affect the foreign 
policymaking architecture in the EU. Section VII considers the state of 
democracy in Europe and discusses important concerns about the legit-
imacy of the European project, with contributors reflecting upon the 
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future of democracy in the EU after Brexit, as well as how the EU may 
attempt to solve its ‘legitimacy crisis’. Finally, Section VIII addresses 
the ‘idea of Europe’ itself, considering the role of identity politics in 
explaining both support for  – and opposition to  – European integra-
tion, and assessing the role of ideas and emotions more generally in 
European politics.
  
Part one
Actors and institutions
 
  
  
I: Brexit and the UK 
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1
Cameron’s European legacy
How Brexit demonstrates the flawed politics 
of simple solutions
Andrew Glencross
‘To govern is to make believe’, proclaimed Machiavelli. David Cameron 
presumably encountered this dictum while studying Philosophy, Politics 
and Economics at Oxford, but he was unable to put it into practice as 
prime minister. For if the vote for Brexit on 23 June 2016 demonstrated 
anything, it was that a majority of the British electorate did not believe 
what political elites were saying in favour of EU membership. Many in 
the losing camp cried foul, claiming the other lot won by playing fast and 
loose with the truth. Yet fixating on the bucket- load of mendacity on offer 
(from both sides) during the campaign is to miss the wood for the trees. 
Although David Cameron subsequently blamed populism as a sentiment 
fuelled by ‘a movement of unhappiness and concern about the state of 
the world’ (Guardian 2016), the responsibility equally lies much closer 
to home. What made the untruths about Brexit believable was a politics 
of simple solutions promoted by Cameron, which ultimately undid him. 
This damaging legacy will cast a long shadow over British politics as the 
country adapts to life outside the EU and also stands as a stark warning to 
other EU leaders on how not to approach European integration.
Cameron saw an in–out referendum as a straightforward fix to 
internal Conservative Party strife over European integration (Copsey & 
Haughton 2014). When announced in January 2013, it appeared a 
low- risk option since winning a parliamentary majority was far from a 
given. At that time the prime minister was more concerned with quash-
ing Eurosceptic backbenchers’ mischief- making under the coalition 
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agreement with the Liberal Democrats. By 2016, Cameron was perhaps 
entitled to feel confident about his favoured political tactic of managing 
domestic challenges by forcing voters to choose between the status quo 
and an unknown future. He had already won two referendums on this 
basic premise, defeating supporters of the alternative vote (2011) as well 
as partisans of Scottish independence (2014).
In fact, the former prime minister’s rise to the top came on the back 
of an equally simple expedient: he won the party leadership by promising 
to withdraw Tory MEPs from the centre- right grouping in the European 
Parliament. It was a neat way to burnish his Eurosceptic credentials at no 
domestic cost – although Angela Merkel never understood why Cameron 
chose to lose influence in the European Parliament. Disdain for EU 
consensus was also the basis of his fateful renegotiation strategy prior 
to the Brexit vote. Here again he resorted to a simplistic conceit of 
talking tough in the hope it might win concessions sufficient to mollify 
soft Eurosceptics (Glencross 2016).
In reality, the UK’s renegotiated terms of EU membership, 
announced in February 2016, failed to convince the sceptics; meas-
ures to address labour migration, in particular, were abstruse and 
legally uncertain. It was this lacklustre outcome that derailed the sub-
sequent referendum campaign. Cameron had wanted a clear message 
about winning a better deal for the country in a reformed EU. Instead, 
it was the Leave camp that had the simpler, more persuasive policy 
slogan: take back control.
The serried ranks of elites, experts and even foreign leaders such as 
President Obama mobilised by the government should have made short 
work of the less well- funded Leave camp. What only Brexiters could offer, 
though, was a peremptory solution to a multitude of political grievances. 
Brexit was successfully presented as a way to end Brussels’ interference, 
fund the NHS, and reduce immigration. It was not even that EU with-
drawal was always presented as a panacea. Rather, it was the one policy 
option that had never been tried, meaning attempts to discredit its poten-
tial risks were necessarily hypothetical. Voters’ desire to break the mould 
is precisely what populists elsewhere in Europe want to tap into by offer-
ing, as with Beppe Grillo in Italy or Marine Le Pen in France, a referen-
dum on membership of the euro. That is why the UK campaign, and its 
outcome, is of such relevance EU- wide.
As the British government sensed the narrowness of the race, it 
upped the ante with its increasingly gloomy prognoses about the state 
of the UK economy and public finances in the event of Brexit. Thus it 
was not just opponents of EU membership who were engaged in political 
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theatrics. Cameron’s Grand Guignol performance, with economic horror 
at its heart, did little to sway a public sceptical about far more than simply 
the EU. Having bet his political career on the electorate’s status quo bias, 
the politics of simple solutions backfired on him. The reverse suffered was 
not just a personal one. Estimates of constituency- level results reveal that 
63 per cent of UK constituencies returned a majority for the Leave side 
(Hanretty 2016). This amounts to a wholesale disavowal of the country’s 
elected representatives, since only 158 MPs openly declared support for 
leaving the EU (BBC News 2016).
Commentators naturally jumped on the chance to explain this gulf 
between governed and governing. Initial academic analysis focused on 
social inequality as the font of electors’ frustration with the EU and the 
domestic governing class in general (Goodwin & Heath 2016). Portraying 
Brexit as a delayed rejection of neoliberalism by the left- behind of glo-
balisation is certainly a seductive explanation. It confirms the comforting 
premise of social- democracy:  the belief that politics trumps economics 
and that the inequities of capitalism can be corrected eventually once 
voters have had enough of market- driven solutions.
However, what the failure of the Remain campaign truly highlighted 
was the insularity of the British political establishment. The pro- EU side 
either misread or, worse, ignored the warnings from recent referendums 
on European integration. A  litany of rejected deals preceded the UK 
vote: the EU Constitutional Treaty (in two countries), the Lisbon Treaty 
(in Ireland), the Greek bailout and the Ukraine Association Agreement 
(the Netherlands). These examples did more than merely illustrate the 
difficulty of selling the EU status quo. The common thread linking these 
votes was in fact citizens’ refusal to be steamrollered into accepting elite 
nostrums about European cooperation.
Dissatisfaction with Europe is not reducible to an accounting exe r-
cise in which the cons outweigh the pros; it is as much a rejection of the 
animating spirit that there is no alternative to the current institutional 
order. In that sense the EU is – rightly or wrongly – perceived by many 
in Britain and elsewhere as a constraining dystopia. As the Director of 
Hatcheries and Conditioning in Huxley’s Brave New World explains, 
creating a harmonious society requires ‘making people like their ines-
capable social destiny … liking what you’ve got to do’. EU citizens on 
the receiving end of austerity, market liberalisation, and the socioeco-
nomic strains of free movement experience the Single Market as a not- 
so- dissimilar conditioning exercise.
Particularly telling in this regard was the 2015 referendum in which 
Greeks said Oxi (no) to a bailout that a near- unanimity of expert opinion 
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suggested was the only way to remain in the eurozone. The Greek vote 
demonstrated the same lesson as in the UK vote: electors could not be 
cowed into voting out of fear to accept the current EU system as their 
inescapable destiny (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou 2016). Greeks, Brits 
and others have sought to express the right to be unhappy with the 
results that lie behind grandiloquent evocations of European unity and 
prosperity. Direct democracy offers precisely such an opportunity for 
voicing discontent, which is why referendums on EU issues since the 
2005 Constitutional Treaty debacle have had to be handled with such 
caution. Indeed, the passage of the Lisbon Treaty was premised on an 
informal agreement by the European Council to avoid ratification by the 
people (Phinnemore 2013).
But the referendum temptation is hard to resist in a Europe where 
politicians increasingly struggle to rely on representative democracy to 
legitimise their policies. What is convenient about delegating policy- 
making back to the sovereign people is that it allows politicians to 
distance themselves from any negative ramifications that might occur 
further down the line. However, the experience in the EU of using direct 
democracy as a device of empowerment suggests it is of very limited 
value. Where voters have refused to endorse planned treaty change, 
recalcitrant Member States have submitted to re- voting on the same 
treaty, as Ireland has done twice. In other instances, a successor treaty 
has been passed without referendum consultation, as in the case of 
France’s and the Netherlands’ adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Even in 
situations where a negative vote has led to the obtention of concessions, 
as with the opt- out on asylum and immigration policy Denmark was 
granted after its vote against Maastricht in 1992, the diplomatic pres-
sure to conform with EU norms has greatly diluted the value of these 
concessions (Adler- Nissen 2015a).
The sovereign people in these instances are being short- changed 
when they supposedly exercise their sovereignty. When a popular 
decision has no discernible impact on the status quo, the referendum 
device thus has the opposite effect from that of empowering citizens. 
Such an outcome reveals the flaw in expecting that direct democracy 
can magically compensate for the shortcomings of representative 
democracy. That explains why those with most to lose from referen-
dums are mainstream politicians such as Cameron or Matteo Renzi, 
both of whom made a unilateral resort to direct democracy with the 
objective of sweeping away long- standing problems.
By contrast, it is populist, anti- system parties led by personalities 
such as Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen or Beppe Grillo that 
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have the biggest incentive to bypass representative democracy. They 
ostensibly promote rule by the people directly as an alternative to a 
cartelised party politics of both the centre- left and the centre- right that 
allegedly ignores popular concerns. What really matters, however, as 
Jan- Werner Müller (2016b) has explained, is that a referendum offers 
populists a chance for ‘the people to confirm what they have already 
identified as the single authentic will of the people’.
Allowing the people to decide for themselves is nevertheless 
a powerful political message that is hard to ignore, although in the 
British case it was not just external pressure that led Cameron to 
resort to the expedient of direct democracy. Rather, it was a political 
pincer movement. He wanted in part to silence the virulent Eurosceptic 
wing of the Conservative Party that pushed their anti- EU agenda by 
causing parliamentary mischief. At the same time, the other source of 
pressure was the electoral potency of UKIP, whose strategy of spatch-
cocking anti- immigration sentiment with hostility to the EU made 
it the most successful party in the 2014 European elections (Ford & 
Goodwin 2014).
But the appeal to the sovereign people cannot be a replacement 
for representative democracy, because a government is still required to 
exercise sovereignty in the aftermath of any referendum. Nowhere is this 
more obvious than in the case of the UK following the vote on 23 June 
2016. British politicians, like their Greek counterparts in 2015, have had 
to face the consequences that stem from unilateral attempts to resolve 
complex problems of European interdependence.
Cameron’s habit of ruling via easy fixes will have a lasting national 
impact because it leaves those in power at Westminster and Holyrood at 
the mercy of the same forces that cost him his job. In the months after 
the vote, Theresa May and the Scottish first minister counterpart, Nicola 
Sturgeon, became engaged in an ongoing Project Trust  – convincing 
voters they could negotiate the best way out of the Brexit predicament. 
May’s government interpreted the people’s verdict as a call to roll back 
migration from the EU while retaining strong economic ties. Yet the free 
movement of people is a non- negotiable pillar of the Single Market – as 
was made clear to Cameron during the renegotiation. The illusion of 
getting a better deal outside the EU than as a Member State could only 
remain believable until formal exit talks began. That helps explain why 
the government stalled on triggering Article 50 and fought tooth and nail 
to prevent Parliament having a say on the matter.
Meanwhile in Scotland, First Minister Sturgeon toyed with the idea 
of leveraging the 62 per cent majority who supported EU membership 
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into a successful independence referendum second time around. Any 
unilateral move of this sort could only succeed if Scots cast aside con-
cerns about oil revenues and the outstanding dilemma of which currency 
an independent Scotland would use (Glencross 2016). Indyref 2.0 would 
in any case mirror the Brexit referendum, becoming a debate centred 
around hypothetical in or out economic scenarios drawing on expert 
forecasting.
Cameron’s flawed EU policy has thus left UK politicians struggling 
to restore the electorate’s confidence in their ability to make the right 
decisions and raised the stakes in case they do not. There is no way of 
knowing beforehand whether Brexit will help or hinder that objective 
across the UK. What is clear is that – except for blaming EU hostility if 
a speedy free trade deal cannot be agreed alongside Article 50 negotia-
tions – there are no simple solutions left.
Ironically, the political mess occasioned by Brexit might have a posi-
tive impact on the EU at a time of ever- growing populism. Despite certain 
predictions to the contrary, there was no immediate domino- effect of 
other governments pledging to hold referendums on leaving. Seen from 
Europe, British politics in the months after the referendum appeared 
mostly in a chaotic and cacophonous state as government ministers made 
claims and counter- claims about preferred outcomes or strategies. That 
compares negatively with the measured statements of leaders across the 
EU that the four fundamental freedoms cannot be cherry- picked. This 
show of unity in a time of crisis is not so common.
More importantly, as revealed by a Bertelsmann survey in the 
aftermath of the British vote, the difficulties facing the UK seem 
to have reinforced voters’ belief in the importance of the EU and its 
Single Market (Financial Times 2016a). The complexity and risks 
associated with unravelling the UK’s EU membership offer an object 
lesson to European voters in the limitations of simplistic policy solu-
tions. Contradictions that before existed merely in theory, such as the 
UK having to renegotiate free trade deals with countries for which 
there was already an EU one, become of practical relevance to vot-
ers. In this fashion, Brexit may potentially re- affirm European solidar-
ity  – at a time of great self- doubt  – by highlighting once and for all 
exactly what would be lost without European integration. It is not that 
Euroscepticism or Europessimism, especially that occasioned by aus-
terity within the eurozone, will disappear. That said, anti- EU populism 
prospered by claiming elites were too blinkered to see the benefits of 
reclaiming sovereignty. The throes of Britain’s attempt to ‘take back 
control’ from Europe could finally reverse this narrative.
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Brexit and the improvised 
constitution
Albert Weale
‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves …’
(Cassius, William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act 1, Scene 2)
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty famously says that any Member State ‘may 
decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own consti-
tutional requirements’. Brexit will have many effects. However, possibly 
its most important has already occurred, namely its highlighting of the 
peculiarly improvised nature of the UK’s constitution. What does it mean 
to say that the UK is acting in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements, when those requirements have to be made up as we go 
along? And what does the improvisation mean for the principles of con-
stitutional democracy and the constraining of government power?
In proposing answers to these questions, I am going to suggest that 
the Brexit referendum creates a political paradox. Ostensibly the use of 
referendums gives control to the people. In practice, within the UK, how-
ever, a referendum reinforces executive power. To understand the para-
dox, we need to grasp the basic principle of UK constitutional practice. 
Despite many changes in recent years, that principle is one of identifi-
able party government, with the governing party responsible to the peo-
ple through the electoral process. Since a referendum only determines a 
broad direction of policy, the party in government, as the executive, needs 
a parliamentary majority. When that majority is threatened, it will need 
to enhance its party support by risking a general election, a logic nicely 
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revealed in Theresa May’s calling a sudden election, in order to secure 
support for any likely Article 50 agreement. The large majority she sought, 
but ultimately failed to obtain, would have overcome the objections from 
the opposition and the Lords to those elements in the EU (Withdrawal) 
Bill that explicitly enhance executive discretion. The same logic of execu-
tive dominance means the neglect of the contrary voices of the peoples 
who make up the compound polity that is now the UK. Constitutionally 
the fault is in ourselves.
The British constitution
Once upon a time, as they say in all the fairytales, the British political system 
held a special place in the study of comparative constitutions. The tale ran 
as follows. If the USA represented the liberal, France the republican and the 
USSR the socialist route to modern politics, Great Britain (the UK, Britain, 
England – the names were used interchangeably, significant in itself) exem-
plified an evolutionary path. Its democratic politics represented new wine 
in old bottles. The continuity of its institutions and practices reflected a 
deep national identity and a widespread willingness to defer to legitimate 
political authority. Its political strength drew support from the UK’s peace-
ful transition from a monarchical to a democratic regime. Its parliament 
had avoided the instability of the Third and Fourth French Republics; the 
UK had not fallen prey to the revolutionary upheaval undergone by Russia; 
and it had fought successful wars under the continuing scrutiny of parlia-
mentary government. Even a left- wing critic like George Orwell in The Lion 
and the Unicorn (Orwell 1941) thought that England was like a family, its 
problem being that the wrong members were in charge. The fault was not 
in the institutions but in those who controlled those institutions.
As with all fairytales, there was much by way of selective percep-
tion in this account. The constitutional struggle over Irish Home Rule 
and independence at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of 
the twentieth centuries had to be written out of the picture, as did the 
UK’s colonial reach. The tale also ignored the price paid for continuity 
and stability. The institutions and practices of the UK constitution often 
seemed anomalous. How, for example, could one account for the exist-
ence of an unelected parliamentary chamber in the form of the House of 
Lords? Why, in order to resign, did MPs have to accept a notional royal 
appointment to the Chiltern Hundreds rather than just hand in their 
notice? How was it possible for a legislative chamber also to function as a 
supreme court in defiance of the elementary principles of the separation 
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of powers? However, these anomalies could be excused as representing 
merely the formal elements of the constitution. Writing about the consti-
tution in the nineteenth century, Walter Bagehot (1867, 59) said that it 
was like an old man who still wore the fashions of his youth: what you see 
of him is the same; what you do not see is wholly altered.
If all unseen was altered, what was it altered into? Bagehot sug-
gested that the ‘efficient secret’ of the constitution was its concentration 
of power in the executive in the form of cabinet government. The cabinet 
is formed from the members of that party that can secure a parliamentary 
majority. Since Bagehot wrote, the electoral system has usually delivered 
a bonus of parliamentary seats to the party winning a simple plurality of 
the popular vote. The effect has been to underwrite cabinet government, 
giving governments a secure parliamentary majority on which they could 
rely. Parliamentary majorities thus manufactured by the electoral system 
did not require a popular majority. Since 1935 no political party in the UK 
has won a majority of the popular vote, and a popular minority could be 
translated into large legislative majorities: 1945, 1979, 1983, 1987 and 
1997 being stand- out examples. With little devolution of power, a judici-
ary that interpreted the public interest as being coextensive with the pub-
lic policy of the government of the day and with a relatively weak second 
chamber, UK governments exercised considerable power, revealed most 
obviously in the significant and frequently mutually self- cancelling alter-
ations of policy from one government to another. British government is 
party government, and that means government by the party that controls 
the Commons. As Arend Lijphart (1999, Chapter 2) has shown, the UK 
system contrasts with many other examples of European governments 
where there is a greater sharing of power among political parties and 
political institutions.
Of course, since the UK’s first application to join the European 
Economic Community in 1961, there have been considerable constitu-
tional changes, well identified by Anthony King in his study The British 
Constitution (King 2007). The winnowing of local government under 
Thatcher, large- scale privatisation programmes, the devolution of pow-
ers to Scotland and Wales, the settlement in Northern Ireland, the crea-
tion of a separate supreme court, the ending of automatic inheritance of 
the House of Lords, even a period of coalition government have been sig-
nificant. But none of these changes has overturned the core principle that 
a government of the day has the constitutional right to pursue its mani-
festo commitments provided that it can secure a majority in the House of 
Commons, or the fact that it is easier in the UK than in other jurisdictions 
to maintain a secure majority.
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Given that a cabinet can carry out its programme, the principal 
security against misrule is supposed to be electoral accountability. If the 
UK’s electoral system did not deliver a broadly representative legislative 
chamber, it was at least supposed to deliver responsible government, 
with this responsibility upheld through the ballot box. However, the use 
of the referendum as a tool carries one major and unique implication: it 
abandons the principle of responsible government at a crucial point in 
the public policy process. Governments cease to be responsible for their 
programme. A  new principle emerges, namely that the policy of the 
government, and not just the party forming the government, should be 
determined by a popular vote. To the doctrine of cabinet government has 
been added a mandate theory of representation, a theory that coheres 
badly with the principles of constitutional democracy.
The intoxications of mandate theory
Go back to Article 50 and the rule that any Member State ‘may decide 
to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional 
requirements’. The difficulty for the UK, given its flexible constitution, is 
that there are no established constitutional principles widely accepted 
as authoritative for making a serious decision on a major question of 
national destiny. All that the legislation on the referendum said was that 
a referendum would be held. It said nothing about its constitutional sta-
tus or significance. In consequence, the surprise result, unsurprisingly, 
has led to constitutional improvisation. Suddenly, we are all supposed to 
believe in a mandate theory of British government.
The basic principles of mandate theory can be expressed in 
three propositions. Firstly, the people is sovereign. Second, the people 
expresses its will on matters of public policy through a referendum in 
which a simple majority is decisive. Third, the function of the govern-
ment is to implement the will of the people as decided by the referen-
dum. Consult almost any government statement since the referendum 
to see this theory of political authority at work. I cite, almost at random 
and as just one example, the White Paper on legislating for the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU: ‘The result – by 52 per cent to 48 per cent – was a 
clear instruction from the people of the UK to leave the EU’ (Department 
for Exiting the European Union 2017, Paragraph 1.7).
An instruction from the people to the government appears at 
first sight to embody an obviously democratic principle. Yet, as Max 
Weber (1968, 1126– 7) pointed out, the logic of the plebiscite can be to 
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legitimate executive domination. This may seem paradoxical, but it is 
not. The mandate from a referendum is necessarily an incomplete basis 
for public policy. A referendum can at best only state a decision of prin-
ciple, it cannot determine a course of public action. In so far as there is 
popular will in the result of a mandate, and this is doubtful in itself, that 
will must be given effect in the circumstances of the day that prevail.
In this context, executives come to see themselves as embodying 
the higher interests of the nation over the claims of competing political 
parties. Anything that frustrates the will of the people is simply anti- 
democratic. The holding of a referendum enhances executive domi-
nance. This logic was at work in the government’s wanting to use the 
royal prerogative, free of parliamentary accountability, as the legal basis 
for triggering Article 50. Although the High Court and the Supreme 
Court in the Miller case (see Eeckhout, Chapter 18) upheld the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty, the result of the Commons vote was to give 
the government back the mandate that it sought. Yet, because any man-
date is essentially incomplete, it raises deep questions about the role of 
Parliament, the rule of law, and, of course, the assumption that there is a 
unitary people whose will is to be given expression.
The demands on Parliament
As is well known, the Brexit negotiations involve at least two elements. 
The first is the settling of the outstanding house- keeping arrangements 
relating to such matters as the existing budgetary commitments of the 
UK and the liability for civil servants’ pensions. The second, and by far 
and away the most important in constitutional terms, is an agreement 
on the framework for future relations between the UK and the EU. 
Straddling the two is the question of retained rights of EU citizens living 
in the UK and of UK citizens living in the EU. The choice to leave the EU 
was not a choice for a singular option, but a choice to enter into nego-
tiations over which of a range of hypothetical options might be adopted. 
Although it may be clear what the referendum decision was against, it is 
not clear what it was for. At some point, hypothetical options will have 
to be turned into practical choices. How will that process be managed?
The prime minister in her letter to the Council president spoke 
of the UK seeking ‘a deep and special relationship’ with the future EU. 
To some ears that sounds suspiciously like an association arrangement 
as envisaged by Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU). The advantages of an association agreement 
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from the point of view of the UK government is that it encompasses 
‘a deep and comprehensive free trade area’ in which there is freedom of 
movement for goods, services and capital. It also gives tariff free access 
for goods and passports for services, alongside customs cooperation. 
Since the movement of labour is subject to work permits, the government 
could claim to be delivering on its manifesto promise to reduce migra-
tion. Moreover, an association agreement would allow participation in 
such common EU programmes as Horizon 2020 and Euratom, common 
transport, aviation, environment, employment and consumer protection 
policies, creating a link with policy areas, particularly security coopera-
tion, where a UK government would be able to make a serious contribu-
tion to the European interest (see Duff 2016).
The snag, however, is that the UK would have to respect EU disci-
plines on competition, state aids, anti- dumping and public procurement, 
and these agreements would have to be policed by an agreed authority 
in which the jurisprudence of the CJEU would play a decisive role. This 
would be unacceptable to Conservative Eurosceptic backbenchers. Even 
if it were to offer sufficient guarantees on migration, an association agree-
ment is also unlikely to meet the demands of those same backbench MPs 
on any budgetary contributions required to participate in specific pro-
grammes. We shall never know the full calculations that went into the 
prime minister’s decision to call an election. But it is at least a plausible 
hypothesis that she wanted to increase her party majority in order to 
have sufficient control over an otherwise unstable Parliament, so as to be 
able to secure an association agreement that would have been unaccepta-
ble to a significant portion of the backbenchers inherited from the 2015 
election. Calling an election at a high point of popularity for the govern-
ment and a low point of popularity for the opposition held out the prom-
ise of greater freedom of action unavailable with a small parliamentary 
majority. As we know, however, the decision backfired spectacularly.
The rule of law
The rule of law embodies the requirement that a government acts on 
principles of legal impartiality and the due authorisation of political 
authority by the legislature. In the modern state, these principles come 
under constant pressure from the large volume of administrative regula-
tions that governments need to adopt in order to ensure the good work-
ing of a modern economic and social order. Many hold that already the 
legislative scrutiny of executive regulation is defective by virtue of the 
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volume of work that has to be undertaken. In the UK since 1973, much of 
this administrative activity has been increasingly embedded in EU policy 
processes. So, the UK’s departure from the EU requires the repatriation 
of the legal powers associated with administrative regulation (in the gen-
eral sense, not the specific EU sense of that term), known as the EU’s 
acquis. This is the domain of the so- called ‘Great Repeal Bill’.
The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform 
Select Committee (2017) has drawn attention to the dangers of enhanc-
ing executive power and discretion as a result of the Great Repeal Bill. 
That Committee points out that although the government’s announced 
intention is simply to domesticate the powers currently exercised within 
the framework of the EU, simple transposition of those powers into UK 
law cannot be assumed to have an equivalent effect. Thus, an existing 
legal duty on the UK government to send information to an EU body, 
for example on oil and gas projects, cannot have the same force if the 
relevant procedure is domesticated. All that the duty could simply mean is 
that a UK government had a duty to send information to itself. Repealing 
existing obligations to EU institutions will not leave the legal powers of a 
UK government unaltered.
Here again we can see how the seemingly democratic logic of the 
referendum increases executive power. The only way in practical terms of 
repatriating EU law is to allow the government of the day wide-ranging 
discretionary powers to determine the details of administrative procedure. 
These are the so-called ‘Henry VIII’ clauses, which the proposed bill duly 
enshrines. The decision of principle in the referendum is inherently incom-
plete in the context of inherited commitments that have to be unstitched 
one by one. Within the two- year timescale allowed for by Article 50, it 
is easy to see the dilemma for the government. Unless the powers under 
which administrative action is empowered is legislated for in UK law, the 
government would have no legal powers with which to undertake vital 
functions. So an omnibus bill is needed. On the other hand, precisely 
because the legislation has to be omnibus, the transfer of the large num-
ber of powers that it entails inevitably means that the significance of many 
individual elements in the transfer escapes proper scrutiny.
The plurality of the people
A mandate theory of the referendum presupposes a unitary people. To 
act as a people’s agent assumes that the government is responding to 
the mandate of a single people whose will is determinative. Formally 
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speaking, the UK is a unitary state. There are no constitutionally protected 
spheres of action assigned to sub- national government. Although the 
devolution legislation had constitutional effects, its status is that of ordi-
nary statute law. The corollary is that there is a ‘British people’ whose will 
was expressed in the referendum result.
However, while this is the formal legal position, the political real-
ity is quite different, and it would be unwise to construct a theory of 
the popular will based upon the principle that devolution law is merely 
ordinary statute law. No one supposes that in the foreseeable future 
the devolution of powers to the Scottish government can be rolled 
back, and there are few who want any other arrangement other than 
a substantial devolution of political authority to Northern Ireland. 
Whatever may be true in legal principle, the UK has become a com-
pound polity over the last twenty years. The peoples of the constituent 
nations of the UK have a substantive political existence in their own 
right. A UK government needs to accept the restriction of its authority 
that has emerged since devolution.
The principle of public choice in compound polities is not that 
of a simple majority of ‘the people’ but rather concurrent majorities 
of the different peoples, in which the majority decision of the whole 
is a function of the component majorities of the parts. In the case of 
the Brexit referendum, this condition was not met. The majorities for 
‘Leave’ in England and Wales were complemented by majorities for 
Remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Setting the simple majority 
principle applied to the UK as a whole against the principle of concur-
rent majorities, it is clear that there can be an inconsistency, as was the 
case with Brexit.
There is an interesting contrast in the scope of the UK government’s 
powers between Scotland and Northern Ireland. Section 30 of the 1998 
Scotland Act gives the UK prime minister the power to refuse a request 
for a referendum in Scotland, whereas the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) 
commits both the Irish and UK governments to recognising a united 
Ireland if majorities in both countries favour that option. Although if 
there were a clear majority for independence in Scotland, it might be 
as difficult politically to resist the move as to resist Irish reunification. 
Moreover, there are significant differences in the way that executive 
action would play out, not least because Irish reunification would enable 
the current Northern Ireland to remain within the EU, whereas an inde-
pendent Scotland would have to go through the same application process 
as other candidate countries. The limit of the mandate of the people is 
found in the existence of a plurality of peoples in the UK.
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Conclusions
The paradox of a referendum is that it is often presented as a device of 
popular control by which political power is returned to the people. In 
practice, it increases executive power, as the government seeks the free-
dom from Parliament and legal constraint in order to implement what it 
sees at the popular will. A popular decision of principle creates the field 
of power in which a government can seek to act. With an improvised con-
stitution like that of the UK, the paradox is heightened, since the meaning 
of the referendum result becomes a contest of political wills rather than 
an interpretation of a basic constitutional process. That is the legacy of 
an evolutionary and flexible constitution. There is no one else to blame. 
The fault is in ourselves.
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Is the EU ‘a crap 1950s idea’?
Dominic Cummings, branching histories 
and the case for Leave
Glyn Morgan
The Brexit campaigns of 2016 – both Leave and Remain – were fought 
largely through the medium of simplicities, delusions and lies (Shipman 
2016). Neither campaign generated much deep political thinking. The 
Leave campaign floated to victory on a fantastical promise of ending 
immigration and returning Britain’s EU funds to the National Health 
Service (NHS). The Remain campaign relied on no less fantastical 
projections of the ruinous short- term economic costs of Brexit (the 
so- called ‘Project Fear’). Dominic Cummings, Leader of the Vote Leave 
campaign, did more than anyone to focus the campaign debate on bogus 
issues like the NHS and the impending enlargement of the EU to include 
Turkey (Cummings 2017a). Nonetheless, in a series of writings authored 
after the referendum, Cummings has produced various arguments for 
Brexit that have drawn considerable attention and praise.
Cummings’ position is worth considering for two reasons. First, it is 
useful to know which actual arguments propelled some of the leading fig-
ures in the campaign, especially since they chose not to reveal those argu-
ments at the time. Second, Cummings insists on moving beyond vague 
ruminations on whether Brexit will succeed or fail. He thinks political 
judgments must be based on ‘precise quantitative predictions about well- 
formed questions’.1 While Cummings’ own judgements are not, I think, at 
all defensible, those who advocate Britain’s re- entry into Europe – which 
is now in all likelihood a generational project – would do well to follow 
the form, if not the actual substance, of his approach.
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Brexit and disaster- avoidance
Cummings’ position on Brexit flows from four more general preoc-
cupations. First, he possesses a deep- seated disdain for the British 
political and administrative classes, which he variously damns as 
incompetent, lacking in relevant knowledge and mired in dysfunc-
tional bureaucracies. Second, he has a fascination with the advances 
of science and technology, and their application to human under-
standing and societal improvement. Third, he recognises that soci-
eties face key moments, when the decisions taken send the society 
down one or another branch of history. Brexit was one of those key 
moments; for better or worse, the Leave decision sent Britain down 
a very different ‘branching history’ than would have been the case 
had Leave lost. Fourth, Cummings is a follower of Tetlock’s work on 
forecasting. He thinks that political judgements  – and presumably, 
key political decisions  – should be based upon rational probabilistic 
assessments of specific, measurable, time- defined outcomes (Tetlock & 
Gardner 2015).
All four of these preoccupations come together in Cummings’ case 
for Leave, which rests on the probabilistic assessment that leaving the 
EU would improve the chances of ‘1) Britain contributing positively to 
the world and 2) minimising dangers … [including] Britain’s exposure 
to the problems caused by the EU’. Viewed more specifically, Cummings’ 
argument proceeds along three tracks. Track one takes the Eurosceptics’ 
conventional ride through Brussels  – that familiar wasteland, as they 
see it, of failure, false promise and dysfunction. The only distinctive 
feature of this part of Cummings’s journey is the Hayekian- inspired 
claim that the EU lacks the self- correcting mechanisms of the market and 
the experimental sciences (see Van Parijs, Chapter 27). For Cummings, 
the EU  – ‘a crap 1950s idea’, as he calls it  – is excessively hierarchical 
and  centralised, and as such lacks the error- correcting mechanisms of 
a national parliamentary government (Shipman 2016, 38). Quoting the 
physicist David Deutsch, Cummings insists that ‘preserving the institu-
tions of error correction is more important than any policy’.
This part of Cummings’ argument need not detain us. The idea 
that the EU is slow- moving and lacks rapid error- correcting mecha-
nisms is a plausible criticism to make. Scholars of the EU often make 
the same point. No fundamental transformation in the EU can take 
place without a Treaty change, which requires a unanimous decision 
of all Member States. It’s also fair to say that the EU is hierarchical, 
 
IS  THE EU ‘A CRAP 1950s  IDEA’? 39
  
at least in the sense that its decisions are top- down and taken with-
out much direct democratic input. But it’s ludicrous to attribute this 
problem to excessive centralisation. Indeed, the principal reason why 
the EU is so slow- moving is due to its highly decentralised and consen-
sual decision- making practices. The EU is such a feeble force in global 
affairs because it lacks the centralised political system of the other 
Great Powers. Similarly, the EU has struggled with the eurozone crisis 
because it lacks the centralised tax and budgetary powers necessary to 
manage successfully a Monetary Union. More generally, the concept 
of ‘error correction’ in politics is more problematic than Cummings 
seems to recognise. Where there is a clearly agreed aim, it is relatively 
straightforward to identify an error  – this is the case, for example, 
in computer coding. But in politics, errors are often only identifiable 
after the event, and even then, the attribution of ‘error’ remains con-
troversial. Was Western military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 
an error? Was the absence of Western military intervention in Syria 
in 2012 an error? Was the creation of the EU an error? None of these 
questions can be answered independently of a justification of our polit-
ical projects, a justification that will inevitably require an appeal to 
contestable moral values as much as any probabilistic assessment of 
outcomes (Morgan 2005).
The second track of Cummings’ argument focuses on the idea that 
‘leaving would improve the probability of … making Britain the best place 
in the world for science and education’. Here it is important to recall that 
Cummings worked in Whitehall as an advisor to the minister of educa-
tion and is the author of an ambitious project for educational renewal 
(Cummings 2013). For Cummings, science and education are key evalu-
ative criteria. He predicts that a post- Brexit UK will achieve more, and 
make a greater scientific contribution to the world, once free of the EU’s 
legal and regulatory regime.
One merit of this argument is that it is sufficiently precise to 
generate a testable prediction. Post- Brexit Britain will, if this predic-
tion pans out, score higher on objective criteria of scientific success 
at some specified date in the future (2026?) than the Britain of 2016. 
Presumably the criteria will include such factors as educational 
scores on the PISA surveys, citation- weighted research publication 
rates, scientific prizes, global university rankings and technological 
patents.
The third track of Cummings’ argument is the most interesting. 
Brexit, he argues, minimises dangers, especially the biggest danger of 
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all:  the danger that the free movement of labour will spark a populist 
backlash that will threaten free trade. As he puts this point:
1) … a return to 1930s protectionism would be disastrous, 2) the 
fastest route to this is continuing with no democratic control over 
immigration or human rights policies for terrorists and other seri-
ous criminals, therefore 3)  the best practical policy is to reduce 
(for a while) unskilled immigration and increase high skills immi-
gration particularly those with very hard skills in maths, phys-
ics and computer science, 4)  this requires getting out of the EU, 
5)  hopefully it will prod the rest of Europe to limit immigration 
and therefore limit the extremist forces that otherwise will try to 
rip down free trade.
This argument conjectures a chain of events leading from ‘no [national] 
democratic control over immigration’, a requirement of the EU’s Single 
Market, to the rise of extremist forces demanding 1930s style protec-
tionism, which Cummings rightly considers a disaster. He wants to 
avoid this disaster by way of another conjecture: a chain of events lead-
ing from ‘democratic control of unskilled labour’ – high-skilled labour 
would be unaffected  – to a broader public tolerance of free trade. 
Ideally, Cummings would like to see post- Brexit UK prompt the forma-
tion of ‘new institutions for international cooperation to minimize the 
probability of disasters’ (Cummings 2017a). He seems to think that 
the UK post- Brexit is in better position to do this than as a member 
of the EU.
While it is difficult to argue against probabilistic wagers and coun-
terfactual claims, there are significant problems with both the second and 
third tracks of Cummings’ argument. The claim that post- Brexit UK will 
be well placed to experience a scientific renaissance runs into a number of 
obvious difficulties. First, the UK already does relatively well on national 
comparative measures of scientific progress (Scientific American 2012). 
Second, scholars have never been able to identify with any great confi-
dence the conditions likely to produce scientific progress (Taylor 2016). 
And third, any post- Brexit UK government will have to ensure that the 
country remains (and is perceived to remain) an attractive place for for-
eign science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) workers 
to come to study, live and work. It is very difficult to see how Brexit helps 
here, especially since it diminishes the status of all workers coming from 
EU countries. Where once these workers had a status grounded in the 
EU constitution, they now will be in the UK merely at the pleasure of Her 
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Majesty’s Government (Morgan 2016). The reluctance of the Tory gov-
ernment to allow the CJEU any role in protecting the rights of EU citizens 
in the UK can only increase the anxieties of such people.
Cummings’ wager that Brexit would diminish the chances of an 
extreme form of protectionism emerging in Britain has some initial 
plausibility. Certainly, UKIP has pretty much collapsed; in the June 
2017 election, the voters it had gained in earlier elections largely fled 
back to the two major parties. But viewed more closely, his argument 
about Brexit as a means to avoiding protectionism and increasing the 
UK’s share of global trade is deeply problematic. Here we have to weigh 
a probabilistic claim together with a preventative claim. How likely is 
it that – absent a reduction in unskilled immigration – the UK would 
face an anti- trade backlash leading to 1930s- style protectionism? On 
the face of it, the UK is an unlikely site for protectionism. No current 
political party  – not even UKIP  – favours trade protection. Indeed, a 
central argument of leading Tory thinkers is that post- Brexit the UK 
will enter a ‘ “post- geography trading world” where we are much less 
restricted in having to find partners who are physically close to us’ (Fox 
2016). Furthermore, opinion surveys suggest that UK public opinion is 
among the most pro- free trade in the advanced industrial world (Pew 
Survey 2014). In short, 1930s- style protectionism seems like a rather 
low probability threat. But even if we were to accept that protectionism 
represents even a low- level threat, there is little reason to think that 
ending low- skill immigration offers an effective and efficient solution, 
especially since this type of immigration is so essential in the hospi-
tality, retail, health care and agricultural sectors of the UK economy 
(Consterdine 2017). Cummings’ remedy is not only unduly costly; it 
promises to be even more injurious than the underlying ailment.
As to the hope that post- Brexit UK will spring to life as a trading 
superstar, Cummings’ argument is no more persuasive than that of Liam 
Fox and others in the Tory government. The major problem here is that 
EU membership does not prohibit any EU Member States from trading 
successfully around the globe. The fact that the UK has been relatively 
unsuccessful in key global markets (China, for example) has nothing to 
do with the EU. Indeed, if the EU were the principal cause of trade fail-
ures, then why has Germany proven so much more successful? No less 
problematic is the suggestion that post- Brexit UK will make gains in this 
new ‘post- geography trading world’ sufficient to outweigh any losses 
from exiting the Single Market. If the UK were to trade under WTO rules 
and couldn’t negotiate new frictionless customs arrangements, it is diffi-
cult to see how the UK could retain its domestic car industry, one of the 
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largest sources of UK manufacturing exports, or even its aircraft manu-
facturing industry (Islam 2017). The other big trade problem facing the 
UK post- Brexit is that the UK has very little power to force the EU to offer 
favourable trading conditions. Cummings like other pro- Leave advocates 
often neglects to mention that as a Regional Trade Association (RTA), the 
EU is allowed, even under WTO rules, to discriminate against third- party 
countries. For these reasons, most macro- economic estimates of the 
effects of leaving the EU predict that Brexit will have a significant trade- 
lowering and welfare- diminishing impact on the UK economy. In sum, 
if the goal is to increase trade, Brexit seems like the wrong way to do it.
What disasters should we worry about?
While there’s not much to be said in favour of the actual content of 
Cummings’ argument, the general form of his argument is quite sensi-
ble. Cummings is right to warn against the vacuity of general claims that 
Brexit will succeed or fail. He is right to recommend that political judge-
ments be based upon probabilistic wagers and predictions. Cummings is 
also right to emphasise the importance of identifying threats and think-
ing about institutions capable of error-correction and disaster- avoidance. 
Yet even with these admonitions in mind, I think it is possible to reach a 
very different assessment about the merits of leaving the EU.
At this point, it would be helpful to introduce a few brief distinc-
tions. A threat might be conceptualised as a harm multiplied by the prob-
ability of its occurrence. A disaster is a harm with very high costs, whether 
material costs or value costs. The notion of value costs is important. 
Political communities stand for certain values – whether liberty, democ-
racy, justice or whatever  – and when those core moral values are lost, 
it might be counted a disaster. Organised political communities guard 
against threats by way of various preventative mechanisms (whether 
policies or institutions). These mechanisms must be both effective 
(i.e. they must work) and efficient (i.e. they must have low ancillary 
costs). It is no good putting in place preventative mechanisms that impose 
higher costs  – whether material or moral  – than those posed by the 
underlying threat. A  surveillance society with unlimited police powers 
might be effective against terrorism, but it is inefficient, since it requires 
a sacrifice of some of our core moral values. One further point:  politi-
cal decisions have uncertain outcomes. When taking a major political 
decision – a decision that initiates a new ‘branching history’ – a sensible 
political actor will weigh not only likely costs and benefits, but also the 
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capacities of those bureaucrats, politicians and administrative agencies 
that must enact that decision.
With these distinctions in place, it’s possible to think about some 
threats that post- Brexit UK faces. To narrow the focus, it might be 
helpful to limit our attention to threats that jeopardise values that are 
relatively uncontroversial and widely shared, such as national security 
and societal wealth. The following threats all seem sufficiently pro-
bable and sufficiently costly to these values that they require preventa-
tive measures:
 (i) the exclusion of the UK from the favourable trade, security and 
research opportunities enjoyed by other EU Member States;
 (ii) the break- up of the UK as a political community and the return of 
terrorism in Northern Ireland;
 (iii) US isolationism and trade protectionism leading to a collapse of 
the post- war international order;
 (iv) Russian aggression in Eastern Europe;
 (v) large- scale migration – tens of millions per year – into Southern 
Europe;
 (vi) a major banking and debt crisis in Italy;
 (vii) large- scale domestic terrorism as a consequence of the implosion 
of Middle Eastern and North African states and the failure to inte-
grate existing Islamic minority populations.
We have already discussed threat (i), which will arise as an immediate and 
direct consequence of Brexit, especially if Brexit takes the form of exiting 
the Single Market and Customs Union. The seriousness of threat (i) fur-
ther increases, if the EU were to pursue its own self- interest and seek to 
ensure that the UK is materially worse off outside the Single Market than 
inside. The EU certainly has no interest in seeing the UK flourish outside 
the Single Market, because it might encourage other states to leave. Nor 
does the EU have anything to gain by allowing the UK to pursue an à la 
carte strategy, where it enjoyed the benefits of access to the Single Market 
while bearing none of the costs. A prudent UK government cannot dis-
miss the possibility that the EU will follow such a realist strategy towards 
the UK. It must expect the EU to pursue policies designed to diminish the 
UK’s economic and political power.
The threats the UK faces outside the Single Market are only exacer-
bated by threat (iii), which acts as force multiplier to threat (i). Indeed, 
if and when the UK exits the EU and its Single Market, the UK becomes 
much more dependent on the US. Pro- Brexit ministers like Liam Fox 
 
BREXIT  AND BEYOND44
  
speak of the opportunities the UK will have for new trade deals with the 
US. But it is far from clear that these trade deals will be offered on favour-
able terms by a US president who emphasises ‘America First’ and is aller-
gic to international treaties. The most readily available remedy against 
threats (i) and (iii) is simply for the UK to remain in the EU.
The same remedy can be said about threat (ii). No one has yet 
come up with a solution to the Northern Ireland problem once the 
UK leaves the EU. This problem has both an economic and a political 
dimension. Economically, Brexit presents Northern Ireland with the 
problem of trading across a new land- border between the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland. Not only will this land- border make it difficult to 
sustain the extensive intra- company trade flows that depend upon 
just- in- time deliveries. But a land- border will likely have a severe impact 
on the Northern Irish agricultural sector. The political problems are, if 
anything, even more daunting. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
presupposes that the UK and the Republic of Ireland are both members 
of the EU; and it makes explicit reference to the European Convention 
of Human Rights and to European Courts in safeguarding the rights 
specified in the Agreement. If the UK pulls out of both the EU and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as Prime Minister May 
has urged, then the GFA could unravel and terrorism return to Northern 
Ireland.
Threats (i), (ii) and (iii) can hardly be dismissed as either impro-
bable or trivial. They are serious threats – threats to security and societal 
wealth – that would not have arisen had the UK remained in the EU. The 
case for Brexit does not, however, require that these threats be ignored. 
A  sophisticated case for Brexit could concede that these are genuine 
threats, but are outweighed by other even more serious threats that 
Brexit would allow the UK to avoid. Some obvious candidates here are 
those listed as threats (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii). All of these threats affect 
the UK only indirectly. Thus if one judged that Eastern and Southern 
Europe had a high probability of collapse, whether because of external 
factors (Russian aggression or migration) or internal factors (a finan-
cial crisis or domestic terrorism), then Brexit might present itself as an 
escape. Why shackle the country to a corpse – especially if the corpse is 
facing impending disaster?
At this point, the threat- based case for and against Brexit turns on 
a set of probabilistic judgements about which combination of threats is 
more likely and more harmful. Cummings is right, I  think, to maintain 
that arguments for and against Brexit that took place on this territory 
would be more fruitful than one that relied upon vague and emotive 
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appeals to the failure or success of Brexit. It must be noted, however, 
that arguments in the register of threats and disaster- avoidance become 
altogether more complex once we include more controversial and con-
testable values than security and societal wealth. For many people in 
the pro- Brexit camp, national identity remains their ultimate and most 
important value; and the threats to national identity posed by large- 
scale immigration are sufficient to justify Brexit even at some expense 
to security and societal wealth. Conversely, for many people in the anti- 
Brexit camp transnational solidarity (or cosmopolitanism) is their cen-
tral value. For these people, the idea that the UK turn inwards and ignore 
threats to Eastern and Southern Europe would be an anathema. It is not 
obvious how to resolve or even meliorate disagreements driven by incom-
mensurable values. Perhaps the promise of Cummings’ threat- based 
approach to politics is to allow us to distinguish disagreements about 
probable outcomes and disagreements about the efficacy of preventative 
measures – both of which disagreements seem amenable to some form of 
rational adjudication – from disagreements about fundamental values. 
Given that the 2016 referendum debate never approached this level of 
clarity, Cummings’ post- referendum writings might be viewed as his own 
mea culpa.
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How British was the Brexit vote?
Gráinne de Búrca
Understandably, the Brexit debate moved quickly from an initial quest 
to identify causes of discontent and errors of policy and strategy to focus 
on the mechanics and the terms of exit as well as on the likely terms of 
future UK engagement with the EU. But an understanding of the causes 
of Brexit continues to be of central importance, both for intrinsic reasons 
as well as for the practical purpose of considering what kind of response, 
or reform, on the part of the EU – and just as importantly on the part of 
the UK – may be appropriate. An appreciation of the distinctive and local 
features of the vote as a reflection of the UK’s relationship with the EU, 
as well as the features that it seems to share with current developments 
across other democracies worldwide, is therefore worth seeking. Hence 
this contribution steps back again from the immediacy of the current 
issues to reflect on the extent to which the vote should be understood 
primarily as a British decision, caused by persistent concerns and long- 
standing sentiment within the UK body politic, as well as interrogating 
more closely the role played by the ‘populist wave’ sweeping much of the 
Western world.
A dominant focus in the aftermath of the referendum has been on 
analysing and situating the Brexit vote as an integral part of a wider set 
of political developments across the globe, namely the rise in nation-
alist sentiment and illiberal authoritarianism, and the backlash against 
the perceived consequences of economic globalisation and migration, 
somewhat neglecting the distinctive relationship the UK has had with 
the EU.
Much of the commentary has also emphasised the similarities 
between the impetus for the Brexit vote and the forces that propelled 
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Donald Trump to electoral victory in the US. The two events have been 
grouped together as populist political events which expressed and 
reflected (i) a reaction against immigration, (ii) concern about economic 
insecurity, (iii) a rejection of internationalism and transnationalism, 
(iv) a return to inward- looking (economic) nationalism and (v)  a rise 
in authoritarian and illiberal sentiment. This approach to understand-
ing and explaining Brexit stresses the similarities between the issues that 
were salient during the Brexit campaign and which seem to have ani-
mated the vote to leave the EU and those that are fuelling political devel-
opments within other democracies, not only in the US election but also 
across much of Europe at present.
The local story: Brexit as a British event
A different interpretation of the vote suggests that it is best understood 
and analysed by paying close attention to the particular context of Great 
Britain, and that its root causes are to be found less in some kind of 
contagious, common international backlash against globalisation, and 
more in Britain’s political and cultural distinctiveness and in the exper-
iences and perceptions of EU membership of the 17.5 million people who 
voted to leave (Le Galès 2016).
This reading of the UK vote views it as something of a vindication 
of the position expressed by French President Charles de Gaulle when in 
1963, and again in 1967, he vetoed the UK’s application for EEC mem-
bership on the basis (among other reasons) that the UK saw the EEC pri-
marily as a trade bloc and was insufficiently committed to the broader 
project of European integration. Indeed, since the trajectory of European 
integration from 1973 until today has unquestionably been one of ‘ever 
closer union’, moving from what was essentially a common market pro-
ject when the UK initially joined to a much more integrated political 
community by the time of the UK referendum in 2016, the Brexit vote 
can readily be understood from this perspective as the unsurprising and 
predictable outcome of calling a popular vote on a challenging political 
relationship.
The UK, when it set out to join the European Economic Community, 
sought different things from its membership than did the six founding 
Member States which had been more explicitly committed to ‘ever closer 
union’ since the time of the European Coal and Steel Treaty (and indeed 
the abortive European Defence and Political Communities in 1952– 3).1 
The UK chose not to join the original six in the 1950s, preferring instead 
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to commit to the multilateral free trade system and to its Atlantic rela-
tions, which it prioritised over its relations with Western Europe (Carter 
1966, Neely 1991). It has been argued that the UK’s change of heart in 
the 1960s was driven by its desire to avoid continued economic decline, 
and not because of any sudden conversion to the political project of 
European integration (Campos & Coricelli 2015). Joining the EEC was 
a pragmatic economic choice and not an indication of any commitment 
to greater political unity with ‘continental’ Europe. Moreover, even after 
it had joined the EEC in 1973, the UK remained an ‘awkward partner’ 
(George 1998). While other Member States expressed sharp reserva-
tions at various times about aspects of EU policy, with specialised opt- 
outs being sought for particular interests and issues such as the Danish 
‘second homes’ protocol2 and the Irish abortion protocol,3 and while 
there was a gradual rise in Eurosceptical political movements across the 
EU from the time of the Maastricht Treaty onward (Mudde 2012), the UK 
nonetheless remained somewhat exceptional (if not exceptionalist) in its 
attitude towards the EU. Britain sought and received special treatment in 
relation to the so- called EU budget rebate (European Parliament 2016), 
and it adopted a pragmatic, case- by- case approach to the introduction of 
new areas of EU policy. It secured opt- outs on a range of issues on which 
it was unwilling to countenance closer integration, notably from EMU 
and Justice and Home Affairs at the time of the Maastricht Treaty, with 
other shorter- lived or less successful attempts seen in the Social Protocol 
attached to the Maastricht Treaty (Falkner 1996, Towers 1992) and the 
more recent Protocol on the Charter of Fundamental Rights attached to 
the Lisbon Treaty (Barnard 2008).
In 2000, Helen Wallace wrote that ‘British governments have 
been repeatedly concerned that other European governments would 
run ahead with cooperative and integrationist adventures that would 
leave the UK on the margins. Their fears have repeatedly been well- 
founded’ (Wallace 2000). She noted that, despite the UK’s enthusiasm 
for specific EU policies, in particular for the Single Market but also, 
interestingly, for the development of EU foreign policy, there remained 
a deep resistance towards European ‘federalism’ and everything this 
was assumed to imply (Economist 2003). Wallace also noted – tellingly, 
in view of the circumstances in which the initial decision to hold a ref-
erendum on EU membership was taken – that ‘typically governments in 
office have sought to develop a more engaged European policy, while 
the alternating lead party of opposition has found “Europe” a per-
suasive and useful subject on to which to differentiate itself from the 
governing party. There has been a damaging cycle of acrimony, which, 
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hardly surprisingly, has been reflected in ambivalent public opinion on 
European issues and an image of Britain as an unpredictable partner’. 
Her comment that British political culture did not yield easily to the 
pressures of Europeanisation can be supplemented by the findings of a 
leading market research organisation that British public opinion never 
entirely warmed to the UK’s participation in the EU, with levels of sup-
port for membership constantly fluctuating, and regularly overtaken 
by a majority opposed to membership (Mortimore 2016). Given these 
numbers, it seems plausible to assume that if a popular referendum 
on UK withdrawal from the EU had been held on any number of occa-
sions over the four decades of EU membership, the outcome of the vote 
may well have been the same as in June 2016, long before the apparent 
populist revolution sweeping the West.
Britain was one of the few European countries to emerge with a 
sense of victory and strength from World War II. With its network of 
Commonwealth relationships and firm Atlanticist outlook, as well as its 
distinctive history and strong sense of independence, the UK’s decision to 
join the EU was a pragmatic one taken for largely economic reasons and 
with clear reservations about the deeper political project of European 
integration. And while the experience of EU membership seems to have 
been broadly positive, and to have generated a commitment to transna-
tional integration amongst the younger generations for whom Britain’s 
post- war history and prior alliances are less salient, it has failed to win 
over a substantial part of the (predominantly older) public brought up 
in post- war Britain, for whom the ‘take back control’ slogan resonated 
strongly. The sense of exclusion or of having been ‘left behind’ which 
seems to have driven some of the Brexit vote was thus not only a sense 
of being left behind economically, but of being left behind in a chang-
ing Britain and Europe which does not reflect some voters’ preferences, 
expectations or sense of belonging (Goodwin & Heath 2016).
Hence the referendum vote in the end reflected a deep split within 
the British public, with 52 per cent voting to leave and 48 per cent to 
stay. The most striking cleavages appeared along age and educational 
lines, with other divisions evident in the urban/ rural vote and in the 
devolved regions (British Election Study 2016; Goodwin & Heath 2016). 
And though the decision came as a shock, not least given its immense 
repercussions both for the EU and the UK, the fact that many Britons had 
never overcome their initial reluctance about joining the EU, nor settled 
into a stable pattern of support for EU membership, meant the warn-
ing signs about the risk of holding a referendum were evident for many 
years. Indeed, the referendum result can be quite reasonably understood 
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as the predictable outcome of a difficult 43- year relationship between the 
UK and the EU that had never managed to transcend its reluctant and 
contested origins, and that never fully won the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
British public.
What are the implications of this interpretation of the Brexit vote? 
One reading of the significance of the age and educational divide is that as 
the younger generation matures, majority support could well develop for 
a much closer relationship with the EU than that currently contemplated 
by those leading the Brexit movement, or possibly even for renewed EU 
membership after a period outside the EU. The salience of education 
points to the importance both of adequate public investment in educa-
tion as well as the integration of a European civic education component 
into the national school curriculum. The above analysis is not intended 
to suggest that other issues and political cleavages were not also at play 
in, and relevant to, the Brexit vote, but rather to show that there is a com-
pelling indigenous story which merits close attention when we seek to 
understand what gave rise to the result of the vote in June 2016.
The contagion story: Brexit as a boat on the global tide 
of populist anti- internationalism
The weight of analysis in the aftermath of the vote, however, has been 
rather less on the local and longer- term story, and more on an understand-
ing of Brexit as a part of the wave of populist, illiberal, anti- international 
and nationalist sentiment apparently sweeping the democratic world.
There is a certain risk, in my view, given the broad set of political 
challenges and changes taking place within many democracies at pres-
ent, of lumping together in the broad category of populism a range of 
distinct, albeit at times related, issues that would each benefit from sepa-
rate analysis. Of these separate issues often lumped together, the first is 
attitudes towards immigration, a second is economic insecurity, a third 
is a move against internationalism towards economic and other forms 
of nationalism, and a fourth is the rise of illiberalism, including a move 
towards reducing or removing constitutional checks and balances on 
popular democracy.
Concerns about immigration were unquestionably highly salient in 
the Brexit vote (Swales 2016; Economist 2016). The relevance of economic 
factors and economic status, on the other hand, seems to have been less 
straightforward. It is not in doubt that the twin issues of EU- driven aus-
terity policy on the one hand, and EU- promoted economic liberalisation 
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on the other, generated significant discontent and opposition to EU 
policies and to the Union itself amongst parts of the population. 
Nevertheless, while there was a clear correlation between unemployment 
status and the vote to leave, many groups of wealthy and economically 
secure voters who benefited from economic liberalisation also opted to 
leave, and many less economically secure voters seem to have been moti-
vated more by issues of identity than by economic interest (O’Neill 2016; 
Williams 2017).
Can the Brexit vote be understood as an instance of the wider global 
trend toward economic nationalism and against international cooper-
ation? This reading of the referendum vote is complicated by the stated 
goal of many outspoken Brexit supporters in the UK for free trade. The 
opposition of 52 per cent of the population to EU membership seems to 
have been motivated by opposition to a certain conception of suprana-
tionalism (or ‘federalism’) which the EU was seen to represent, rather 
than a retreat from economic globalisation or internationalism per se. The 
desire of ‘Leavers’ to be free seems to have been aimed against European 
regulation, and not necessarily other alliances or forms of international 
engagement.
What, then, of the rise in popular support for illiberal authoritarian 
governments, and the corrosion of constitutional checks and balances in 
many states? Does the Brexit vote fit within this set of developments? Is 
the Brexit vote to be categorised alongside the rise of the extreme right 
across Europe and beyond, somewhere on the same continuum as the 
growth in support for illiberal autocracy? Such an interpretation would 
require us to view EU membership as a set of supranational constitutional 
checks, including the constraints of the EU treaty rules and of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, and to understand the vote to leave the EU as a 
vote to be free of these constraints. But even if it is reasonable to assume 
that many of those who voted for Brexit sought to avoid the future appli-
cation of the EU Treaty rules or of the Charter of Rights, such a vote did 
not necessarily amount to an attempt to remove domestic constitutional 
checks and balances within the UK, or to promote popular rule over con-
stitutional government. On the contrary, even if  – following the Miller 
judgment – there were protests from the tabloid media at the prospect of 
the judiciary and the UK Parliament playing a role in the decision to leave 
the EU,4 the vote to leave the EU, and the ‘take back control’ slogan, must 
still be understood as referring to the restoration of British parliamentary 
democracy, with its own distinctive set of domestic checks and balances. 
Even Theresa May’s flirtations with the possibility of British withdrawal 
from the European Convention on Human Rights were accompanied 
 
BrExit  And BEyond52
  
by the prospect of adopting a domestic bill of rights instead (Asthana & 
Mason 2016; Bates 2017). As far as the rise of the far right is concerned, 
the UK Conservative Party is a party of the centre- right, while the UK 
Independence Party, which attracted some extreme right- wing support, 
has largely collapsed in the aftermath of the vote. Even if the salience of 
immigration in the Brexit campaign often had an illiberal and xenopho-
bic dimension, and authoritarian values were prominent in the vote to 
leave the EU (Swales 2016, 14), it would be an over- statement to present 
the vote as a move towards illiberalism in the UK.
The foregoing analysis has certainly not set out to argue that the 
broader international context was not highly relevant to the Brexit vote. 
There is no question that issues gaining traction in the US presidential 
election and elsewhere resonated with those prominent in the Brexit 
debate, especially concerns about immigration and, to some extent, eco-
nomic insecurity. Indeed, it seems likely that these factors tipped the 
balance in the referendum, proving decisive on the day and leading to 
the vote to leave the EU. But what I want to suggest is that, while those 
issues helped to provide a new set of narratives to frame and reinforce 
traditional Eurosceptic sentiments in the UK, an important part of the 
explanation for the referendum outcome is local, and lies in the specifi-
cities of the UK’s relationship with the EU the contestation which has 
characterised that relationship from the outset, and the structure of 
British politics. This leads to two conclusions. The first is that the EU 
needs to examine, and to reflect carefully on, the appropriate responses 
to the concerns about migration which resonated so successfully in the 
Brexit debate, as well as to the issues of economic insecurity. But the 
second is that it would be a mistake to assume that the factors that gave 
rise to the ‘leave’ vote in the UK are the same as those that are fuelling 
the discontent arising in other EU Member States – whether in France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, or elsewhere across the democratic world. 
Thus, in the months and years ahead, careful disaggregation of the var-
ious factors at play in different contexts, and of the specific and local 
dimensions of political discontent and popular unrest, will be essential if 
we are to understand and respond to the challenges driving the populist 
revolt.
  
II: Europe’s institutional order 
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Brexit
Yet another crisis for the EU
Neill Nugent
Introduction
This chapter puts the Brexit crisis within the context of the many other 
crises the EU has experienced in recent years. The first part of the 
chapter identifies and briefly describes the nature of these other crises. 
The second part shows how, in varying ways, these crises have impacted 
on the Brexit process, notably by influencing: the referendum outcome; 
the ways in which the EU is structuring itself to conduct the Brexit 
negotiations; and the stances being adopted by the EU27 in the 
negotiations.
The EU’s many crises
Brexit is clearly a major crisis for the EU. It is so not only because it is 
the first time a Member State has sought to withdraw from the Union, 
but also because the state concerned is a large and powerful Member 
State whose withdrawal will have damaging political and economic 
implications for the EU’s standing and influence. But Brexit is not the 
only major crisis the EU has experienced in recent years. Rather, it has 
experienced, and to some extent is still experiencing, a series of cri-
ses. These crises have been so deep as to bring the very viability and 
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continuance of the European integration ‘project’ seriously into ques-
tion. Whilst it is not possible here to examine all of the other crises the 
EU has been experiencing, the ‘headline’ crises can be outlined. Short 
descriptions of them will help to bring out how severe, varied and mul-
tidimensional the crises have been in their natures and impacts. (More 
detailed accounts and examinations of the EU’s crises can be found in 
Dinan et al. 2017.)
There have been four main headline crises:  the eurozone, migra-
tion, governance crises, and the crisis of rising Euroscepticism.
the eurozone crisis
The EU’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was not built on solid 
foundations. A  strong currency union needs to be accompanied by an 
economic union which includes both a fiscal union and a banking union, 
plus a political union since currency unions need institutional structures 
that can provide authoritative union- wide decisions on key macro-
economic matters. But, as many academic economists and policy prac-
titioners have noted, both at the time of EMU’s creation in the years 
following the Maastricht Treaty and since, whilst the ‘M’ in EMU has 
always been strong, the ‘E’ has been weak. As for politics, this has been 
almost totally absent. These design faults remained uncorrected in 
the years leading up to the eurozone crisis, mainly because eurozone 
Member States had little appetite for creating strong EU fiscal pow-
ers that included the capacity to make significant budgetary transfers 
between members when necessary.
In consequence, EMU was always likely to succeed only as long 
as the EU economy remained reasonably buoyant. However, the ripple 
effects of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US in September 2008 
quickly led to some eurozone countries – notably Greece, but also includ-
ing Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus – becoming financially vulnera-
ble and experiencing severe sovereign debt crises, which in turn exposed 
the eurozone’s structural weaknesses. For there were no semi- automatic 
mechanisms, as there would be in fully developed economic and mone-
tary unions, to assist EMU Member States experiencing difficulties. States 
with debt problems were thus forced to seek help – most notably in the 
form of bailouts – from whatever sources that could be persuaded to be 
providers. Eventually, a so- called troika of lending sources was created – 
consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)  – but its approach 
was strongly influenced by German preferences for recipient states of 
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financial aid to be subject to stiff austerity measures, which resulted in 
lengthy and unseemly public disputes between donor states on the one 
hand and beneficiary states and their sympathisers on the other.
Indeed, so severe did tensions between creditor states and the main 
indebted state – Greece – become during the eurozone crisis that at one 
point – in 2015, when Greece’s debts were, yet again, the focus of crises 
meetings – the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, even sug-
gested that Greece and the eurozone could both benefit if the former left, 
albeit perhaps only temporarily, the system.
the migration crisis
Like the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis also stemmed from a core 
EU system with design faults being placed under severe strain. In this 
case, the Schengen System, which contained key arrangements for 
providing for one of the EU’s main policy provisions – free movement of 
people – was the system under pressure. As with the eurozone crisis, the 
migration crisis resulted in the EU trying to fix a system only after it had 
entered crisis conditions.
At the heart of Schengen’s inadequacy was insufficient attention 
to the interplay between internal and external EU migration. While 
Schengen provided for largely unchecked internal movement of peo-
ple between signatory states, there was no systemic anticipation of 
what would be done if hundreds of thousands of migrants suddenly 
appeared at Schengen’s external borders. This is what happened from 
2014 onwards, with over one million migrants attempting to gain access 
to the EU in 2015. They did so for a mixture of push and pull reasons, 
with the main push reason being the desire of migrants to flee Iraq, Syria 
and other war- torn and/ or impoverished countries, whilst the main pull 
reason was the lure of living in a peaceful and secure country (with 
northern EU states, especially Germany, being the main destinations of 
choice of most migrants) where there was the prospect of employment or 
welfare assistance. Chancellor Merkel’s apparent willingness in the sum-
mer of 2015 to allow unlimited numbers of refugees to enter Germany 
opened the metaphorical floodgates, with Schengen’s largely unpro-
tected external borders coupled with its (initially at least) relatively open 
internal borders making it possible for migrants to have realistic hopes of 
reaching the northern states.
When the numbers of attempted migrants to the EU exploded in 
2015, the EU simply did not have a system in place that could cope. There 
was no fully functioning common asylum system, whilst the porousness 
 
 
BrExit 57
  
of the EU’s external borders undermined the integrity of the intra- EU free 
travel area. The fact was that, like EMU, Schengen had been designed on 
the basis of hoping for the best rather than anticipating the worst. The 
migration crisis resulted in the EU being portrayed very unsympatheti-
cally in much of the European media. It was seen as being under siege 
at its external borders, insufficiently resourced and unable to assist the 
plights of ‘legitimate’ migrants. The EU’s perceived inadequacies were 
further enhanced when tragedies occurred with drownings of migrants 
in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas and when conditions in reception 
areas and camps were revealed as being appalling.
the EU governance crisis
The EU’s governance crisis has contained a number of elements, includ-
ing a leadership crisis, a legitimacy crisis and a crisis in the relations 
between Member States.
The leadership crisis has had various dimensions, including con-
cerns that in the economic and migration policy areas it has been unclear 
who should be, and who is, taking the policy lead. In some respects, 
Germany has sought to exercise a virtual hegemonic leadership in these 
spheres, but it has by no means been unchallenged – with the Commission, 
the European Council, the ECB and other Member States also vying for 
leadership roles. Of course, EU leadership has always been widely dis-
tributed, but the crises have exacerbated the extent and uncertainty of 
the nature of this distribution. They have done so both by increasing the 
number of potential leaders (notably by making the ECB a potentially 
important policy player on economic and financial policy matters) and by 
complicating who is looked to as, and who feels they should be, the lead 
player(s) on specific matters.
Regarding the legitimacy dimension of the governance crisis, ques-
tions have long been asked about the legitimacy of the EU system, with 
the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU’s institutions featuring particularly 
prominently in such debates. But, as the EU’s problems in solving the 
crises have made its ‘output legitimacy’ look increasingly weak, and as 
the powers of the ECB – the least accountable of the EU’s institutions – 
have grown considerably as a result of the banking crisis, so has the EU’s 
legitimacy been further undermined.
As for the crisis in the relations between Member States, the EU has, 
of course, always been the location for inter- state disagreements as states 
have sought to defend and advance their own interests and policy prefer-
ences. But, the eurozone and migration crises have been the occasions 
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for considerably sharpened disagreements, being focused as they have 
been on core national policy interests and preferences, and on issues 
(fiscal and border- related) that touch directly on national sovereignty. 
For example, the migration crisis saw some states, especially Germany, 
supporting attempts by the Commission to persuade Schengen members 
to share the burden of refugee settlement, but others, including most 
Central and Eastern European states, being strongly opposed to being 
told what they should do.
The rifts between Germany and Greece demonstrate how less 
clubbable the EU became during the crises. Greece, which had been 
on the front line of the eurozone crisis was similarly on the front line 
of the migration crisis, with the Greek border being the principal exter-
nal border through which most migrants entered the EU en route to 
Germany and other northern states. Given Germany’s treatment of 
Greece during the eurozone crisis, Greece was not inclined to accom-
modate Germany during the migration crisis by preventing migrants 
from travelling north, at least not without the prospect of significant 
financial assistance and debt relief.
the crisis of rising Euroscepticism
Largely in consequence of the crises outline above, another crisis has 
loomed large in the life of the EU in recent years: there has been a sig-
nificant decline in popular support for European integration which 
has, in turn, been accompanied by increased support for anti- European 
and deeply Eurosceptic parties. As Webber (2017) notes, in the win-
ter of 2015– 16 opinion polls indicated that such parties were the larg-
est in terms of popular support in Austria, France, Greece, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Poland and the UK, whilst they were growing fast in 
Germany, Spain and Italy. Such was the advance of popular disillu-
sionment with integration that anti- European or Eurosceptic parties 
were the main governing parties in Greece, Poland, Hungary and the 
UK, whilst they featured as minority governing parties in Finland and 
Portugal.
The impact of the crises on the Brexit process
The EU’s crises have had, and will continue to have, many and varied 
impacts on the Brexit process. In this section of the chapter, three par-
ticular impacts are examined.
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the referendum outcome
As measured by public opinion polls, not least the long- standing 
Commission- organised Eurobarometer polls, the UK has, with only occa-
sional interruptions, been the most consistently Eurosceptic Member 
State over the years. However, there is no doubt that in the years leading 
up to the referendum, at least three of the EU’s crises  – the eurozone 
crisis, the migration crisis and the legitimacy crisis – played significant 
parts in furthering UK Euroscepticism by contributing to the picture of a 
distant and undemocratic EU that could neither cope with, nor solve, the 
various crises afflicting the Union. Although the UK itself never adopted 
the euro or joined Schengen, widespread perceptions of these core poli-
cies as foundering served to undermine confidence in the EU system. 
The migration crisis in particular featured frequently in the popular 
media, often accompanied not by sympathetic headlines addressing 
the plight of the migrants but rather by ill- defined suggestions of the 
UK itself being under threat. As for the legitimacy crisis, perhaps the 
most powerful and effective messages at the fore of the Brexit cam-
paign were the various versions of ‘let’s take our country/ sovereignty/ 
independence back’.
the ways in which the EU is structuring itself  
to conduct the Brexit negotiations
The crises have witnessed intensified EU- level inter- institutional compe-
tition and have further complicated the EU’s institutional complexity and 
surplus of leadership. These developments are, in various ways, feeding 
into the EU’s structural arrangements for conducting the Brexit negotia-
tions, including the following:
• All of the EU’s leading political institutions have established a 
Brexit negotiating team or coordinating unit. ‘Under’ the European 
Council team, which is being led by Donald Tusk, the European 
Council president, are teams from the Commission (led by Michel 
Barnier), the Council (led by Didier Seeuws), and the European 
Parliament (led by Guy Verhofstadt).
• ‘Major’ EU directional decisions have long been made by, or at 
least channelled through, the European Council. But, as a result 
of the crises, the European Council has become much more 
actively involved in such decision- making  – with many special 
summits having been convened to deal with subjects such as the 
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size and conditions of bailouts during the eurozone crisis, the 
distribution of migrants during the migration crisis, and sanctions 
against Russia during the Crimea/ Ukraine crisis. Deliberations 
regarding, and the taking of decisions on, ‘macro’ issues by the 
European Council have become, more than ever before, the ‘new 
normal’. In line with this evolving practice, the EU27 heads of 
state and government made it clear at an informal meeting in 
December 2016 that they would have their hands firmly on the 
Brexit negotiations tiller. This would involve adopting ‘guidelines 
that will define the framework for negotiations under Article 50 
and [setting] out the overall position and principles that the EU 
will pursue throughout the negotiation’ (Informal meeting of the 
EU27 2016, 2).
• The detailed application of decisions taken at the EU political level 
has always been primarily the responsibility of the Commission. 
The crises reaffirmed this. In the context of the eurozone crisis 
for example, a host of politically approved directional decisions – 
such as on tighter fiscal rules and the creation of a banking union –  
were referred to the Commission for detailed drafting. The Brexit 
negotiations will follow this practice with the Commission, operat-
ing within political guidelines set out by the European Council and, 
on specific matters, the General Affairs Council, undertaking the 
detailed and technical negotiations.
• The EP has been greatly irritated by being largely excluded 
from decision- making in respect of most aspects of the EU’s 
crises, except where legislative measures have been required. 
Decisions on such major issues as the sizes and conditions of 
financial bailouts and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have 
been taken on intergovernmental bases that have excluded the 
Parliament. But, the EP has a history of making maximum use 
of the powers it does have, and on Brexit it cannot be bypassed 
because it has the power of consent over the UK withdrawal 
agreement. In a resolution it adopted in early April 2017, the 
Parliament served notice that it will seek to use this power 
to exert significant influence over the final Brexit agreement 
(European Parliament 2017a). The EP will not itself be directly 
involved in the negotiations, but it will  – working within 
plenary- approved guidelines on the EU’s aims in the nego-
tiations and via a specially appointed steering committee plus 
various sub- committees – exercise important roles in helping to 
shape and guide the negotiations.
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the stances of the EU27 in the Brexit negotiations
In the run- up to the April 2017 special meeting of the European Council, 
when the EU’s guidelines for defining the framework for Brexit nego-
tiations were set out (European Council 2017a), the 27 Member State 
governments and the EU institutions were broadly united in their 
approaches. This enabled the guidelines to be agreed without too much 
difficulty. So, amongst the key guidelines were stipulations that:  until 
‘sufficient progress has been achieved’ on the size of the UK’s ‘exit bill’ 
and on the residency and related rights of EU and UK citizens post- 
Brexit, trade talks will not be allowed to begin; there will be no ‘cherry 
picking’ by the UK on access to the Single Market (that is, there will be 
no especially favourable sectoral agreements); and the UK will not be 
permitted to enter formal trade talks with non- Member States until it 
leaves the EU.
This seemingly firm and united line has arisen in large part from 
the high levels of support for Eurosceptic parties and movements in 
many Member States. To avoid giving Euroscepticism further encour-
agement, which could threaten the very existence of many EU govern-
ments and, in turn, the EU itself, the EU cannot risk letting the UK be 
seen to have won a deal that results in it being materially no worse 
off, let also potentially better off, than it was pre- Brexit. As Emmanuel 
(now President) Macron said during his 2017 election campaign: 
‘I don’t want a tailormade approach where the British have the best of 
two worlds. That will be too big an incentive for others to leave and 
[will] kill the European idea, which is based on shared responsibilities’ 
(quoted in Slawson 2017).
However, notwithstanding this seemingly common resolve, during 
the EU’s crises Member States have shown a firm determination to pur-
sue and defend their particular national interests and policy preferences. 
They have, of course, always looked carefully to these, but during the 
eurozone and migration crises in particular they showed themselves to 
be more than usually resolved to ‘dig in’ – as, for example, when most 
Central and Eastern European states refused to accept the Commission’s 
proposals (even though they had been backed by a qualified majority 
vote in the Council) to distribute migrants between Schengen states on 
a compulsory basis. In a similar vein, during the Brexit negotiations the 
EU27 will doubtless disagree on countless specifics that are particularly 
important to them and will seek to defend or advance their own positions 
with vigour.
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Conclusions
As has been shown in this chapter, Brexit is far from being the only major 
crisis the EU has experienced in recent years. The eurozone and migra-
tion crises are the best known of these other crises, but they are very far 
from being alone. In varying ways, many of these other crises have had, 
are having, and will continue to have impacts on differing aspects of the 
Brexit process.
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The implications of Brexit for the 
future of Europe
Michelle Cini and Amy Verdun
Introduction
The result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership came as a shock 
not only to UK elites, but also to the rest of the EU. The outcome hit the 
EU, its Member States and its institutions, hard for many reasons – but 
perhaps for three in particular. First, it was the first time (barring the 
exceptional cases of Greenland and Algeria, for which see Kiran Klaus 
Patel’s Chapter 12 in this volume) that the EU would diminish in size. 
Second, EU actors recognised that the political implications of the UK’s 
decision would reverberate across their domestic political arenas. Third, 
the outcome was extremely puzzling. Few could figure out exactly why 
UK voters wished to leave, why the UK government would accept the 
decision when there was such a slim majority in favour of leaving, why the 
popular support was against what most experts and leading politicians 
advocated for, and what the UK would put in its place. Furthermore, the 
referendum results varied significantly across the UK, suggesting that 
any new relationship the UK might end up having with the EU (what 
became known as a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ British exit from the EU) could alter 
the UK’s constitutional settlement. Despite numerous concerns about 
how the UK and the EU would sort through the many issues involved 
in only two years, Prime Minister Theresa May invoked Article 50 on 29 
March 2017 by notifying the EU Council President Donald Tusk of the 
UK’s intention to leave the EU (HM Government 2017b).
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While the domestic debate on Brexit has mainly focused on the 
implications for the UK, it is important to reflect on the possible impli-
cations of Brexit for European integration more generally. The chal-
lenge comes from the fact that Brexit is not ‘the only game in town’, but 
rather one of several ‘crises’ that have been ailing the EU, and which 
will also affect European integration (Cini & Pérez- Solórzano 2016; 
Nugent, Chapter 5 in this volume). As such, Brexit has to be considered 
as part of a broader package of uncertainties determining the direction 
of travel for the EU. On that basis, we view successive EU crises (e.g. 
the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and the crisis associated with 
Brexit) as contextual factors that open windows of opportunity and gen-
erate sources of motivation for actors who seek to take advantage of the 
instability and uncertainty that crisis provokes. They do this by pushing 
their own agendas. These agendas, whether or not they deal explicitly 
with European integration, have repercussions for the EU. These reper-
cussions are not so much final outcomes as processes of change: they 
either fragment the EU or make it more cohesive. With that in mind, 
in addressing the possible impact of Brexit on European integration, 
we distil two broad trajectories, the first of which leads to the fragmen-
tation and weakening of the EU (the centrifugal trajectory); and the 
second, which leads to greater EU cooperation, and the strengthening 
of the European integration process (the centripetal trajectory).
The UK: an influential EU Member State
The premise on which the argument rests is that the UK has been, until 
now, an influential member of the EU. Ever since joining, in 1973, 
what was then the European Communities, the UK, as one of the larger 
Member States, has more than most helped to shape European integra-
tion. It has done so in two ways: first, by constraining EU initiatives; and 
second, by supporting and promoting EU initiatives.
In its constraining role, the UK often sought to veto or limit EU 
initiatives. An example of such behaviour can be found in the negotia-
tions on the Maastricht Treaty. These negotiations led to the creation of 
the EU with its important new policy of EMU and its Social Chapter. The 
UK managed to restrict integration in these areas and eventually negoti-
ated special arrangements for itself in both cases (but only having first 
made sure they were restricted in their scope and not overly ‘federal’) 
(Verdun 2000). More recently, the UK exerted its veto against the reform 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Other Member States were keen to strengthen the 
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rules on budgetary and fiscal governance, in the light of the eurozone 
crisis, so as to firm up the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). As there was 
no unanimous agreement on the matter, the other Member States signed 
the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance (often known as the 
‘Fiscal Compact’) as an intergovernmental treaty in 2012, which subse-
quently came into effect in 2013.
The UK has not always been successful in its attempts to limit EU 
initiatives, however. As UK Prime Minister Thatcher discovered in the 
early 1980s, for example, the national veto, preventing the operation 
of qualified majority voting, was already something of a chimera. To 
this day, more often than not, the Council takes decisions by consensus. 
On those occasions when the Council actually votes, in the vast major-
ity of cases the UK votes with the majority. Having said that, recent 
research by Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann suggests that this situation 
has recently changed. Their research on formal voting outcomes shows 
that although the UK failed to vote the same way as the winning vote in 
only 2.6 per cent of the cases in the period 2004– 9, in the more recent 
period (2009– 15) it was deviating from the winning vote in 12.3 per cent 
of cases (Hix & Hagemann 2015).
Second, in its supportive role, the UK itself promoted various 
initiatives, from the introduction of regional and cohesion policy in 
the 1970s, to the relaunch of the internal/ Single Market in the 1980s, 
and even, though it ultimately never became a full member, the design 
of the architecture for EMU and Justice and Home Affairs. It also was 
often an advocate of ‘widening’ over ‘deepening’, that is, in favour of 
expanding the EU, so as to include new Member States, rather than 
supportive of deeper integration in the areas in which the EU was 
already involved. Its policy influence is perhaps most clearly identi-
fied in the UK’s shaping of Enlargement Policy and in its impact on 
Common Security and Defence Policy, where the UK became a core EU 
player – not least because of the size of its armed forces and defence 
sector.
Successive UK governments have thus been fairly successful 
in shaping EU initiatives in line with what they conceive to be in the 
national interest. Of course, there are many instances where ‘red lines’ 
were crossed and compromises agreed  – even if they were not always 
presented as such back home. Standing back from the specifics, the UK’s 
influence has promoted, first, a particular form of European integration, 
and second, a particular ideological agenda. In the case of the former, 
UK governments have tended, more than other governments, to favour 
intergovernmental solutions to institutional reform. The instigation of 
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the pillar system at Maastricht, which failed to integrate internal affairs 
and foreign policy into the EU’s supranational ‘European Community’ pil-
lar, is a notable case in point. With regards to the latter point, UK govern-
ments have advocated a more liberal economic agenda within the EU, 
irrespective of the party in power.
The impact of Brexit
Based on the premise that the UK has been an influential Member State 
of the EU, what then might be the implications of UK withdrawal for 
European integration? While the two perspectives – a centrifugal and a 
centripetal one – oversimplify the options available, and do not cover all 
potential implications, they do serve as a useful heuristic device in high-
lighting the ways in which Brexit might be used by different actors to 
advance their own political agendas on the future of Europe.
the centrifugal trajectory
Arguably, the EU has never been more fragmented than it is today. 
Divisions over policy preferences have become bitter. European solidarity 
has been undermined as a consequence of both long- term problems and 
more recent crises. Growing distrust of European elites has been exploited 
by nativist groups and parties, often allied with anti- immigration senti-
ment, to propose populist solutions to Europe’s problems. Euroscepticism 
has sometimes driven these agendas, though on other occasions it has 
simply become a supplementary agenda. Important substantive policy 
differences often lie at the source of these divisions. The political cleav-
age that opened up during the eurozone crisis, based on an economic 
split between creditor states, such as Germany, and debtor states, such 
as Greece, saw the countries directly involved in the crisis take opposite 
sides in a bitter blame- game. A  similar phenomenon was witnessed at 
the height of the migrant crisis, where the absence of effective burden- 
sharing exacerbated already fragile relations between North and South, 
and between East and West. The citizens and governments of numerous 
Member States began to disengage from European integration, turning in 
on themselves. Collective institutions, such as the border- free Schengen 
system, were suspended, ostensibly for a limited time, but flagging up the 
possibility of total collapse. While policy differences may be resolved – 
once solutions are found and the crisis passed – the more fundamental 
differences that shape them, differences in assumptions about social 
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and economic liberalism, whether from the left or the right, seem more 
intractable.
Where does Brexit and the UK fit into this analysis of the EU? It 
is paradoxical that the UK was always on the outside of these issues. 
It looked on while the crises were in full flow. But these high- profile 
crises hide the fact that where the more pro- European governments of 
the EU, perhaps supported by a Franco- German vanguard, would be 
inclined to seek deepened integration (as in areas such as fiscal policy, 
police cooperation, and immigration and border control), the UK was 
typically the voice providing opposition and scepticism, and advocat-
ing greater caution. Although there were occasions when the UK was in 
a minority of one, it was often speaking out loud the private thoughts 
of other Member States. Where Central and Eastern European govern-
ments were reluctant to appear anti- European, they were often content 
with the UK’s more subdued vision of integration. With this voice gone, 
others will have to take over this role, and their vision will be a differ-
ent one than the liberal- market- oriented, Atlanticist view that the UK 
typically represented. These other states, moreover, do not have the 
same political clout that the UK managed to conjure up – the product 
of its seniority in the EU, its democratic track- record, the size of its 
economy and population, and its long experience in diplomacy and for-
eign affairs. Nor do they necessarily possess the skills of UK statesmen 
and diplomats, or hold the natural advantage of being native speakers 
of the English language. This could mean that calls for less integration 
will have weaker backers. Or, given that even without Brexit, Central 
and Eastern European states, such as Hungary and Poland, have become 
more vocal in their resistance to supranational and regulatory EU initia-
tives, it could mean that anti- EU sentiment persists, but in more stat-
ist form, and without a clear articulation that reaches the citizens and 
political leaders of other Member States. Even though many Europeans 
are appalled at the British tabloid press, it has offered a language for 
others elsewhere in the EU to emulate. The national media in Eastern 
Europe do not reach other Europeans as easily.
Likewise, there are numerous political groupings within Member 
States, both parties and more diffuse social movements, which reflect 
popular concern over the deepening of integration in the EU. Without 
the constraints that UK membership represents, those groups may see 
an opportunity for further mobilisation of support, resulting from the 
fear that the EU without the UK could push ahead to integrate further 
in certain areas. The same arguments used to justify a Leave vote in the 
UK referendum could also hold sway in other European states (Cini and 
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Pérez- Solórzano 2016). Anti- immigration, anti- globalisation and anti- 
elite political positions are hardly exclusive to the UK. While Hobolt 
(2016, 1273) argued that there was no evidence of short- term contagion 
effects, in the sense of other Member States planning on holding referen-
dums, she admits that ‘the Brexit vote nonetheless poses a serious chal-
lenge to the political establishment across Europe’ and that such effects 
might thus emerge in the months and years ahead.
the centripetal trajectory
However, without the UK, the EU might be better equipped to move into 
crisis resolution mode. The Brexit negotiations, if handled well, could 
help the process of rebuilding solidarity among the EU27. The German 
government has itself pushed this line (Duff 2017, 1). There is noth-
ing more unifying than having to show a common front. The EU dem-
onstrated this unity early on, during the Bratislava European Council 
meeting of September 2016, and it was also evident in the run- up to 
the agreement of the negotiation mandate in April 2017. Indeed, even 
if relations between the two sides remain relatively cordial, the Member 
States entering into negotiations with the UK will be aware that the 
effectiveness of the EU’s negotiating strategies will be carefully exam-
ined by their own domestic constituencies and that they will need to 
demonstrate their toughness. The argument often made in the weeks 
following the UK referendum, that EU Member States will want to 
ensure the UK does not get too ‘good’ a deal in order to deter Eurosceptic 
forces in other Member States’ domestic constituencies, still carries 
some weight – at least in some quarters. The European Council, led by 
European Council president Donald Tusk and the head of the Brexit 
taskforce of the Council, Didier Seeuws, is especially important when it 
comes to bringing the Member States together, since it is responsible for 
the EU’s common negotiating stance (European Council 2017a).
While solidarity has been sorely lacking among the EU Member 
States in recent years, this has not prevented the emergence of new initia-
tives. The eurozone crisis has already led to new institutional initiatives, 
new legislation, a new treaty, and even new institutional mechanisms to 
deal with the sovereign debt crisis and to prevent further financial melt-
down (Verdun 2015). One can easily argue therefore that one of the con-
sequences of the eurozone crisis has been to open the door to further 
European integration. Brexit may make further steps in this direction 
even more likely. While the UK neither joined EMU, nor prevented the 
introduction of the euro, it has since the early 2000s argued vehemently 
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for recognition that the EU comprises more than one currency. It has 
stressed that the EU’s (read: eurozone’s) policies should not be prejudi-
cial towards Member States using currencies other than the euro. For the 
UK, this position most often took the form of a defence of the interests 
of the City of London, and of a more ‘facilitative and liberal approach 
to financial regulation’ (Moloney 2017). This matter was of such impor-
tance to the UK government after 2010 that it featured as one of the issues 
dealt with in David Cameron’s pre- referendum negotiations. With the UK 
leaving the EU, and the other EMU ‘outs’ much weaker, the stage is set 
for the euro to become, once again, the flagship policy of the EU – and 
perhaps for further post- crisis steps towards a fiscal (or economic) union. 
As Sapir et al. put it: ‘Brexit also involves opportunities for the EU27. It 
may generate momentum towards building more integrated and vibrant 
capital markets that would better serve all its Member States’ economies, 
improve risk sharing to withstand local shocks, and make the Union a 
more attractive place to do global financial business’ (Sapir et al. 2017).
In other policy areas, too, there is some indication of the devel-
opment of a new pro- integration agenda. Indeed, in the second half of 
2016, following the Bratislava European Council in September, France 
and Germany announced that they were considering strengthening 
cooperation on security matters. Some might argue that the expected 
departure of the UK from the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) makes little difference, since the UK has been something of a 
half- hearted member since at least 2010, and because the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) is more important for European defence. 
But from a centripetal perspective, with the UK’s departure, the EU loses 
half of its Franco- British defence axis, which has been at the heart of the 
CSDP. Thus, in order not to weaken EU defence policy, something needs 
to be proposed to fill the gap left by the UK. The fact that US President 
Donald Trump appears less committed to the Western Alliance means 
that the development of a more robust European defence policy seems 
more important than before. German leader Angela Merkel seems fully 
to have grasped this fact, when announcing at the end of the G7 Meeting 
in late May 2017 that the EU will need to take charge of its own defence 
(Politico 2017).
Even if these integrative initiatives go ahead, the EU cannot sim-
ply return to a business- as- usual approach to integration, but must learn 
from the experience of Brexit and other EU crises. The March 2017 
Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe indicates that there are 
some important decisions to be made. Without considerable resources 
(competences, funds) at the EU level, the EU cannot be everything to 
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everyone. While it is a system that is based on the rule of law and a large 
acquis communautaire, the EU is struggling with various Member States 
that do not always respect the founding principles of the EU. Moreover, 
the protest votes witnessed in the 2016 Italian referendum, as well as 
the lessons learnt from Brexit and the election of Trump, indicate that 
citizens are disgruntled with the way globalisation has treated them 
(Blockmans & Weiss 2016, 3).
Yet, with national elections in Western Europe in late 2016 and 
spring 2017 (Austria, the Netherlands and France) having generated 
more pro- EU than anti- EU populist leaders, there may be more scope 
for unity among Member State leaders in the coming months and 
years. Having had a chance to vote explicitly with European integra-
tion in mind, and with more clarity after the UK referendum about the 
challenges involved in being outside the EU (Financial Times 2017a), 
there might even be more support from European citizens for deeper 
European integration. Yet the EU is well advised to ensure that with any 
deepening comes some sort of increase in democratic accountability to 
its citizens.
Conclusions
Brexit is one of several crises to have hit the EU in recent years. The 
implications of Brexit on European integration are, therefore, also 
the consequences of those other crises. We view crises as windows 
of opportunity and sources of motivation for actors who take advan-
tage of instability and uncertainty to push particular agendas. Those 
agendas are not necessarily pro- integration, in the sense of uncon-
ditional transfer of national powers to supranational institutions 
(supra national integration), but they are associated with EU- level 
reform. They may, as such, seek to push European integration in a 
non- supranational direction, by promoting new forms of intergovern-
mentalism, by institutionalising a multi- speed, differentiated model 
of European cooperation (Cini & Pérez- Solórzano 2016), or by further 
enhancing mechanisms that advance coordination and fine- tuning, as 
has been the case with social policy coordination (Verdun & Wood 
2013). In his contribution to the Brexit debate, Ferrera (2017) for exam-
ple makes the case for the establishment of a European Social Union, 
one that is ‘capable of combining domestic and pan- European solidari-
ties’. Alternatively, other agendas pushed by actors in times of crisis 
may seek to promote disintegration. Actors working for the collapse 
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of the EU and a return to exclusively national, or even nationalist, 
politics will also see crises as an opportunity for them to push their 
own vision of the future. It remains to be seen which of these com-
peting agendas will be successful. There are no clear indicators as to 
which agenda will win, as there is no mechanism that will at all times 
push forward the pro- cooperation agenda. But the political winds that 
are blowing through the EU27 seem to have produced fertile soil for 
another attempt at deepening integration. Provided that both the EU 
and national leaders remain committed to European integration, the 
event of Brexit may very well mark another bout of centripetal activity, 
bringing the remaining EU Member States closer together.
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7
Decentralised federalism
A new model for the EU
Simon Hix
The EU is facing multiple crises. Brexit. Refugees crossing the Aegean 
and Mediterranean. Putin’s shadow over the Baltics. A  possible new 
eurozone debt crisis. President Trump threatening to undermine NATO. 
Growing support for populist anti- European parties. Challenges to liberal 
democracy in Hungary and Poland. And so on, and so on.
The EU has faced profound challenges before, such as the French 
National Assembly’s rejection of a political union in the 1950s, President 
De Gaulle’s ‘empty chair’ policy in the 1960s, the oil price hikes and ‘stag-
flation’ in the 1970s, the battle over the UK’s budget contribution in the 
1980s, and the various rejections of treaties by the publics of Denmark, 
Ireland, France and the Netherlands in the 1990s and 2000s. In the face of 
each of these challenges the European integration project has found a way 
to muddle through; perhaps never as quickly, elegantly or efficiently as 
many would have liked, but the car has been kept on the road, the bicycle 
has continued to move forward, or whatever other metaphor you prefer.
As with these previous challenges, a common response to the current 
challenges is to advocate ‘more Europe’. Most visibly, in March 2017 the 
Commission presented its White Paper on the Future of Europe, which set 
out five ‘scenarios’ for the EU27 by 2025 (European Commission 2017b). 
Of the five scenarios, it was clear that the Commission favoured the fifth, 
where: ‘The EU decides to do much more together across all policy areas’. 
This would include inter alia: deeper integration in the eurozone, such 
as genuine fiscal union and more coordination of national tax, expend-
iture and social policies; a European Defence Union, with integrated 
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military command structures; greater cooperation in the management 
of external borders of the Union and more integrated asylum and ref-
ugee policies; new policies within the Single Market on energy, digital 
and services; and a new budgetary structure for the Union, including a 
new EU ‘own resource’ (for example from a carbon tax or a Europe- wide 
sales tax).
However, this time, this sort of ratcheting forward of integration is 
unlikely to work. There are simply too many current challenges, and they 
cover many more areas of EU action than any previous challenge: from 
macro- economic policies, to security and defence, to justice and interior 
affairs, and even social cohesion and integration. Add Brexit to the mix, 
and the political and institutional foundations of the EU are also now 
open to question. The extent of policy integration that addressing all these 
challenges at once would entail – for example in the Commission’s ‘sce-
nario five’ – would mean the most significant step forward in European 
integration certainly since the Single European Act, and perhaps even 
since the Treaty of Rome.
Such a major step forward is now impossible. First, it is more diffi-
cult to achieve policy integration in any one area, let along across a whole 
range of areas, amongst 27 states than it was amongst six, nine, 12 or 15. 
More Member States means a greater divergence of interests and pref-
erences and, as a result, invariably at least one Member State who will 
prefer ‘no deal’ to any options on the table.
Second, and above all, unlike in any previous period of European 
integration, the public cannot be ignored, and the public is heading 
against the EU. Until the early 1990s there was a ‘permissive consensus’ 
towards the European project (e.g. Inglehart 1970). This consensus 
came to an abrupt end in the early 1990s, with the Danish and French 
referendums on the Maastricht Treaty and the sudden emergence of 
anti- European parties in the 1994 European Parliament elections. Mark 
Franklin and his collaborators characterised this period as the ‘uncork-
ing’ of popular opposition to European integration, with the idea that 
once the cork of public opinion was out of the bottle it could not be put 
back in (Franklin et al. 1994). The public had woken up to the new real-
ity: that a ‘political union’ of sorts had been created by their political lead-
ers without this being clearly mandated or noticed much by voters.
Until the mid- 2000s, though, this popular opposition to the EU was 
mainly expressed in European Parliament elections and in EU referen-
dums, which were the two main arenas where (some) voters could express 
their opposition to European integration at the same time as ‘punishing’ 
governments and mainstream parties. Yet, the issue of ‘Europe’ remained 
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largely absent from the main political contests that mattered: elec-
tions to national parliaments. As long as national elections focused on 
the standard fare of domestic politics, of national taxes and spending 
policies, and as long as anti- European parties did not win many votes 
or seats in these elections, mainstream parties on the centre- left and 
centre- right could ignore growing popular opposition to European 
integration.
This changed dramatically in the 2010s. The eurozone crisis, and 
the consequent ‘austerity’ packages in debtor states and ‘bailouts’ in 
creditor states, meant that Europe now encroached directly on national 
tax and spending debates. Similarly, the refugee crises, and the sheer 
volume of people moving across borders, affected domestic debates 
about immigration, social cohesion, crime and even terrorism. Added 
to this was growing opposition in many North Western European soci-
eties (such as the UK, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) about 
the volume of immigration from Eastern Europe. Few concerns about 
migrants from Central and Eastern Europe had been expressed while 
the economies had been growing, but economic downturns and public 
spending cuts combined with mass immigration led to greater competi-
tion for low- skilled jobs and greater competition for declining public 
services.
Together these factors produced growing support in national  
elections for parties that combined anti- EU positions with anti- austerity 
and/ or anti- immigration policies and anti- establishment populism. 
This is shown in Figure  7.1. The data are the percentage of total 
votes for left and right populist parties in the most recent national 
Parliament elections. This is a good indicator of the influence of popu-
list parties in EU politics, as there are no compositional changes over 
time and the overall support levels are weighted by the size of each 
country.
The figure clearly shows a growth in the support for anti- European 
populist parties in the wake of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which 
began in 2008, and then a second jump in support following the refu-
gee crisis, that first hit in the spring of 2015. Between 2000 and 2016, 
support for populist parties on the radical left (such as Syriza in Greece, 
Podemos in Spain and Sinn Fein in Ireland) grew by about 4 per cent, 
while support for populist parties on the radical right (such as UKIP in 
the UK, the Front National (National Front) in France, the Alternative 
für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany), the Partij voor de Vrijheid  
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(Party for Freedom) in the Netherlands, the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish 
People’s Party), the Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats) and 
Prawo I Sprawiedlowość (Law and Justice in Poland) jumped by about 
8 per cent. So, together, populist anti- European parties of various stripes 
now command the support of almost one in four voters across Europe, 
and this support has grown dramatically following the eurozone and 
refugee crises.
It may be too early to conclude that European integration is finished 
and that the EU is doomed. What is clear, though, is that the standard EU 
response to crisis, of ‘more Europe’, is not going to work this time. It is 
simply not going to be supported by 27 Member States and their increas-
ingly sceptical publics.
What other options are there? Table  7.1 presents one way of 
thinking about this question. In any multi- level political system there 
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are two main dimensions of institutional design. The first dimension 
relates to how decisions are made at the centre. At one extreme, deci-
sions are by unanimous agreement (‘consensus’), usually at the high-
est political level. At the other extreme, decisions are made by a simple 
majority of states. But no multi- level system operates through pure 
majoritarian rules, as a union could not survive simple majority ‘dic-
tatorship’. So, in practice, the alternative to unanimity is majority rule 
with significant checks and balances (‘veto players’), where decisions 
require the support of majorities in multiple legislative chambers, as 
well as an independent executive and an independent judiciary. For 
example, the German federal system is more ‘majoritarian’ than the US 
system, because the parties in the German government usually control 
a majority in the Bundestag (and the Bundestag is more powerful than 
the Bundesrat), whereas the US president does not have a right of leg-
islative initiative and is forced to build legislative coalitions issue by 
issue across two powerful legislative chambers (the House and Senate) 
(cf. Tsebelis 2002).
The second dimension relates to the degree of centralisation or 
decentralisation of policymaking power. This dimension also relates to 
whether common rules require a high level of harmonisation of local 
policies or whether states are allowed a degree of discretion and flexibil-
ity in the application of central rules. For example, across federal systems 
there is significant variation in the level of centralisation of policy- 
making power, where the states in some systems (such as Switzerland 
and the US) have considerable independent tax- raising power and legis-
lative autonomy.
This gives us four ideal types of designs, which characterise various 
options for the EU. Most international organisations, such as the World 
Trade Organization or NATO, are ‘loose unions of states’: where few pow-
ers are centralised, and all major decisions are reached by unanimous or 
near- unanimous agreement. This may not seem a realistic option for the 
EU, but it is the direction of travel supported by many right- wing populists 
Table 7.1 Institutional design options for the EU
Degree of policy centralisation Decision- making mode
Consensual Majoritarian
Centralised/ harmonised Intergovernmentalism Supranationalism
Decentralised/ flexible Loose union of states Decentralised 
federalism
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in Western Europe as well as some more mainstream conservative parties 
in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic.
The current design of the EU combines both ‘intergovernmental-
ism’ and ‘supranationalism’. Intergovernmentalism, via consensus agree-
ments between governments (usually at the level of heads of government 
in the European Council), is the main EU decision- making mode for treaty 
reforms, multi- annual budgetary packages, foreign and security policies, 
some aspects of refugee and asylum policies (such as refugee burden- 
sharing), and most aspects of EMU and the emerging mechanisms for the 
coordination of national macro- economic policies. Supranationalism, 
with agenda- setting by the Commission and legislative action by majori-
ties in the Council and European Parliament, is the standard mode for 
governing the Single Market and the flanking policies (such as social and 
environmental policies), for justice and home affairs policies (although 
not refugee burden- sharing), and for the regulatory framework govern-
ing EMU and the emerging Banking Union.
Within both of these decision- making modes, the EU has become 
increasingly centralised, with little discretion for the Member States once 
decisions are made. Within the Single Market, for example, directives 
were originally envisaged as ‘framework rules’ within which Member 
States would have some discretion. But directives have become indis-
tinguishable from normal ‘laws’, which require extensive harmonisation 
and adherence to the detailed articles in any directive. This may be the 
optimal legal and economic strategy for governing the Single Market, as 
harmonisation ensures regulatory compatibility and legal certainty, but 
this significantly reduces Member State discretion. And, as the policy 
competences and legislative rules of the EU have expanded, centralised 
decision- making and harmonisation has increasingly become a policy 
straightjacket for domestic publics.
One implication of this centralisation is that policy competition 
between mainstream political parties has become severely restricted 
(Dorussen & Nanou 2006). Parties cannot compete on social and environ-
ment policies, market regulation, international trade policies and. increas-
ingly too, on immigration and asylum policies. And, for Member States of 
the eurozone, choices over taxing and spending have increasingly been 
removed from domestic political contestation. This is not healthy for 
European democracy. If voters would like to significantly change policy sta-
tus quos – either in a leftward or rightward direction – then they must also 
support anti- European positions. More interventionist economic and tax 
policies are not possible within the design of EMU, while more discretion 
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in the application of regulatory standards or in immigration policies is not 
compatible within the current design of the Single Market or EU justice 
and home affairs policies. In other words, centralisation of the policy pow-
ers of the EU inevitably pushes even moderately left- wing or right- wing 
voters into the arms of radical left and right populists.
But, there is another option, which I call ‘decentralised federalism’. 
This model of a multi- level polity requires two things: 1) granting policy 
competences to the central institutions in a restricted set of policy areas, 
and allowing majority decision- making over these policies; and 2) grant-
ing a high degree of flexibility and discretion to the states in the appli-
cation of central rules. Decentralised federalism implies an alternative 
‘grand bargain’ for all Member States: where some policies are further 
integrated (such as new fiscal instruments, military command structures 
and refugee burden- sharing) in return for more decentralisation and 
flexibility in other policy areas (such as macro- economic policies within 
the eurozone, in expenditure policies such as agricultural price support, 
or in regulatory policies in the Single Market for all Member States).
So, for example, within the eurozone, states would be allowed to 
run higher public deficits, but in return there would be no obligation on 
the more fiscally stable states to bail out states that run into difficulties 
with their debts. Contrast, for example, the EU’s imposition of severe aus-
terity on Greece in return for repeated bailouts with the US government’s 
decision to allow the City of Detroit to default on its debt. Fiscal hawks 
will immediately complain about potential contagion or free- riding in 
such a system. But, a genuine banking union and more independent 
fiscal capacity of the EU, via eurozone bonds for example, would counter- 
balance the greater independent fiscal autonomy and responsibility of 
the states that make up the monetary union.
Similarly, in the services sector, greater flexibility and discretion 
could be a way of liberalising services markets. In the mid- 2000s the 
Commission proposed a Services Directive based on ‘mutual recogni-
tion’ in the services sector, which would have opened up services sectors 
across Europe to greater competition. The Services Directive was eventu-
ally watered down, and the result (which entered into force in 2009) has 
not achieved much in terms of opening up services markets to new pro-
viders. The problem is that the strategy for the services sector so far has 
been based on the principle of a common set of rules – mutual recogni-
tion and harmonisation – for all sectors and all Member States. With so 
many conflicting interests between and within Member States, a compre-
hensive reform of services is impossible, even via the EU’s supranational 
decision- making mode.
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An alternative would be a decentralised federal model:  to allow 
groups of states to liberalise their services sectors, or parts of their ser-
vices sectors, on a bilateral or multilateral basis within a common EU- 
wide legal and regulatory framework. So, for example, Germany and 
Austria could agree to mutually recognise each other’s service providers, 
as could Sweden and Denmark, the Benelux states, the Visegrad states, 
Spain and Portugal, Bulgaria and Romania, the Baltic states, and so on. 
In time, this patchwork structure could gradually be linked up, with 
cross- agreement rules, perhaps coordinated by the Commission. This 
may sound fanciful to some European policymakers, but is exactly how 
the liberalisation of the US services economy has evolved, with bilateral 
and multilateral agreements between states to recognise each other’s 
services providers.
One aspect of such an architecture may be some forms of ‘asymmet-
ric integration’, where sub- sets of states voluntarily choose to integrate 
policy competences in some areas. This is called ‘flexible’ or ‘multi- speed’ 
integration in the EU context. Several of the larger Member States have 
raised this form of cooperation as a possible way of enabling further inte-
gration of refugee and asylum policies. This might be consistent with 
decentralised federalism, but asymmetric integration also has the poten-
tial of establishing a permanent two- tier design – with an ‘inner core’ and 
an ‘outer periphery’ – which would undermine the cohesion of the EU as 
a whole. In contrast, decentralised federalism would be a way of keeping 
the EU27 together within a single institutional framework, although with 
some flexible integration, such as the euro and Schengen.
Overall, the EU is at a turning point in its history. Never before has 
it faced so many crises on so many fronts. The standard crisis manage-
ment response in the EU is to push for further policy integration. This 
may have worked in the past, but is unlikely to work now. The EU27 
are simply too heterogeneous. And, above all, there is growing public 
opposition towards deeper economic and political integration, and the 
further restrictions on domestic policy choices that this would inevitably 
entail.
There are alternatives to deeper integration, one of which I have 
called ‘decentralised federalism’. This model would enable some new 
policies to be centralised, to establish genuine fiscal union in the euro-
zone, or common European refugee and common defence command 
structures for example, but in return for greater decentralisation and 
flexibility in other areas, such as macro- economic policy choices and 
some regulatory policy choices within the Single Market. This might be 
anathema to many Euro- federalists, who see the Single Market and EMU 
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as great achievements of the European integration project. But more 
decentralisation and flexibility may be the only way to save the European 
integration project from either permanent gridlock or slow collapse. 
Furthermore, decentralised federalism may foster greater policy innova-
tion and economic growth, which in turn should erode public support for 
populist anti- European forces.
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Seven Brexit propositions
Towards a Union that protects
Luuk van Middelaar
After the UK referendum, there was a palpable temptation in Brussels to 
dismiss the result as insular British doggedness, in the hope that a mar-
ginal readjustment of a few policies or symbols would suffice to keep the 
voters of the other countries of the Union on board.1 A dangerous illu-
sion. The EU urgently needs to strike a new balance between the freedom 
and the protection that it endeavours to provide. Voters will not be fooled 
by empty, meaningless slogans like ‘A Europe of results’, ‘Better Europe’ 
or ‘Big on big things, small on small things’. The distinction between free-
dom and protection offers a better tool for fashioning a political response. 
This distinction reveals real dilemmas, and as a result forces a search for a 
sincere political language, a sincerity that could only benefit the Union’s 
political life. There are some signs this adjustment is taking place, but 
more must be done.
1. Starting point: British voters have not gone mad
It would be a mistake to attribute the victory of the Leavers on 23 June 
2016 to the campaign’s often baseless claims against ‘Brussels’, or to 
the ‘irrational’ behaviour of the British voters voting against their well- 
understood economic interests, or to the fact that Rupert Murdoch or 
other powerful enemies of the European project are laying down the law 
to the British media. Nor should we understand the result of the referen-
dum as purely the result of ‘fact- free politics’, where feelings of prejudice 
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run rampant. In a country like Great Britain, one cannot win a vote with 
lies and propaganda alone. It is impossible to convince 52 per cent of 
voters to vote against their personal interests (even if lies may have made 
the difference between winning and losing). The British people, it must 
be said, have expressed something else beyond this vote, something that 
could very well be ‘rational’, once the perspective is broadened beyond 
the analysis of economic self- interest alone.
2. First message: identity politics trump economic 
interest
It is of little importance whether the British voters refused to believe the 
economic warnings of ‘experts’,2 or whether they did believe them 
but simply did not care because of other priorities. Evidently, the 
result of the British referendum is part of a larger phenomenon 
in the Western world: on both sides of the Atlantic, more and more vot-
ers are rejecting the rationale of globalisation and its corollaries, such 
as open markets and borders. The left is primarily targeting the econ-
omy (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, the EU, the 
euro), while the right is concerning itself with migration (of Muslims, 
Mexicans, Polish, Romanians, depending on the context). The net result 
is the same, as we saw during the American presidential primaries with 
the success of outsider candidates Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, 
as well as in the French 2017 presidential elections, with the high scores 
for leftwing anti- capitalist Jean- Luc Mélenchon and nationalist Marine 
Le Pen. The battle was between the ‘centre’, in the broader sense (as 
represented by ‘Remain’, Hillary Clinton or Emmanuel Macron), and 
the ‘fringes’, verging on the ‘extremes’.
3. Second message: Brexit weakens Brussels doctrine
For the EU in particular, the possibility that identity politics trump eco-
nomic interests amounts to an existential crisis. A choice like this will, 
of course, have an adverse effect on Brussels doctrine in general, and on 
the two central elements of European integration in particular. Since the 
time of the founding of the Coal and Steel Community, the entire system 
has been based on (1) the postulate that economic interdependence cre-
ates grateful populations and (2) the idea that integration is a one- way 
street towards ‘ever closer Union’. Only the membership of new Member 
States and the addition of new competences are envisaged. In this vision, 
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there is no place for Member States to quit the club, neither is there space 
to repatriate competences to the national level. In this sense, the result of 
the Brexit referendum was unthinkable. Now that it has taken place, it is 
necessary to change the doctrine.
4. Battlefield: national elections
The battle between the fringes and the centre represents a real danger for 
the EU. The Union is a large democratic sounding board and this struggle 
is one of the principal issues in each election. In reality, ‘European elec-
tions’ do not take place once every five years (as only a Brussels- centric 
point of view could see things), but rather several times a year.
Since the Brexit vote, a number of national elections have taken 
place in Europe confirming the pattern. One can think of the rerun of 
the final round of the Austrian presidential election in December 2016 
(for which neither traditional governing party qualified and in which 
pro- European Green candidate Von der Bellen beat the anti- European 
FPÖ- candidate Hofer) or of the Dutch parliamentary elections of March 
2017, where the biggest winners were the pro- European centrist- liberal 
and green- left parties on the one hand, the extreme- right PVV of Geert 
Wilders on the other. But without denying the strategic interest of these 
battlefields, the real post- Brexit test for the Union was always going to be 
the French presidential election of April– May 2017. France is where the 
front line between the forces ‘for’ and the forces ‘against’ Europe is stark-
est. The country’s systematic importance is due to its weight within the 
Union, its political system that favours polarisation, as well as the state 
of shock in which it finds itself following a series of terrorist attacks. 
The final round between pro- European centrist Emmanuel Macron and 
National Front leader Marine Le Pen, who campaigned for a ‘Frexit’ 
from the EU and the eurozone, electrifying as it was, crystallised the 
same cleavage observed in the UK and Austria; it may even restructure 
the party- political landscape, since in France too, the traditional gov-
erning parties of the moderate right and moderate left suffered defeat. 
Although Macron secured a large victory on 7 May, this expressed just 
as much a vote against Le Pen and her party in the name of the Republic 
as a vote in favour of Macron’s pro- European and liberal agenda (for 
43 per cent of those voting for him, stopping her was their main motif). 
Telling in this respect were the results of the first round: both the pro- 
European camp (Macron, Fillon, Hamon) and the anti- European camp 
(Le Pen, Mélenchon, Dupont- Aignan and some smaller candidates) 
arrived at added totals of about 49 per cent. Just as in post- Brexit UK 
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some observers see ‘two nations’, French commentators speak about 
‘les deux France’.
Although the immediate outcome in France was a relief to the EU, 
it would be premature to speak of a ‘European spring’. The pro- European 
camp will need to increase its voter base to more solid majorities. This 
means that in France, as elsewhere, Europe must win back the centre and 
the undecided voters, with a new strategy.
5. The answer: a new balance between freedom 
and protection
In order to win back the centre, the EU must find a new balance between 
its efforts to promote economic freedoms, and its role as a social protec-
tor. The British referendum, along with evidence from other national 
elections, reveals a divide among the populations. It is a divide between, 
on the one hand, voters who generally appreciate the EU for its freedom, 
openness, and the opportunities it offers and, on the other hand, those 
who ultimately fear the disorder and disruptions that the EU creates in 
terms of migration, competition for jobs, or the loss of national sover-
eignty. This divide may be informed by, even though it may not directly 
map onto, the divide between the ‘mobile’, often the entrepreneurs, the 
young, students, the well- off, or those who have nothing to lose when 
leaving their country, and the ‘sedentary’, who are fine staying home. 
As we know, ‘[t] he European order gives the benefits of equal treatment 
only to the footloose’ (van Middelaar 2013, 255).
Two nuances:  this divide cannot be reduced to an opposition 
between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’, because this revolves around a 
50– 50 ratio, as we have seen in the case of the British referendum and the 
Austrian and French presidential elections. Similarly we cannot slide into 
sociological determinism:  millions of the ‘poor’ and the ‘elderly’ voted 
for Great Britain to remain in the EU, and a number of the ‘rich’ and the 
‘youth’ voted to leave. In the end, it is of course the free choice of each 
individual, based on their interests, experiences and values, for which 
only they themselves are responsible.
6. Policies: the importance of borders
It is crucial, therefore, that the EU works and is seen to work, not only 
for half of the voters, its own freedom- loving ‘clientele’ as it were, but 
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also addresses the other half. Failing this, we risk a ‘civil war’, in which 
the European side will be quickly beaten by the strength in numbers of 
the hostiles. This disastrous outcome may yet come to pass in but a few 
short years.
The key message should therefore be to express that, alongside the 
old ‘Europe of opportunities’, European leaders and institutions must 
work for a ‘Europe that protects’. If this message has been first heard in 
France  – when in 2007 French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy 
asked for ‘une Europe qui protège’ – by now it resonates across the Union 
as a whole. At the same time, it must be recognised that achieving a bet-
ter balance between freedom and protection can mean two different 
things: either minimising the negative effects of freedom, or producing 
more order.
The first is fundamental with regard to social and economic 
security. Because the EU cannot credibly replace the national welfare 
states without becoming the ‘super- state’ that the voters clearly refuse, 
it must at least stop sapping the national and local institutions of their 
protective and healthcare systems. In terms of policies, two priorities 
stand out here. First, to retain the elements of the agreement between 
the EU and Great Britain of February 2016 (the ‘new UK settlement’), 
if not in their UK- specific legal form at least in their political substance, 
in particular those aspects of the agreement concerning the possibility 
of an ‘emergency brake’ procedure in relation to freedom of movement 
(Pisani- Ferry et  al. 2016). Second, to find a solution for the Posted 
Workers Directive, above all for the purpose of confronting hostile and 
Eurosceptic climates in other Member States.3
A better balance between freedom and protection can also mean 
providing order. Since the Brexit vote, the themes of internal and exter-
nal security have finally received the necessary attention:  defending 
Europe is no longer a taboo. The regulation of September 2016 concern-
ing a new European body of coast guards and border guards is useful and 
important, and it is the implementation of this decision that now matters 
most.4 Enlargement is the other major issue when it comes to a discussion 
of borders – not the ‘physical’ but the territorial border. In this regard, it 
falls to the European leaders to decide how long they want to continue 
their game of hypocritical diplomacy (of which both parties are guilty, 
incidentally) around the status of the candidate- country Turkey (unless 
the ever more pronounced authoritarian slide of the Turkish state under 
president Erdogan decides the issue for them before). At the very least, 
leaders must realise that an eventual Turkish membership would not only 
have considerable (and very real) ‘external’ geopolitical consequences, 
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but also costs in terms of the ‘internal’ capacity of the EU to regain the 
trust of its citizens, without which it cannot survive.
After a summer where the shock of post- Brexit denial gripped 
Brussels, later signs were more promising. In the letter of invitation 
for the informal summit of Bratislava on the 16 September 2016, the 
president of the European Council Donald Tusk wrote, without hesi-
tation:  ‘People quite rightly expect their leaders to protect the space 
they live in ... It is therefore crucial to restore the balance between the 
need for freedom and security, and between the need for openness and 
protection.’ Those who know the realistic liberalism of the Pole, quite vis-
ible in his role in the migrant crisis during the winter of 2015– 16, would 
not have been surprised. More remarkable, however, was the ‘State of the 
Union’ speech by Jean- Claude Juncker, delivered on 14 September 2016 
in Strasbourg. What the president of the European Commission said, 
among others, about border guards, border patrol and Chinese dump-
ing was just as remarkable as what was not said – not a word about the 
TTIP in the nearly 50- minute speech (Juncker 2016). More recently, in 
his speech after the first round of the French presidential election, on 23 
April 2017, Emmanuel Macron called for ‘a Europe that protects’, keenly 
aware that he needs to reach out to those voters who are angry or frus-
trated with the EU. Denial is clearly a thing of the past. In the months and 
years ahead, European leaders must solidify the implementation of this 
new balance between freedom and protection. It is a matter of survival.
7. The ‘We are Europe’ policy
As long as European citizens consider Brussels as a threat to their con-
stitutional, political or cultural identity, the Union will remain in murky 
waters. Even if a real response emerges to force the creation of a Union 
that is to care for and protect its citizens, there will remain an impor-
tant role for communication. It is particularly incumbent upon the heads 
of state and of government before, during and after each summit meet-
ing, to show and explain to their respective voters that Europe cannot be 
reduced to ‘Brussels’ alone. Rather, whatever our nationality, at the heart 
of the Union, Europe belongs to us all.
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Britain’s singular other
Germany and the Brexit crisis
William E. Paterson
The road to Brexit
The Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was arguably the key event in post- war 
British politics.The UK’s role in the allied victory and its role in post- war 
Germany gave it an enhanced status and removed the rivalry that had 
scarred British–German relations in the preceding century. This privi-
leged role for the UK was swept away by German unity, where Germany 
achieved full sovereignty and territorial expansion. It is this sense of loss 
that explains Prime Minister Thatcher’s hostility to German unification 
(Campbell 2004, 32– 41).
German unity turned out to be a critical juncture and took 
Germany and the UK along different paths. The German government 
under Chancellor Kohl opted for the path of deeper integration in the 
Maastricht Treaties, while the UK made ever more frequent use of 
‘opt- out’ provisions to escape the embrace of deeper integration. Until 
the onset of the eurozone crisis, these divergent paths did not appear to 
be an immediate existential threat to the EU, though the complete failure 
of the UK government to inform the British public about the EU obvi-
ously carried grave risks in the event of a crisis. With the breaking out 
of the crisis, the status quo no longer looked like an option for Germany 
and members of the eurozone and it was clear that at some point further 
steps would need to be taken to safeguard the eurozone. Within the UK, 
the eurozone crisis emboldened the Eurosceptics, who now perceived the 
EU as a failed enterprise, which they sought to exploit to effect a British 
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exit, and the defenders of British membership of the EU could not draw 
on a reservoir of public knowledge and support. The decisive blow how-
ever was probably Chancellor Merkel’s decision to allow Syrian refugees 
to proceed from Austria to Germany in August 2015, which was quickly 
exploited by the Eurosceptic press and politicians to give the (wholly mis-
taken) impression that Britain would be threatened by waves of refugees. 
Ironically both the eurozone and the issue of migration were covered by 
‘opt outs’, but the low level of information about the EU in Britain allowed 
them to be used as an argument in favour of leaving.
David Cameron and renegotiation
Under pressure from Eurosceptics inside the Conservative Party and elec-
toral pressure from UKIP, Prime Minister Cameron decided to hold an ‘in– 
out’ referendum on the UK membership of the EU, though it was labelled 
as an ‘advisory referendum’. This was to be preceded by a renegotiation of 
the terms of the UK membership where it was hoped that Britain would be 
granted major concessions in relation to ‘freedom of movement of labour’, 
the area where the Conservative government felt under most pressure 
from UKIP. In the renegotiation, David Cameron had hoped to secure con-
cessions through relying on the ‘good offices’ of Germany to move other 
Member States to support sufficiently dramatic concessions so as to allow 
him to triumph. In taking this option, Cameron assumed that Germany 
occupied a hegemonic position. This calculation failed for a number of 
reasons. Whilst Germany operates as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ (Paterson 
2011) in the eurozone, it lacks hegemonic power across the EU as a whole. 
Almost no attention was paid to other Member States whose agreement 
would have been necessary. Cameron also assumed a convergence of pri-
orities between the UK and Germany, failing to understand that Germany 
was above all concerned with maintenance of the eurozone and of the EU 
as a whole. Ultimately, the UK’s ‘transactional’ approach to its EU member-
ship clashed with a German approach that reserved significant space for 
fundamental values, freedom of movement being one of the more impor-
tant. The British approach of demanding bespoke ‘opt- outs’ and its policy 
of promiscuous differentiation, which had been so successful in the past, 
would therefore have its limits. In the Brexit post-mortem, many in the UK 
continue to argue that, had there been one more concerted push, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel would have conceded on free movement. There 
is no evidence for this view and even if she had conceded some ground, it 
would not have been accepted by other Member States.
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After the referendum
The balance of UK policy towards Germany changed sharply with the 
arrival of Theresa May as prime minister, who reversed the policy and 
personnel choices of her predecessor. There was a perception that David 
Cameron over- invested in Germany, and after an initial visit to Berlin by 
Prime Minister May no great effort was made to court Germany or any 
other major Member States. With the arrival of President Trump, atten-
tion has been concentrated on Washington and potential trade partners 
rather than European partners. A ‘Remainer’ in the referendum campaign, 
May subsequently positioned herself at the head of a ‘hard Brexit’ course 
and appointed three pro- Brexit ministers (Boris Johnson, David Davis and 
Liam Fox) to key ministerial posts. One of the assumptions of the ‘hard 
Brexit’ position is that the negotiating advantage lies with the UK and that 
the correct course is to press the British position strongly (whilst being 
prepared to leave if progress does not result). This highly risky position 
which reflects a visceral dislike of the EU rests, to some extent, on the 
view that Cameron’s renegotiation failed largely because he had indicated 
a strong preference to remain and had not stressed that he would be pre-
pared to exit if the renegotiation failed.
For the German government, Brexit has slipped sharply down 
the list of priorities. Chancellor Merkel’s first priority, especially after 
a temporary surge in support for the Social Democratic Party’s candi-
date, Martin Schulz, was to secure re- election. The second priority was 
maintaining the unity of the remaining EU members post- Brexit, since 
a special responsibility is seen to fall on Germany in this regard. A third 
priority was to deal with the threats to the EU posed by Putin in Russia 
and Trump in the US, and a fourth was dealing with the eurozone and 
migration crises. Only then was Brexit considered a priority.
The economics of Brexit
In Cameron’s premiership there was a widely held view that Germany, 
and particularly Merkel, would throw its weight unequivocally behind 
the British negotiating position. This was always an unrealistic posi-
tion which ignored the fact that Merkel had to take account of the 
preferences of other Member States and that ‘freedom of movement’ 
was a core EU value. Nevertheless the failure of Merkel to meet British 
expectations in this regard led to deep disappointment in the UK. 
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Post- referendum, attention has shifted in the direction of German 
business. Germany is the exporting nation par excellence and the inter-
ests of export- oriented business could be expected to weigh heavily. 
Moreover, German businesses are heavily invested in Britain. In 2016, 
Germany exported €86 billion worth of goods to the UK, while German 
imports from the UK were only half of that. Germany is also a major 
investor in the UK car industry with a very healthy trade balance in 
pharmaceuticals, machine building and electronics (Turner & Green 
2017). In recent years a number of authors, notably Hans Kundnani 
(2014), have argued that German external preferences are essentially 
set by its export- oriented firms.
Although these factors might be expected to lend credence to the 
primacy of economics argument, in actual fact the evidence points the 
other way. Trade with Britain is much smaller than trade with the rest 
of the EU. Merkel’s priority, accepted by German business, is to keep 
the EU together and the Single Market flourishing (Savage 2017). 
Hans Kundnani’s view that business is becoming more dominant in 
preference- formation seems to be the reverse of what is happening. 
Traditionally, the German export industry indeed shaped German pref-
erences, but in a series of recent decisions the relationship has been 
the other way around. Merkel overruled the objections of business, for 
instance, in order to press sanctions against Russia in the Ukraine crisis. 
Even more strikingly, the support that German business gave the pro-
posals for a TTIP gained no traction whatsoever, and on Brexit German 
firms were forced to bow to the wider interest. There is an obvious sym-
metry here with UK businesses, which have also been unable to make 
their preferences in favour of British Single Market membership count.
The politics of Brexit
If the view that the economic interests of Germany will be enough to 
secure a favourable outcome for Britain in the Brexit negotiations is mis-
placed, it is reasonable to ask whether the political environment will be 
any more benign.
the clouds gather
The starting point is the feeling of annoyance generated by Brexit. 
Germany had taken the lead in offering Britain concessions in successive 
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negotiations since the UK’s original entry into the EEC in 1973. These 
concessions were often made against strong resistance from France. 
The German government felt it had gone as far as it could in the nego-
tiations with Cameron, and was therefore surprised and disappointed 
that Cameron was unable to sell the deal to the British public despite 
continually assuring them that victory was inevitable. They were fur-
ther irritated by post- referendum British claims that this was the fault 
of the Germans, who had been unreasonable in not making concessions 
on freedom of movement. This charge ignores the fact that limitations 
on free movement would have received even less support from the other 
Member States. The harsh tone employed by Prime Minister May towards 
the EU, and her identification with President Trump, also succeeded in 
further alienating German opinion.
germany’s lonely position
A British exit from the EU leaves Germany with a number of unwelcome 
problems. The UK is a major contributor to the EU budget and its depar-
ture raises awkward questions in relation to financing, with a number 
of Member States entertaining expectations that Germany – as the rich-
est and largest Member State – will fill the gap. The financing issue also 
explains the firmness of the German insistence that Britain must settle its 
debts before the negotiation of any future trade deal can begin. In rela-
tion to the EU27, the focus of the German government will be on con-
taining expenditure and exporting its brand of austerity. This was an area 
where Britain was a dependable ally. Germany thus also stands to lose its 
most powerful ally against (economic) statism. The departure of the UK 
also leaves Germany even more exposed as the dominant power in the 
EU. A great deal now hinges on the recovery of France under Emmanuel 
Macron.
Germany’s position as ‘reluctant hegemon’ is also likely to come 
under more pressure after Brexit. The term applies especially to Germany’s 
role in the eurozone crisis. In the past, Germany would have sought to 
deal with the crisis through the Franco- German relationship but France’s 
weakening economy meant that it became clear quite quickly that it was 
not a viable partner in this regard. Germany’s ever- strengthening econ-
omy and principal creditor status placed it in the driving seat in relation 
to setting the rules in the eurozone.
Germany’s historical past and the costs associated with a hegem-
onic role meant that it was one it accepted with some reluctance. 
By some measures the largest economy, it is now even more obvious 
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that Germany is the dominant Member State, a role that comes with 
increased expectations and responsibilities. This is at its most obvious 
in relation to the migration crisis where the Eastern European Member 
States continue to benefit from substantial EU funds while refusing to 
play their part in a fair distribution of incoming refugees. In that con-
text, demands from Britain that it be afforded a bespoke Brexit deal are 
especially irksome.
changing geopolitics
These added burdens have arisen at a time when the political sands 
are shifting around Merkel’s feet. Geopolitically, she is the first German 
Chancellor to face a challenge from a US president. Barack Obama had 
been a staunch ally of Chancellor Merkel whilst in office, but Donald 
Trump’s cry of ‘America First’ has made enemies of the liberal world 
order generally – and China and Germany specifically – because of their 
large trade surpluses with the US. Things started to normalise after the 
Chancellor’s visit to Washington, and Trump became somewhat less 
hostile, but he is still a long way from being a supporter of Germany 
and made a number of statements critical of Germany at the G20 
Conference in Hamburg (Gathmann & Wittrock 2017). The fact that the 
UK continues to support the position of President Trump, despite its oft- 
proclaimed support for global free trade and the Paris Climate Accord, is 
a source of bafflement and annoyance to many Germans. Merkel is fur-
ther pressured by the actions of President Putin in Syria and the Ukraine. 
Whereas her Social Democrat coalition partners offer strong support in 
her dealings with the US, they have continued to privilege engagement, 
not containment, in her dealings with Russia. The emergence of illiberal 
governments in Hungary and Poland is a source of further pressure on 
Chancellor Merkel.
The envisaged departure of the UK has not led to the contagion 
effect some predicted, although in truth this was a view that was 
only really held by the British. Nevertheless, the EU remains frac-
tious, with southern Europeans attacking Germany’s austerity policy 
and Eastern Europeans opposing Merkel’s refugee policy. Faced with 
these challenges, Merkel’s priority has to be to focus on keeping the 
EU together, rather than spend time and political capital on the Brexit 
negotiations.
The election of Emmanuel Macron to the French Presidency has 
transformed the mood and reduced the German sense of isolation;. 
Macron is a pro- European who is keen to revive the Franco- German 
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alliance, although French economic weakness will mean that Germany 
remains the indispensable and dominant partner in this relationship, 
with all the attendant responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Franco- German 
relationship represents the future and policy attention will be centred on 
that relationship rather than pandering to the British as they vanish in 
the rear-view mirror.
In relation to the negotiations themselves, one immediate prob-
lem arising is the relative readiness of the respective negotiating 
teams. The German team, despite still coping with the migration and 
eurozone crises, is formidably well prepared. They have, in turn, been 
shocked by the ignorance and lack of preparedness on the part of the 
UK. The British coordination mechanism on the EU was traditionally 
regarded with great admiration by other Member States, with the UK’s 
Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP) in Brussels considered 
formidably well briefed. The resignation of the hugely respected Sir 
Ivan Rogers as UK Permanent Representative on 7 January 2017 and 
his replacement by Sir Tim Barrow, a non- EU security specialist with-
out any of Sir Ivan’s vast knowledge, has gravely weakened UKREP. 
Moreover, the new ministries established to deal with Brexit  – the 
Department for Exiting the EU and the Department for International 
Trade  – are headed by ministers with no recent experience of deal-
ing with the EU, and are seriously understaffed. This leads to myriad 
difficulties. The UK government’s desire for a quick deal on the rights 
of EU nationals in the UK, seen as essential for the operation of the 
British labour market, ignores many of the legal and technical com-
plexities involved. The insistence on abolishing the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU while aiming for the best possible access to the Single Market is 
viewed with confusion in Germany. If Britain were to secure favourable 
terms of access to the Single Market, it would need to be on the basis 
of equivalent regulation, for which there would have to exist some pro-
cess to monitor divergence and resolve conflicts. An alternative to the 
CJEU would be cumbersome and extremely difficult to agree upon.
Whilst the area of trade policy is of the greatest interest to the 
two governments, the ‘red lines’ set out by the UK government in Prime 
Minister May’s Lancaster House speech (May 2017a) will make agree-
ment very difficult. The area of security and counter terrorism should be 
much easier to resolve given the UK’s acceptance of Europol and the obvi-
ous common interest both countries have in this area. Here too the ‘red 
line’ on the oversight of the CJEU would create obstacles in the technical 
details of cooperation in areas such as data protection, which is extremely 
sensitive in Germany for historical reasons.
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Cooperation in the area of foreign policy, which has always been 
intergovernmental and is outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU, will be 
easier. The danger here is that the UK regards security as its ‘get out 
of jail’ card, able to produce large concessions on the trade front. The 
German view is that security is best understood as a common good that 
is in the interests of both countries and should therefore not be used to 
extract leverage in other areas. Although cooperation with the UK is seen 
as desirable, the German government is stepping up defence coopera-
tion with France, including the joint development of a fighter aircraft and 
increasing spending on Germany’s own defence forces to ensure contin-
ued security after Brexit.
Conclusions
The future is uncertain, more so than usual, and the outcome of the 
Brexit negotiations are unclear. What is clear is that the result of the 
UK referendum marks a deep caesura in UK– German relations. After 
an awkward initial start under Margaret Thatcher, the post- German 
unity relations between Britain and Germany have been unprecedent-
edly close. This closeness required the exercise of tact and restraint on 
both sides, but especially on the German side. A united Germany inevi-
tably reduced the importance of the UK, even in regard to relations with 
the US, traditionally a cornerstone of British self- regard. Although they 
diverged on integration issues, the two countries were close on trade 
and security. Under David Cameron, who relied totally on Germany in 
his renegotiation bid, relations were probably closer than at any time in 
recent history.
Theresa May began her tenure as prime minister with a success-
ful visit to Berlin, but since then relations have rapidly worsened. The 
German government has been dismayed by May’s uncritical support 
for President Trump and her jettisoning of the more traditional UK 
role acting as a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. A series of veiled 
threats on security and the possibility of the UK adopting a low- tax 
‘Singaporean’ model in the event of talks breaking down have been 
received poorly in Germany, where it is pointed out these would harm 
the UK more than the EU.
The decision by Theresa May to attempt to strengthen her 
majority by calling a snap election on 8 June 2017 turned out very 
badly for her, resulting in a ‘hung parliament’. Prime Minister May 
was forced to strike a deal with the Democratic Unionist Party of 
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Northern Ireland to secure a majority. It is quite difficult to establish 
what the voters intended but at the very least it indicates a lack of 
support for Prime Minister May’s ‘hard Brexit course’. It was not at 
all clear that Prime Minister May would be able to survive as prime 
minister beyond the initial weeks. The weakness of the British gov-
ernment has provoked some alarm in Germany and Foreign Minister 
Sigmar Gabriel in an interview with Welt am Sonntag indicated that 
the German government might be prepared to make concessions to 
encourage a ‘soft Brexit’; in particular he floated the idea of a joint 
court rather than the CJEU to arbitrate disputes (Maidment 2017). 
The Chancellor has been extremely sparing in any comments in the 
run- up to the Federal Election of 24 September.
Whatever option finally emerges, Germany will not, and cannot, 
act as a comfort blanket for the UK in the future. The British hope that 
the US might fulfil this role also looks unlikely, after President Trump 
indicated that a trade agreement with the EU will take precedence 
over a similar deal with the UK. For Germany, the departure of the UK 
will be regrettable on trade and budgetary issues, but it will not make 
a significant dent on Germany’s upwards rise, either politically or eco-
nomically. For Britain the results will be economically and psychologi-
cally very painful.
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France, Britain and Brexit
Helen Drake
2017: a year of disruption
Brexit, and the election of Emmanuel Macron, have galvanised the politi-
cal environments in Britain and France, respectively. Each development 
is, in its own way, highly disruptive of the status quo. If the mantra of 
disruption is ‘to move fast and break things’ (BBC Radio Four 2017), then 
the election of Macron to the French presidency and the wholesale suc-
cess of his political movement La République en Marche (LREM) in the 
French National Assembly fits the bill entirely. Macron and his party sped 
to power in little over 12 months and the French political landscape is, for 
now, littered with the debris of the political parties that he – and LREM – 
outwitted. In the business world, disruptive change involves stealing 
a march on one’s incumbents whose customers initially deem the new 
product to be inferior (Christensen et al. 2015). Substitute Macron for 
‘product’ and voters for ‘customers’, and here, too, the analogy is not so 
far- fetched (if unpleasant).
In the case of Brexit, the process can hardly be described as ‘fast’ 
but as time goes on, finding evidence that Brexit will not be inferior to EU 
membership is becoming harder and harder. Moreover, the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU is by definition a matter of ‘breaking things’, and 
the Franco- British relationship will certainly not be left undisturbed by 
the separation. At the same time, Brexit in fact fits perfectly into a cross- 
Channel friendship that for centuries has been marked by competition, 
collaboration, rivalry and change. No one should have been surprised 
that the UK’s shock decision by referendum to withdraw from the EU 
was greeted in France in part as an opportunity for French competitive 
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advantage. ‘Let the expatriates return!’, exclaimed French Prime Minister 
Édouard Philippe when presenting his government’s legislative pro-
gramme to the National Assembly (Philippe 2017). The French leader 
was making a general point about France’s future, but on the specifics of 
Brexit, such overtures have been just as common as expressions of regret. 
Given that ‘Year One’ of Brexit (from the referendum of 23 June 2016 to 
the UK general election of 8 June 2017) coincided with the French elec-
toral marathon – culminating in the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions in May and June 2017 respectively – it was particularly likely that 
Brexit would serve as electoral bait across the French political spectrum.
Brexit and the EU in the 2017 French elections
According to Édouard Philippe, the results of those elections can be taken 
as evidence that the French remain firmly attached to the EU and the 
euro, since they voted for a candidate – Emmanuel Macron – who openly 
embraced France’s European identity (Philippe 2017). ‘Frexit’ was cer-
tainly averted in the 2017 elections, despite being on the electoral ticket. 
One candidate, François Asselineau, had openly campaigned for Frexit 
but scored less than 1 per cent (0.92 per cent) of the votes in the first 
round of the presidential elections. Two other presidential candidates – 
Marine Le Pen and Jean- Luc Mélenchon  – fought highly Eurosceptic 
campaigns and achieved significant scores: in the first round the two can-
didates between them won just over 40 per cent of the votes combined 
(a total of over 14 million votes); and in the second round, Le Pen broke 
through the barrier of 10 million votes with a score of 33.9 per cent of the 
total (against Macron’s 66.1 per cent).
The entire thrust of Mélenchon’s campaign was to rail against the 
idea of a ‘submissive’ France. Applied to the question of Europe, this trans-
lated into a Plan A: to radically reform the EU treaties along with other 
Member States wishing to free themselves (as Mélenchon saw it) from, 
in particular, the rigours of eurozone governance. If Plan A failed, then 
Plan B was for France to unilaterally ‘leave’ the EU’s treaty framework 
(‘the EU: change it or leave it’). In the case of Marine Le Pen, the hor-
rors of the EU, as she portrayed them, were both central to her platform 
and a factor in her loss of the second- round presidential vote to Macron. 
Her number one proposal (out of 144) was to ‘recover France’s national 
sovereignty in a Europe of independent nations at the service of its 
peoples’ (Le Pen 2017), much as proponents of Brexit aim to ‘take 
back control’. She would negotiate this recovery of France’s ‘monetary, 
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legislative, territorial and economic sovereignties’ (Le Pen 2017) with her 
EU counterparts, and put the result to the French people in a referendum. 
For Le Pen, Brexit was inspirational, representing, in her eyes, nothing 
less than the liberation of the British people. Unfortunately for Le Pen, 
she performed badly when debating these issues on live TV, especially in 
the head- to- head debate with Macron between the first and second rounds 
of the presidential elections. Apparently unsure of her technical ground, 
her visceral emotions were laid bare for anyone who chose to see.
Sixty years of French engagement with the EU: 
at what cost?
Nevertheless, were the French to hold an ‘in– out’ referendum of its 
own on the subject of its EU membership, we would be unwise to pre-
dict the outcome. ‘Frexit’ was evidently no longer unthinkable by the 
time of the 2017 elections in France. Previous referendums in France 
on EU affairs have seen either narrow victories for further integration 
(as with Maastricht in 1993) or rejections (the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005), and French public support for EU membership remains shaky 
(Eurobarometer, 2017). Generations of French politicians since 1945 
have proclaimed their commitment to European integration in the form 
of a promise ‘to make Europe without unmaking France’ (see Bossuat 
2006; Drake & Reynolds 2017, 111), but France’s relations with the EU 
are problematic for domestic French politics, and have been for some 
time. In this respect, France and the UK are not so dissimilar in their 
quandary over what it means to be an EU Member State.
In 2011, the Economist’s Intelligence Unit downgraded France 
from a ‘full’ to a ‘flawed’ democracy on the specific grounds that its 
response to the eurozone crisis  – agreeing to more stringent oversight 
of national finances by Brussels – was undermining national democracy 
(Drake & Reynolds 2017, 113; Economist Intelligence Unit 2011). By the 
time of the 2012 presidential elections, the extent to which France was 
integrated into the EU was made more explicit by the leading presiden-
tial candidates than was typically the case; they could hardly do other-
wise in the context of the EU’s ongoing crises (financial and migratory, to 
name but two). That election, it has been argued, was an unprecedent-
edly ‘Europeanised contest’ whereby candidates joined the dots between 
national political competition (the presidential election) and EU- level 
policy orientation (Dehousse & Tacea 2012, 16). They did so overwhelm-
ingly to oppose the EU in some shape or form. The appeal of the two 
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leading Eurosceptic candidates of 2017 seen above – Mélenchon and Le 
Pen – was certainly established in this 2012 contest (between them they 
won almost 30 per cent of the votes in the first round). But front runners 
François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy were also critical of the EU’s han-
dling of the crises, and raised expectations that they would be the presi-
dent to improve EU affairs.
Constitutionally speaking, French presidents do have considerable 
leeway over European policymaking. Institutionally, they also have far 
more of a free hand than, say, the UK prime minister has: as Rozenberg 
(2016) has demonstrated, they are simply not held to account by their 
parties in Parliament in the same way. (We have seen how unwelcoming 
UK Prime Minister Theresa May has become to her parliamentary oppos-
ition on the matter of Brexit.) But to bring their party to power in the 
first place, French presidential candidates have to clear the hurdle of the 
two- round voting system of the presidential election. They have to ‘catch 
all’ in their electoral camp, Europhiles and Eurosceptics alike, by means 
of a ‘synthetic vision of Europe’ (Rozenberg 2016). This is a vision that 
papers over the cracks in their own parties and in the camp that delivered 
50+ per cent of the national vote, and stores up problems for the next 
elections. President Macron, as we saw above, came to power by creating 
a new political camp entirely. In so doing, he neatly side- stepped the pre-
vious ‘laws of nature’, and created an opportunity (however ephemeral) 
for French- led disruption on the EU stage.
Towards a ‘political Europe’?
It would seem from President Macron himself that the plan is to secure 
a ‘political Europe’. This is anything but original. For Rozenberg 
(2016, 2), ‘[t] he solution of a ‘political Europe’ is so regularly put 
forward that the idea has become polymorphous and even meaning-
less’. It certainly is a mainstay of French discourse on the EU, and it 
does arguably have some shape, at least conceptually. In Macron’s 
own words, a political Europe is a ‘voluntary and realistic association 
of states’ that have agreed upon ‘useful policies’ on matters such as 
the freedom of movement of goods and people, and especially young 
people, security, monetary and fiscal affairs, and culture (Macron 
2017). Macron differs little from his predecessors here in rationalis-
ing European integration as a matter for national states and govern-
ments (over and above free markets, and in theory favouring the long 
term and the strategic); as a project defined by fundamental values 
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(freedom, peace, progress); and as an expression of Europe’s poten-
tial as a global actor.
This is a vision that is airily dismissive of the EU’s actual nature 
as an intensely rules- based system of governance and, true to French 
form, Macron mocks the EU for its ‘tyranny of agendas and calendars’, 
likening the EU to neighbours in crisis- management mode, no longer 
trusting each other to run their communal assets and instead devis-
ing ever more rules to govern their interactions (Macron 2017). He 
attributes Euroscepticism in general, and Brexit in particular, to such 
distractions, as he sees them. He, in contrast, is impatient to get back 
to basics. By the end of 2017, says Macron, he will initiate ‘democratic 
conventions’ all across Europe to get the continent back onto this polit-
ical footing – a Europe that unites people. Member States can sign up 
or not, as they wish, he breezily announces. This, he claims, is a job 
for a new generation of political leaders, and perhaps here he has a 
point. Brexit, we should note in contrast, is being handled in the UK 
by an existing generation of leaders, many of whom appear unable or 
unwilling to escape the shadow of the past when it comes to the UK’s 
relations with the EU, and many of whom are seeking, if anything, to 
go backwards not forwards. With reference to both the EU– UK Brexit 
negotiations and Macron’s plans for a political Europe, Kuper’s (2017) 
argument against relying on rhetoric rather than a gritty engagement 
with the rules seems timely.
In the case of France there is some sense of more concrete 
priorities, and Brexit is towards the bottom of the list. It features as one 
of three EU- level negotiations that Prime Minister Édouard Philippe 
has identified as ‘crucial’, the others being the ‘redefinition of our pro-
ject as 27 with Germany and those of our partners who want to move 
ahead’; and the EU’s financial perspectives for beyond 2020 (Philippe 
2017). Above and beyond this triad of talks come two broader priori-
ties for France. The first is to ‘reconcile’ the French with the EU; the 
second is to build a ‘Europe that protects’ (via improved eurozone gov-
ernance; progress on EU defence policy and ‘social convergence’, and 
the development of a commercial policy based on reciprocity). These 
two ideas – restoring public confidence in the EU and in French lead-
ers’ ability to lead it, and re- orientating EU policy – are not remotely 
new, and flow from the ‘political Europe’ goal outlined above. As 
such, Macron’s best hope for results lies in French engagement on 
the ground. By way of example, the Franco- German Council in July 
2017 ended with an announcement of plans for a joint (‘European’) 
fighter jet. Whilst this signalled shared intentions to bolster the EU’s 
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autonomous defence capacity, the initiative for now raises far more 
questions than answers (Le Monde 2017).
Negotiating change …
Will France will be any more successful at re- engaging with the EU 
under Macron’s leadership than the UK will be at disengaging via Brexit? 
To succeed in either case implies productive negotiations with the other 
EU Member States and with the EU’s own institutions. Productive nego-
tiations, in turn, require the primary parties (in the case of Brexit, the 
EU Commission and the UK government) to be both properly constituted 
and fully functional (see Crump 2006). Year One of Brexit has already 
provided much food for thought in these regards and could be instruc-
tive by comparison for the French case.
By properly constituted we mean they must have clearly defined 
roles and cohesive and predictable support from supporting parties 
(such as junior partners in a government coalition). Taking the example 
of Brexit once more, the parties to the negotiations and their roles are 
highly structured on the EU side by dint of Treaty provision and the nego-
tiations guidelines and directives that have flowed from them (European 
Commission 2017c, European Council 2017a). On the UK side, the cohe-
sion and predictability of the primary party – the UK government – has 
been weakened since the UK general election of 8 June 2017, in which 
the Conservative government lost its majority in the House of Commons.
Second, to be functional means at the very least to be able to own 
the problem or the opportunity, to identify it as such; to take decisions; 
and to communicate those decisions as required (Crump 2006, 2). The 
EU party to the Brexit negotiations is for now fully functional: agreed 
on what Brexit means for the EU, agreed on how they want to talk 
about it with the UK government, in what sequence and by which 
deadlines. To date, they have communicated their interests coher-
ently, and speak with one voice. The solidarity of the EU27 may well 
fray when it comes to decision- making time, but they have entered 
the talks in good shape. In contrast, the UK party is dysfunctional. 
Rhetorically, the government has defined Brexit as an unrivalled and 
unprecedented opportunity for the UK, but this has yet to be translated 
into a negotiations script and is contested, even within the govern-
ment. In term of its decision- making capacity, the UK government has 
explicitly bound itself by the ‘will of the British people’ as expressed in 
outcome of the 23 June 2016 referendum. Since that referendum, the 
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courts and Parliament have predictably entered the decision- making 
arena since even the ‘will of the people’ must be implemented via due 
democratic process. Owning and communicating these facts – that the 
UK is a weak and dysfunctional negotiations party at a Brexit negotia-
tions table where the power is stacked against it – is understandably 
challenging.
… Or change through disruption?
For France and in contrast, negotiating its way back in to a position 
of power and influence within the EU27 should be far less fraught. 
France is well constituted as a negotiating partner following Macron 
and LREM’s victories at the 2017 elections. Moreover, it is func-
tional:  Macron ‘owned’ Europe from the night of his election victory 
on Sunday 7 May onwards, by appropriating symbols such as the EU 
anthem and the EU flag; Macron and his government have identi-
fied the EU as an opportunity; and to communicate all this, France’s 
current leaders are deploying a familiar rhetoric of ‘political Europe’ 
with the intention of disarming the Euroscepticism that has taken root 
in French political parties and public opinion alike. On the other side of 
the table are individual Member States and the EU institutions. There is 
no joint bloc to face France down, nor are France’s partners brandishing a 
ticking clock. The complex and heightened emotions that characterise the 
Brexit negotiations are less of an issue in France’s relations with the EU.
But there are time pressures on Macron and his government to 
deliver on their electoral promises (and not only on EU affairs). The 
presidency is ‘fast’ – a short five years (Cole 2012); expectations are high 
and the political climate is troubled. The very nature of Macron’s dis-
ruption of the status quo creates conditions in the political environment 
that threaten France’s ability to negotiate change at the EU level. We saw 
above that he is supported politically by a new camp that is untried and 
untested, and this potentially weakens the constitution – the coherence – 
of France as a negotiating partner. Indeed, the first weeks of the new 
government witnessed numerous ministerial resignations and reshuffles. 
Then there are threats to the functionality of France as an EU partner, 
and would- be leading partner at that. In particular, the risk of domes-
tic distractions is high, given the controversial agenda of socioeconomic 
change and the several false starts already made in this regard, and this 
will drain attention and decision- making resources (including political 
capital) away from the French executive.
 
BrExit  And BEyond104
  
Conclusions
We have seen above that in the case of both France and the UK, 2017 
will have been a year of some reckoning. In particular and for both 
countries, EU membership came to dominate the political agenda and 
capture people’s emotions. In neither case was the status quo deemed 
sustainable. Accordingly, and on either side of the Channel, political 
leaders are engaged in challenging conversations with their domes-
tic and EU constituencies. The end game is change, and the method 
is disruption. Strictly speaking, disruption is not negotiated change. 
It is a method of challenging the status quo that relies on creativity, 
speed and luck. Its intent is positive in the sense of growth:  of 
markets, market share and consumer choice. But ‘moving fast and 
breaking things’ is a high- risk strategy in the business world, and in 
the political environment may well come at very high cost. Brexit 
and the Macron effect have broken their respective moulds, and we 
await the outcomes with much interest.
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Brexit and Ireland
Collateral damage?
Nicholas Wright
Introduction
Nowhere are the complexities of Brexit more apparent than in the 
challenge they pose to Ireland, North and South, and particularly in 
the issue of the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland, 
the UK’s only land border with a neighbouring state. The European 
Council guidelines identify the ‘unique circumstances on the island of 
Ireland’ as one of the three main issues to be dealt with in the first 
stage of the Brexit negotiations which are focused on the actual with-
drawal (or ‘divorce’), along with citizens’ rights and the UK’s financial 
obligations (European Council 2017a). Only once sufficient progress 
has been made on each of these – a determination to be made by the 
European Council based on a recommendation by the EU’s chief nego-
tiator, Michel Barnier – can discussion of the post- Brexit UK– EU rela-
tionship, including the nature of their new trading relationship, begin.
Brexit has, though, begun against a backdrop of increasing ten-
sion in Northern Irish politics, partly but not only as a consequence 
of the fallout from the referendum result which saw a 55.8 per cent 
vote in favour of Remain. Following the referendum, the first minister 
and deputy first minister wrote to the prime minister in August 2016 
calling, in essence, for the status quo in terms of freedom of movement 
of people, goods and services to be maintained (Doherty et  al. 2017). 
However, the subsequent collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive in 
January 2017 brought 10  years of power- sharing to an end and led to 
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elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly in March (less than a year 
after the previous elections). While the two main parties dominated once 
more – the pro- Remain Sinn Fein won 27 seats, only one fewer than the 
pro- Leave Democratic Unionist Party – the results mean that for the first 
time Unionist parties no longer have an outright majority, while overall 
70 per cent of Northern Irish voters backed ‘parties opposed to Brexit’ 
(Murphy 2017).
Since then, negotiations between Sinn Fein and the DUP have made 
little progress. Moreover, the results of the UK general election in June 
2017 have caused further complexity, with the DUP agreeing to support 
a minority Conservative government through a ‘confidence and supply’ 
arrangement. This has led some, including former Conservative Prime 
Minister Sir John Major, one of the architects of the 1993 Downing Street 
Declaration,1 to question the capacity of the UK government to act as an 
honest broker in Northern Irish politics, an important element of the 
Good Friday Agreement (Syal & Walker 2017). The key point, though, 
is that as long as power- sharing remains in abeyance, Northern Ireland 
lacks an independent voice representing both communities in the discus-
sions that will determine how Brexit will impact them.
This chapter explores the political ramifications of Brexit for the 
two parts of Ireland in greater detail. It begins by examining the role 
played by the EU both in supporting efforts at peace in Northern Ireland 
but also in facilitating the remarkable improvement in the Anglo- Irish 
intergovernmental relationship in recent years. It then considers the 
challenge Brexit poses to Northern Ireland’s political settlement, as well 
as to Ireland and Anglo- Irish relations in the context of the border. In 
doing so, it seeks to highlight the inherent tension between the UK gov-
ernment’s broader stated aims regarding the return of sovereignty and 
desire for control of borders on the one hand, and its declared commit-
ments and legal obligations to sustain Northern Ireland’s political settle-
ment on the other. While these tensions are not easily resolved, failure 
to do so is likely to place even greater pressure on devolution and the 
broader peace process.
1. The EU and Northern Ireland
In the almost two decades since the Good Friday Agreement was signed 
(HM Government 1998), Northern Irish politics have transformed, 
as has ‘Northern Ireland’ as a political issue both in the UK and inter-
nationally. Although currently suspended, the devolved administration 
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in Belfast, the Northern Ireland Executive, has seen Unionist and 
Nationalist politicians working together as equals despite ongoing and 
sometimes significant tensions. Meanwhile, North– South engagement 
between Belfast and Dublin has become normalised to an extent barely 
imaginable only a few decades previously. Finally, Anglo- Irish rela-
tions have never been closer, as symbolised by the state visits of Queen 
Elizabeth II to Ireland in 2011 (the first by a British monarch in a cen-
tury) and the Irish President Michael D. Higgins to the UK in 2014 (the 
first ever by an Irish head of state). The House of Lords European Union 
Committee described this relationship as having been ‘turbocharged in 
recent years by an unprecedented degree of friendship as the Northern 
Ireland peace process has advanced’ (House of Lords 2016, 3), while the 
UK government considers that it ‘has never been better or more settled 
than today’ (HM Government 2017d, 21). Much of this has been down to 
the many years of hard work and commitment of politicians, officials and 
activists from all sides.
However, the influence of the EU both directly and indirectly has also 
been vital in facilitating a sea  change in relations. Indeed, the UK govern-
ment acknowledges the EU’s ‘unwavering support for the peace process’ in 
its recent position paper on Northern Ireland (HM Government 2017d). 
The EU’s engagement with Northern Ireland can be seen both technically/ 
financially and politically – or as ‘context and agency’ (Hayward 2017a). 
In technical terms, EU membership has been expressed primarily through 
the access the UK and Ireland have to a number of EU programmes and the 
funding they disburse. The most obvious example of this is the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). EU subsidies provided through the CAP cur-
rently represent 87 per cent of income for Northern Irish farmers com-
pared with 53 per cent for the UK overall (Burke 2017). In 2014, the then 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development for Northern Ireland 
noted that Northern Irish farmers received almost £300m in annual subsi-
dies which they considered ‘essential support … sustaining farming com-
munities’ (HM Government 2014a, 40).
Funding and support has also been provided through the EU’s 
regional policy, designed to help the EU’s most economically disadvan-
taged regions through the pursuit of a range of Union- wide cohesion 
objectives (European Commission 2017a). Northern Ireland has thus 
benefited from the EU’s INTERREG programme, as well as the dedicated 
PEACE programme, launched in 1995 ‘as a direct result of the EU’s desire 
to make a positive response’ to the peace process (SEUPB, 2017). This 
has supported projects in Northern Ireland and the border counties of 
Ireland focused primarily on improving economic and social stability 
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and increasing cohesion between communities affected by the conflict 
(European Parliament 2017b). In 2014, the UK government’s Review 
of the Balance of Competences reported that more than 100,000 peo-
ple had gained qualifications through PEACE II funding, and more than 
800,000 people on both sides of the border had participated ‘in cross- 
border activities and reconciliation projects’ (HM Government 2014b, 
52). The PEACE III (2007– 13) and PEACE IV (2014– 20) programmes, 
meanwhile, have contributed, or are scheduled to contribute, 
€225 million and €229 million respectively, with objectives including 
community reconciliation, economic development and education 
(Special EU Programmes Body 2017).
Underlining this financial commitment, in 2007 the Barroso 
Commission established a special Northern Ireland Task Force ‘to 
examine how Northern Ireland could benefit more from EU policies’, 
particularly in terms of encouraging and sustaining economic growth 
(European Commission 2016). The creation of the NITF is the first time 
the Commission has created ‘a close partnership specifically with one 
region’ in this way (European Commission 2014, 10). These mechanisms 
have been intended to support the peace process and help drive reconcili-
ation and collaboration. What has made them particularly important is 
the perception of the EU as being ‘neutral’ in a way the UK or Irish gov-
ernment cannot be (Bell 2016). In essence, the EU is uniquely positioned 
to offer a friendly, outside and ‘apolitical’ hand.
This neutrality has been especially important at the political level. 
Here the EU’s core contribution has been to help depoliticise a range of 
complex issues including justice and policing, identity, equality and human 
rights by enabling cooperation between national governments and local 
communities in the context of broader EU membership. Thus, while the 
difficult negotiations that have brought about and sustained the peace pro-
cess over more than 20 years have focused on, and been driven primarily 
by Belfast, London and Dublin, the institutional framework and norma-
tive environment provided by the EU – described by former Taioseach Enda 
Kenny as the EU’s ‘intangible role’ – has been crucial in creating the space 
for the different sides to move forward (Flanagan 2015, 4).
This indirect facilitation can be discerned in a number of ways. For 
example, we have seen a dramatic change in the dynamic of relations 
between London and Dublin which really began their upward trajec-
tory with the 1985 Anglo- Irish Agreement (Tannam 2017). One senior 
Irish diplomat attributes this in part to the two countries having joined 
the then EEC at the same time (1973), and since then having spent so 
long ‘sitting around the table together’. Thus, Irish governments have 
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recognised they have ‘more in common with the UK than they thought’, 
a view reciprocated in London.2 For another former Irish Taoiseach, John 
Bruton, the two countries being part of the EU has seen the transfor-
mation of a ‘bilateral unequal relationship’ into ‘an equal membership 
of something bigger than either of them’ (House of Lords 2016, 42). If 
the close intergovernmental cooperation that has developed since 1985 
has been ‘a fundamental cause of the peace process’ (Tannam 2017), for 
Bruton it is their common EU membership that ‘made all the progress 
that followed possible’ (House of Lords 2016, 42).
The EU’s institutional contribution, meanwhile, can be seen in the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement. Thus, while it is a bilateral treaty, the ‘status 
of the UK and Ireland as EU Member States is woven throughout’ (Douglas- 
Scott 2015, 4), for example in how sensitive issues related to human rights 
and identity are both framed and addressed. The political settlement 
established in 1998 is finely tuned, carefully balancing a range of issues of 
concern to the communities involved. The EU’s contribution is to provide 
what is essentially outside adjudication and a common system of protec-
tion based on European law and the principle of equality, something that 
can be accepted by all parties within the context of EU membership.
One of the clearest expressions of this can be seen in how, prior to the 
2016 referendum, the border had largely ceased to be ‘an issue of con-
tention’ (Bell 2016). Thus, whilst the Good Friday Agreement enshrines 
Northern Ireland’s status as part of the UK until such time as its population 
decides otherwise, the border itself has softened to the extent that it essen-
tially no longer matters in terms of communication, mobility and trade. 
Crucially, it has enabled ‘Nationalists in Northern Ireland to develop a sense 
of common identity with fellow EU citizens’ in Ireland whilst also address-
ing Unionist concerns (House of Lords 2016, 43). This ‘de- emphasising of 
state sovereignty’ has come about as a result of Europeanisation and the 
peace process (McCall 2015, 158), with the EU acting as an important ‘ena-
bling factor’ for peace. Not for nothing, therefore, did Charles Flanagan, 
Ireland’s former foreign minister, suggest that it is in Northern Ireland that 
‘the EU’s positive influence has been most keenly felt’ (2015, 4).
2. Northern Ireland’s ‘hard border’ conundrum
Northern Ireland is, of course, not alone in facing challenges from the 
UK’s departure from the EU – all parts of the country will be affected to 
some extent. However, its unique position and circumstances – not least 
the current lack of a functioning Northern Ireland Executive to give it a 
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voice – mean there are very specific concerns about the consequences for 
its economy and political situation, both of which are closely interlinked. 
While all sides have made clear their commitment to ensuring that the 
interests of Northern Ireland are properly considered in the negotiations, 
the region remains ‘particularly vulnerable to the potential negative 
effects of Brexit’ (House of Lords 2016, 13)  while the Irish govern-
ment has warned of ‘profound implications’ for the whole island (Irish 
Government 2017, 6). For its part, the UK government emphasises that 
political stability ‘is dependent on the continued operation of the Good 
Friday Agreement’s institutions and constitutional framework, effective 
management of the security environment, and economic prosperity’ (HM 
Government 2017d, 3). The importance of and linkages between each of 
these are clearly reflected in the issue of the border.
The problem in this regard is clear. Under EU law, the establish-
ment of a hard border would be consistent with the UK government’s 
commitment to withdraw from both the EU’s Single Market and Customs 
Union (and in the event of a ‘no deal’ scenario, would likely be inevi-
table). However, this is an outcome that all are seeking to avoid. The 
UK government has called for ‘flexible and imaginative solutions’ to the 
border issue in the context of broader discussions about future UK– EU 
customs arrangements (HM Government 2017c, 2– 3). For its part, and 
using identical wording, the EU had also previously made such a call 
‘with the aim of avoiding a hard border, whilst respecting the integrity 
of the Union legal order’ (European Council 2017), and the Irish govern-
ment has made clear its rejection of any ‘visible, “hard” border on the 
island of Ireland’ (Irish Government 2017, 7). The challenge, though, is 
how to turn these shared aspirations into reality.
As always, the devil lies in the detail, and particularly in how to 
manage the issues of freedom of movement for people and goods that 
will have such economic and political significance. Of the two, the move-
ment of individuals is more straightforward. Neither the UK nor Ireland is 
a member of the Schengen area, with free movement of people across the 
islands governed instead by rules agreed under the Common Travel Area 
(CTA) (encompassing the UK, Ireland, Isle of Man and Channel Islands). 
Alongside these, a range of reciprocal arrangements guarantee rights to 
residency, voting, health, social welfare and work. The CTA pre- dates by 
many years both countries’ membership of the EU, is recognised in the 
EU treaties, and is acknowledged in the European Commission’s nego-
tiating guidelines as being in conformity with EU law (HM Government 
2017d). The UK government’s proposal is therefore to continue with the 
current CTA arrangements, which is relatively uncontroversial.
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More difficult, however, are the proposals regarding the move-
ment of goods. Here, the UK is seeking ‘as seamless and frictionless a 
border as possible’ (HM Government 2017d, 14), and one involving 
no form of physical infrastructure. However, it is difficult to see how 
this will work if the UK is ultimately outside the Customs Union and 
Single Market. While there is a range of potential options in terms of 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU,3 these show that the desire 
to maintain an ‘invisible’ border is incompatible with the pursuit of 
an independent international trade policy (e.g. Hayward 2017b) or 
the avoidance of a costly additional regulatory burden, unless the UK 
government is willing to countenance some form of special arrange-
ment for Northern Ireland. Doherty et al. (2017) have suggested, for 
example, that Northern Ireland could join the European Economic 
Area in its own right. While Simon Coveney, the Irish foreign minis-
ter, has suggested that a ‘unique political solution’ will be required 
(Cooper & Marks 2017), a development along those lines currently 
seems unlikely.
Thus, the risk remains that a hard border will be the ultimate 
outcome. This would result in immediate and significant economic 
consequences. The economies of Northern Ireland and the Republic 
are ‘deeply interdependent’ (House of Lords 2016, 17), with Northern 
Ireland exporting £2.7 billion of goods to Ireland in 2015, represent-
ing 36 per cent of its total goods exports (HM Government 2017d). 
Indeed, in some sectors it is feasible to talk of an ‘all- island market and 
… and all- island economy’ (Doherty et al. 2017, 2), two examples being 
the Single Energy Market and the aforementioned agricultural sector 
(House of Lords 2016). Estimates by Ireland’s Economic and Social 
Research Institute are of a potential 20 per cent overall reduction in 
bilateral trade as a consequence of Brexit, with small companies bear-
ing the brunt of this (Economic and Social Research Institute 2015). 
Such a contraction in economic activity could be expected to have a 
major impact on Northern Ireland’s economy, which has already suf-
fered significantly and, according to Oxfam, ‘disproportionately’ from 
austerity (BBC News 2014). Indeed, given the British government’s cur-
rent economic policy direction, it is unlikely that HM Treasury would be 
either willing or able to make up the consequent financial shortfalls, 
for example in funding to agriculture. It has, though, raised the pos-
sibility of the UK continuing post- Brexit to participate in the funding 
of specific initiatives such as the PEACE programmes discussed above 
(HM Government 2017d). For its part, the Irish government believes 
Brexit poses ‘very significant and serious challenges to its economy’ 
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(Irish Government 2017, 9)  and is seeking support from the EU to 
 manage and mitigate the risks to trade with the UK, its largest bilateral 
trading partner.
The political ramifications of such a development are even less 
appealing. Northern Ireland’s fragile and fractious political settlement, 
Anglo- Irish intergovernmental relations, and the UK’s longer- term post- 
Brexit relationship with the EU would all be at risk in the event a hard 
border is re- constituted. The dismantling of physical barriers between 
North and South was an important element in securing nationalist sup-
port for the political process (Gilmore 2015) and has been both ‘a symbol 
of and a dividend from the success of the peace process’, transforming the 
daily lives of people in Northern Ireland and in Ireland’s border counties 
(Irish Government 2017, 20). The practicalities of re- bordering would be 
hugely complex. Dozens of farms and rural communities sit astride the 
border and some of the suburbs of Derry/ Londonderry now extend across 
it (Bell 2016). It is hard to see, therefore, how the establishment of a new 
frontier could avoid their division. It would also entail the building of a 
physical infrastructure including customs checkpoints, a border security 
regime, etc. (McCall 2017). In a region still highly sensitive to political 
symbolism, there would be significant negative associations with such 
developments. Indeed, McCall warns that Nationalists and Republicans 
are both likely to interpret this as ‘an abrogation’ of the 1998 agreement 
(McCall 2015, 158). Regardless of the fact that such re- bordering would 
simply be fulfilling the legal and technical responsibilities for managing a 
frontier between the EU and a non- Member State, it would mark a stark 
reversal in a political process that has gone a long way to detoxify complex 
questions surrounding British and Irish sovereignty and identity.4
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to provide a brief examination of the potential 
impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland, and the huge difficulty involved 
in balancing the Province’s unique political and economic circum-
stances with the UK government’s commitment to withdraw the UK 
from the EU. While the issue of the border is only one aspect of the 
story, it is nevertheless reflective of the wider problems that need to 
be considered, particularly: how to sustain Northern Ireland’s politi-
cal settlement and the peace process; how to protect the Anglo- Irish 
relationship; and, ultimately, what kind of post- Brexit relationship the 
UK wishes to establish with the EU. It is in the context of Northern 
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Ireland more than anywhere else that the interlinkages and tensions 
between UK domestic politics and its Brexit aspirations are thrown 
into sharpest relief. There remains the risk that Northern Ireland will 
be used for leverage in the negotiations, with the ‘moral imperative’ 
of safeguarding the peace process presented as necessitating a spe-
cial arrangement for the UK in its future trading relationship with 
the EU. However, it is hard to imagine that the EU27 will collectively 
sanction any agreement that weakens the integrity of the legal and 
regulatory structures upon which the EU is constructed and through 
which it trades with the wider world. This could potentially leave both 
Northern Ireland and the Republic paying a significant price for the UK 
government’s pledge that ‘Brexit means Brexit’. As the Irish Taoiseach, 
Leo Varadkar, declared in August 2017, this is indeed ‘the challenge in 
our generation’.
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Something new under the sun?
The lessons of Algeria and Greenland
Kiran Klaus Patel
The UK is the first fully fledged Member State ever to decide to with-
draw from the EU. But it is not the first country to do so. While the 
case of Greenland – an autonomous part of Denmark which left the 
European Community (EC) in 1985 – is sometimes mentioned in 
Brexit discussions, other cases are largely unknown. Only five years 
after the Treaty of Rome, in 1962, Algeria took the same step as part 
of its assertion of independence from France. And despite all the 
debates about Brexit, Grexit, and other scenarios in our own times, 
even among EU experts, few know that the Caribbean island of Saint- 
Barthélemy, a French overseas collectivity, changed its status in 2012 
from an Outermost Region of the EU to that of an Overseas Country 
or Territory.1
This chapter discusses the lessons that can be learned for Brexit 
from the ‘Algexit’ of 1962 and the ‘Greenxit’ of 1985, these being the 
two cases for which the medium- and long- term effects of withdrawal 
can be assessed, and for which archival records are available (Patel 
2017). It argues that important lessons can be learnt from these ear-
lier experiences, despite the obvious differences from today’s situation 
with the UK. Most importantly, it highlights the complex relationship 
between processes of integration and disintegration as a more perma-
nent feature of the European integration process than existing research 
has had it.
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Taking (back) control
The stakes were high and the message was clear. The leading repre-
sentative of the leave camp argued that his island was very special 
‘in terms of language, culture, economy and social structure’. Moreover, 
he stressed the islanders’ intention of ‘developing on the basis of locally 
generated values.’ For all these reasons, it was vitally important to sever 
the ties with Brussels ‘in order to preserve the peculiarity of the country.’2 
While that might sound like Nigel Farage, these were in fact the words of 
Greenland’s Prime Minister Jonathan Motzfeldt, speaking on behalf of 
Greenland’s government prior to the 1982 referendum. On the world’s 
largest island with a population of some 50,000, dissatisfaction with the 
EC had been gaining momentum for quite some time. Economic argu-
ments centring on the EC’s Common Fisheries Policy as a challenge to 
the island’s most important sector coalesced with debates about identity. 
Already in 1972, when Denmark held an EC membership referendum, 
70 per cent of Greenlanders opted against accession, but their vote was 
overruled by the majority in the country as a whole. Back then, there 
had been little Greenland could do. After Denmark granted home rule 
in 1979, however, Greenland held a membership referendum in 1982, 
which ultimately led to its withdrawal from the European Community 
three years later.
Sovereignty, self- determination and the desire to take back control 
played an even bigger role in the Algerian case. The country entered the 
EC as part of France. When the Treaty of Rome was signed, France still 
had vast colonial possessions, and the link between metropolitan France 
and Algeria was particularly strong. Article 227 therefore stipulated that 
most of the Treaty’s regulations also applied to the North African coun-
try, which thus became a part of the original community of six Member 
States. The Algerian War of Independence, waged for eight long years 
with hundreds of thousands of deaths and many more eventually forced 
to flee the country, was fought mainly to shake off the yoke of French 
rule. But, unsurprisingly, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) also 
wanted to cut the connection with the EC. Looking back a few months 
after independence had been won, Algeria’s first president Ahmed Ben 
Bella deplored the ‘300 years of colonial domination’ and heavily criti-
cised the EC, particularly its nascent Common Agricultural Policy (Ben 
Bella 1963, 7).
Europe’s colonial past is therefore central to explaining why Algeria 
and Greenland became part of the EC; in both cases, integration into the 
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European Community did not result from a sovereign decision by the 
people of the country, but was determined by the will of the motherland. 
Obviously, the situation of today’s UK is markedly different:  it first for-
mally applied in the early 1960s, was admitted in 1973, and has since 
enjoyed all the rights and obligations of full membership. Still, the mix 
of economic and identity arguments that drove the Brexit campaign has 
certain parallels in the Algerian and Greenlandic cases. In all three coun-
tries, the specific history, values, forms of economic and political govern-
ance, and the social fabric all turned into key arguments for withdrawal. 
The EC/ EU was accused of not accommodating these differences. The 
desire to (re)gain control therefore unites all these cases. This also dis-
tinguishes all three of them from the debates about the option of a Greek 
withdrawal from the eurozone, which was much more about a state’s 
inability to live up to the commitments of membership.
Undoing and reconnecting
Some three months after his aforementioned speech, Ben Bella wrote 
a letter to the president of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein. 
Given his public announcements, his request might have come as a sur-
prise. He requested that despite Algeria’s withdrawal from the EC, exist-
ing rules and regulations should remain in force. Algeria was thus to be 
treated as if it was still part of the European Community.3 And what did 
Greenland’s Motzfeldt do in parallel with his leave campaign? As the 
island’s prime minister, he quickly negotiated an association agreement 
with the EC (Patel 2017). Both countries thus opted for a paradoxical 
double move. On the one hand, they sought greater sovereignty, control 
and independence. On the other hand, they were highly interested in 
maintaining close ties to the EC, mainly for economic reasons.
And, surprisingly, close ties continued to exist in both cases even 
after withdrawal. Given that Ben Bella wrote his letter on 24 December, 
one might be tempted to speak of a Christmas miracle since, in fact, the 
European Community basically accepted Algeria’s request. Half a year 
later, in June 1963, a secret document of the EC Council of Ministers 
noted that Algeria was treated ‘de facto as a Member State of the 
Community.’4 Greenland also quickly obtained its association agreement. 
Several Member States were highly interested in close links with the 
island, not least due to its rich fishing waters. This holds particularly true 
for the Federal Republic of Germany, whose fishing lobby pressed Bonn 
to push this point. Denmark’s position was particularly awkward:  since 
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Greenland continued to be part of the Danish Realm (Det Danske Rige), it 
was the Danish government that had to submit the withdrawal proposal in 
Brussels – despite strongly disliking the islanders’ decision. Copenhagen 
therefore also supported the association deal in an attempt to limit the 
damage (Patel 2017). The role of the British government is particu-
larly interesting: during the referendum campaign, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office enquired informally in the Danish capital whether 
it could help positively influence public opinion in Greenland, as London 
was afraid that the Arctic example might unleash disintegration tenden-
cies elsewhere. Ironically, it was the government of Margaret Thatcher –  
the nightmare of every Brussels bureaucrat – that was especially con-
cerned about the repercussions of Greenland’s exit and worked to avert it.5
The situation of the UK today bears both similarities and differ-
ences to these processes in Algeria and Greenland. Worlds separate the 
scope and depth of European integration today from the pre- Maastricht 
and pre- Lisbon realities of the 1960s and 1980s. Economically and geo- 
strategically, the UK is a giant in comparison to Algeria or Greenland. 
The international system has changed markedly too, with the end of the 
Cold War and a new era of insecurity challenging core pillars of gov-
ernance in Europe and the wider transatlantic context. In the British 
case, Prime Minister Theresa May has declared that she was prepared to 
accept hard Brexit and has stressed that she did not want the UK ‘half- 
in, half- out’. She also stated that it was her ‘priority’ to pursue a ‘free 
trade agreement with the EU’ (May 2017a). Negotiations might thus 
lead to comparably loose ties between the remaining EU and the UK – in 
the context of the range of relationships the EU has with states such as 
Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. Still, it reveals that even a large trad-
ing and military power such as the UK relies on keeping some close ties 
with the EU, and that the populist idea of regaining full sovereignty and 
autonomy is partly impossible.
Incremental solutions
As the cases of Algeria and Greenland reveal, there has never been a 
default mode for leaving the EC/ EU. Today, the Lisbon Treaty’s famous 
Article 50 has created a procedure for withdrawal, although it also leaves 
a lot of room to decide on the details of the deal. How, then, did Algeria’s 
and Greenland’s relationships develop after pulling out? The following 
assessment will not judge whether the deals were beneficial for one side 
or the other – for that, much more space would be needed. Instead, it 
will examine the intensity of the formal ties to the EC/ EU – as the more 
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straightforward yardstick that reflects the chapter’s interest in the politi-
cal and legal dimensions of withdrawal.
Algexit can be summarised as a trajectory from ‘super- soft’ to ‘super- 
hard’ and from there again to a softer constellation. For several years in the 
1960s, the country retained a precarious special status that kept lawyers 
awake at night. As late as 1968, an internal EC document maintained that 
its close relations with Algeria still lacked a clear legal basis. With regard 
to trade, the country continued to float in an undefined twilight zone, 
almost as if it was still part of the common market.6 Gradually, however, 
Algeria’s privileged position crumbled. The EC’s Member States started 
to apply different rules in their trade with the North African country. And 
as the common Market was established and the common organisation of 
the market for more and more specific commodities agreed on, the former 
colony increasingly found itself on the wrong side of the fence. The com-
mon organisation of the wine market, established in 1970, was the hardest 
blow. Around 1960, Algeria had been the globe’s fourth largest producer of 
wine. Domestic consumption was small in the mostly Muslim country, but 
it was the world’s biggest exporter. Wine accounted for half the country’s 
exports, and it mainly traded with EC countries. With the 1970 market 
organisation, the EC’s protectionist Common Agricultural Policy created 
insurmountable trade barriers, which had a deleterious effect on Algerian 
wine exports. Algiers complained bitterly about these measures, but to lit-
tle avail. Meanwhile, wine producers in the Member States were happy 
to be rid of competitors from the southern shores of the Mediterranean. 
Today, Algeria produces hardly any wine at all, and this had much to do 
with its relationship with the EC/ EU. In a nutshell, therefore, ‘Algexit’ also 
led to ‘Alcexit’, at least in the longer term (Meloni & Swinnen 2014).
From this low point in the 1970s, EU– Algeria relations slowly 
improved over the past four decades. Building on several smaller agree-
ments, the two partners concluded an association agreement in 2002 and 
later added further steps. Still, it has long lost the special status it held in 
the years immediately after 1962. In many ways, it is now treated as any 
other North African country; the special ties from a colonial past that 
impacted on the first decade after independence having withered away.
In contrast, Greenland’s exit was consistently soft. Despite the 
concern about foreign fishermen plundering its rich waters, Greenland 
agreed to a series of protocols to the association agreement, which 
granted the EC extensive access to its fisheries, a point insisted on by the 
West Germans in particular. Since then, relations have intensified further. 
Today, Greenland is one of the EU’s Overseas Countries and Territories, 
where primary and secondary EU law applies automatically, though with 
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some derogations. Trade relations are so intense that Greenland has, 
ironically, started to move closer to the EU compared with the situation 
in 1985. In contrast, devolution within the Danish context has contin-
ued, with some activists in Greenland now demanding full independence 
from the Danish Realm.7 This could lead to a reversal of the dynamics of 
the 1980s, when Greenlanders wanted to remain part of the Kingdom, 
but rejected EC membership.
At this stage, it remains unclear what kind of deal the UK and the 
EU will ultimately agree on. It is rather unlikely that this question will 
be answered as quickly as some Brexiteers would like, or within the two- 
year period stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty. The experience of Algeria 
and Greenland is a reminder that a new settlement will only be the basis 
for the next phase, and not the once- and- for- all, clear- cut solution that 
the exit camp likes to imagine.
Colonial legacies
Taking stock of the historical experience also highlights a dimension that 
has long seemed obsolete: Europe’s colonial past. This was clearly at the 
core of Algeria’s and Greenland’s experience, and also impacted on the 
recent decision of Saint- Barthélemy, an island ‘discovered’ by Christopher 
Columbus and, with some interruptions, a French colony since the seven-
teenth century. Brexit also conjures up a colonial past. Theresa May’s opti-
mism, in her 17 January 2017 speech, that the idea of deepening links to 
‘India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
countries in Africa’ will be met by similar feelings in these former British 
colonies has yet to prove itself. Moreover, she had a good point about 
the need to ‘strengthen the precious union between the four nations of 
the UK’ (May 2017a): Northern Ireland, whose past some historians con-
sider to be principally colonial history, is obviously a case in point, where 
one can only hope that the peace agreement will hold. And it is worrying 
that as soon as the Brexit referendum’s results were made public, Spanish 
Foreign Minister José Manuel García- Margallo declared that the day had 
come closer when the Spanish flag will fly over Gibraltar (Amón 2016). 
Disintegration in the EU has the potential to reopen the door to seem-
ingly remote chapters in Europe’s unsettled past. Most Europeans have 
never heard about the 1713 Peace of Utrecht that forced Spain to cede 
Gibraltar to Great Britain, and a UK withdrawal would obviously ignore 
the 96 per cent of voters in Gibraltar who opted for ‘remain’ in the refer-
endum. Not only Northern Ireland and Scotland, but also Gibraltar thus 
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has the potential of turning into a key stumbling block in the Brexit nego-
tiations. So while exit decisions are seemingly about a country’s future, 
they are also closely related to the continent’s haunted past.
Conclusions
The cases of Algeria and Greenland demonstrate that withdrawal from 
the EC/ EU is not completely unprecedented. Admittedly, the integration 
process has changed massively since the 1960s and 1980s, as have the 
wider European and global contexts. Moreover, the UK is a power of a 
different calibre than the two earlier ‘exiteers’. Still, their trajectories are 
quite revealing, especially with regard to the motives leading a majority 
to opt to leave the EC/ EU. In addition, in both cases the complex renego-
tiation process at the moment of exit did not lead to a complete unwind-
ing of ties, and the long- term trajectories after withdrawal were of great 
importance.
History reveals that the details of the deal, and the historical con-
text informing it, both impacted massively on the eventual outcome. Very 
often, negotiators on both sides of the table shared an interest in main-
taining close ties, at least initially, regardless of public rhetoric. While 
the exit settlement matters a lot, of course, the substantial minority that 
opted for ‘remain’ in the Brexit referendum might yet find some consola-
tion in history. Any deal will be a precursor to the next deal, as this chap-
ter shows, and in that sense, hardly any decision is fully irreversible – for 
better or for worse.
Finally, examining instances of withdrawal from the EC/ EU con-
veys an important message concerning the history of the European inte-
gration process. A  careful historical assessment challenges the logic of 
the ‘ever deeper union’, as a powerful narrative the EU itself has forged 
and helped to disseminate. In this standard story, there is no place for 
phases and processes of disintegration; that is why Brexit is perceived as 
such a fundamental challenge to the EU. As shown here, however, Brexit 
would in fact not be the first moment of disentanglement and disintegra-
tion in the EU’s history. This reminds us how little attention EU history 
has attracted so far, and that even some basic facts have no impact what-
soever on the public debate. For all the talk about crisis, the European 
integration process has mastered difficult moments with astonishing 
resilience. In doing so, it has undergone fundamental transformations, 
and the multiplicity of crises it presently faces are most worrying. Still, 
the stakes for the UK are certainly higher than for the EU.
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What impact will Brexit have 
on the euro area?
Waltraud Schelkle
A major consequence of Brexit is that the financial centre of the euro 
area (EA) – the City of London – has decided to cut regulatory ties with 
the euro area as a whole. The City’s role in banking and investment 
finance in the EA was always an anomaly, made possible primarily by 
the creation of the Single Market in financial services. The UK govern-
ment shaped EU legislation in favour of banks that reside in London 
and use the City as a gateway to the Continent. This was not economic 
nationalism, since it favoured above all transnational banks, and it was 
not protectionist since the idea was to foster financial liberalisation in all 
EU Member States. Rather, it was an exercise in ‘economic patriotism’ 
(Clift & Woll 2012, 308– 9, Morgan 2012):  the idea was to champion 
free trade in a sector in which the national economy has a comparative 
advantage. However, economic nationalism has fought back, notwith-
standing the rhetoric of ‘Global Britain’.
This chapter focuses on the likely effects of Brexit on the EA. What 
changes are in the offing for a currency area that is abandoned by its 
major financial centre? The chapter makes three claims in particular: (1) 
some of the business currently transacted in London will go to the EA, 
which is a mixed blessing; (2) the EA’s regulatory approach will become 
more attuned to the financial institutions and political preferences preva-
lent in Continental Europe; and (3)  the euro will remain permanently 
stronger vis- à- vis the British Pound.
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Relocation of financial services
The City will certainly lose in relevance for European finance and seems 
to be resigned to this, although not without lobbying the government for 
favours. A study by Bruegel assumes, at this stage inevitably arbitrarily, 
that about 30 per cent of wholesale banking in Europe will relocate from 
the City to the continent, which would leave London still hanging onto a 
sizable share of 60 per cent of the European banking industry (Sapir et al. 
2017, 5– 6). Both the British government and officials in continental 
Europe have threatened one another with ‘competitive’ taxation and 
regulation of banks if they stay or move, respectively. It beggars belief 
that such open threats of a race to the bottom should be issued on both 
sides of the Channel: not even ten years have gone by since the biggest 
financial crisis in post- war history broke out, caused, inter alia, by lax 
standards and regulatory enforcement. The only silver lining in this is 
that supervisors, like the member of the Bundesbank’s Executive Board 
responsible for financial supervision, and the Governor of the Central 
Bank of Ireland, have come out publicly against such archaic offers to 
transnational finance (Dombret 2017; Sapir et al. 2017, 6).
The reason for the declining relevance of London as a gateway to 
mainland Europe is that banks stand to lose their ‘passporting’ right. 
This is the ability to use a banking licence issued in one Member State to 
do financial business anywhere else in the EU. Passporting could be sub-
stituted by so- called equivalence, by which a bank proves that the juris-
diction from which it has its licence covers all the areas and is as strict in 
its regulation of the various areas as the EU. But such equivalence deci-
sions cover only the wholesale business, not retail. And they are not per-
manent: they come under scrutiny each time there is legislative change in 
one of the two jurisdictions. Besides, the EU has been reluctant to afford 
US banks such equivalence, which makes it unlikely that it will treat UK 
banks any more leniently ten years down the line.1 ‘[T] he prospects for 
EU market access through the UK look rather dim’, as Andreas Dombret 
(2017) from the Bundesbank put it.
It is unlikely that the EU- related parts of the City’s business and the 
accompanying jobs will all relocate to a single new centre inside the euro 
area, such as Amsterdam, Dublin, Frankfurt or Paris (which are the four 
most frequently mentioned). In fact, some financial business may not go 
to the EA at all. There is anecdotal evidence that some US banks may 
relocate to places like Warsaw instead, because they do not trust that the 
 
 
BrExit  And BEyond126
  
EA will survive;2 again, this is made possible by the Single Market and the 
passport it gives to any and all banks that are incorporated as headquar-
ters or subsidiaries in another Member State. Other US banks may reduce 
their presence in Europe altogether and relocate to New York, the City’s 
old rival in international finance.
Anglophone observers are always quick to portray any change as yet 
another nail in the coffin of the euro project. But such speculation dem-
onstrates a rather short memory of the history of European monetary 
integration. At the height of the crisis in 2008– 9, there was a consensus, 
reaching the echelons of high finance, central banking and supranational 
regulatory bodies, that financial markets had become too prolific in gen-
erating phony assets and that they had become too interconnected and 
too self- absorbed for their own good, let alone for the good of the rest of 
the economy (e.g. Bernanke 2016; Turner 2015). If Brexit can contribute 
to the shrinking of an oversized financial system in the EA, then it may 
well turn out to be a net benefit for every economy. Political and market 
pressure will make this hard to resist, though, proving again how hard it 
is to contain boom– bust cycles and ‘excessive financial elasticity’ at the 
national level (Borio 2014).
Relocation of the financial sector to the EA is a mixed blessing 
from another point of view. It reduces the scope for risk sharing. The 
Irish bailout in 2011 illustrated how this worked when the UK was still 
a member of the EU. Banks headquartered in the UK were the largest 
creditors of Ireland; according to the Bank for International Settlement 
they were exposed to the tune of around €160 billion on an ultimate 
risk basis and also held large claims on Spain (around €98 billion). 
The UK government offered to guarantee €3.8 billion of the €85 billion 
rescue package for Ireland. A  meeting at the Treasury came to the 
conclusion that this was the best and cheapest insurance it could get 
for banks for which the British taxpayer would otherwise have been 
potentially liable. This implicit insurance premium of around 4.5 per cent 
looked particularly attractive after the UK had performed three years 
earlier the biggest single bank bailout in history. The rescue of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland had cost the British taxpayer £113 billion 
(around €138 billion) by 2013 (HM Government 2014c:  para 3.14), 
costs that were still accumulating by 2017. It was in the EA’s interest 
that the UK financial system was not destabilised even more, as this 
could have unleashed flight from the pound, a flight that only various 
central bank swap arrangements would have prevented from turning 
into a full- on currency crisis, and which would have contributed to the 
nervous breakdown of markets. The risk sharing also works the other 
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way round. To the extent that British banks with international exposure 
were rescued by the British taxpayer, the bailouts also stabilised bank-
ing systems across the continent. Any relocation of banks will reduce 
such risk diversification. To make up for it, the overall risk level needs 
to be brought down by ensuring a smaller, less leveraged and better 
regulated financial system.
Refocusing the regulatory approach
With the creation of the banking union that came into effect in 2014, the 
ECB has become the developed world’s largest financial supervisor, meas-
ured by the banking assets under its purview.3 The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism has the responsibility for the licensing and supervision of 
all euro area banks, but supervises directly only around 130 ‘Significant 
Institutions’, representing 85 per cent of all bank assets in its jurisdic-
tion. For the rest, it delegates supervision to national authorities and 
merely supervises their practices. Since financial regulation is no longer 
national, or even European, the ECB will in future make its voice heard 
through international fora, such as the G20 and the Basel Committee. 
Even before the banking union was agreed in June 2012, the European 
Commission was pro- active in pre- empting US financial regulation and 
opted for setting standards so as to prevent having to follow standard 
setting by others (Moloney 2010, 1342– 3). To the great dismay of hedge 
fund managers, it regulated their business. Some of them subsequently 
became the biggest funders of the Leave campaign.
Even before the crisis, financial re- regulation set the EU on a col-
lision course with the UK. Some of this seems to have been a chosen 
path:  indeed, the Cameron administration apparently preferred litiga-
tion to negotiation, as these examples attest to.
• The UK challenged the Financial Transaction Tax (C- 209/ 13 UK v 
Council): the UK wanted the Court to annul the introduction of the 
tax under enhanced cooperation because it deemed it to be costly 
for non- participating countries, since the tax would be levied on 
any transaction in which one party is from any of the 11 participat-
ing countries. The UK lost the case.
• The UK government also took other EU legislators to court (C- 270/ 
12 UK v European Parliament and Council) regarding the prohibi-
tions of short- selling and other aspects of credit default swaps. The 
UK disputed whether the newly created European Securities Market 
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Authority had the authority to conduct interventions in financial 
markets that would suspend, temporarily, the short- selling of finan-
cial instruments or buying of credit default swaps if the orderly 
functioning of markets so requires (notably a downward spiral of 
asset prices). Again, the UK lost the case.
• The UK government wanted the capping of bankers’ bonuses 
annulled (C- 507/ 13 UK v European Parliament and Council). It dis-
puted that the EU has the right to restrict the variable element in 
the remuneration of ‘material risk takers’ in financial institutions. 
The UK dropped the case after the Advocate General delivered his 
opinion that the case should be dismissed by the Court.
The dilemma for the UK government is now stark:  as soon as the UK 
wants to act on its preferences, or has to give in to the lobbying of hedge 
funds and bonus- seeking bankers, equivalence of UK and EU financial 
regulation becomes a distant prospect.
A test case may soon arise, namely that regarding the jurisdiction 
of central counterparties.4 This multi- billion currency business is to clear 
claims and liabilities arising, mainly, from trillions of derivatives. These 
clearing houses emerged as a consequence of financial re- regulation after 
the crisis of 2008– 9. The international regulatory community at the G20 
level agreed to reduce shadow banking and the risk of over- the- counter 
derivatives, the latter being the main activity of central counterparties. 
Over- the- counter means that these financial instruments are not traded on 
an exchange but between two market parties; so if one side fails to meet the 
contract this may trigger a liquidity crisis for the other party, and because 
the sums involved are so huge, this can easily spread across the market. 
Clearing houses can reduce this risk since only net payments have to be 
met by each party, and the central counterparty itself acts like a mutual 
insurance fund in that it can meet the obligations of the failing party out 
of the ‘margins’ it requires each party to pay. An additional problem may 
arise, however, if the clearing house  – that tends to hold open positions 
overnight that are in the order of one billion euros – has a currency mis-
match (i.e. not enough funds in the currency that the failing party was 
supposed to deliver). Hence, central bank cooperation is required.
In 2011, the ECB announced that central clearing in euros has to 
happen in its jurisdiction. The UK government challenged this require-
ment as discriminating under Single Market rules. The Court case 
T- 496/ 11 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European 
Central Bank (ECB) was decided in the UK’s favour:  the Eurosystem 
Oversight Policy Framework was annulled on the ground that the ECB 
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referred to ‘securities’ for which the central bank has no mandate. This 
wording can easily be changed. The ECB kept a brave face and sent a sig-
nal of cooperation shortly before the referendum, entering immediately 
into a formal swap agreement with the Bank of England that would give 
the latter unlimited access to euros. But it is not clear that this is the last 
word. Andreas Dombret, the Bundesbank’s supervision tsar, was quoted 
as saying that euro- clearing can stay in the UK only if its authorities com-
ply with the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (Marsh 2017).
Strengthening of the euro vis- à- vis the pound
The breadth and depth of the financial system are vital determinants of 
an exchange rate. We should expect the euro to strengthen permanently 
vis- à- vis the pound sterling as the role of the City of London diminishes 
and international financial regulation reflects continental European 
preferences more strongly, as argued above. This may help to recali-
brate trade (im )balances between the two currency areas, although UK 
services exports to mainland Europe will likely be adversely affected by 
Britain exiting the Single Market. The negative effect on UK’s export of 
services will be muted by the fact  – well- established in the economics 
of intra- industry trade between advanced economies – that the competi-
tiveness of core export industries in advanced economies depends less 
on costs (as determined by the exchange rate) than on strong brands, 
innovation and logistics.
It is hard to say how this will play itself out when it comes to the 
euro area’s internal imbalances. The following table shows the UK’s 
main trading partners and the UK net trade balance in goods and 
services for 2014.
As Figure 13.1 shows, the UK has a deteriorating trade balance 
with the EU as a whole. At the beginning of 2016, the main EU trad-
ing partners of the UK were, on the import side (and in order of mag-
nitude):  Germany, China, the US, the Netherlands and France; and 
on the export side: the US, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the 
Irish Republic.5 Three out of five main importers, then, and four out 
of five main export destinations, are in both the EU and the euro area. 
A strengthening of the euro vis- à- vis the British pound would rebalance 
trade with strong trading nations in the euro area. On the whole, this 
would be unproblematic and arguably beneficial for both sides.
A further consideration, however, is whether the transition to a 
stronger effective (trade- weighted) euro will have an additional dis- 
inflationary effect on the EA economy.6 This would be problematic, since 
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it is the opposite of what the euro area economy needs to bolster its 
recovery. Low growth and low inflation (even deflation in some sectors) 
make already onerous debt burdens more difficult to serve leading to a 
surge of non- performing loans. The plight of Italy, with its conservative 
banking system that had not financed a bubble that burst, is a warning 
sign of how debt may become unsustainable in an environment of low 
growth and low inflation.
Unlikely changes
Having enumerated the three most likely changes that will follow 
British withdrawal from the EU, it is worth pointing out two possible 
changes that are not very likely. The first concerns the potential for a 
breakdown in central bank coordination. While central bank coopera-
tion may be affected by the UK’s withdrawal, the crisis management 
of 2009– 10 showed that central banks have become quite accustomed 
to coordinating their rescue operations effectively. Indeed, this has 
been the case ever since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system 
in the 1970s. In 2009– 10 a network of swap lines prevented currency 
attacks on Eastern European currencies, while a swap line between 
the Bank of England and the ECB supported Irish banks exposed to net 
600
£ billion
400
200
0
–200
–400
–600
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU exports
Non-EU imports
Non-EU exports EU imports
Non-EU balanceEU balance
Figure 13.1 UK exports, imports and trade balance to EU and non- EU 
countries
Source: Office for National Statistics
 
 
wHAt iMPAct will BrExit  HAvE on tHE EUro ArEA? 131
  
claims in pounds sterling. These were made into a standing arrangement 
between six central banks in October 2013: the US Federal Reserve, the 
ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the Swiss National Bank 
and the Bank of Canada (also called the C6). The cost- effective preven-
tion of currency crises in open economies is in the interest of all countries 
trading with, and investing in, each other; this will not change with the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
A second unlikely scenario is a wholesale decline in the perceived 
value of EA membership. The threat of currency crises makes it unlikely 
that other countries’ desires to seek or maintain euro area membership 
will be affected by the UK’s withdrawal. Even at the height of the crisis, 
Baltic countries joined the EA: Estonia in January 2011, Latvia in 2014 
and Lithuania in 2015. This was, moreover, not because there existed 
overwhelming popular support for membership or pressure on them to 
join. Rather, policymakers in these countries realised that EA member-
ship would make their economies less exposed to current account cri-
ses and less dependent on the goodwill of foreign central banks. The 
cross- border payments system, TARGET, eliminates foreign exchange 
constraint and provides insurance against a sudden stop of trade fin-
ance (Schelkle 2017, Chapter 9). Furthermore, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism now protects them against the ring- fencing of liquidity by 
supervisors in other euro area countries.7 For these small economies, giv-
ing up the exchange rate does not mean losing a policy instrument, since 
they would have to follow the moves of the ECB anyhow. The peripheral 
Member States of the EU do not have the advantages of the UK, which 
is an old financial power with an established reputation that it will not 
default on its foreign debt, and hence they are unlikely to take any cue 
from the UK’s withdrawal.
In sum, Brexit is likely to have negative effects on the EA. Contrary 
to what some policy makers seem to think about those trying to attract 
parts of the City into their jurisdiction, the relocation of financial services 
into the monetary union may well turn out to be a cost for these jurisdic-
tions. Contingent liabilities for this crisis- prone sector will increase and 
the relocation will reduce risk sharing between the two currency areas, 
although by how much is hard to predict. Other effects, such as that on 
financial regulation in the EA and on trade with the UK, are more ambig-
uous and probably of second- order relevance.
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The Brexit iceberg
Chris Bickerton
There is a way of thinking about Brexit that has proven popular 
because it is of comfort both to the UK and to the remaining 27 
Member States of the EU. This is to view Brexit as a curiously British 
affair, important in the short term for the EU but of limited wider 
significance. Those who think this way within the UK see Brexit as 
an affirmation of the country’s distinctive traditions and as a means 
by which the UK can regain its rightful place in global politics  – in 
Europe, but not a direct part of it, and a bridge between Europe and 
the US (Rachman 2016).1 The continental version of this view wel-
comes Brexit as the first step towards deeper European integration. 
As a prominent French journalist put it, a day after the 23 June EU 
referendum vote, ‘My English friends, thank you for your sacrifice’ 
(Quatremer 2016).
Far from being a unique or isolated event, however, we should 
think of Brexit as an iceberg: merely the visible portion of a much larger 
and more powerful mass below the surface that needs to be properly 
studied and understood (Bickerton 2017b). This is not to suggest that 
European disintegration is just around the corner but rather to draw 
out from Brexit some points of connection with wider trends that 
are affecting Europe as a whole. Three such points of connection are 
discussed below: political contestation after Brexit; economic growth 
models and their interaction with the EU’s Single Market; and the 
relationship between Brexit and the structure of the modern European 
state. In effect, what follows is analysis of the political, the economic 
and the constitutional spheres as they relate to the UK’s decision to 
leave the EU.
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An EU of discontent
Critics of the British press believe it has fuelled a nationalistic anti- 
Europeanism that has few parallels elsewhere in Europe. In fact, the UK is 
representative of a growing division in Europe on the matter of European 
integration. Politicians and political scientists alike frame this as a more 
general struggle between the winners and losers of globalisation, of which 
the EU is a symptom rather than a cause.2 By virtue of its openness to trade 
and its flexible labour market, the UK has done better in some ways than 
other EU Member States in dealing with the effects of globalisation. In 
France, the combined vote for Marine Le Pen and Jean- Luc Mélenchon – 
two explicitly Eurosceptic candidates – in the first round of the country’s 
presidential election was 14.5 million votes, around 40 per cent of French 
citizens who voted. Elsewhere in Europe, Eurosceptic parties and move-
ments have become key political players at the national level. In Italy, 
the Five Star Movement (M5S) regularly tops opinion polls. The M5S has 
fudged its position on the euro but has made the issue of ‘monetary sov-
ereignty’ a central part of its platform. The other leading opposition party 
in Italy is the Northern League, a long- standing Eurosceptic voice in Italy.
The precise meaning of Euroscepticism differs across national 
contexts and there is a marked difference between eurozone and non- 
eurozone Member States. The EU’s critics find it hard to win support for 
exiting the eurozone, as Marine Le Pen has discovered. However, far from 
being popular it is common to hear people say that they regret having 
joined the euro but that now they are in the eurozone they are stuck with 
it. The expectation that membership of the euro would translate into a 
political and social community  – widely held by all those who lauded 
the project in the course of the 1990s and early 2000s  – has proven 
unfounded (McNamara 2015; Streeck 2016a, Chapter 7). The euro has 
brought forth greater heterogeneity than before and structural differ-
ences between national economies (so- called ‘supply-side factors’) are 
the basis of powerful intra- eurozone forms of competition. Accepting that 
the euro is a ‘trap’ (Offe 2015) from which it is very difficult to escape is 
quite different from a positive sense of belonging, though interpreters of 
polling data tend to confuse the former with the latter.
The mainstreaming of Euroscepticism does not mean other coun-
tries will follow the UK in leaving the EU. Many contingencies produced 
the Brexit outcome, including the poor pro- EU campaign and political 
rivalries within the British Conservative Party (Cummings 2017b). Other 
institutional factors  – such as being outside the eurozone  – made the 
UK’s exit relatively easier to contemplate than for most other countries. 
 
 
 
BrExit  And BEyond134
  
Moreover, what we are really seeing in Europe is not so much a deepen-
ing antagonism between Member States and the EU. It is rather a wide-
spread crisis in state– society relations, where national party systems 
find themselves convulsed by the forces of popular disaffection and dis-
enchantment with mainstream politics. These forces overwhelmed the 
UK’s EU referendum and they are exerting powerful effects elsewhere in 
Europe. The EU may appear shielded from direct criticism, but if Member 
State governments are unable to rule authoritatively because of a hollow-
ing out of their national political life, then this leaves the EU as a weak 
and ineffectual regional body.3
One market, many growth models
Brexit had many causes and it would be wrong to single out economic fac-
tors. However, if one looks at the political economy of Brexit then there are 
clear lessons for the rest of Europe. The nub of the matter is that national 
growth models mediate heavily the experience people have of European 
economic integration. In the British case, this interaction produced results 
that helped push the UK out of the EU. In other countries, the results are 
different but the lesson is the same: there may be one European Single 
Market, but there are many different national growth models. Each model 
has its strengths and weaknesses but the Single Market makes it very dif-
ficult to reform these models, leading to a build- up of pressures.
In Britain’s case, the economy grows by expanding the labour mar-
ket. This has the effect of boosting aggregate demand and injecting life into 
the country’s service sector- dominated economy (Baccaro & Pontusson 
2016). This model delivers low levels of unemployment  – even outside 
the booming Southeast of England – but is associated with low productiv-
ity and low wage growth, both of which are prominent features of open 
labour markets (Giles 2017).4 The only way the labour market can grow, 
in the absence of significant domestic population growth, is through high 
levels of net immigration. For this reason, the free movement of labour 
is at the heart of the UK’s experience of the Single Market. This aspect of 
the British growth model has received much less attention than the other, 
more fashionable part, namely the very high reliance on credit as a way of 
compensating for stagnant real wages, what Colin Crouch calls ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’ (Crouch 2009). Commentary around Brexit and immigra-
tion has focused on the themes of xenophobia and racism but the core of 
the matter lies in the nature of the British growth model.
This mediation of Single Market rules through national growth 
models produces very different results in other parts of Europe. In some 
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countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria and in the crisis- hit economies 
of Spain, Greece, Italy and Ireland, net emigration is the great worry 
and criticisms of the EU focus on fears of a ‘brain drain’. Elsewhere, in 
countries with heavily regulated labour markets such as in France and 
Sweden, protest has centred on ‘posted workers’ and the clash between 
national labour codes and the rules regulating EU migrant labour.
The German growth model is fundamentally different from the 
British one. The focus is on building export surpluses, with little consid-
eration given to aggregate demand. Indeed, Germany’s huge balance of 
payment surpluses exists only because of a long- standing policy – sup-
ported by the German trade union movement – of wage and price sup-
pression. Whilst Germany has been an economic success story from an 
aggregate perspective, when one looks inside the country the results 
are more mixed (Bickerton 2017c). The euro- equivalent of Poundland 
shops dominate the high streets in many ostensibly wealthy German cit-
ies. Labour market and welfare state reforms in Germany have created 
a large group of people who have seen their incomes stagnate since the 
mid- 2000s. If we add to that the effect of negative interest rates on a 
country with a high savings rate we can begin to understand why there 
is so much opposition in Germany to the idea of a European fiscal trans-
fer union. ‘We’ve not had it easy’, goes the argument, ‘so why should we 
help out the Greeks and the Italians?’ The political consequences of this 
interaction between the German growth model and European economic 
integration are not as dramatic as Brexit but they are shaping the EU in 
profound ways. They go a long way to explaining why Germany took the 
line that it did during the eurozone crisis and why further integration of 
the eurozone is politically off the agenda.
The Single Market radicalises the differences between national 
growth models whilst at the same time making it harder to change the 
models themselves. The pressures this produces go well beyond the 
Brexit result in the UK’s 2016 EU referendum.
The endurance of Member Statehood
A final way in which Brexit unites the UK with the rest of the EU is that 
it has been an exemplary lesson in what it means for a ‘Member State’ to 
leave the EU. The term ‘Member State’ refers to a distinctive form of state-
hood and not just a legal title referring to formal membership of the EU 
(Bickerton 2012, 2017a). The UK underwent its own transformation from 
nation- state to Member State. As a result, Brexit poses more than just jurid-
ical and regulatory challenges. As a process, Brexit makes demands upon 
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the British state that presume it to be and to act like a nation- state, when 
in fact it has become a Member State. This puts the British state under 
acute constitutional, administrative, political and social pressures. As Ross 
McKibbin observed, the EU has become ‘as much a part of the structure of 
the British state as the Union with Scotland once was’ (McKibbin 2014).
The characteristics of Member Statehood shape the Brexit process 
in manifold ways. The European orientation of the administrative British 
state was on show throughout the referendum campaign, with major 
British institutions – such as the Bank of England and the Treasury, and 
the ‘deep state’ of the higher education sector – openly backing the Remain 
campaign. The lack of planning around Brexit, itself a symptom of the deep 
Europeanisation of the British state, has placed a huge post- referendum 
burden on the civil service, which is now struggling to manage.
Brexit has challenged another feature of Member Statehood, 
namely the orientation towards problem- solving and consensus- building 
within institutional settings where all parties share the same basic politi-
cal outlook.5 In effect, Brexit has obliged British diplomats to act in ways 
that are quite alien to them, in particular with regards hard bargaining 
and assessing important trade- offs. Rather than accepting the costs of 
leaving as a price worth paying, we have seen prolonged equivocation on 
the part of British officials about whether there will be any cost associated 
with Brexit at all. ‘Having your cake and eating it’, a phrase that was the 
butt of many jokes in the media, points directly to this inability to think 
in terms of costs and benefits. An earlier example was David Cameron’s 
letter to the president of the European Council. Setting out the UK’s vari-
ous ‘baskets’ of demands; the language used suggested that the goal was 
not to defend the British national interest but rather to transform the EU 
for the better. It was very difficult to tell if the prime minister saw him-
self as defending the national or the European interest, as the boundaries 
between the two had become, by that point, quite blurred.
It is also noteworthy that there has been a great reluctance to 
accept that Brexit means the UK is ‘going it alone’ in any meaningful way. 
Nationalist histories of the past – including that of the UK – have made 
much of the ability to ‘stand alone’ but in the UK’s case even confident 
Brexiters have sought the comfort of wider communities such as the 
‘Anglosphere’ or the Commonwealth (Bell, 2017). The referendum cam-
paign itself never addressed directly the issue of the UK’s status as an out-
sider. Even discussions about leaving the Single Market or the Customs 
Union were muted. Instead, there was an extensive debate about which 
‘model’ the UK would adopt. Critics of this discussion talked of a ‘bespoke 
arrangement’ for the UK, which had comforting echoes of receiving 
special treatment and of not being left out in the cold. This refusal to 
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consider Brexit as the state transformational challenge that it is con-
tinues into the post- referendum period. British civil servants currently 
working within the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU) 
are, for instance, only seconded – for a term of two years – from their 
original ministries, the implication being that their services will only be 
needed for this short interim and transitional period. This is clearly a dra-
matic under- estimation of the administrative challenges posed by Brexit.
The relevance of the British experience for the other EU Member 
States is clear. As Member States rather than nation- states, they also con-
stitute themselves as discrete political communities through their par-
ticipation in wider networks of rule, from the EU through to the G20, the 
United Nations (UN) and the WTO. Self- government and the ability to 
construct a national will that stands apart from other national wills is as 
alien to these other EU Member States as it is to the UK. The Greek exam-
ple is telling here. It was only the eccentric and self- absorbed person of 
Varoufakis who could attempt to stand up to the Eurogroup, the Greek 
state as a whole being unable to contemplate life outside of either the 
eurozone or the EU. Opposition to the Troika was thus limited to mere 
grandstanding, with the Greek people left to pick up the pieces.
Brexit raises the fundamental issue of representation and the 
capacity of a state to represent to the outside world the collective and 
popular will. Member statehood is premised on a horizontal understand-
ing of power and legitimacy where it is being a part of the wider com-
munity that matters most. The authority of governments is the borrowed 
authority of this wider group. Brexit thus reveals in a dramatic fashion 
the way in which Member States struggle to fulfil even their most basic 
functions of self- government associated with the model of the sovereign 
state. This is by no means only a British affair. It is also an urgent issue 
for all European citizens who believe in the capacity  – and duty  – of 
governments to represent the will of their citizens.
Conclusions
This chapter has argued that Brexit should not be treated as an excep-
tional and standalone phenomenon, isolated from the rest of the 
European continent. Though it is unlikely that other countries will 
follow suit in the near future, Brexit nevertheless expresses some fun-
damental tensions present within the project of ‘ever closer union’. It is 
something of an irony that it is precisely in its decision to exit the EU 
that the UK has identified itself as a European state, whose trajectory 
and fate have many lessons for the EU’s 27 remaining Member States.
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The new crisis of ungovernability
Abby Innes
The Brexit vote represented, in the most part, a public reaction against 
radically increased material insecurity, frustration with political elites 
seen to collude with international business at the public expense, despair 
of public services wreathed in regulatory red- tape and perverse deci-
sions and, finally, austerity. And yet the root of these phenomena with 
which the EU became associated can be traced back not to Britain’s acces-
sion to the then EEC in 1973, but to the state reforms initiated at the 
national level within liberal market economies over the past 30  years. 
Indeed, within Europe, Britain has been at the forefront of these reforms, 
initiated by Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative governments during the 
1980s. To the extent that the case for Brexit was built on the claim that 
the EU alone was the root of these evils it should be understood as a 
tragic exercise in misdirected blame, particularly since, insofar as the 
EU became increasingly supportive of these reforms, it did so directly at 
the behest of successive UK governments. If the Brexit vote was largely 
based on opposition to these policies then it is diagnostically important 
that these phenomena be traced back to their original source in the state 
reforms of the past three decades, which is the aim of this chapter.
Over the last 30  years liberal market economies have trans-
formed the character of their states through privatisation, outsourcing, 
internal managerialism and agencification, and through the rejection 
of interventionist industrial policies and the development of ‘quasi- 
markets’ in welfare provision. These changes have been pursued in 
parallel to increasingly ‘competitive’, market- conforming tax and regu-
latory regimes that at the same time reduce the social requirements on 
corporate capital. These measures have been driven by the dominant 
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New Right diagnosis of the economic and state crises of the 1970s, justi-
fied by the analysis of the public choice or ‘supply- side’ school of eco-
nomics aligned with the Chicago School. This diagnosis said that the 
self- aggrandising and bureaucratic ‘Leviathan’ state was essentially to 
blame for these crises, rather than other factors such as technological 
change, the Nixon shock, the end of Bretton Woods, the oil crises or con-
flicting craft unions. However, far from producing better government for 
less money, these pro- market state reforms have caused a new crisis of 
ungovernability that is far more profound than the original.
The problem is that very few supply- side reforms have worked on 
the terms by which they were publicly validated. Instead they have cre-
ated new organisational pathologies that have served to aggravate rather 
than reduce the social polarisation resulting from de- industrialisation in 
the 1970s and the liberalisation of capital movement after the 1980s. 
Capital mobility and technological change spurred the growth of multi- 
national companies and these have in turn found increasing scope for 
deploying regulatory and tax arbitrage between newly competing, rather 
than coordinating, states. Not only have state reforms failed to deliver 
a more efficient state and more socially inclusive economic growth, but 
the unprecedented increase in the porosity of these states to business 
involvement has enabled more political corruption and conflicts of inter-
est. This has created the most damaging possible scenario for democratic 
capitalism. In this situation the mainstream political elites are seen to 
instrumentalise the powers of the state for party political or even private 
gain while simultaneously withdrawing its protections from the public.
If we look back through the last 30  years we have a history of 
increasingly bi- partisan efforts towards the marketisation of the state 
in accordance with supply- side orthodoxies that hold most of the mod-
ern functions of the state to be suspect. New Labour reversed multi-
ple Thatcherite reforms but critically, over successive governments, it 
opened up welfare services to taxpayer- funded private providers on an 
experimental basis while moving more wholeheartedly towards regula-
tory and tax competition, leading a social democratic shift in the same 
vein in much of the rest of Europe. New Labour saw in the creation of 
a mixed- market state the possibility of combining wealth creation with 
greater efficiency and responsiveness in public service provision:  that 
consumer choice would keep the middle classes attached to the welfare 
state. But with the end of the social democratic veto on private provi-
sion for public goods the route was opened for the massive extension of 
these reforms by subsequent right wing governments in which supply- 
side thinking increasingly dominated.
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Unfortunately the assumptions behind supply- side criticisms of the 
modern state are fundamentally flawed for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
this critique of the state is based on an abstract, super- reductionist under-
standing of really- existing states. Supply- siders see the state as equiva-
lent to a monopoly business firm or cartel, with radically dispersed and 
hence inattentive shareholders (read:  voters!). In this approach the 
monopoly or cartel has become the presiding stylised fact in deductive 
modelling of the state and its sins (Brennan & Buchanan 1980; Niskanen 
1973; Tullock 1965; Dunleavy 1991). With these extreme normative 
working assumptions the state is depicted as being doomed to operate 
with all the negative tendencies of a monopoly, such as exploitative price- 
making, parasitic rent- seeking and general budgetary greed and institu-
tional complacency and inefficiency. Clearly, if you conceive of the state 
in this narrowly economistic way then the only rational solution is to 
break up the monopoly wherever possible and subject it to market forces, 
but the argument is circular rather than empirically founded.
The second flaw in supply- side reasoning, even if you find pur-
chase in the diagnosis, is the failure to anticipate the practicalities of 
marketising the really- existing state. As a different body of economic 
theory – namely, of contract and property rights – warns, the higher the 
complexity of a good or product the higher the risk of ‘asymmetrical’ con-
tracts in which the seller has more information than the buyer and hence 
has built- in opportunities to exploit that buyer (Barr 2015; Hart et  al. 
1997). Transaction cost theory, which considers the ‘friction’ costs of con-
tractual negotiation and compliance, shows that trying to manage such 
contracts leads to massively increased costs (Williamson 2002). These 
costs can hardly be rendered efficient because of the intrinsically unbal-
anced nature of the original contract (Baker et al. 2002, 41). The analogy 
between state and firm also elides the fact that a failed firm reallocates 
labour and capital resources in a way that is painful in the short term, 
whereas a failed state collapses the main mechanism for social integra-
tion and public order per se (Shaxson & Christensen 2016).
The vast majority of the tasks and goods provided by modern states 
violate most of the preconditions for efficient markets, such as perfect 
information between buyers and sellers, no external effects not priced 
in the original transaction (‘externalities’) and no interdependencies 
between buyers and sellers. As Hans Werner Sinn remarked of regulatory 
and tax competition between states, ‘since governments have stepped in 
when markets have failed [historically], it can hardly be expected that a 
reintroduction of the market through the backdoor of systems competi-
tion will work. It is likely to bring about the same kind of market failure 
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that brought about government intervention in the first place’ (Sinn 
1997, 249). And indeed it has, but in the meantime the now profoundly 
‘hybridised’ UK state has developed distinct pathologies of its own.
The supply- side theory of the state as a scheming Leviathan 
anticipated nothing about what would happen when marketisation of 
the state necessarily failed to produce a competitive market as a result 
of the nature of the goods and services it provides. After 30 years the 
evidence suggests that introducing choice and competition into the 
state and between states produces the worst, rather than the best, 
of both public and private regimes. In the case of tax and regulatory 
competition, the largest, wealthiest firms in particular have increas-
ingly escaped their share of the fiscal contract via a race to the bot-
tom on rates, standards and enforcement. They have also pushed the 
burden for continuing taxation onto less mobile factors such as labour 
and small- and medium- sized enterprises, while producing no evident 
compensatory dividend in greater productive investment or increased 
growth (Shaxson & Christensen 2016). In the meantime, the evidence 
for the profound market and regulatory failures behind the global 
financial crisis is comprehensive. In the case of welfare, the norm has 
become one of profit- seeking firms engaged at the tax- payers’ expense 
but in thoroughly non- competitive conditions which force the state 
into Kafkaesque games of regulatory catch- up because of its ongoing 
statutory responsibility for outcomes. These are textbook scenarios for 
‘moral hazard’, in which private providers have few incentives to avoid 
risky or perfunctory behaviour because of de facto (publicly funded) 
insurance. And of course such hazards existed in theory in the ver-
tically integrated state, but with fewer transaction costs, minus the 
profit motive and (whisper it) offset by a vocational sense of public 
service.
Today’s taxpayer- funded quasi- markets in welfare and public ser-
vice provision are characterised either by highly fragmented systems, 
such as the poorly regulated private trusts with low economies of scale 
seen in Academy schools, or by public service industry oligopolies, with 
the necessary conditions for efficient competition a rarity. Public service 
companies like G4S, SERCO and Capita have a proven tendency to sweat 
the guaranteed public funding while only producing ‘satisficing’  – that 
is to say perfunctory, low-quality – performance within hard-to-monitor 
contracts, which explains the higher costs, lower service quality and 
increased regulatory oversight of the services in question. Moreover, this 
oversight is largely doomed to ineffectiveness because the most impor-
tant activities in schools, prisons, hospitals, etc. cannot be codified, and 
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attempts to codify them increase transaction costs whilst incentivising 
behaviour towards box- ticking at the expense of the core but uncodi-
fied tasks. Even the quickest study of Communist central planning would 
have warned supply- siders that overbearing regulatory control and sanc-
tion creates multiple systemic informational and organisational distor-
tions and contributes to professional demoralisation.
The problem, which is relatively hidden from the service-using 
public, but which is equally serious, is that the increasing role for private 
businesses is replicated throughout the entire state administration. This 
has caused extensive administrative and informational fragmentation 
and hence, again, those increased transaction costs. After a sabbatical 
in the Cabinet Office, Matthew Flinders argued that institutional frag-
mentation and the bureaucratic Taylorism of agencification had ended 
the capacity of UK central government to operate ‘meta- governance’ over 
state authority (Flinders 2008). But this process of dis integrating state 
capacity has only intensified after 2010 and 2015 under the supply- side 
policies of the Conservatives. The process of Brexit is going to reveal how 
critically weak the capacity of the UK state has become.
According to one of the very few studies that evaluates these reforms 
over the long term, Ruth Dixon and Christopher Hood find that reported 
administration costs in the UK have actually risen by 40 per cent in 
constant prices over the last 30  years, despite a third of civil service 
numbers being cut over the same period, whilst total public spending 
over the same period has doubled. Most significant of all, they find that 
running costs have been driven up the most in the outsourced areas. 
Service failures, complaints and judicial challenges have at the same time 
soared (Dixon & Hood 2015). This is in no respect the ‘better government 
for less money’ heralded across the political aisles.
The UK is now experiencing a crisis of supply in social care and 
in the NHS and an unprecedented recruitment and retention crisis for 
doctors and teachers. Indeed, one recent YouGov poll showed that over 
half of the UK’s teachers contemplate leaving the profession within 
the next two years (Boffey 2015). These shortages are exacerbated by 
the new ambiguity surrounding the immigration status of EU nation-
als and the rate of EU nationals leaving the NHS has already acceler-
ated sharply since the referendum. UK trains are roughly six times 
more expensive than those on continental Europe (Khan 2017). The 
UK recently saw the worst prison riot in decades at the G4S- run HMP 
Birmingham. UK prisons now have the highest suicide rate since records 
began (BBC News 2017). But not only do these reforms repeatedly fail 
to deliver on their promises, they have also undermined the democratic 
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accountability of the state by undercutting the government’s ability to 
reverse failing or unpopular policies. State autonomy is undermined 
when authority is given to unaccountable and poorly regulated private 
business actors on long- term and highly informationally asymmetric 
contracts. The National Audit Office, for example, has declared the fin-
ancial statement of the Department of Education to be unsafe and 
unsound for the second year running (National Audit Office 2017). At the 
same time, via the creation of Academy Schools, parents have lost their 
legal rights of redress in a system that performs more poorly on the gam-
ing of league tables and on exclusions and attainment for disadvantaged 
students compared with Local Education Authority (LEA) maintained 
schools, because the legal contract now stands between the Secretary of 
State and the legally private institution of individual Academy Trusts, of 
which there are now thousands. In the meantime, supply- side reforms 
have created major business interests in the perpetuation of these poli-
cies and increased the structural dependence of the state on individual 
businesses. It is hard to imagine a system more productive of a popular 
perception that political elites collude with business at the expense of 
the public interest. But since the leading Brexiteers are also the strongest 
exponents of these already failed state reforms, that sense of public disil-
lusionment may actually worsen once they deepen these practices and 
the EU is no longer available as the target of frustration. However, there 
is a serious risk that other more xenophobic and less potentially construc-
tive narratives will be brought into play first.
So why isn’t there a public debate about the systemic crisis of the 
state, as occurred in the 1970s? One reason is that this crisis does not fall 
neatly between party lines as it did in the 1970s. The expressive function 
of the main parties is not aided by the fact that all the most powerful 
actors in this system, from the political parties to large public industry 
corporations and the City, are implicated in its creation. Nor is an effec-
tive party political debate encouraged by the fact that business represent-
atives now form some 30 per cent of senior civil service appointments, 
constitute the majority of non- executive board directors in every depart-
ment, and can be brought in as special policy advisors through a revolv-
ing door that now spins – without serious regulation or sanction – both 
in and out of government. The system of party political finance in this 
context has become a political economy of its own.
The double standards are stark if one compares the relentless 
criticism of Britain’s failing industrial corporatism in the 1970s to that 
of the corporatist relationship between the City of London and the UK 
Treasury, though the City’s neglect of national developmental needs is 
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an entrenched historical tendency (Crouch 2005, 146– 7). If warring 
UK craft unions were a restraint on UK productivity in the 1970s, then 
why is there no equivalent outcry today over the fact that tax and reg-
ulatory competition have contributed more evidently to the financial 
crisis and the financialisation of firms than to either their improved pro-
ductive capacity or innovation potential? And why are the City and the 
Treasury not deemed unhealthily close when this relationship produces 
a dystopian vision of the UK as a tax haven (Withnall 2017)? Even if 
supply- side reforms had not built so powerful a constituency for their 
extension it would be politically awkward for mainstream parties to call 
for actively rebuilding the state after so many years of insisting on its 
comparative inefficiency. But that criticism was only ever coherent in 
the light of the analogy between state and firm:  an analogy that not 
only ignores the historical role of the state in making and sustaining 
markets but also the entire body of behavioural economics regarding 
the theory of firms that questions their profit- seeking efficiency, and 
understands them as complex institutions prone to internal opportun-
ism and contractual failures.
Is it any wonder, then, that those with the poorest life chances 
in this economy in particular despair of mainstream parties? It is the 
populists alone who have said ‘we feel your pain’. The trouble is that 
the UK’s populists argue that the voters’ problems have been caused 
exclusively by the EU. The more glaring truth is that many voters are 
disappointed because mainstream UK parties – sometimes aided, some-
times countered by EU policy – have, over the last 30 years, made the 
state both an inefficient public regime and a poorly performing mar-
ket. Indeed, they have succeeded only in creating a chaotic hybrid state 
that is now prone to all the rent- seeking and exploitative behaviours, 
along with byzantine and bureaucratic attempts at regulatory catch- up, 
which supply- siders are supposed to abhor. But on these failures the 
supply- siders have had nothing consequential to say. As for the main 
opposition party, in the continuing absence of a coherent analysis of 
why supply- side reforms have failed, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn 
looks like a time traveller from the state crisis of the 1970s, while the 
Blairites just look guilty.
One of the most remarkable ironies of Brexit is that it is the supply- 
siders who are now in the driving seat who have done so much to dis-
credit the efficacy of the state and, by extension, its executive, while 
passing the blame largely onto the EU:  if we were looking for appro-
priate culpability then exactly the wrong faction won. If you consider 
the politics of Michael Gove, Iain Duncan Smith, David Davis or Boris 
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Johnson in the UK, these are supply- side militants still determined to 
dis integrate the institutions of the state and rent out its authority to the 
private sector.
The persistence of supply- side reforms in the face of their 
demonstrable failure is consequently profoundly politically danger-
ous as well as socially damaging. Ironically, though predictably, these 
failures will be intensified under any Brexit outcome engineered by 
the chief exponents of supply- side reform. In the short term, it is hard 
to be optimistic. It is not clear how this trend to political polarisation 
can be reversed without a radical shift in the political economic para-
digm, since the UK production regime, like that in the USA, offers 
up an increasingly divergent set of social interests. The knowledge 
economy encourages a dramatic shift in the producer coalition land-
scape and the welfare regime that it favours. There were distinct pat-
terns in the Brexit vote and the 2016 US election of divergent voting 
preferences between the centres of the new knowledge economy  – 
rooted in ICT and services  – and those of the rural, industrial and 
mid- range technology economies. These trends support a worrying 
thesis (Schwartz 2017), which is that there are deepening structural 
divisions in advanced capitalist economies between those higher 
educated voters who feel able to self- insure in minimal or failing 
state conditions, and therefore prefer the dynamism of highly liber-
alised economies, versus those with little hope of achieving a stake 
in that system. Such massive social polarisation, particularly in a 
majoritarian electoral system, is inimical to compromise, consensus 
and democracy.
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The ties that bind
Securing information- sharing after Brexit
Deirdre Curtin
Introduction
The history of European integration has for many decades been one of 
unity and, at the same time, one of differentiation. As the EU has moved 
into areas that were previously exclusive to the nation- state, such as 
criminal law and border control, a preference by some Member States for 
‘outsiderness’ over full membership has progressively come to the fore. 
The UK – in common with Denmark – has never been a full participant 
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). During the Treaty 
of Amsterdam negotiations in 1996, the UK acquired the right to opt out 
of various EU initiatives in the field of police and judicial cooperation. It 
never joined the Schengen Convention and maintained the right to opt 
out from the Schengen border control system, which enabled the UK to 
continue exercising controls at its borders.
The Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 merged police and judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters into the main structure of the EU, making ini-
tiatives in this policy domain subject to qualified majority voting and 
the supranational institutions of the EU. In response, the UK negotiated 
a block opt- out, giving it the option to opt out of pre- Lisbon police and 
criminal justice measures (around 100 measures) or to remain bound 
by them. The UK exercised this block opt- out in 2014, but rejoined 35 
measures – including participation in EU agencies such as Europol and 
Eurojust  – later that same year. During the scrutiny that took place in 
2014 in the House of Lords assessing whether the UK should rejoin these 
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35 measures, Baroness Prashar highlighted that the measures were ‘thor-
oughly assessed’, ‘judged to be in the national interest’ and deemed ‘vital’ 
(European Union Committee 2016, 9). The UK opted not only to join a 
considerable number of police and criminal justice measures, but also 
the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive. All these measures were 
substantively judged – fewer than three years ago – to offer crucial ben-
efits to public safety and national security. As Home Secretary, Theresa 
May emphasised their necessity in order to ‘stop foreign criminals from 
coming to Britain, deal with European fighters coming back from Syria, 
stop British criminals evading justice abroad, prevent foreign criminals 
evading justice by hiding here, and get foreign criminals out of our pris-
ons’ (European Union Committee 2016, 9).
One of the top four overarching objectives of the Brexit negotia-
tions for the UK has been ‘to keep our justice and security arrangements at 
least as strong as they are’.1 This is in the UK’s own interest and is indeed 
acknowledged as such by UK law enforcement agencies. The EU tools 
and capabilities the UK would like to see retained or adequately replaced 
include Europol, Eurojust, the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II), the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), the Prüm Decisions and 
PNR. The UK’s future relationship with Europol has been identified as ‘a 
critical priority’ (European Union Committee 2016, 20). The form that 
this might take has not been given much consideration but there are some 
sources of inspiration for a future relationship that is both inside and out-
side, with some variations in between. As Denmark is the first EU Member 
State to negotiate an agreement with Europol with the status as a third 
party, the negotiations may very well set a precedent for the those con-
ducted by the UK. Norway has also negotiated a bilateral international 
agreement with the EU as a third country, and the trajectory of both the 
negotiation process and the result will be explored below. As a former 
Member State, Britain will definitely require more than third- country sta-
tus (in all its existent permutations) after Brexit, in order to avoid a surgi-
cal severing of an integral part of a well functioning organism. That is, at 
least, the perspective of the cooperating law enforcement agencies them-
selves. Severing an artery, thereby cutting off a much needed security rela-
tionship within Europe cannot be considered in the public interest either. 
As Bruce Springsteen (1980) expressed it lyrically: ‘now you can’t break 
the ties that bind’. A panoply of alternative nautical- knot metaphors are 
on offer to help understand how the various parts might be kept together 
after Brexit. This chapter discusses several of these – the Danish ‘adjust-
able bend’, the Norwegian ‘anglers’ loop’ and bespoke Brexit– Europol 
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‘tangles’ – to shed some light on the options for the UK’s post- Brexit par-
ticipation in AFSJ. The chapter will examine how an ‘in between’ solution 
will affect the rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights and 
which courts will ensure justiciability in the last instance.
A Danish ‘adjustable bend’
The possibility of a UK cooperation agreement with Europol being 
conditioned on continued cooperation in other EU policy areas, such 
as the Single Market, is not entirely unrealistic, particularly in view of 
recent discussions on Denmark’s future relationship with Europol. In 
a referendum that took place in December 2015, the Danish elector-
ate rejected a proposal to transform the Danish opt- out system into an 
opt- in on EU matters on Justice and Home Affairs. The Danish public 
also voted to opt out of the new Europol Regulation, and Denmark is 
thus no longer a member of Europol as of 1 May 2017. To ensure future 
cooperation between Denmark and Europol, on 17 February 2017 the 
Council added Denmark to the list of Third States with which Europol 
may conclude agreements (Council Implementing Decision 2017a). 
The Commission considered it ‘vital to provide for cooperation between 
Europol and Denmark on key matters’, particularly given that it is ‘one 
of the key contributors to the Europol database’ (European Parliament 
2017c). The intention was to construct Denmark- specific arrangements 
that amounted to less than full membership of Europol. In essence this 
is a type of ‘associate’ membership of Europol (while – oddly – Denmark 
remains a full Member State). It is explicitly conditioned on Denmark’s 
continued membership both of the EU and of the Schengen area, its full 
implementation of the Directive on cooperation in police matters, its 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the CJEU and its acceptance of the com-
petence of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).
The obligation for Denmark to remain bound by the Schengen 
acquis was strongly disputed by the Danish People’s Party (Dansk 
Folkeparti) which had been adamant during the referendum process 
in its support for reintroducing border controls and exiting Schengen 
(Garulund Nøhr 2016). Prior to the referendum, the Danish People’s 
Party had promised voters that a ‘no’ vote would still ensure full mem-
bership of Europol but withdrawal from Schengen. The new agreement 
certainly does not meet this promise. The Agreement on Operational 
and Strategic Cooperation between Denmark and Europol entered 
into force on 30 April 2017 after being approved by Council decision 
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(Council Implementing Decision 2017b). The Agreement emphasises 
the ‘urgent problems arising from international crime’ and the wish to 
ensure cooperation between Europol and Denmark. Article 8 allows a 
representative to be invited to the Europol Management Board and for 
its subgroups to act as observers, but does not grant it the right to vote. 
On the experience of other Agencies, the deprivation of the formal 
right to vote is not to be seen as a crucial stumbling block to effective 
cooperation in practice.
The concern that Denmark may lose access to Europol information 
is well- founded given that the Agreement does not include any provisions 
on this matter. Following the Agreement, Denmark will lose the possi-
bility to directly search in Europol databases, following the principle of 
interoperability. Denmark will however have the possibility to designate 
up to eight Danish- speaking staff to handle Danish requests, and to input 
and retrieve data from Danish authorities in the Europol processing sys-
tems (Europol 2017). What this will mean in practice remains to be seen 
but Denmark as a voluntary Europol outsider may in practice and infor-
mally be granted (much) more liberal access to relevant data, also from 
other Member States, than its legal position would warrant. The agree-
ment between Europol and Denmark (Europol 2017) may be a template 
for the UK after Brexit, but many of the conditions imposed on Denmark, 
alone or together, may prove problematic for the UK in future arrange-
ments with Europol, including subjecting the UK to the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU, and requiring its participation in Schengen.
A Norwegian ‘anglers’ loop’
Within the UK it is felt that in the Brexit context, there is not only the 
Danish ‘precedent’ but that the UK should look at ‘something more than 
that’ (European Union Committee 2016, 60). What that ‘more’ designates 
in this context is unknown and arguably does not (yet) exist. Something 
‘less than’ the Danish knot is a Norwegian one:  an anglers’ loop. The 
bilateral agreement concluded with Iceland and Norway on the surren-
der procedure between the EU Member States and Iceland and Norway 
provides that disputes be resolved through a meeting of representatives 
of the governments rather than through recourse to the CJEU (Official 
Journal of the European Union 2006). This bilateral agreement states 
that the contracting parties shall consider ‘the development of the case 
law of the Court of Justice’ as well as the development of the case law in 
Iceland and Norway to achieve uniform application and interpretation 
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of the Agreement (Article 37). In this way the case law of the CJEU may 
play a role in the interpretation of provisions. The practicalities of this 
influence are unclear as yet, particularly considering that the Norway/ 
Iceland agreement has not yet entered into force.
One thing is certain:  since the new Europol Regulation entered 
into force on 1 May 2017 future agreements between Europol and third 
countries are formal ‘international agreements’ negotiated on the legal 
basis of Article 218 TFEU and entailing a veto power by the European 
Parliament. This is a quite different legal and political situation to that 
prevailing when Denmark was (with considerable haste) entered onto 
the list of third countries with which Europol could make agreements 
and when the agreement was subsequently made. A  further practical 
issue concerns the actual time it may take for the UK to negotiate an 
agreement with Europol. The average negotiation time for operational 
agreements that allow for the exchange of data is around nine to 12 years 
(European Union Committee 2016, 58). The UK is unlikely to accept this 
lengthy period of negotiation, particularly as it has played such an ‘active 
role in the development of EU policy on police cooperation and access to 
data for law enforcement purposes’ (Carrera et al. 2016, 4).
Bespoke Brexit– Europol ‘tangles’
The UK has been a member of Europol since its creation in 1998. It also 
included the 2009 Council Decision as one of the 35 measures that it 
rejoined following its block opt- out arrangement after the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Carrera et al. 2016, 43). In November 2016, the UK announced 
that it would opt in to the new Europol Regulation (Home Office 2016). 
The government highlighted the timing of this opt- in in the context of 
Brexit by stating that, whilst the UK is leaving the EU, ‘the reality of cross- 
border crime remains’. The UK considers Europol to be a ‘valuable service 
to the UK and opting in would enable us to maintain our current access 
to the agency, until we leave the EU’ (Home Office 2016). The National 
Crime Agency (NCA) has listed a UK opt- in to the new Europol regula-
tion as an ‘immediate priority’ and has classified membership of Europol 
or an alternative arrangement as its most important priority (European 
Union Committee 2016, 51). Whilst some EU agencies allow for non- 
EU Member States to enjoy a level of participation in the workings of 
the agency, which may be used as a precedent for future UK relations 
with Europol, these non- EU states do not always enjoy voting rights. For 
example, the new Europol Regulation states that the Management Board 
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is to be composed of ‘one representative from each Member State and 
one representative of the Commission’, with each representative having 
a voting right. The Management Board can also invite non- voting observ-
ers to its meetings (Official Journal of the European Union 2016, Article 
14(4)). Given that Europol merely allows EU Member States and the 
Commission to be represented in the management board, the UK must 
negotiate an agreement with Europol to remain connected in order to 
retain some form of influence. Europol may establish and maintain coop-
erative relations with third countries, but the Council must first publish 
a list of third states with which Europol may conclude such agreements 
(Official Journal of the European Union 2009, Article 26(1)).
Before any agreement can be concluded with the UK on its future 
cooperation with Europol, the Council must, therefore, first add the UK 
to the list of countries with which Europol may conclude agreements. 
Europol furthermore recognises two types of agreements with third par-
ties, namely, strategic and operational agreements. Strategic agreements 
are ‘limited to the exchange of general intelligence whereas operational 
agreements allow for the exchange of data’ (Europol 2017). For example, 
Norway signed a strategic agreement with Europol in 2001, thereby 
removing obstacles to the exchange of data. Norway’s position is limited, 
however, in comparison with full membership, and also with regard to the 
Danish version. Norwegian police cannot search Europol’s database dir-
ectly and must go through Europol’s operational centre to ensure compli-
ance with Europol rules before being granted access to the analysis forums.
According to Adler- Nissen (2015b, 195), Norway ‘has failed to 
secure agreements with the EU on matters such as the transfer of sen-
tenced prisoners and has yet to reach an agreement on common rules 
on documents in legal proceedings and evidence gathering’. Hufnagel 
(2016, 175) furthermore argues that Norway’s agreement with Europol 
is conditioned on its being closely associated with law enforcement 
cooperation in the EU ‘through its association with the Schengen coop-
eration mechanisms’ and as a member of the European Economic Area. 
A UK agreement with Europol will therefore be much more problematic 
if the UK moves toward a hard Brexit, with no participation in Schengen 
or in the Single Market. Of course, it will always be an option – unlikely 
though it is – that the UK as a non EU Member State joins the Schengen 
area in the future, a status that would then be shared with Iceland, 
Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein. The crucial difference is that the 
UK has never been part of Schengen and as such is unlikely to now join 
(given that Schengen is now an integral part of the EU, as opposed to 
when the agreement with Norway and other EEA states was concluded). 
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There are in any event no non- Schengen states outside the EU with which 
the EU engages in anything comparable to its cooperation with Member 
States or Schengen states. Nor has there ever been an existing Member 
State that exited before, so a further bespoke arrangement in specific 
regards cannot be ruled out, provided that there is no hard Brexit. In such 
circumstances it would be difficult to envisage – or justify – a cherry pick-
ing bespoke arrangement with the UK in AFSJ.
‘Now you can’t break the ties that bind’
The House of Commons Justice Committee (2017, 11)  considers the 
security and safety of the UK’s residents as ‘too precious to be left vul-
nerable to tactical bargaining’. Where there is a will, however, there 
may yet be a way. The highly pragmatic solution adopted – at the very 
last moment before the new Europol Regulation entered into force on 
1 May 2017 – of Denmark being added in an unprecedented fashion, as 
a Member State, to the list of third countries with which Europol may 
conclude agreements, bears witness to the desire of the EU to find solu-
tions that would enable ongoing cooperation and access to databases, 
even if this is not the same as full participation in Europol. But we should 
recall that that fundamental political willingness to engage in these kinds 
of legal and temporal knotting arrangements was for Denmark as a ‘full’ 
Member State, and not for a genuine (future) third country, which is 
what the UK is about to become, albeit from the position of having been 
a Member State partially ‘opted in’ to the system.
The likelihood of considerable ‘bits and pieces’ looms large in par-
ticular as the UK struggles to maintain already existing levels and choices 
of cooperation. The reason may not only be the need to do what is neces-
sary for the security and well- being of the citizens and residents of the 
UK, but also the considerable sunk costs incurred by the UK in setting up 
the existing arrangements (e.g. on implementing the Prüm decisions) as 
well as the likely costs of replicating capabilities outside the EU (e.g. on 
the EAW or a Europol- type agency or database). The UK clearly faces a 
future different from that which has gone before. It will move from being 
an engaged insider in which it operated, in practice, as a leader – in its 
own words, the UK was ‘a leading protagonist in driving and shaping the 
nature and direction of cooperation on police and security matters under 
the auspices of the EU’ (European Union Committee 2016, 10)  – to a 
disempowered outsider. The vista thus beckons of the UK having to 
formally prove ‘adequacy’ arrangements prior to any data- sharing 
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agreements just like any other third country – a bitter pill for the UK given 
the manner in which its own personal data protection for law enforce-
ment purposes preceded – and provided a model for – that of the EU itself.
The leadership role of the UK has undoubtedly been instrumen-
tal in designing the very foundations of AFSJ as well as constructing 
some important pillars (for example, on data retention and recent 
EU rules on PNR). The UK has the highest number of seconded offic-
ers at Europol headquarters in the Hague; it was a major advocate of 
the European Arrest Warrant and the PNR Directive and the (subse-
quently annulled) Data Retention Directive. But emancipation is nigh 
for the EU27. There is no reason to believe that we will see anything 
but further intensification of the role and powers of the agencies in this 
field and their steering ‘management’ by national administrations on 
the ground. Information- sharing, and in particular the further devel-
opment of the principle of inter- operability across the supranational– 
national divide, will gain ever more importance and accrued practical 
content in the years ahead. The role of the CJEU will become more and 
more pivotal in ensuring the balance with fundamental rights and the 
issue of access to justice for individuals will remain as challenged and 
difficult as it is today.
Opt- outs and other differentiation processes may actually reinforce 
the integration process, through the ‘stigmatization of transgressive 
states’ (Adler- Nissen 2015b, 2). Whatever was the case with regard to 
the existing British (and Danish) opt- outs from borders, asylum, migra-
tion and justice policies, the position of the UK as a stigmatised outsider 
will greatly intensify after Brexit. Yet there is a paradox as the UK will 
almost inevitably be forced to ‘mimic’ rules and regulations in the future, 
without any formal democratic participation in defining their content 
and without contributing towards the ongoing, and at times fundamen-
tal, debates on core issues before the CJEU. Mimicry of ‘bits and pieces’ 
of AFSJ, along with continued application of CJEU interpreted case law, 
seems to be the bespoke Brexit antidote in this field at any rate. The AFSJ 
is a space to be closely watched as the negotiations unfold – both in terms 
of law and in terms of the ongoing practices below the political radar. Yet 
the peculiar saga of how Denmark was legally enabled to remain part of 
Europol in spite of the fact that a national referendum specifically decided 
it would not may provide some indications how elites can construct legal 
and pragmatic ways out of clear political dilemmas. Where there is a will, 
it seems, there may well be a way, in particular in areas that are more 
under the political radar than others (e.g. police cooperation and infor-
mation- sharing). You cannot, after all, break the ties that bind.
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Citizenship and free movement 
in a changing EU
Navigating an archipelago of contradictions
Jo Shaw
Introduction
One result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership on 23 June 2016 
has been to leave behind a situation of considerable legal and personal 
uncertainty for EU27 citizens and their families resident in the UK, and 
UK citizens and their families resident in the EU27 Member States.1 It 
has also struck a blow against the viability of much of the UK economy, 
where a ‘high employment– low wage– low productivity’ triangle has 
largely been kept in place by a ready supply of labour from elsewhere 
within the Single Market, especially since the post- 2004 enlargements. 
It is the putative impact of this supply of flexible and arguably cheaper 
labour on domestic labour markets which means that calls to end free 
movement come not just from those who oppose immigration per se, 
but also from those on the political left who profess an internationalist 
outlook yet who argue that free movement makes it harder to pursue 
domestic policies that push the UK towards being a ‘high wage– high 
productivity’ economy.2
The focus in this chapter is on the individual rights and status con-
sequences of the ending of free movement as a result of leaving the EU, 
rather than wider questions about either the principles (Parker 2017) or 
the appropriate policy and regulatory mix (Boswell et al. 2017) for immi-
gration and mobility in the post- Brexit UK.3
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Ending free movement?
The basic situation is easy to state but hard to elaborate with sufficient 
precision to cover all eventualities: leaving the EU means an end to the 
regime of ‘free movement’, which has fostered and protected mobility (by 
workers, the self- employed, service- providers, students, pensioners and 
others, including third- country national family members) within the EU 
for the last 60 years. But designing a revised legal regime for ‘free movers’ 
after Brexit is a task of immense complexity, given the intricacy of existing 
EU law in this field (e.g. for social security and pension issues). Resolving 
these scenarios brings into play governance structures at many different 
levels, including national and subnational law, EU law, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and poten-
tially other sources of migrants’ rights at the international level. Because 
of the large numbers of UK and EU27 citizens involved, reciprocity is the 
watchword, with an agreement at the point of withdrawal needed, in 
order to avoid negative impacts on individuals on both sides of the equa-
tion. As negotiations under Article 50 got underway, it became clear that 
all parties shared the view that free movement should be at the top of the 
agenda, even though agreement may be hard to reach.
By July 2017, the UK and the European Commission (leading in the 
negotiations on behalf of the EU and the EU27) had both put forward 
their outline positions on the situation of EU citizens in the context of 
withdrawal. There was a great deal of distance between the two starting 
positions, noted by the negotiators themselves, although this has grad-
ually reduced over time as the UK has conceded on key points.4 It has 
been widely noted that the original UK proposals would entail a signifi-
cant degradation of rights for EU citizens compared with the status quo 
(Peers 2017; Reynolds 2017; Yeo 2017). For example, even EU citizens 
in the UK with the status of ‘permanent resident’, with documentation 
issued by the UK Home Office, would need to re- apply to the UK authori-
ties in order to benefit from the new ‘settled status’. If they failed to do so, 
they could find themselves in breach of UK immigration law, regardless 
of how long they had been resident in the UK, or under what conditions. 
This could potentially have very serious consequences if applied strictly, 
especially for vulnerable persons such as the elderly, those with disabili-
ties, or persons suffering from ill health. It has also been noted that Brexit 
risks exacerbating the gender bias previously observed in free move-
ment rules because EU law does not recognise caring as ‘work’ (O’Brien 
2017). In addition, family reunion rights would be reduced (in line with 
the very restrictive income- based rules applicable to UK citizens and 
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third- country nationals seeking family reunion) and those who left the 
UK for more than two years would lose their ‘settled status’ and would 
re- enter under whatever future regime applied to EU citizens (presum-
ably as third- country nationals). The absence of an unconditional right 
of return (one of the classic citizenship rights) sharply differentiates the 
proposed ‘settled status’ from UK citizenship.
These are not trivial questions affecting just a few people. It is not 
an exaggeration to suggest that the loss of individual rights resulting 
from the UK’s departure from the EU could be the most substantial loss of 
rights in Europe since the break- up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, with the 
loss of the status of ‘Yugoslav’ citizen for millions of people. Just as with 
the break- up of Yugoslavia, which saw individuals in many of the suc-
cessor states experience problems related to uncertain citizenship and 
immigration status (Shaw & Štiks 2012), so severing the bond of free 
movement law, which many have relied upon in order to build their lives, 
threatens to reduce life chances and life choices for millions now and in 
the future.
While none of the non- UK EU citizens resident in the UK ought to be 
at risk of statelessness as a result of the withdrawal of the UK, since they 
are by definition citizens of one (or more) of the EU27 Member States, 
the body of free movement law nonetheless offers substantial enhance-
ments in the socioeconomic, political and civic domains. It offers out-
comes that are well worth defending on both practical and philosophical 
grounds (de Witte 2016; Salomone 2017). Ironically, because of disen-
franchisement effects in relation to national elections and referendums 
(most EU citizens resident in the UK and UK citizens resident long- term 
outside the UK could not vote), there were fewer opportunities for politi-
cal voices to articulate the value of free movement during the EU referen-
dum campaign (Shaw 2017). Simply to suggest that EU citizens resident 
in the UK should themselves become UK citizens misses the point: many 
cannot (for a variety of reasons); the process is very expensive; they 
may fail whatever probity or integration tests are applied; or they may 
not wish to risk losing their ‘home’ state citizenship. Finally, there is the 
sheer bureaucratic effort involved, with the UK not geared up to deal 
with millions of residence applications, never mind millions of new natu-
ralisation applications. Ultimately, becoming a citizen in the formal sense 
(and the linkage thereby made between citizenship and immigration) is 
not the same thing as being a free mover. It is, however, clear from the 
famous ‘citizens of nowhere’ comment in her speech to the Conservative 
Party conference in October 2016, that the difficult situations in which 
those with fluid mobile residencies, complex multinational families 
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and/ or transnational work/ study/ life commitments do not inspire 
instinctive sympathy on the part of Prime Minister Theresa May.
It is also self- evident that the complexities of free movement law 
did not enter the minds of the vast majority of those who voted in the 
UK’s referendum. Free movement had been constructed, in the minds of 
many, as one of the problems facing a UK struggling with austerity and 
stagnant wages, not one of the solutions (Shaw 2016a). One re action 
has been to treat those exercising free movement rights as ‘lucky’ immi-
grants, not subject to the ‘hostile environment’ rules for third- country 
national immigrants, introduced by successive governments and sub-
stantially upgraded by Home Secretary Theresa May between 2010 and 
2016. When that narrative is applied, it starts to look wrong that in some 
areas (e.g. family reunion) EU citizens do better than UK citizens. It has 
also been easy to blame EU citizens for shortages in public services, rather 
than budget restrictions imposed on providers. The notion of EU citizen-
ship as a reciprocal bond founded on enforceable rights joining together 
citizens across the EU28 was completely lost within public discourse, not 
least because the Leave campaign was regularly punctuated by sweeping 
and unsubstantiated claims that EU citizens would have the same status 
after Brexit as before.5
Everything that has been done since June 2016 by the UK govern-
ment has reinforced a sense of chaos and uncertainty for EU27 citizens, 
and for UK citizens resident in the EU27. There has been a very high 
rejection rate (reportedly up to 28 per cent) of applications for perma-
nent residence documentation made by longstanding EU27 citizen resi-
dents (although the Home Office has claimed that this has not changed in 
recent years),6 with many rejections referring to the notorious – and argu-
ably both unnecessary and insurmountable  – comprehensive sickness 
insurance requirement applicable to those not in employment (Davies 
2017). Such rejections come with a letter from the Home Office stating 
that the unsuccessful applicant is not exercising treaty rights and should 
make arrangements to leave the UK. This spreads fear and despondency, 
even if such letters are not followed up on. Successful applications often 
entail costly consultations with lawyers. For months, there was no official 
government policy on what might come next, except for blandishments 
of a ‘generous offer’ in the making. Meanwhile the European Commission 
issued a set of principles agreed with the EU27 suggesting that EU/ UK 
citizens (on both sides of the UK/ EU27 divide) should enjoy the exact 
same rights they had enjoyed under free movement, even if that meant 
lifelong protection, complex arrangements for social security and pen-
sion aggregation, continuation of mutual recognition of qualifications, 
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the right of return or onward mobility, and the maintenance of the juris-
diction of the CJEU. The latter condition runs contrary to one of Prime 
Minister May’s ‘red lines’ from her Lancaster House speech.7 Absurdly, 
when the UK made its widely criticised ‘offer’ in June 2017, this was 
accompanied by calls from government politicians for the EU to recip-
rocate the UK offer, something which was impossible since the EU paper 
had preceded the UK one by several weeks.
It is clear that the unravelling of the composite polity that is ‘the 
UK in the EU’ raises serious practical issues for those whom it affects 
directly (i.e. those who are already in the UK) – and also for those indir-
ectly affected, including potential future movers as well as businesses 
and employers. There will be substantial opportunity costs for the UK 
economy in terms of losing access to a ready supply of labour coming 
from elsewhere within the Single Market under flexible conditions. 
But that point runs against another nostrum of Conservative Party 
policy, the commitment to reduce net immigration to below 100,000 
per annum. Pursuing this policy is bound to push up prices for compa-
nies and consumers and it is not clear that it will lead to higher levels 
of better remunerated employment for so- called ‘native Britons’ (Portes 
2017a, 2017b).
These implications, plus the loss of personal freedoms, are perhaps 
just starting to gain traction with the wider UK public, with one survey 
indicating that 60 per cent of UK citizens, including 58 per cent of Leave 
voters, want to keep their EU citizenship even after Brexit.8 It is worth 
setting this figure against the figures for EU citizens resident outside 
their Member State of citizenship, which sat at just 16 million in 2016 
(against a population of over 500 million), and amounts to less than 4 
per cent.9 This is somewhat misleading, however, and a better under-
standing of physical and virtual European mobilities emerges from the 
work of Salamon´ska and Recchi (2016), who assess the scale of the 
manifold cross- border practices of EU citizens and residents, across a 
number of dimensions including degree of permanence and frequency. 
They conclude that up to 20 per cent of the European population could 
be described as highly ‘mobile’ in this broader sense, but even this figure 
is still well short of those survey findings showing ‘attachment’ to EU 
citizenship. It is of course possible that the conflation of EU citizenship 
and free movement is starting to break down, so that the former is start-
ing to be understood as a political value above and beyond the latter 
(e.g. giving the opportunity to participate democratically by voting in 
European Parliament elections). Or it could be a finding that correlates 
closely to another survey, which indicated that voters were more likely 
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to say that any trade- off between the economy and immigration should 
be resolved in favour of policies promoting growth and trade, even if 
this meant more immigration or free movement.10 The complexities  – 
and unpalatable consequences  – of unravelling free movement might 
just be a catalyst contributing to the collapse of the case for Brexit. Or 
perhaps this is just the early stirrings of ‘euro- nostalgia’ that will sweep 
across the UK in the years to come until memories fade. Brexit Britain 
truly is, as I  have noted previously, an ‘archipelago of contradictions’ 
(Shaw 2016b).
Free movement and citizenship
The very idea that European citizenship as a legal status for UK citizens 
could somehow survive the separation of the UK from the EU brings 
us back to the core issue of what EU citizenship actually is, and how it 
relates both to free movement and to national citizenship (Mindus 2017; 
Schrauwen 2017). Exploring the relationship to national citizenship can 
lead us along well- trodden pathways, especially in terms of case law of 
the CJEU. EU citizenship is a creature of EU law, but it is based on access 
points controlled under national law. The McCarthy case suggested that 
those with dual citizenship of the host state and another Member State 
do not enjoy the protection of EU law,11 although the pending Lounes 
case may well see a different approach taken by the CJEU in the case of a 
person naturalised after having enjoyed family life with a third- country 
national in the host state whilst only a citizen of another Member 
State, if the advisory opinion of the Advocate General is followed in the 
November 2017 judgement.12 Furthermore, the CJEU has held that EU 
law requires the possibility of judicial review of decisions on deprivation 
of national citizenship, if this would have the effect of depriving an EU 
citizen of substantially all of the benefits of EU citizenship. However, this 
proposition was developed for a scenario where it was the actions of the 
EU citizen in question – in combination with national citizenship laws – 
which triggered the scenario in which he was deprived of the benefits 
of EU citizenship.13 We do not yet know how the CJEU might approach 
the question of loss of EU citizenship because a Member State withdraws 
from the EU.
At first sight, it seems that if EU law no longer applies after seces-
sion/ withdrawal of the UK, then EU citizenship must surely lapse. 
Absent any international agreement specifically preserving such a 
status or certain rights attaching to it (e.g. under Article 50), it seems 
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obvious that a withdrawing state retains the power, under international 
law, to deprive its citizens of the status of EU citizen, and to render the 
legal effect of that status, for citizens of other continuing Member States, 
nugatory within its territory. In similar terms, other Member States have 
no obligation to treat UK citizens other than as third- country nationals 
on their territory. There is no parallel with the duties on states in cir-
cumstances of secession, as there is no risk that such an act could render 
affected persons stateless. They are still protected by national citizen-
ship somewhere. There would be protection of non- citizen residents of 
the withdrawing state in relation to certain rights, such as family life, 
under international human rights law. The Kuric case of the European 
Court of Human Rights14 (Vidmar 2014) appears to ‘freeze’ the rights of 
those who have regular residence in the host state and who do not accede 
to the citizenship of that state when it secedes. Although developed in 
the context of the secession of a former Yugoslav republic (Slovenia), 
the principles in this case can be applied to a UK withdrawal from the 
EU (Mindus 2017; Schrauwen 2017). This seems to be what the offer 
of ‘settled status’ is reflecting, although that status offers less than EU 
citizenship.
The general proposition must be that national citizenship status 
will be unaffected by Brexit. The only caveat upon that point comes from 
the Tjebbes case, pending before the CJEU, concerning legislation with-
drawing Dutch citizenship from persons who are resident for more than 
10 years in a third country and who have taken on that country’s citizen-
ship.15 This case has obvious implications for the post- Brexit scenario, as 
the UK will be such a ‘third country’ after Brexit, so any intervention by 
the CJEU to suggest that Member States are not free to withdraw citi-
zenship in such circumstances because of EU citizenship could be for the 
benefit of EU27 citizens resident in the UK.
For the future, we could speculate that further adjustments to 
national citizenship laws might be a desirable part of the solution to the 
upheaval brought about by Brexit, if a stronger parallel is drawn to the 
impact of secession from a state. Seceding parts of states must attend to 
issues of citizenship as a matter of urgency, as must states from which 
regions secede. But the UK, on withdrawal from the EU, is making no 
moves to facilitate citizenship access of resident non- citizens, despite 
the loss of their preferential ‘free mover’ status. On the contrary, it seems 
that this group must accommodate themselves to the UK’s requirements, 
rather than the other way around, by applying for a form of ‘settled sta-
tus’ that falls far short of both national citizenship and of the protec-
tions and freedoms previously offered by free movement. Initially, there 
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was no sign of other Member States with restrictive approaches to dual 
citizenship, such as the Netherlands, Estonia or Austria, making adjust-
ments to citizenship law to accommodate resident UK citizens or to 
offer wider access to dual citizenship to protect the interests of new or 
existing citizens. On the contrary, the prime minister of the Netherlands 
appeared to double down on his country’s resistance to dual citizenship 
(Boffey 2017a; EUDO Citizenship 2015). However, perhaps in a harbin-
ger of further changes to come, in October 2017 the new Dutch coali-
tion adopted a more liberal approach to dual citizenship which was the 
existing policy of just one of the four coalition partners (the D66 Liberal 
Democrats party), offering assurances to Dutch citizens resident in the 
UK that they would be able to keep their Netherlands citizenship after 
naturalising in the UK (Boffey 2017b). The details of how this might 
work are not as yet known.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the absence of state action to 
remedy the situation, some European citizens – for whom it is possi-
ble and useful  – are taking action to acquire new or additional citi-
zenships as an insurance policy against the impending restriction of 
free movement. Quite substantial numbers of UK citizens are pursuing 
ancestry- based or family- relationship- based options in order to pre-
serve or open up new options for mobility, in addition to the classic 
mode of acquisition by residence/ naturalisation:16 Irish citizenship 
has been heavily in demand reflecting the many millions of UK citizens 
who have at least one Irish- born grandparent; German citizenship 
is an option for those descended from persons deprived of their citi-
zenship in Nazi Germany; Italian citizenship is accessible not only on 
the basis of descent, but also via a spouse. For those wealthy enough, 
there remains the option of purchasing citizenships and residencies in 
a number of Member States with minimal physical residence obliga-
tions (Džankic 2015).
Many EU citizens resident in the UK are pursuing the UK citizenship 
route despite the considerable expense and the numerous bureaucratic 
hurdles in place (e.g. the prior acquisition of the permanent residence 
documents that those same EU citizens are now being told will be value-
less after Brexit).17 The irony is that many are seeking UK citizenship not 
because they feel more integrated in the UK, but precisely because they 
face more hostility than ever before. A wave of xenophobia seems to have 
been unleashed by the UK’s ‘Brexit experience’.18 But there are still many 
mixed- nationality families, as well as highly mobile persons and groups, 
who find that citizenship acquisition does not match up to the fluid flex-
ible possibilities of free movement.
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Conclusions
Free movement is not, and has never been, an unconditional ‘right’ with 
benefits attached, and it remains primarily linked to economic interests. 
It also has a ‘dark’ side in the form of the posting of workers by firms 
providing services on a transnational basis; the position of these workers 
is barely regulated under EU law, and they are therefore subject to the 
vagaries of national law alone (MacShane 2017). But what is interest-
ing (and even ironic) about the post- Brexit period is that a clearer per-
spective on the value of free movement has now opened up. It is easier 
to argue how free movement for individuals has operated to obviate the 
restrictions of national citizenship and immigration regimes and to offer 
mobility options with low transaction costs over the lifecourse (for work, 
study, family or lifestyle reasons). This highlights the extent to which – in 
perception and practice, if not in law – EU citizenship has evolved into 
a form of transnational citizenship practice that complements the lacu-
nae that arise where overlapping national citizenship and immigration 
regimes are all that is on offer (Mindus 2017).
For the EU, and indeed for the international community more 
generally, Brexit creates an unprecedented situation. It has given rise to 
equally unprecedented civic mobilisation around demands for the pro-
tection of acquired rights, including several European Citizens’ Initiatives 
registered by the European Commission. Some have raised the possibil-
ity of EU citizenship becoming a freestanding status that can be acceded 
to other than through the nationality of the Member States, with UK 
citizens being offered the possibility of ‘associate citizenship’ (discussed 
in Schrauwen 2017), but at present such proposals remain utopian 
rather than practical in character. Eventually, unscrambling the eggs of 
free movement may demand some creative solutions going beyond the 
scope of the Article 50 agreement itself, including increased pressure 
on Member States to remove barriers to dual citizenship.19 This seems 
appropriate in an increasingly global age.
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The Emperor has no clothes
Brexit and the UK constitution
Piet Eeckhout
Introduction
In the nine months between the Brexit referendum and the triggering 
of Article 50, the principal development in the UK was not a search for 
what Brexit might mean – that search was cordoned off by the drawing 
of red lines, and was vacuously substituted with ‘Brexit means Brexit’. 
The main development was a legal one:  the Miller litigation, which 
decided the question of whether the Brexit referendum afforded suffi-
cient authority for the UK government to notify the EU of the UK’s inten-
tion to withdraw from the EU, or whether instead an Act of Parliament 
was required.1 The litigation was conducted under conditions of unprec-
edented public attention, ranging far beyond the traditional echo cham-
bers of lawyers and legal academics. For months the mainstream media 
focused on Gina Miller – now a celebrity – and her daring challenge to 
the government’s plans. Concepts such as ‘the royal prerogative’ and the 
‘Sewel Convention’, and cases like De Keyser Royal Hotel,2 normally the 
preserve of sophisticated constitutional lawyers, became items of popu-
lar debate. In academia there was a veritable blogfest on what the liti-
gation was about, and how it should be resolved.3 This was the case of 
the century, and possibly of the last one too. The hearings before the 
Supreme Court were live- streamed in an unprecedented reality show, 
populated by star- studded barristers and a fearsomely erudite panel of 
Justices. The outcome was a set of judgments  – one by the Divisional 
Court and one by the Supreme Court – which considered and analysed 
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a range of constitutional instruments, across the UK’s history, reaching 
back to Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. Constitutional lawyers rev-
elled in the judgments, and the litigation was seen as crowning an era 
which confirmed that the UK constitution was as thick as any other, even 
if unwritten.
This chapter challenges this conception. It argues that the Brexit saga 
reveals that UK constitutional law is threadbare, much more so than pre-
viously thought. The only constitutional principle that really stands, and 
indeed emasculates all others, is the principle that Parliament is sovereign. 
The constitutional version that this principle is said to confirm is called 
political constitutionalism, but its proponents seem oblivious to the idea 
that a true constitution – as its name suggests – constitutes politics as much 
as it is the product of politics. The chapter makes its claim in two parts. The 
first one looks at Miller, and what it revealed about the intensely political 
limits to UK constitutional law. The second focuses on the UK’s external 
constitution: the principles governing international treaty- making and the 
treatment of foreign affairs. This chapter is no more than an attempt at an 
initial challege and the analysis is not a complete one, for there is much 
more that could be said about the defects of the UK constitution.
Miller and the limits of UK constitutional law
The claim this chapter makes appears to fly in the face of the intensive and 
extensive constitutional scrutiny of Miller. Both the Divisional Court and 
the Supreme Court focused on grand constitutional principles (though 
the former more so than the latter). The judgments were no less than a 
full judicial tour of the historical foundations of the division of powers 
between the legislature and the executive. It was on the basis of the les-
sons from that tour, and of an analysis of how EU exit would interfere with 
existing statutes, particularly the European Communities Act (ECA), that 
both courts concluded that legislation was required to trigger Article 50.
But consider the following assessment of Miller, focused on the 
positivist and doctrinal reading of UK constitutional law which the judge-
ments offered, and on the approach towards devolution.
A positivist and doctrinal reading
This subsection looks at the unprecedented nature of the Brexit deci-
sion, and how the debate (judicial and academic) responded to this. The 
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triggering of Article 50 is not just any international withdrawal notifica-
tion. Article 50 itself speaks of a Member State’s decision to withdraw, 
taken in accordance with its constitutional requirements. In virtually 
all other Member States such a decision would require a constitutional 
debate, about the country’s approach towards European integration, and 
could also require constitutional amendment. Given the extent to which 
EU policies and laws penetrate the domestic sphere – and in many areas 
contribute to constituting the domestic public sphere – withdrawal is a 
wholly unprecedented decision, with massive political, economic, finan-
cial, legal and indeed constitutional consequences. One year into the 
Brexit process, this much one can say as an established fact. However, 
the Miller debate did not conceive of Brexit in this way. It focused imme-
diately on judicial precedents regarding the royal prerogative, much of 
them pretty antiquated.4 Complex doctrinal analyses were put forward to 
distinguish the various cases, and the different forms of royal prerogative 
and their relationships with legislative power (Craig 2016). The Brexit 
tiger, most of the legal community thought, had to be put back in the 
antiquated cage of positive, doctrinal law, and it was perfectly possible to 
contain it in that way. An astute analysis of past judicial statements was 
all that was needed.
This ‘reading’ of the UK constitution had its mirror image in the 
interpretation of the effect of the ECA. All that was required here was a 
proper characterisation of this Act of Parliament, with the aid of ingen-
ious devices, such as the concept that the ECA is a mere ‘conduit’ (pipes 
and all) for EU law to flow into UK domestic law.5 The ultimate crown-
ing of this positivist reading, focused on form rather than substance, was 
(with great respect) the dissent by Lord Justice Reed. He considered that 
when Parliament adopted the ECA, shortly before the government rati-
fied the EEC and other European Treaties, it was not prejudging the gov-
ernment’s ultimate act of joining the EEC. Parliament did not decide to 
join; it merely made this possible.6
This positivist and doctrinal approach, focused on ancient prece-
dent and textual construction, meant that there was hardly any debate 
on what the respective roles of the legislature and the executive ought 
to be in an age of globalisation and European integration. It was simply 
presumed that European integration is a branch of international rela-
tions, and that it was right for the executive to be in control, with a sin-
gle proviso, namely, that it cannot use those executive powers (its ‘royal 
prerogative’) to make any changes to the law of the land. It is because of 
this approach that the question of whether the Article 50 notification is 
revocable became so significant. For Lord Pannick to make Gina Miller’s 
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case it was necessary to establish that the Article 50 bullet, once it left the 
notification arm, would irrevocably reach the target of the UK leaving the 
EU, and that Parliament would not be able to reverse course. For else the 
notification would not, in and of itself, change domestic law. The govern-
ment, of course, agreed with the irrevocability thesis, clearly for political 
reasons. Both courts in Miller could base themselves on that consensus 
between the parties, and avoid an embarassing reference to the CJEU 
on the question of revocability – a question of interpretation of EU law, 
which can ultimately only be answered by that Court. In the meantime it 
is clear that most academic commentary argues that Article 50 is revoca-
ble (Eeckhout & Frantziou 2017, 711– 14), but that does not mean that 
Miller was wrongly decided. Whatever precedent says about the scope of 
the royal prerogative, the decision to leave the EU is so far- reaching that 
it simply cannot be left to the executive.
The outcome of this positivist reading of the enormous constitu-
tional questions which Miller raised is a decidedly narrow judgment. All 
the Supreme Court in the end established was that an Act of Parliament 
was needed to notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw. Nothing 
else was said about the process of withdrawal, or about Parliament’s role 
in the Brexit negotiations, or indeed its role at the end of the process, 
when the withdrawal agreement (if there is one) will need to be ratified, 
and may need to be incorporated in UK domestic law. Parliament duly 
did what the government asked it to do, in an Act which is so short and 
exclusively focused on the Article 50 notification that there are still voices 
claiming that the UK has not yet decided to leave the EU, at least not in 
accordance with its constitutional requirements.7
Devolution
Antecedents and context are important here. For a couple of decades 
the UK has been embarking on a process of devolution of powers  – in 
an asymmetrical manner  – to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
That process has reached its furthest extent in Scotland, culminating in 
the 2014 referendum on independence. Even if a majority voted against 
independence at the time, it is clear that Scotland regards itself as a coun-
try, rather than a mere region, with far- reaching powers. The political 
response to the referendum was to strengthen devolution.
The outside observer might therefore conclude that, in its own 
quirky constitutional way, the UK has become something of a federal 
state. But Brexit and Miller show that that is not the case. Notwithstanding 
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the fact that withdrawal from the EU affects significant devolved powers 
(e.g. in agriculture, fisheries and the environment), the EU Referendum 
Act 2015 completely disregarded devolution by not requiring any specific 
majorities in the UK’s constituent parts. A simple majority of voters across 
the UK were empowered to launch Brexit, as indeed they did, notwith-
standing majorities for ‘remain’ in Scotland and Northern Ireland.8 As a 
small excursus, it may be noted here that this disregard for devolution is 
but one manifestation of the constitutional failure to frame referendums. 
The EU Referendum Act regulated hardly anything at all – indeed, it was 
even silent on the referendum’s very authority and legal force, thereby 
creating the juridical space for the Miller litigation.
Devolution became a significant component of that litigation. The 
debate focused mostly on the Sewel Convention. This is a constitutional 
convention according to which the UK Parliament will not normally leg-
islate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the affected 
devolved assembly. Such conventions are, as a rule, not embodied in 
legislation, even if they establish significant constitutional principles. 
However, the Sewel Convention is an exception in that it is incorporated 
in the Scotland Act 2016 (Section 2(8)).9 The central issue of Miller was 
whether an Act of Parliament was required to trigger Article 50 and set 
the UK on the course of withdrawal. Clearly, such legislation ‘affects’ the 
powers devolved to e.g. the Scottish Parliament, as those powers extend 
to matters of EU law. But the Supreme Court rejected the relevance of the 
Sewel Convention, unanimously, on the simple basis that such conven-
tions are not legally enforceable, and that it is not for judges to give legal 
rulings on their operation and scope, because those matters are deter-
mined within the political world.10 The fact that the Sewel Convention 
was incorporated in the Scotland Act 2016 did not modify that assess-
ment:  the Supreme Court stated that it would have expected the UK 
Parliament ‘to have used other words if it were seeking to convert a con-
vention into a legal rule justiciable by the courts’.11
It is not the aim of this chapter to critique Miller, even if such a cri-
tique is called for. All this chapter seeks to do is to invite the reader to 
contemplate what Miller reveals about the UK constitution. The ECA has 
been called a constitutional statute, but all that is needed, constitution-
ally, to trigger its demise is a two- section act allowing the government to 
notify the UK’s intention to withdraw. The Brexit process is tremendously 
complex and wide- ranging, and will fundamentally change the law of the 
UK, but there is no role for Parliament in the withdrawal negotiations 
which the constitution demands, other than that any changes to UK law 
will at the end of the day need to be approved by Parliament. Brexit is the 
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outcome of a referendum, but there is no constitutional law framing such 
referendums, and Parliament can do as it likes with them. That is so even 
for referendums that affect devolved powers. There is a constitutional 
convention on the need to obtain the consent of the devolved assemblies, 
partially enshrined in legislation, but that convention has no force of law 
whatsoever.
The external constitution
The UK’s approach towards the Brexit negotiations is characterised by 
a very traditional approach towards the conduct of ‘foreign affairs’, as 
opposed to domestic matters (Endicott 2016). Even if Miller decided that 
a statute was required to trigger Article 50, neither the Supreme Court 
nor Parliament went any further than the bare minimum such a statute 
had to contain. Neither of those constitutional actors determined any fur-
ther role for Parliament in the Brexit negotiations. The UK government is 
adamant that it should completely control those negotiations, which are 
about the ‘best deal’ for Britain.
This traditional approach to the conduct of foreign affairs, which, 
paradoxically, leaves the royal prerogative unscathed, is based on the 
assumption that the executive is best placed to determine and implement 
external policies, and that Parliament’s input is required only at the point 
of incorporating an international treaty in domestic law. However, the 
Brexit process, more than any other ‘foreign’ policy, shows how funda-
mentally outdated these constitutional concepts are.
As analysed in greater depth elsewhere, Brexit constitutes a mas-
sive interference with the vast body of individual rights conferred by EU 
law (Eeckhout & Frantziou 2017, 699– 703). Most of those rights are con-
cerned with cross- border matters: rights to live and work in the UK and 
in the EU27; rights to trade; rights to provide services, such as passport-
ing in financial services or aviation; rights to have judgments enforced; 
rights to put products complying with EU regulations on the market and 
so on. Those rights are as much part of domestic law as they are rights 
involving ‘foreign affairs’. Indeed this body of individual rights to cross- 
border activity would make no sense if the rights were not fully incorpo-
rated in the domestic laws of the EU Member States. One could even say 
that these rights constitute globalisation, in its European manifestation.
The process through which these rights have been defined and con-
ferred – the process of making EU law – is one involving a range of con-
stitutional actors. They principally include: Member State governments, 
 
tHE EMPEror HAS no clotHES 171
  
which negotiate the EU founding treaties, but in this century with the 
aid of wider conventions;12 those governments, in the Council, act-
ing together with the Commission and the directly elected European 
Parliament for the purpose of enacting EU legislation; and the CJEU, 
which interprets and enforces the treaties and legislation, and ensures 
the coherence of EU law as a legal system. The claim is not that this is an 
ideal constitutional model, rather that it must be characterised as a legis-
lative model – one in which a range of constitutional actors participate, 
which includes checks and balances, and published proposals which are 
debated and amended in open fora, under deliberative processes which 
are open to public participation. These legislative processes have in effect 
determined the bulk of the UK’s foreign affairs, insofar as relations with 
other EU Member States are concerned, from 1973 onwards. In this 
respect, EU law has become the UK’s external constitution.
The Brexit process, whose function it is to determine the future 
relations between the UK and the EU, is projected to be entirely different. 
The UK government will ‘negotiate’ a ‘deal’, and would have preferred 
to do that in conditions of secrecy, which the EU side have (fortunately) 
resisted. A traditional intergovernmental, rather than legislative, model. 
Few checks and balances, no deliberative processes in public fora, no for-
mal public participation.
To illustrate the contrast, it may be useful to refer to the first nego-
tiation ‘offer’ the UK government has made, at the time of writing, on the 
acquired rights of EU/ UK citizens (HM Government 2017e). This pro-
posal is intended to define the rights of around three million people, to 
work, to reside, to be reunified with family members, and to benefits and 
social security  – rights which are clearly central to their lives. The UK 
government generated this offer in conditions of complete secrecy, with-
out giving Parliament any opportunity to debate its terms, and it intends 
to conduct the subsequent negotiations in the same intergovernmental 
manner. It has emphasised that the resulting deal (if there is one) will 
come before Parliament in a take- it- or- leave- it vote, which in the leave- it 
version would mean that Parliament becomes responsible for there being 
no rights at all. The constitutional concept is that 3 million people can be 
stripped of a range of basic rights by mere executive action.
UK constitutional lawyers may retort that, whatever happens in the 
Brexit negotiations, at least some of the acquired rights will continue to 
be protected through the Human Rights Act (HRA), which incorporates 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). That is indeed the 
case, but even a quick glance at the HRA reveals further weaknesses 
of the UK’s constitution. The UK courts cannot protect ECHR rights in 
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the face of inconsistent primary legislation. Any treatment of acquired 
rights which Parliament would endorse and incorporate in domestic 
legislation could not be judicially overturned. Moreover, the HRA itself 
can be repealed at any time, and on the traditional understanding of the 
royal prerogative any UK government could decide to withdraw from the 
ECHR itself, without the need to involve Parliament.
Conclusions
For many years now UK constitutional lawyers have argued that the 
UK’s unwritten constitution is thriving. One of the ways in which that 
constitution was said to be reinforced was through the presence of 
so- called constitutional statutes, with the ECA and the HRA as prime 
examples. However, the Brexit process reveals the extent to which these 
foundations of UK constitutional law are not as solid as they have at 
first seemed. A very short act allowing the government to notify under 
Article 50 is sufficient, so it seems, to emasculate the ECA. Of course that 
act followed a popular referendum, but that referendum, ill- defined as 
it was, is itself a manifestation of constitutional instability and shallow-
ness. Brexit and the Miller litigation further confirm that core principles 
of the UK’s devolution are not legally enforceable. Paradoxically, Miller 
seems to promote rather than halt the traditional approach towards 
the preeminence of the royal prerogative in foreign affairs. The govern-
ment’s position is that the Brexit negotiations, which are concerned, on 
one perspective, with a range of individual rights, do not require parlia-
mentary involvement. That position is as yet unchallenged, by either the 
courts or Parliament itself.
Ultimately, the only principle that stands is that of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Any Parliament can always do as it likes, with any statute, at 
any time. Parliament can also choose to leave any ‘foreign affairs’ to the 
government, however much those affairs are intertwined with domestic 
ones, provided any negotiated changes to domestic law are ultimately 
incorporated by Parliament. Whether this is the best system for a twenty- 
first- century constitutional democracy which aspires to be ‘global’ is, 
however, an open question.
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Britain against the world?
Foreign and security policy in the ‘age of Brexit’
Amelia Hadfield
Introduction
Foreign policy is something of a paradox. Scholars are taught about the 
long- standing axioms of statehood, and schooled in the age- old verities 
of conflict and cooperation. Pragmatic policies, as Kissinger reminds us, 
‘must be based on some fixed principles in order to prevent tactical skill 
from dissipating into a random thrashing about’ (Kissinger 1994, 98). 
Policymakers, however, operate on rather less fixed requirements of cost– 
benefit analysis and strategy construction, often requiring swift changes 
in the practice of statecraft.
While EU foreign policymaking has innovatively blurred distinc-
tions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ areas in scope, European foreign 
policy overall remains traditionally intergovernmental in practice. From 
the perspective of Brexit, this operates as both a benefit, and a problem. 
The benefit is obvious. Operating via state- to- state negotiations, the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) represent the least integrated areas of policy 
between the 28 EU Member States. The intergovernmental nature of the 
CFSP and CSDP allows the UK ‘to preserve independence in its diplo-
macy while allowing for the coordination of policy where interests are 
held in common with other Member States’ (Whitman 2016, 254). This 
suggests that in strategic terms there is less in the way of detailed unpick-
ing of shared policies, legislation, budgets and resources between Britain 
and the EU, but rather a reorientation of Britain based on its preferred 
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location within, alongside or beyond the EU on a case- by- base basis. 
Simple enough, but not wholly accurate. The problems come when look-
ing in detail at what has constituted since 1993 the nature of Britain’s 
involvement with the EU’s emerging foreign and security policy struc-
ture. In brief these entail:
• the extensive nature of the CFSP in terms of sheer policy coverage 
(see Part 5, Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which details the 
scope of the EU’s cooperation with third countries);
• the multiple forms of interdependence that have evolved in imple-
menting the CSDP;
• the increasingly communitarian and justiciable1 nature of the com-
mitments incumbent on all Member States flowing from the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), covering external border 
controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention of crime, along-
side specific tasks on border checks, asylum and immigration; judi-
cial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters; and police cooperation.
The following evaluates the risks and the opportunities to UK foreign 
and security policy on the basis of dissociating from, or remaining con-
nected to, the EU in three key areas: the CFSP, CSDP and AFSJ. In each 
of these three areas, Britain has paradoxically exhibited both pioneer-
ing and reluctant attitudes, remaining defiantly autonomous in those 
areas touching on the retention of material forms of hard power (CSDP), 
while actively supporting European collaboration in others (Europol and 
Eurojust).
The potential change within these three areas rests upon two key 
key factors. First, the UK’s ability to identify those foreign, security and 
defence requirements that would benefit from continued cooperation with 
the EU. Second, the ordering of those national preferences based on a 
hierarchy of strategic options identified between 2017– 19 (and beyond) 
by UK decision- makers which supports both its traditional preferences 
and requirements of a post- Brexit status).
During the 2016 referendum campaign, foreign policy was largely 
sidelined in favour of trade access and business opportunities, as well 
as issues of migration, EU law and border control. The few foreign pol-
icy discussions that did surface merely itemised the UK’s hard and soft 
power arsenals. Hard power for example focused on the UK’s military 
hardware, defence industry size and nuclear capability, with soft power 
ranging from London’s role as global financial hub to British diplomatic 
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networks covering the UN Security Council, NATO, G8, the UK– US ‘spe-
cial relationship’ and the Commonwealth. Such lists however represent 
merely one side of the British foreign policy structure, and are only 
made viable by the genuinely magnifying impact of the following two 
principles, which combine Britain’s hard and soft power facets. First, UK 
membership of the EU has for 40  years been a substantive, and vital, 
element of its own national foreign and security policy. Second, while 
resistant to enhanced institutionalisation of some aspects of security 
and defence within the EU itself, the UK government itself has accepted 
that it is ‘strongly in the UK’s interests to work through the EU in a num-
ber of policy areas’ based on the ‘the extent to which EU external action 
correlates to UK national interests’ (HM Government 2013).
Taken together, the problems are clear:  in removing itself from 
both the collective form and the collaborative content of the CFSP, the 
CSDP and the AFSJ, Britain risks both a diminishment of its soft- power 
diplomatic status, and an attenuation of its hard- power security and 
defence capabilities across continental Europe in the short and quite 
possibly the long term. Equally however, the practical difficulties 
entailed in a wholesale removal from these three areas, which com-
bine both intergovernmental and supranational decision- making, as 
well as the UK’s uneven approach in collaborating on some aspects of 
EU foreign affairs whilst disengaging with others, may ultimately pro-
duce less uncoupling in foreign policy than in other areas. The hard/ 
soft Brexit spectrum has complicated an easy understanding of Britain’s 
preferred approach to leaving the EU. However, given the strategic 
imperatives of retaining both its hard and soft power attributes, includ-
ing their European foundations, the government’s initial message from 
the February 2017 White Paper will likely remain the priority, i.e. to 
‘continue to cooperate closely with our European partners on foreign 
affairs’, recognising that in security terms, the UK is ‘uniquely well 
placed to develop and sustain a mutually beneficial model of coopera-
tion … from outside the Union’ (HM Government 2017a, 61).
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
In terms of refashioning its foreign policy identity, the challenge is both 
essential and existential. Britain has already undergone a complete 
sea change in shifting from a post- imperial to a twentieth- and now 
twenty- first- century power. Decolonisation has further shrunk its geo-
political footprint, and neither the Commonwealth nor the vagaries of 
 
BritAin AgAinSt tHE world? 177
  
its relationship with the US have yielded the opportunities promised in 
Churchill’s three circles (which envisaged British leadership in Europe, 
the Commonwealth and the ‘Anglosphere’). Austerity cost- cutting has 
forced the majority of shrinkages in twenty- first- century foreign and 
security policy. In terms of Brexit, however, if the emphasis is simul-
taneously upon cost efficiency and maintaining an effective British 
foreign policy presence, then decision- makers in London will need to 
explain – to national and European audiences alike – what genuinely 
constitutes the UK’s ability to remain a ‘networked’ foreign policy actor 
both in and beyond the EU. Both the 2015 National Security Strategy 
and the Strategic Defence and Security Review relegated the role of 
the EU within the terrain of UK foreign policy. Yet networks are prem-
ised both upon connectivity with, and reach to, a range of partners, 
generally made easier via a larger bloc of coordinated actors drawing 
upon both financial and diplomatic tools to cultivate a range of third- 
party agreements. This is precisely what EU membership has produced 
for Britain. The combined clout derived from the EU’s Single Market, 
trade agreements, development and economic partnerships, humani-
tarian assistance and wide- spread diplomatic engagement represents 
a wide and versatile range of foreign policy tools that could never be 
replicated by a single state. Taken together, the magnifying power of 
the EU undoubtedly boosts British connectivity with a range of EU and 
non- EU states, regions and institutions, which – overall – constitute a 
foreign policy ‘plus’.
The benefits to retaining some form of partnership with the EU, 
whether as a quasi- integrated partner, mid- range associate, or aligned 
ally requires balancing Britain’s interest in remaining an important 
player in Europe alongside post- referendum promises made by the 
British government to become a truly ‘global’ actor. However, the two 
are in no way mutually exclusive, indeed they are deeply connected, as 
far as mainland Europe, NATO and most international forms of govern-
ance are concerned. The British government itself conceded as much 
in the 2010– 15 Review of the Balance of Competences, assessing that 
it is ‘generally strongly in the UK’s interests to work through the EU in 
foreign policy’. More broadly, the CFSP could offer a host of benefits to 
the UK, covering both general strategy and the day- to- day operations of 
European foreign, security, defence, development, humanitarian action 
and trade. These include for example continued CFSP influence via asso-
ciate membership, consultative observership, or a case- by- case format in 
the European External Action Service (EEAS), Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC), the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and related Working 
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Groups. The benefits of such a status would also present regional advan-
tages to Britain in terms of presence and access, both within (e.g. in the 
Levant including Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey) and beyond (e.g. the Gulf, 
West and East Africa, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia) the 
EU neighbourhood in tandem with current national strategies.
Equally, the opportunities afforded by disengagement from the 
EU can be categorised first according to the institutional and budg-
etary latitude of working outside formal EU structures, and second, 
on the basis of a redrafted global mandate. The first permits Britain 
to permanently sideline its involvement in areas like the European 
Neighbourhood Policy as a whole, or specific diplomatic approaches 
with the Ukraine, the Balkans and Turkey that have not been prioritised 
by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The second could 
spur Britain to improve its bilateral relationships with individual EU 
Member States while cultivating non- EU connections, allowing the UK 
to carve out its much- vaunted ‘Global Britain’ foreign policy, in paral-
lel with, or consciously reoriented away from Europe (Chalmers 2017, 
8). Whatever the specific EU+ format that emerges, ‘it should not be 
too difficult to consider a number of informal mechanisms which would 
enable this cooperation to continue’, ranging from formal participation 
to the agenda- based Gymnich format (Dijkstra 2016, 2).
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
The UK’s engagement with the CSDP is a tale of two attitudes. First, a 
pioneering commitment to the entire concept of autonomous European 
security in the 1998 St Malo Agreement. Second, the erosion of interest 
and commitment to subsequent initiatives, from leadership in military- 
oriented CSDP operations, including the role of Battlegroups and 
European Defence Agency (EDA).
The CSDP entailed for its members a novel series of security 
and defence objectives, tools and attitudes, all generally premised 
upon the prevention, management and resolution of conflict through 
the use of civilian and military resources. Known as the Petersberg 
Tasks, this challenging spectrum includes peacekeeping, monitoring 
disputed borders, maintaining ceasefires and enabling peace agree-
ments, election monitoring, state- oriented capacity building, police 
and armed forces training and civil society support. Since 2003, this 
has been implemented in the form of a number of missions covering 
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe 
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and the Caucasus, most generally accredited as successful if low- level 
examples of bespoke European peace- keeping. Union- wide CSDP obli-
gations to enhance the collective capabilities of EU Member States 
entail the coordination of military procurement and enhancing the 
interoperability of the joint military forces necessary to undertake the 
Petersberg Tasks. Measured against its own goals of defence spend-
ing, research and development and a fully functioning European 
Defence Agency, the EU’s collective defence and security progress has 
proved less successful,  with Britain having done little to assist this 
uninspiring trend.
As an EU member, the UK has remained distrustful of the entire 
concept of the CSDP, opposed to the coordination of military hardware 
or personnel, and a slim contributor to CSDP military ops, preferring 
capacity- building projects based on civilian missions. Further, the UK 
has not catalysed the voluntaristic method of hardware and person-
nel commitment, and opposed both the expansion of the European 
Defence Agency and the establishment of a permanent military EU 
operational headquarters. Instead, Britain prefers a balance of NATO 
multilateral frameworks and ex- EU bilateral defence relations (e.g. 
France, Germany and Poland). Arguably, the majority of UK security 
and defence decisions taken in the past decade ‘have been made with no 
reference to military roles that might be undertaken by the UK through 
the EU’ (Whitman 2016, 259).
It could of course be argued that, given the fall-off in UK commit-
ment to the CSDP as a whole in recent years, there is far less to untangle 
in terms of decoupling the two sides, and that Britain’s ‘security’ sur-
plus combined with its defence punch will fall disproportionately heav-
ily upon the EU. However, caution should be taken with this approach. 
First, the interdependent nature of defence, in terms of R&D, rational-
ised budgets, and geopolitical requirements of a restive Europe and vola-
tile neighbourhood together suggest that Britain’s role as a European 
defence provider, and a security underwriter will increase, not decrease. 
Second, the UK has had accredited successes in both military and civil-
ian operations, and clearly views itself as a leader within, if not actually 
of, the CSDP.2
Third, these contributions are important, even impressive, and 
arguably permit the UK to claim to have ‘helped increase stability in 
Europe’ (van Ham 2017; HM Government 2017a, 63). They are also evi-
dence of a trend that is likely to continue, with the UK participating as a 
non- EU Member State on an op- by- op basis, for example, via the 2011 
established framework agreement on crisis management operations 
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allowing US involvement. Recent non- EU involvement in EU Battlegroups 
on the basis of framework participation agreements by Norway, Turkey, 
Macedonia, Ukraine, Iceland and Serbia could therefore be easily com-
plemented by the UK to boost interoperability and ensure strategic cover-
age (Tardy 2014).
Again, the choice to do so will simply echo current trends, with 
the UK balancing EU involvement alongside commitments to NATO, 
and against the context of its emerging post- Brexit foreign policy. The 
UK’s voice has historically been uneven in this area, and its participation 
entirely driven by individuated rather than collective interests. Relative 
gains arising from European cooperation are an acknowledged plus, but 
their loss is not necessarily perceived as a minus; equally the multiplying 
effect used to explain the overall heft of the EU (if not its actual effective-
ness) remains now – and post- 2019 – fundamentally less important than 
the practical effects of the sheer capacity to implement policy effectively, 
and the prestige of doing so credibly in the eyes of European and interna-
tional partners.
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)
An area of acknowledged UK leadership is the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, which covers a host of areas within cross- border police and 
judicial cooperation. These are vital to the safety and security of both the 
UK and European states, and are likely to be prioritised in the post- 2019 
UK– EU Transitional Agreement. The requirement for cross- national 
security agreements also illustrate  – as much as defence proper  – the 
erosion of ‘the benign security environment in Europe’, and the increase 
of territorial, ideological, social and technology- based threats arising 
within Europe and its peripheries (Chalmers 2017, 2). The four areas 
set out in the 2017 White Paper include workers’ rights, transport policy, 
science and research, and security, law enforcement and criminal justice 
(entitled ‘cooperating in the fight against crime and terrorism’), with the 
latter strongly worded regarding the need ‘to work more closely with 
our partners, including the EU and its Member States’ (HM Government 
2017a, 61). As with defence, the document lists examples detailing UK 
leadership of, and broader benefits from, collective efforts covering:
• Europol systems coordinating UK and EU police forces;
• participation in 13 of Europol’s operational priority projects against 
organised crime;
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• the use of the European Arrest Warrant to extradite 8,000 
suspected criminals (2004– 15);
• the benefits of the Schengen Information System II alert system;
• the EU Passenger Name Records rules;
• the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) to 
enable criminal convictions.
Cooperation on such issues appears undeniably beneficial for both 
sides. The question is therefore not whether UK– EU security and 
criminal justice measures, as well as those concerning cyber security 
and anti- terrorism cooperation, should continue, but rather how, and 
on the basis of what institutional, legal and budgetary capacity. An 
operational membership of agencies including Europol and Eurojust, 
the maintenance of Joint Investigation Teams, as well as access to key 
databases like SIS II and ECRIS, and even the continued use of the 
EAW, could likely be negotiated without much difficulty (Bond et al. 
2016). Equally, cooperation at the EU- level regarding anti- terrorism 
strategies, data- sharing and other issues is likely to be strongly sup-
ported by both sides, although the differing perspectives of Member 
States on data- sharing itself has yet to produce a clear ‘European’ posi-
tion (Black et al. 2017).
More complex will be the daily challenges of border control, given 
the toxic nature of this issue before and after the referendum. Despite 
the rather blithe assertion in the 2017 White Paper that the UK will 
‘focus on operational and practical cross- border cooperation’, no detail 
regarding the challenges of juxtaposed border control with France and 
Belgium has been forthcoming. Nor has clarity emerged regarding bilat-
eral agreements for local police cooperation, e.g. between Kent and the 
Lille Prefecture, despite the pressing need for such settlements (Hadfield 
& Hammond 2016).
The UK’s role outside the Schengen Area has produced a series of 
bilateral agreements covering border management relative to security, 
safety, transport and immigration. Most notable are the Canterbury 
Treaty (1986) regarding the operation of the Channel Tunnel (opened 
in 1994), the Sangatte Protocol establishing the principles of juxta-
posed border controls, and the 2003 Le Touquet Treaty routinising pre- 
embarkation immigration checks between the UK, France and Belgium. 
At a minimum, effective bilateral relations between the UK and its prox-
imate neighbours laying out the rights and obligations of either side 
pursuant to all forms of transport, transit and mobility must be swiftly 
established. More broadly, these agreements need to be framed against 
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the emergent migration and asylum agenda of the EU, as well as sea-
sonal and structural requirements for goods and passenger transport 
in key areas like Calais, Dunkerque, Dover, Folkestone and Portsmouth.
Conclusions
Timing is never easy. The EU’s most recent attempt at redefining its 
regional and global foreign and security challenges was released within 
a day of the UK referendum. Article 50 itself fell within a fortnight of 
the 60th anniversary of the foundational Treaty of Rome, likewise 
the UK government’s 2017 White Paper on Brexit and the European 
Commission’s own White Paper on the Future of Europe. The latter 
made no mention at all of Brexit, conceding that ‘for too many, the EU 
fell short of their expectations’ while paraphrasing Jean Monnet by sug-
gesting (possibly unhelpfully) that the ‘Union has often been built on 
the back of crises and false starts’ (European Commission 2017b, 6). 
Interestingly, each of the five scenarios which the 2017 White Paper out-
lines to move Europe forward provides some surface area for continued 
British involvement, from an emphatically reworked trade relationship, 
to framework agreements enabling a 27 + 1 approach to CFSP, CSDP 
and ASFJ, to enhanced cooperation on ringfenced policies with bespoke 
groups, to ex- EU bilateral relations. The UK may not be able to assist the 
EU in ‘doing much more together’, but it could dispose of its awkward 
reputation within the EU and become a more consistent partner from 
without.
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Turning back the clock
The illusion of a global political role for Britain
Christopher Hill
It was almost inevitable that the Brexit decision of 2016 would lead 
British ministers to cast around for alternative points of reference 
for the country’s general foreign policy orientation  – even if the 
issue of diplomatic coordination with European partners was barely 
an issue in the referendum campaign. The government could hardly 
respond to the result by reaffirming Britain’s geopolitical destiny as 
part of a European ‘pole’ in world politics. On the other hand the 
prospect of appearing to have no option but to become bag- carrier to 
the US also had little appeal. The election of President Trump made 
that even less attractive. Thus it was hardly surprising that Prime 
Minister Theresa May and her Cabinet started to talk increasingly 
of Britain’s ‘global’ future. What this might mean in practice is by 
no means clear, and cannot be understood without reference to the 
historical background.
The historical background
Historians tend to date the start of Britain’s decline as the world’s lead-
ing power from the end of the nineteenth century, when economic dif-
ficulties and the emergence of Germany, Russia and the US as potential 
rivals began to expose the fault lines in the country’s hegemonic posi-
tion (Reynolds 2016, 131– 42). Of course it took two world wars over the 
ensuing 70 years to sound the definitive death knell of British primacy, 
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and another 20 before the empire came to an end, but by 1945 it had 
become clear to any independent observer that de Tocqueville’s predic-
tion from 1835, that Russia and America would dominate world politics, 
had come to pass (de Tocqueville 1839, 432– 3).
It took British governments several decades before the practical 
meaning of this change was fully absorbed. Although Indian independ-
ence had to be conceded immediately, and the Mandate over Palestine 
was suddenly abandoned  – with disastrous consequences  – there was 
no question of embarking on full- scale decolonisation. Indeed when the 
young Elizabeth II came to the throne in 1952 on the death of her father, 
she spoke immediately of her responsibility ‘to advance the happiness 
and prosperity of my peoples, spread as they are all the world over’. Even 
five years later, when the empire began to unravel, with most African 
colonies reaching independence by 1964, there was no presumption that 
Britain’s geostrategic situation would change. It took the Vietnam War, 
the end of ‘Confrontation’ in Malaysia, and finally the economic crisis 
and devaluation of sterling in late 1967 to force withdrawal from the 
military bases ‘east of Suez’ and an associated rethinking of the country’s 
world role (McCourt 2009).
For the next 15 years the principal concern of British foreign policy 
was to establish its European credentials. The UK joined the EEC in 1973, 
but it had already been participating informally in the new system of for-
eign policy coordination labelled European Political Cooperation. The 
combination of the Vietnam War and the decision by the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to use the oil weapon against 
the West seemed to make it imperative for Europeans to band together 
and to seek diplomatic rather than military solutions to the pressing 
problems of the Cold War and the Middle East. For Britain, however, it 
was thought imprudent to give up on the idea of the ‘special relation-
ship’ with Washington, and so a balancing act had to be performed, on 
the basis of an optimistic belief in its ability to act as a political bridge 
between the two main pillars of the West.
The idea of British indispensability was turned on its head during 
the Falklands War of 1982, which was won with discrete military help 
from France and the US, together with European solidarity in imposing 
sanctions against Argentina (although Ireland and Italy broke ranks after 
a month). This was why Margaret Thatcher, in her memoirs, praised 
President Mitterrand, when on other issues she diverged sharply from 
him, especially over aspects of the European project (Thatcher 1993, 
182– 3). Still, it was on Thatcher’s watch that the Single European Market 
was launched, and no serious debate took place about leaving the EC. 
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Significantly, however, Thatcher’s successes, attracting more consensus 
abroad than at home, led her to revive the idea of Britain as a major inde-
pendent power in the world – ‘putting the Great back into Britain’ – and 
to criticise the Foreign Office for its belief in the need for multilateral 
diplomacy, seen by her as mere defeatism.
The difficult interlude of John Major’s governments between 1990– 
7 saw growing unrest among Conservatives, especially those dismayed 
by the coup which had forced out Thatcher. They focused increasingly 
on the perceived failings of the EU, as it had become, through the coinci-
dence of the ambitious Maastricht Treaty of 1993 with Europe’s inability 
to stop the savage wars which had broken out in former Yugoslavia (Hill 
1993). The Conservative divisions, however, simply brought New Labour 
to power, and inaugurated a decade in which Tony Blair took forward 
Thatcher’s ambitions for Britain to give a lead in international affairs, 
albeit with a different kind of spin.
Blair wanted to make Britain a force for good in the world, in line 
with the general trend towards ‘good international citizenship’ and the 
‘responsibility to protect’. Indeed, he and Foreign Secretary Robin Cook 
were both prominent in pushing that new agenda. There was, as so 
always in Britain, a sense of moral superiority about both the right and 
duty to take a central role in world politics – even if diminishing power 
meant that increasingly it had to take the form of ‘thought leadership’ 
and political entrepreneurship. At first it seemed that New Labour 
would be keen to use the EU as its platform, perhaps in conjunction 
with France, but that idea faded – first with the decision to stand apart 
from the new euro currency, and then with the fall- out from 9/ 11, 
which led Blair to see the UK– US alliance as the key bulwark against 
the forces of darkness. Steadily the distance from France and Germany 
increased, particularly through the traumatic divisions over the Iraq 
war of 2003 (MacShane 2015, 84– 107). Growing Euroscepticism in 
Britain was encouraged more than assuaged by the referendum results 
in France and the Netherlands which killed off the idea of a European 
constitution. But it was the consequences of EU enlargement, working 
through unexpected ways, which really turned up the flame of popular 
antagonism.
Enlargement
Britain had long been a supporter of EU enlargement, as a onetime 
beneficiary itself, for largely strategic reasons. These took two forms. 
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First was the geopolitical concern to stabilise east- central Europe in the 
aftermath of communism, although there was also an enthusiasm (in 
principle) for Turkish accession, raising the questions of what kind of 
Europe the UK ultimately envisaged and of how far its borders should 
extend. The second reason was more devious, if hardly secret, as it 
amounted to the wish to stop integration in its tracks – the assumption 
being that the widening of the EU would inevitably make deepening 
much more difficult, if not impossible. It would also be likely to create 
more allies for Britain around the Council table, with many of the new 
members being fervently pro- US and pro- NATO – as well as, of course, 
most unwilling to envisage the disappearance of their newly regained 
national sovereignty. These assumptions proved to be largely correct, 
although their practical implication derived from a Faustian pact with 
Germany, which laboured under the illusion that it could promote 
widening and deepening in parallel. Another factor was the weakness 
of France, which was deeply sceptical about enlargement but lacked the 
political will and capacity to halt the UK– German project.
But enlargement proved to have negative externalities both for 
the EU and for Britain. It had not been widely foreseen how the acces-
sion of 12 new and predominantly poor countries would impact on 
social and economic life inside the existing Member States, given the 
principle of the free movement of labour enshrined in the Treaties. In 
particular, the British decision to allow free movement to occur from 
the first day of membership in 2004 (rather than to manage the flow 
of new arrivals through a transition period, as France and Germany 
did) led to nearly a million people coming to Britain over the follow-
ing decade from the so- called A8 countries admitted to the EU in 2004 
(Consterdine 2016). It led also to the image of the British economy 
as a kind of El Dorado for those living in European states with low 
wages and high unemployment rates  – which soon came to include, 
once the financial crisis had started in 2007, not just the further new 
Member States Bulgaria, Romania, but also Italy, Spain and France. 
Unsurprisingly, this produced a backlash inside the UK against the 
sheer scale and pace of change, which had led even small country 
towns to face pressures on schools and housing, and inevitably weak-
ened the bargaining position of workers over wages, in what was 
already becoming a ‘gig economy’.1 Although not the whole story of 
what happened in 2016, there can be little doubt that this combination 
of factors, replicated to differing degrees across the EU, had serious 
effects in terms of the rise of populism and Euroscepticism, which in 
Britain eventually led to the shock vote to leave the EU.
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Between Europe and globalism
This sequence of events contains several ironies with respect to the 
ambivalence between a European and a global orientation in British 
society. For one thing the tensions arising over Afro- Caribbean and 
South Asian immigration from the late 1950s, which initially focused 
on the issue of colour, had by the turn of the millennium sufficiently 
subsided to give the impression that Britain had become a genuinely 
cosmopolitan country. Many Britons owned property in France and 
Spain, just as others maintained links with their roots in the diverse 
states of the Commonwealth. The ‘little England’ stereotype seemed 
increasingly out of date. Younger people enjoyed the freedom of move-
ment offered by the EU, with stag nights in Prague and Tallinn boom-
ing and some starting to take advantage of the Erasmus network to 
spend a year in a continental university. It was, however, a warning 
sign that British universities were more populated by students and 
teaching staff from elsewhere in the EU than vice versa, while the bois-
terous British groups travelling abroad in search of cheap beer, sun 
and sangria tended to be noted for their parochialism, even xenopho-
bia, more than any sense of cultural Europeanism.
This tendency was present in the narrow majority which voted 
for Brexit in June 2016. There were many strands to that coalition, but 
it does seem that education and age were significant factors in decid-
ing preferences, with the older and less well educated tending to vote 
Leave, and the younger and better educated tending to vote Remain 
(although differential turnout was also a factor), an older generation 
seeming to be more resentful over the wave of immigration from the 
EU which had taken place since 2004. But many of all ages and levels 
of education were concerned about the associated loss of sovereignty, 
and remained unconvinced by the economic arguments made by the 
Remain side (Clarke et al. 2017, 146– 174).
There are thus many who appear to favour the view of Britain 
regaining its independence through leaving the EU, and thus making 
its own way internationally. They might even believe the notion, trum-
peted by the right- wing tabloids, that Britain is ‘the greatest country in 
the world’, and can regain its position as a great power. In this they find 
comfort in the government’s embarrassing public relations campaign 
for exports and tourism simply labelled ‘Great’. Even the reception desk 
to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office now greets its visitors with 
notices instructing them that the country is ‘Great’, in every possible way. 
Yet the prime minister and most of her colleagues, certainly including 
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the senior reaches of the civil service, are fully aware that going it alone 
is wholly incompatible with the nature of the British economy, with the 
aspirations of British foreign policy, with its security and defence obliga-
tions, and with the transnational links of large numbers of its population. 
If the UK is now to place itself outside the network of EU institutions and 
close relationships, therefore, some alternative will have to be found.
For the reasons explained earlier, hugging the US even closer is 
not attractive either practically or politically. The relationship is hugely 
asymmetrical. For its part the Commonwealth is not the kind of organi-
sation capable of becoming a major trading bloc or foreign policy unit, 
even assuming the UK has major interests in common with more than 
few of its members. All that remains, therefore, is the trope which has 
quickly come to dominate both the thinking of hard Brexiteers and of 
official discourse – that of a ‘global Britain’, creating a series of overlap-
ping special relationships with key states and markets across the world, 
thus maximising its access, flexibility and influence while escaping the 
straitjacket of a supranational regional grouping, which in any case was 
beginning to display sclerotic characteristics. This idea, as it happens, is 
not so far removed from the ‘bridge- builder’ notion employed by Tony 
Blair and some of his predecessors, suggesting a unique role for the UK in 
connecting up the different regions and outlooks of the world. That in its 
turn was a version of Winston Churchill’s post- 1945 conception of Britain 
as being at the centre of three intersecting circles – Atlantic, European 
and imperial (Sanders & Houghton 2017). The difference now, of course, 
from both the Blairite and Churchill visions, is that Europe is pushed to 
the margins. If it has any place in conceptions of Britain’s role, then it is 
only on the presumption that London will still enjoy close and influential 
relations with its ex- partners despite having snubbed the EU and dam-
aged the prospects of the City remaining as Europe’s key financial centre, 
particularly in relation to the highly profitable business of clearing euro- 
denominated securities.
Some practical implications
What are the practical implications of this latest iteration of resistance 
to the idea of Britain’s regional destiny? They can be analysed at three 
levels: economic, politico- military and sociocultural.
It is at the economic level that most of the discussion has so far 
occurred, as the Brexiteers are anxious to show that the economy will not 
only not be damaged by leaving the EU, but will actually benefit from it. 
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This will apparently occur through freedom from regulatory constraints 
and from the burdens imposed by the Community budget and its com-
mon policies in trade, agriculture and fisheries. The UK will be able to 
conclude bilateral trade deals with more vibrant economies than those 
of the depressed European Single Market, and gradually diversify its 
economic life.
This may turn out to be a plausible scenario. But at best it will take 
a long time to realise, with considerable transition costs along the way. 
And the conceit that Britain will be the ‘champion of free trade’ runs into 
the considerable difficulty that the UK accounts for less than 4 per cent 
of the world’s gross product, and is likely to be overtaken by emerging 
economies before long. Moreover, the bigger players like the USA, China 
and Japan are only qualified supporters of free trade, especially with the 
current wind blowing towards protectionism. In any case, tariffs on man-
ufactured goods are already low with little scope for improvement. Given 
that the service sector, which accounts for around 75 per cent of the UK’s 
GDP, is the most difficult area to open up, any drive for free competition 
led by the City of London is going to resemble a conductor without an 
orchestra. Indeed, Brexit has already convinced some financial houses to 
relocate staff into the eurozone.
On the politico- military front there is a prima facie case for seeing 
the UK as still having a global role. It is one of nine states in possession 
of nuclear weapons, and it has a sophisticated ICBM delivery system. It 
is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 
and a key player (if not the leader) in the Commonwealth, one of the 
few international organisations outside the UN with both developing and 
developed countries as members. This is the basis for the claim by Labour 
as well as Conservative politicians that Britain has special responsibilities 
for international order, beyond its particular national interests.
But closer scrutiny reveals a distinct thinness to these claims. The 
‘independent’ deterrent is in practice very closely tied to US strategy and 
technology and is completely unusable when it comes to the global pro-
jection of power. In the Commonwealth the fact that most other Member 
States are the product of the British empire, with many negative mem-
ories of the experience, hobbles UK policy as much as it provides an 
advantage. As for the UNSC, Britain’s position depends on a defence of 
the 1945 status quo which is seen as increasingly untenable by the major-
ity within the General Assembly. A reconstitution of the UNSC to reflect 
contemporary conditions would be very unlikely to give either Britain or 
France the vetoes they currently enjoy. It is interesting, moreover, that 
while the government talks about ‘a global Britain’, that does not lead it 
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to think of turning towards the universal institutions of the UN system to 
replace the regional EU network. Rather, the tendency is to go along with 
US scepticism towards the UN or at least to lack the enthusiasm and cour-
age needed to revive it. A more honest version of globalism might have 
Britain taking a lead in the reform of the UNSC, perhaps by accepting the 
set of revolving semi- permanent memberships envisaged by Kofi Annan’s 
High Level Panel in 2005, and by stressing the way the UN framework 
enables states to strike the balance between sovereign independence and 
the evident value of multilateral cooperation in so many fora.
Britain and France see themselves, with reason, as the only 
European states able to project military force outside their own 
region – as they have done over the last decade in Afghanistan, Libya 
and Syria. Yet none of these ventures has provided a successful tem-
plate for future action. Indeed, in Britain, public opinion has turned 
decisively against putting troops on the ground even for humanitarian 
reasons. For their part the professional military have learned hard les-
sons through their relative failures in Basra in Iraq, and in Helmand 
province in Afghanistan. Their resources have been run down to the 
point where even small wars present serious dangers of overstretch. 
Given the continued determination to prioritise the defence of the 
Falkland Islands, the resources available for any British government 
to back up a forward foreign policy with serious military leverage 
are very limited. The idea of acting as a major power again in Africa, 
let alone the potential crisis zone of the east and south China seas, is 
simply implausible. Two new aircraft carriers are due to come into ser-
vice in 2020 but it is by no means clear what foreign or defence policy 
they will be serving beyond that of adjunct to the US.
Thus in the politico- military field the idea of global Britain has little 
content. Emerging regional powers like Brazil, India and South Africa do 
not need to take the UK seriously into account when considering their 
own security, apart from the attractions of buying British arms. But what 
of the sociocultural dimension and Britain’s famous ‘soft power’? Are we 
capable of setting standards which others will wish to emulate, thus giv-
ing Britain a role of cultural, intellectual and political leadership? There 
is an obvious element of hubris here given the tendency to downplay the 
appeal of others, whether France, Germany and Italy in Europe or global 
success stories like China, Singapore and South Korea. Even President 
Putin has become a model for some, showing that not everyone wants, 
or even admires, what Britain has to offer. Yet the UK’s higher education, 
legal and medical systems are still widely admired, while the health of 
its artistic, musical and literary scenes, assisted by the English language 
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and Britain’s heritage, means that the country has an unusually high 
global profile. This can to some extent be turned to economic and politi-
cal advantage, but only indirectly and over the long term. It is hardly a 
substitute for being associated with the most successful regional organi-
sation, market and zone of civility ever created, which, for all the EU’s 
many faults, is seen in the rest of the world as a major point of reference – 
especially if a multipolar world system is ever to come about.
Britain has a population of 64 million with large minorities from 
India, Pakistan the Caribbean and a number of African countries. This 
multiculturalism gives it, by definition, many global linkages. Yet it also 
now has large minorities from many EU partner states, notably France, 
Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain. Whilst it is unlikely these people will 
be forced by Brexit to depart, they might start to drift away of their own 
accord, in which case labour market needs will probably seek cheap 
labour once again from Commonwealth sources. That would have impli-
cations for collective identity. It has always been revealing that the British 
media talk about ‘Europe’ as if it is a place apart, and it cannot be denied 
that a large part of the population does not feel European, lacking lan-
guage skills and having tastes in food, music and film which look more 
towards the US, or towards Asia. So the idea of combining independence 
with a global rather than regional outlook may well continue to prove 
popular, especially if migration from Europe slows and that from other 
parts of the world picks up again.
Unfortunately, however, it does not follow that UK public policy will 
have much capacity to shape the international economy or the interna-
tional political system. In fact, despite the Brexit decision the UK will be 
forced to find some way of working in partnership with the states of the 
European continent, albeit on worse terms than before. The government 
has implicitly recognised this fact, first with some strong statements 
about the importance of deepening the Franco- British defence relation-
ship based on the Lancaster House Treaties of 2010, and then implicitly 
through its ham- fisted attempt to threaten the EU with the withdrawal 
of cooperation on security if a good exit deal is not on offer. Over recent 
years NATO and the EU have worked ever more closely together on secu-
rity matters, a category which now routinely includes counter- terrorism, 
crime and migration  – all of which cross over the domestic– foreign 
divide, and thus implicate questions of sovereignty. The UK cannot afford 
to disdain working closely with EU Member States on all this, for reasons 
of geographical contiguity and common values, as Theresa May acknowl-
edged in November 2016 when she agreed to opt in to the scheme to 
share fingerprint and DNA data across the EU.
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As for classical foreign policy, despite the derision of Brexiteers 
towards the idea of European harmonisation, Britain has actually been 
a leading player for 40-plus  years in Europe’s system of institutional 
coordination. It is a loose, often dysfunctional, but also indispensable 
system which accepts differences, but which also enables collective 
action on such issues as economic sanctions and the Iranian nuclear 
negotiations  – not least because it can dispose of the EU’s economic 
and human resources for political purposes. The prospect of London 
standing apart from this system, while the other Europeans confer on 
a wide range of key issues, from Ukraine to Algeria, from North Korea 
to Israeli settlements, and then (perhaps) associating itself post hoc, 
is neither plausible nor encouraging. In practice the UK will want to 
have a de facto seat at the European foreign ministers’ table, as the 
US has managed to do discreetly over the years. But the US is Europe’s 
indispensable ally and the world’s only superpower. A state which has 
wilfully given up its privileged position in foreign policy consulta-
tions is not likely to be welcomed back to the centre of discussions. 
Ministers will therefore discover quite soon what its professional dip-
lomats know already, that the notion of being able to opt in and out of 
European endeavours is an embarrassing mirage. The historical clock 
cannot be wound back.
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A speculation on the future of Europe
John R. Gillingham
Speculation about the future is not necessarily to be sneered at. At 
times it can be useful and even necessary, if only to shed light on 
long- term historical trends often obscured by the crushing avalanche 
of daily news as reported by the media. Brexit is a case in point. 
Developing an understanding of its impact on Europe is no straight-
forward matter. It will require explicating any number of complicated 
interrelationships that unfold across several planes. The domestic 
politics of Great Britain is only one of them. Another is, of course, 
the state of the EU. Finally, larger forces are in play:  an emergent 
China and advanced new technologies are driving change forward 
at a breakneck pace. In addition, an erratic and untested American 
administration is in office.
The number of variables is daunting. The eventual conse-
quences of the recent elections in Great Britain and France cannot 
be predicted. The actions and impacts of President Trump’s foreign 
policy must still be subject to speculation. An even larger spectre hov-
ers overhead:  the possible creation – for better or worse – of a new 
international order to replace the American- designed system put into 
place after World War II.
Present uncertainty has given rise to both hopes and fears but 
also to public confusion as well as an inordinate amount of theorising 
about the future. It would be rash at this early date to project a scenario 
of events, let alone predict eventual outcomes. Surprises are in store. At 
the same time, long- run historical trends will likely in the end determine 
how Brexit changes both Europe and Britain’s relationship to it.
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An electoral shock
The first surprise of the summer of 2017 came with the mistaken deci-
sion of Prime Minister Theresa May to call for a snap election in order to 
strengthen Britain’s hand in the then forthcoming Brexit negotiations. It 
cost the Tories their parliamentary majority. Since the Brexit talks are still 
barely under way, it is impossible at this point to gauge how much, and 
to what effect, the UK’s bargaining position has been weakened. There 
will, however, be no turning back from the decision to leave. The British 
assertion of parliamentary sovereignty will stand, and laws crafted by the 
CJEU will be subordinate to law made in the UK.
None of the dire predictions of the former Remain campaign, which 
might have reversed the referendum results, has come to pass. Above all, 
the British economy has not tanked and shows no signs of doing so. If 
anything, it has done rather well. ‘Buyers’ remorse’ has therefore not put 
in a significant appearance. Nor does the reproach made by the Remain 
party that Brexit will lead to isolation carry much conviction. The 
British government has not ‘gone nativist’ or turned its back on Europe 
but seeks a new accommodation with it which, God willing, will result 
in global trade liberalisation, promote innovation and, in the end, may 
even improve the prospects of a reformed EU. Nor should the election’s 
outcome be understood as a rebuke to Tory policy towards Europe. The 
Brexit issue in fact barely figured in Labour’s campaign, which empha-
sised domestic policy to the virtual exclusion of Britain’s future relation-
ship to the EU. The occasional remarks of party chief Jeremy Corbyn on 
the subject can charitably be characterised as confused.
In spite of Prime Minister May’s recent setback, Britain’s chances of 
withdrawing from the EU on suitable terms seem good, at least as viewed 
from the perspective of the domestic scene. She has effectively neutered 
UKIP. The Scottish Nationalists were crushed in the election, and the 
ineffective Labour opposition cannot possibly form a government. The 
real threat to May is resistance from hard- liners within her own party 
(Chaffin 2017).
The Trump factor
Britain’s chances of success in the Brexit negotiations will hinge in no 
small measure on international events, and in particular on the actions 
of the brash and mercurial American President Donald Trump, whose 
administration is still emerging from an infantile, post- election phase 
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of policymaking. Nonetheless, governance by Tweet is gradually giving 
way to business as usual, and egregious public outbursts are yielding to 
golf course diplomacy. Trump may actually be starting to act like a genu-
ine Republican. This should not be unexpected. His cabinet and circle 
of advisors are dominated by the usual big boys: representatives of Wall 
Street, the Pentagon and corporate America – the latter now including 
the giants of Silicon Valley. Only one thing may be said with certainty 
about Trump’s intentions: he is committed to a ‘growth agenda’ based on 
the ‘supply-side’ economics of his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Its failure 
could bring down his administration. The main political task facing the 
bombastic president is to appease his core electoral constituency of less 
than well off white folk, by means of gesture and rhetoric, while adopt-
ing policies which, while arguably beneficial overall, are contrary to their 
specific interests.
Trump’s foreign policies must be seen in light of this domestic pri-
ority. There is much less to their purported radicalism than meets the 
eye. Here one must tread carefully. The president’s understanding of 
international affairs is limited  – how limited is, at this point, anyone’s 
guess. This unpleasant fact is surely alarming, but hardly unique in the 
history of the American presidency. Ronald Reagan’s knowledge of the 
world beyond Hollywood was equally sketchy. As reality sets in, Trump 
will have little choice but to back away from the outrageous stances of his 
early presidency and revert to the path of traditional American foreign 
policymaking. This trend, already evident in instance after instance, still 
has a long way to go before one can speak confidently of a return to the 
norm. And what happens between now and then cannot, of course, be 
foreseen. Yet, Trump no longer bashes NATO, has done nothing recent of 
significance to restrict immigration, and has backed away from the pro-
posed wall along the border with Mexico. NAFTA will furthermore not be 
trashed but cosmetically enhanced, the TPP (Trans- Pacific Partnership) 
can be revived by the stroke of a pen, and the trans- Atlantic counterpart, 
the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), faces greater 
opposition from Europe than from the US, where it never has become a 
significant public issue.
The US president will also try to revise the terms of the commercial 
relationships between America and China and between America and the 
EU, the main sources of trade discrimination against the US. Washington’s 
efforts to re- fashion such trade deals do not, however, herald a return 
to the evils of beggar- thy- neighbour, but do betoken a shift in the bal-
ance of power among those who indulge in unfair commercial policies. 
Events favour such an approach. World commerce is slated to increase 
BrExit  And BEyond196
  
substantially over the coming years (Thomas 2017). Export competi-
tiveness will remain at a premium in economic policymaking – a truism 
that will repeatedly be reinforced by the president’s economic advisors 
(Ross 2017a, 2017b).
Three considerations will increase the likelihood of Trump’s future 
pursuit of trade liberalisation: a better understanding of global economic 
interdependence; an inkling that the world is on the brink of a new 
technological era; and a realisation that his growth agenda will require 
acceptance of, as well as accommodation to, these realities (Financial 
Times 2016b). The president is moreover being pushed in this direction 
by heavy lobbying of powerful conservative pressure groups like farmers 
and ranchers, manufacturing exporters, as well as the automobile and 
petroleum interests (Ross 2017c).
Trump’s presidency can be counted upon to produce policies lit-
tle different from those of his predecessor. Like it or not, the outspoken 
man in the White House must build upon a legacy of bipartisanship in 
foreign policy. Continuity should become the rule, unless, of course, a 
string of unwitting White House blunders topples the apple cart. The pos-
sibility cannot be ruled out that Trump’s intemperate behaviour catalyses 
something heretofore absent at the EU: a sense of Euro- patriotism strong 
enough to unite an administrative and political entity that is both deeply 
demoralised and all but immobilised by institutional flaws as well as bad 
policymaking.
The EU faces Brexit
Such an outcome, though optimal from the European standpoint, would 
be improbable for any number of reasons. Democracy did not figure in 
Monnet’s original scheme and since then has only entered EU politics as 
an afterthought. Official Brussels continues, as always, to mistrust and 
manipulate the public. It follows that the EU has never won its citizens’ 
affections, not to say loyalty. Policy errors of the past 20 years have fur-
thermore driven Europe into a decade of depression and internal strife. 
Neither the will nor the necessary means to turn around the grim pros-
pects facing it are at hand, or are soon likely to be (Ross 2017c).
Even a severe critic of the EU must acknowledge its remarkable 
initial accomplishment  – devising a diplomacy of reconciliation in 
post- World War II Europe. But its years of greatness belong to a distant 
past. The EU has gone out as a beacon of hope for Europe’s future. 
The EU actually crossed a point of no return many years ago  – with 
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the collapse of the ill- considered constitutional project in 2004. The 
debacle put paid to the dreams that it could evolve into a political fed-
eration and that the Single Market would ever be more than partially 
completed (Gillingham 2006, 47– 54). Unachievable by fiat, a policy 
trajectory leading to Europe’s federal future would have required years 
of consensus- building anchored in a record of success. Such a thing is 
hard to detect.
The shoddy and self- serving constitutional document served up for 
the approval of the member states in 2004 was so byzantine and opaque 
that not even its official sponsors could make sense of it. The famous Non 
in the French constitutional referendum of that year, which doomed the 
federal project, thus could not have turned on the merits or demerits of 
a proposal that no one understood, but instead grew out of a campaign 
waged on an issue of only secondary importance in the document itself, 
which was, however, fundamental to the nation’s voters: a deep- seated 
aversion to foreign competition for jobs. The rejection of the proposed 
constitution both killed the hope of a politically united Europe and 
undermined the credibility of the fourth supposedly inviolate fundamen-
tal principle of the EU – unrestricted labour mobility between Member 
States – which went up in flames (Gillingham 2016, 120– 141).
The eurozone project was an attempt to circumvent the EU’s mount-
ing unpopularity by imposing an economic fait accompli. The idea under-
lying it was that a single currency would require and generate common 
economic policies, thereby eventually forcing the formation of a political 
union. This grand plan has failed so miserably as to call into question 
the existence of the EU itself. The one- size- fits- all straightjacket of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) has plunged the continent into a dec-
ade of depression; cheated a generation of young people out of jobs and 
opportunities; impoverished southern Europe; driven a thick emotional 
wedge between creditor and debtor nations; stifled innovation across 
the community; weakened both public and private finance; restricted 
European policymaking essentially to crisis management; skewed the 
operation of EU institutions; and embittered the public from north to 
south and east to west (Gillingham 2016, 153– 4).
If pro- EU- optimists, whose annual growth predictions have consist-
ently been wrong for nearly a decade, are right this time, recovery from 
the protracted depression in Europe may have just begun, thanks albeit 
largely to the superior economic performance of the US and China. It 
will nevertheless be many years until European memories fade of chronic 
double- digit unemployment, catastrophic youth unemployment twice 
or more as high, and widespread underemployment. Only a thorough 
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institutional re- configuration of the eurozone can restore healthy rates 
of growth. Yet the need for such far- reaching reform has never been 
accepted in official Brussels.
To the extent that one can speak of a European government, its 
locus is, however, no longer the official EU capital, but Frankfurt, the 
headquarters of the ECB (Financial Times 2017b, 2017c; Wall Street 
Journal 2017a). Its austerity policies remain in place and will not be jet-
tisoned until German opposition to loosening monetary and fiscal policy 
is overcome. In the meantime, a still- fragile Europe facing re- invigorated 
challenges from American technology and Chinese dynamism cannot 
afford economic setbacks of any kind.
One nowadays rarely encounters the hoary defence often made on 
behalf of the EU as an optimal or essential policymaking mechanism. The 
very idea indeed seems ludicrous when crisis has become endemic, the 
institution’s very survival is at stake, and policy planning is effectively 
on hold. In official Brussels, tough talk barely conceals a sense of panic. 
Hence the deep sigh of relief – akin to hysteria – with which Euro- elites 
greeted Emmanuel Macron’s election as president of France.
Europhile pundits veritably leaped over one another to proclaim it a 
turning point in the EU’s dismal recent history. It hardly qualifies for such 
a distinction. The ferociously ambitious photogenic 39- year- old won the 
election on an historically low turnout and with the support of only a 
minority of the French electorate. It is wishful thinking to interpret the 
French vote as a ringing endorsement of the European integration pro-
ject and unrealistic to imagine that Macron will have a free hand in nego-
tiating for a stronger and more centralised EU (Financial Times 2017d, 
2017e, 2017f). He lacks the backing of a real political party. It is also 
by no means certain that his quasi- liberal reform agenda – lengthening 
the work week, raising the retirement age, and reducing the size of the 
bureaucracy – will fare any better in the chamber of representatives than 
similar attempts, which failed him as adviser to the cabinet of the deeply 
unpopular Francois Hollande. If so, the fate of his future government, 
and France’s economy, may be no different from that of his predecessor 
(Wall Street Journal 2017b).
It would be a mistake to conclude that Macron seriously plans to 
open up the economy. A typical product of the elitist French educational 
system, he will, if given the chance, reinforce the power of the state in 
the economy. Nor have the differences between France and Germany 
on economic policy been better than papered over. More will be needed 
than photo- embraces and platitudinous expressions of goodwill to per-
suade the German voting public to assume the heavy burden of EMU 
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debt. Macron could in fact go the way of the EU’s previous White Knight, 
the dynamic and handsome former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, 
who, in the interests of economic reform, tried in vain to install a presi-
dential model of government in Rome. The instability of the Italian politi-
cal system, together with a stagnant economy and a financial community 
on the verge of bankruptcy, makes the country the prime candidate for 
the next existential threat to the EU. The need for a massive emergency 
bank bailout has long been obvious (Wall Street Journal 2017c). To pro-
vide it, the Italian state, in flagrant violation of EMU rules aimed at creat-
ing a single financial market, has stepped in with a massive injection of 
public money and may again be called upon to do so again. The need for 
such national intervention obviously makes a mockery of boasts that the 
euro will displace the dollar as the anchor of the international monetary 
system (Wall Street Journal 2017d).
There are few grounds for optimism given the present state of the 
EU. The refugee crisis and its ugly cousin, Islamic terrorism, are ongoing 
problems, which defy Europe- wide solutions. Obfuscation, secondly, has 
been the sole EU policy response to the festering diesel emissions scan-
dal, which has also shred the credibility of the Parliament as people’s 
advocate, and that of the Commission as honest broker in trade relations. 
Corruption also remains rife throughout much of the European com-
munity. Brussels’ policymaking in the critical field of high- tech industry 
has recently shifted from one of mere harassment of American IT giants 
in the guise of anti- trust policy to a coordinated campaign of outright 
bashing – of imposing stupendous fines from which there is no judicial 
recourse. Hence, the more than two trillion dollars in their European 
earnings which, under more favourable conditions, could have been 
ploughed into investment, remain unspent (Gillingham 2016, 199– 205). 
The evident anti- American bias and injustice of EU policy can, moreover, 
be counted upon to produce a powerful backlash in Washington as well 
as to drive Silicon Valley into an unsought, unwanted, and undesirable 
alliance with the Trump administration. It will move the USA one step 
closer to China and its European followers in adopting policies that rip 
up the seamless web of the internet and strengthen the power of the state 
vis- á-vis civil society,
Over the longer term, the EU’s anti- US IT campaign will reduce 
American financial involvement in European high technology, raise costs, 
and cause the EU member states to lag still further behind in a crucial 
growth field. Europe will therefore remain a bystander to the most con-
sequential economic breakthrough of the era. Such long- run perils pale, 
however, by comparison to an immediate threat, the single currency, 
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which, unless abandoned, or at least re- configured, will condemn Europe 
to chronic low growth.
The present outbreak of Macron- mania in Europhile circles may 
provide a reprieve from the continent’s ailments if, and until, a powerful 
new individual or institution can take over effective leadership of the EU. 
By general agreement such a development cannot arise from within the 
discredited Commission, but must somehow emerge from a consensus 
of the 27 post- Brexit Member States (Financial Times 2017g). Finding a 
common denominator of policymaking will be a tall order in a now bit-
terly divided European community. Nor it is by any means easy to imag-
ine – given the dysfunctional Apparat of official Brussels – how such a 
person or party could make its influence felt through the badly malfunc-
tioning governance machinery. The policy of building up EU institutions 
finds little support outside of Germany except among Euro- elites. The 
sole alternative to ‘more Europe’ remains the devolution of authority to 
the Member States, as long- championed by Britain, which would pre-
serve a single market or trade area, while leaving the rest of the EU policy 
machinery up for grabs.
A British alternative?
Two important considerations favour London’s Brexit negotiating posi-
tion (Sinn 2017). Without Britain’s net contribution, first of all, the EU 
will be poorer; bargaining for spoils will become that much more dif-
ficult, pressure for an increase in contributions that much greater, and 
the likelihood of budget shortfalls that much stronger. The absence of 
the UK will, moreover, eliminate the blocking position which, under 
current EU rules, the ‘free trade faction’ shares with that of the ‘pro-
tectionist faction’, thereby opening the door either to a bolt by the for-
mer, or divisive conflict between the two. The remaining free traders 
will, in any case, need a British ally whether outside or inside the EU. 
At the same time, London’s advocacy of a reform like EFTA (European 
Free Trade Association) bristles with difficulties, not least of all because 
those countries taking an approach like Britain’s – and insisting on the 
supremacy of national law  – may need lengthy transition periods in 
which to dismantle the acquis communautaire, the corpus of directives 
and regulations that are the ne plus ultra of EU membership. No two of 
these national procedures will be quite the same and their relationships 
of the individual states to either a reformed EU or a successor organisa-
tion may vary from case to case.
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For this reason Britain’s exit negotiations must demonstrate that 
departure from the EU can be beneficial. One can only hope that Prime 
Minister May’s constructive attitude is appreciated by her EU inter-
locutors. The latter will in any case face heavy pressure from national 
business and financial communities intent upon making Brexit as mutu-
ally painless as possible. Most important of all, Britain must provide 
practical assurance that departure from today’s EU can bring prosper-
ity and build national confidence because it is consistent with and can 
strengthen with most powerful international trends re- shaping today’s 
world. The auguries are by no means inauspicious. The predictions of the 
Brexit naysayers have, up to now, been wildly off the mark. Theresa May’s 
leadership may be shaken up  – but no worse. Donald Trump is being 
gradually housebroken, and his antics may well prove to be ‘disruptive’ in 
the positive sense of the word as currently understood in business circles, 
which implies promoting innovation and growth. The world economy is, 
like Britain’s, on an upswing, and growing at a substantially higher rate 
than Europe’s – a performance gap that seems almost certain to increase 
(Open Europe 2017).
As a worldwide phenomenon, the influence of protectionism can-
not be denied: globalisation in its many forms and guises may be thrown 
temporarily into reverse. As a long- term trend, however, it is unstop-
pable. There is at least a fighting chance that Brexit will lead to a new 
chapter in the opening of the world economy. If so, the power of a supra-
national but regional political and economic bloc like the EU can only 
weaken over time.
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Whither the 27?
Michael Shackleton
Introduction
What effect will the prospective departure of the UK from the EU have on 
the remaining 27 Member States? Will it release them from the handicap 
that British exceptionalism imposed and enable them to pursue a clearer 
political agenda? Or will it reveal a continuing inability to overcome their 
heterogeneity in the face of a populist storm, with the potential for the 
whole structure to come crashing down? This chapter is not designed to 
give a direct answer to this dichotomy but rather invites the reader to con-
sider the choices that the EU will face in the post- Brexit world. The 27 will 
not have the luxury, even if they had the desire, to stand still. Rather, it 
will be suggested that they will be obliged to enter into a renewed phase in 
which they seek to identify what it means to use the phrase ‘we Europeans’ 
and, in so doing, find fresh ways to create the sense that EU citizens are 
bound together as part of a common political project.
The chapter is organised around the three strategies that van 
Middelaar (2013) identifies as a means of lending credibility to the sense 
of the words ‘we Europeans’: a German strategy as the search for a com-
mon identity to create ‘our people’, a Roman strategy as the production 
of tangible benefits for people in the EU ‘to our advantage’, and a Greek 
(or perhaps better, Athenian) strategy as enabling European citizens to 
participate in the political process so that we make ‘our own decisions’ 
in determining the direction of the Union. All three of these strategies 
are visible throughout the history of the Union and none has enjoyed 
anything like undiluted success. Nevertheless, they offer criteria against 
which the progress of the Union can be measured in the years ahead.
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From a British perspective, the further development of the three 
strategies may seem irrelevant: even before the referendum, in February 
2016, David Cameron had persuaded the European Council to accept 
that the UK ‘is not committed to further political integration’ and that 
‘the references to ever closer union do not apply to the UK’ (European 
Council 2016). However, it will be suggested here that no matter how far 
changes in the EU extend, they will only serve to underline the growing 
gap between the political discourse on the two sides of the Channel and 
the increasing difficulty and indeed unlikelihood of the UK’s ever being 
able to rejoin the EU, should it wish to change its mind.
Identity politics
The search for a common European identity has been hugely problem-
atic throughout the history of the EU. It is widely interpreted as a kind of 
nation- building that both conflicts with and challenges the interests of 
nation- states, who wish to guard the exclusivity of their links with their 
own citizens. The argument over the design of the euro notes and coins 
was a clear indicator of a determination to avoid any attempt at the crea-
tion of a historical narrative behind the establishment of the new cur-
rency (van Middelaar 2013, 238– 44).
And yet it is an issue that keeps re- emerging and that has never 
been removed from the agenda. No other state has indicated its wish 
to follow Britain in removing the reference in the Treaty to ‘ever closer 
union’, whatever their reticence about elevating the status of European 
identity. Indeed, even after the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 
2005, 16 of the then 27 states expressly declared that the flag with a cir-
cle of 12 golden stars on a blue background, the anthem based on the 
‘Ode to Joy’ from the Ninth Symphony by Beethoven, the motto ‘United 
in Diversity’, the euro as the currency of the EU, and Europe Day on 
9 May, ‘will for them continue as symbols to express the sense of com-
munity of the people in the EU and their allegiance to it’ (Declaration 
52, Lisbon Treaty). Such a declaration makes it impossible to return to a 
world where European citizens are not obliged to ask what it is that dis-
tinguishes them from others outside the Union. Invisibility is no longer 
an option, as opponents of the EU rightly recognise.
The nature of the debate evolves in the light of political develop-
ments. In recent times, there has been less talk of symbols of unity and 
more a sense of the EU as a beleaguered actor in an ever more dangerous 
external environment, in severe need of a reinforced sense of common 
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purpose. Donald Tusk, as president of the European Council, wrote a 
remarkably frank letter to the 27 heads of state or government (exclud-
ing the UK) in advance of the Malta summit in February 2017. The let-
ter illustrated this mood of future uncertainty well. He pointed to a new 
geopolitical situation in the world, starting with an assertive China, 
an aggressive Russian foreign policy and radical Islamist movements 
in the Middle East and Africa, going on to include the challenge posed 
by the new American president, stating that ‘particularly the change in 
Washington puts the EU in a difficult situation, with the new administra-
tion seeming to put into question the last 70 years of American foreign 
policy’ (European Council 2017b). He called for greater determination 
and solidarity as essential prerequisites for the EU to survive. As he put 
it, ‘If we do not believe in ourselves, in the deeper purpose of integration, 
why should anyone else?’
The perceived need for unity in the face of external threat puts the 
rest of the EU in a very different place from the UK. One of the central 
planks of government policy in Britain has been to look for a new trade 
agreement with America as part of the post- Brexit settlement, without 
any wish to suggest publicly at least that there is any clash of values 
between the two countries. UK policy is that the country is perfectly able 
to act effectively on the world stage post- Brexit, whereas the discourse 
at EU level is that those outside will be, in the phrase of the Declaration 
prepared for the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Rome Treaty, 
‘sidelined by global dynamics’.
A central issue for the EU27 is the extent to which the rhetoric of 
the European Council filters down into the attitudes of the European 
public. Will European citizens be willing to share this notion of common 
values and to accept the kind of policies that might express that sense of 
community, not least by a reinforcement of the borders between the out-
side and inside of the EU? There is some limited evidence that attitudes 
towards the EU have become more positive since the UK referendum 
(Bertelsmann Foundation 2016), but it is much too soon to claim that 
we are witnessing the creation of a European public under the pressure 
of external threat. What we have is a yardstick against which to measure 
future developments.
Policy structure
What, then, of the ‘tangible benefits’ that the EU generates? There is much 
discussion in the UK about the loss of access to funding, for example, 
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for research for universities, for structural support in poorer areas or for 
the agricultural sector. The question that these sectors ask is: will the UK 
government be ready to match that funding once the UK is outside the 
EU? From the perspective of the 27, however, the issue is quite differ-
ent: it is how to deal with the loss of revenue arising from the UK’s depar-
ture. It is estimated that the ‘Brexit gap’ in the budget could amount to 
around €10 billion (Notre Europe 2017). Whatever solution is found for 
this shortfall, it is almost certain to have an impact on the shape of EU 
policies designed to generate public goods.
At present the funding of EU policies is organised through a 
multi-annual financial framework (MFF), which covers the seven years 
from 2014 to 2020. With UK withdrawal due to take place in 2019, 
there is going to be a considerable argument about the extent of its 
financial commitments beyond that date. However, the ‘divorce bill’, 
as it is known, remains a short- term issue, even if it is certain to gen-
erate considerable political heat. The more long- term issue is how to 
respond to the loss of UK revenue in the next MFF for the years after 
2020. As Notre Europe comments, ‘if the EU wanted to keep its budget 
at the current level and use the money currently spent in the UK on 
other projects, the gap would amount to €17 billion per year or €119 
billion over the course of an MFF’.
The options for the 27 are all very difficult, politically speaking. To 
keep spending at its present level would mean the Member States would 
have to increase their contributions. The biggest increases would fall on 
the four states (Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Austria) who at pre-
sent receive a reduction in their contribution to the UK rebate, negotiated 
at Fontainebleau over 30 years ago. To reduce spending so that no one’s 
contribution increased would require a major overhaul of EU policies, as 
the cut would correspond to the equivalent of a 20 per cent reduction in 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or the entire EU research frame-
work budget (Horizon 2020) plus the Fund for Asylum, Migration and 
Integration. Even a combination of increased contributions and policy 
cuts would fall unequally across the Member States and generate a major 
split between net payers and net recipients, which would be difficult to 
implement, since any agreement will require unanimous consent.
One way of addressing these difficulties is to look again at the 
whole way that the EU is financed. In January 2017, a High Level Group 
chaired by the former Italian prime minister, Mario Monti, presented 
a report which argued in favour of new forms of EU revenue designed 
to support specific EU policy objectives, such as targeted levies to fight 
climate change or to promote energy efficiency (High Level Group on 
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Own Resources 2017). The more cynical may dismiss such ideas as 
unlikely to survive the struggle of competing national interests, but the 
departure of the UK may be precisely the kind of shock that enables the 
EU to ask questions about its revenue that have been considered taboo 
for over 40 years.
However, even if the discussion remains concentrated on expend-
iture, a new balance will have to be found. Since the 1980s a fundamen-
tal trade- off within the EU budget has been between the development 
of the Single Market and support for economic and social cohesion 
through the structural funds. The creation of the Single Market was 
the product of a bargain whereby countries with weaker economies 
were willing to open up their markets in exchange for structural sup-
port. Hence it was accepted that, when the EU was enlarged in 2004 
and 2007 to include the poorer states of Central and Eastern Europe, 
part of the deal would involve substantial cohesion funding. As a 
result, Poland is today the largest beneficiary of the structural funds, 
receiving over €9 billion a year.
Now we are witnessing the start of a different discussion about 
the balance between different policy priorities as expressed through the 
EU budget. The new emphasis on improving the security of European 
citizens rather than stressing the freedom of the market is changing the 
budgetary debate. Thus we see a link emerging between cohesion spend-
ing and solidarity in dealing with the refugee crisis and mass migration 
into the EU. Austria, for example, has warned that net payers will refuse 
to continue paying into cohesion funds if the Eastern Europeans take no 
refugees. Chancellor Kern has explicitly said:  ‘If countries continue to 
avoid resolving the issue of migration, or tax dumping at the expense of 
their neighbours, they will not be able to receive net payments of billions 
from Brussels … . Solidarity is not a one- way street’ (Wintour 2017). In 
other words, the argument about the EU budget is moving on, reflecting 
the change in the policy agenda.
The difficulty for the EU as a whole remains the question of how 
to make the public goods it provides visible to its citizens. The revenue 
structure of the budget is completely opaque to the non- initiated, and the 
expenditure is as much the result of bartering between states as it is the 
product of public debate about priorities. Curiously, the UK leaving the 
EU will create an opportunity for the 27 to see how far they want to go in 
revising the way budgetary politics works. No longer will they have the 
excuse that their hands are tied by a country that has been obsessed by 
‘getting its money back’ and unable to discuss the EU budget in terms of 
the provision of European public goods.
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Political participation
One immediate effect of the UK’s departure will be a reduction in the 
number of MEPs by 73. As the Treaty states that the European Parliament 
is composed of 751 members, the 27 will have to decide, on the basis of a 
proposal from the Parliament, whether to keep that figure and, if so, how 
to reallocate them. Redistribution amongst existing Member States is one 
possibility, as is the creation of a list for European candidates not linked 
to any national constituency but chosen by all European electors.
More important than the precise number of MEPs is the nature of 
the relationship between the Parliament and the electorate. The decline 
in participation in European elections (62 per cent in 1979, 43 per cent 
in 2014)  has underlined the difficulty of making that relationship 
meaningful in the eyes of voters. Many ask why they should vote for a 
Parliament whose members they do not know, and whose impact they 
cannot see. Hence the constant efforts made to make Europeans feel the 
Parliament is ‘our Parliament’ or ‘a channel for a European vox populi’ 
(van Middelaar 2013, 283).
The 2019 European Parliament elections will offer another 
opportunity to assess the progress of these efforts because it will 
witness a repeat of the experiment that was tried for the first time in 
2014. Before the last European elections, five of the European politi-
cal parties (European People’s Party, Party of European Socialists, 
European Liberals, Greens and European Left) put forward candi-
dates for Commission president in advance, obliged those candidates 
to come forward with a political programme, and organised a set of 
debates between them. After the elections, the political groups in the 
Parliament indicated to the European Council that they would not 
accept as a Commission president nominee anyone who had not been a 
candidate in advance of the elections. Hence they invited the heads of 
state and government to propose as Commission President Jean Claude 
Juncker, candidate of the European People’s Party which had won the 
most seats (though not the most votes) in the elections. The European 
Council reluctantly accepted this logic and proposed Juncker, despite 
the opposition of the British and Hungarian prime ministers, promising 
to review the nomination process before 2019.
As I have suggested elsewhere (Shackleton 2017), this was a trans-
formative moment in the development of representative government at 
EU level. For the first time European elections were presented not simply 
as a way of selecting MEPs, but also as a means to link a parliamentary 
election with the holder of an executive office. As a result, the Commission 
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president was seen as depending as much on having a majority in the 
European Parliament as having the support of the European Council, 
and indeed was obliged to establish a programme for five years which 
took explicit account of the wishes of the majority of political groups in 
the Parliament. ‘One can now imagine a Commission that is not beyond 
democratic electoral reach and a European Parliament that can offer the 
possibility of policy change through executive renewal, a system where 
the ‘rascals can be thrown out’ (Shackleton 2017).
In Britain the overwhelming balance of political opinion was 
against this so- called Spitzenkandidaten (top candidate) experiment. 
It was regarded as a power grab by the European Parliament, one that 
would necessarily weaken the role of the European Council. None of the 
candidates for Commission president had the opportunity to campaign 
in the UK, not even those from the European socialist and liberal par-
ties (Martin Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt) whose national parties had 
been involved in their selection. By contrast, whatever the reticence of 
national leaders in other countries, a majority were reluctant to deny the 
appropriateness of the logic behind the process: indeed, Angela Merkel 
was expressly challenged to accept that it was a more democratic way of 
selecting a Commission president (García & Priestley 2015, 160– 3).
The absence of the UK from the 2019 elections makes it much more 
likely that the process for selecting a Commission president will be simi-
lar to that which prevailed in 2014. It may witness drama in the form of a 
stand- off between the institutions, but such drama may be precisely what 
the EU requires as it seeks to create a historical narrative and to make 
Europe a matter of direct public concern where voters can see the impact 
of their choices.
Conclusions
There can be no underestimating the continuing difficulty of develop-
ing the three strategies outlined above. Persuading national citizens 
to define themselves at least in part as Europeans, in accordance with 
the German strategy, is a task that requires overcoming widespread 
distrust of Brussels as well as the divergences of interest among 
Member States. Devising a trade- off between the policy priorities 
of the members of such a heterogeneous entity as the EU presents a 
major challenge for the Roman strategy. Giving EU citizens a more 
direct role in the choice of their leaders will require a reassessment 
at national as much as European level as to the scope of the Greek 
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strategy. Nonetheless, as this chapter has sought to show, the 27 are 
condemned to continue their search for a common identity, to define 
and pursue European public goods, and to offer means for citizens to 
contribute to the political direction of the EU.
There can be no certainty as to the outcome, but at the very least 
we possess a set of common criteria against which success and failure can 
be measured. We will be able to observe the extent to which Europeans 
feel more aware of their common values, assess the popular success of a 
redefinition of the policy structure of the EU, and judge whether citizens 
feel more engaged by European elections in 2019 and thus more inclined 
to participate.
In Britain there will no doubt be a wish to dismiss such develop-
ments as illusory, to suggest that the divisions that they will no doubt 
provoke make a mockery of the notion of a common European destiny. 
The result of such a discourse will be to create an even wider gap between 
the 27 and the UK. Britain will be exempted from any need to identify 
what it means to use the phrase ‘we Europeans’, raising ever higher the 
barriers to rejoining at a future date. For the rest of the EU, however, the 
search for the meaning behind the phrase will continue.
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Sustainable integration 
in a demoicratic polity
A new (or not so new) ambition  
for the EU after Brexit
Kalypso Nicolaïdis
Guardian of the long term: what future  
for the EU after Brexit?
The perennial question of the future of the EU has changed in tone and 
gravity since its 50th anniversary (Phinnemore & Warleigh- Lack 2009). 
While the multidimensional crisis besetting the Union since 2008 had 
already raised the stakes, with Brexit we have truly entered existential 
territory. If the EU is now demonstrably a polity that can shrink, who 
is to say that it cannot shrink to nothing? If vast pluralities across the 
continent echo the feelings of British nay- sayers, who is to say where this 
mood will take us next? Can we avoid tying to the mast a European public 
beguiled by the sirens of Brexit? How can European leaders signal that – 
Brexit or not – the European ship is still afloat? And how can European 
publics re- imagine their role in this endeavour?
The response from officialdom has been predictable; the classic 
three- pronged wheel of institutions, policies and structural ‘solutions’. 
On institutions, magic bullets are shot around, such as an EMU parlia-
ment or more Spitzenkandidaten, as if these were the expressions of 
democracy citizens most cared about. On policies, leaders predictably 
promise ‘concrete progress’  – from control of migration and external 
borders to deeper cooperation in internal and external security or youth 
 
 
 
SUStAinABlE intEgrAtion in A dEMoicrAtic Polity 213
  
employment – but, judging on past record, these worthy goals are bound 
to be betrayed. And on structure, we hear about variable geometry, the 
hallmark of EU integration since Maastricht. But doing more with fewer 
countries is not only restating the obvious when it comes to EMU and 
Schengen, it also assumes that most citizens want to do more in the ‘core’ 
countries, while most citizens from the ‘periphery’ are happy to do less.
Here I  argue that whatever the partial merits of these various 
recipes, unless European officials free themselves from the tyranny of 
dichotomies – where the agenda before us is solely framed as more vs 
less Europe – there is little chance of reconciling a majority of Europe’s 
citizens with the project. Instead we need to talk about the common goals 
that require Europeans to continue to work together or separately at all 
levels of governance: We need to talk about substance. As Grabbe and 
Lehne (2017) argue, ‘public debate about climate change, conflict resolu-
tion, and aging populations would bust the myth that societies can some-
how return to a former golden age when national governments could 
solve problems by themselves’.
If in Europe and beyond we are plagued by short-termism  –  
governments acting under emergency powers, markets wedded to short- 
term returns – what better way to justify anew the process of European 
integration than to proclaim loud and clear the EU’s commitment to 
long- term goals irrespective of short- term expediency. I will argue that 
the EU is best placed to institutionalise the idea of sustainability, the 
idea that we must act together if we are going to survive as a species, and 
that a peace project such as ours can best justify short- term sacrifices for 
long- term goals.
Sustaining our polity as the guardian of the long term for its citi-
zens, a means to an end, should be the new core motive for the European 
project committed to sustaining cooperation among states (Harari 
2014). I have suggested that such a vision should be labelled ‘sustainable 
integration’ which is most fundamentally about turning the sustainabil-
ity gestalt into a broader philosophy of transnational governance for the 
EU (Nicolaïdis 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). It is also an agenda that requires 
widening the conceptual toolbox of political science to social theory and 
anthropology to better apprehend the EU’s social grounding. Sustainable 
integration is altogether a practice, an ethos and a state of mind. As a 
governing idea of integration it calls for pursuing fairer rather than faster 
or deeper integration, through processes that are politically acceptable 
across generations. I define sustainable integration in the EU as the dur-
able ability to sustain cooperation within the Union in spite of the hetero-
geneity of its population and of their national political arrangements. In 
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other words, sustainable integration calls for embracing the complex-
ity of the task thanks to the simplicity of the vision (Innerarity 2014; 
Martinico 2017).
Paradoxically, such a long- term vision calls for eschewing the kind 
of teleology espoused by self- styled euro- federalists, who want to resolve 
once and for all the question of the nature of the EU as a polity bent on 
equating progress with ever more centralisation (Nicolaïdis 2010b). The 
infamous bicycle theory which commands us to choose between moving 
forward or falling makes no sense in a world where we need to move in 
all directions or sometimes stand still if we are to sustain our balance. 
Sustainable integration is about continuously maintaining the precious 
balance between the imperatives of cooperation and control, the coop-
eration whose benefit we seek, and the autonomy which we continue to 
crave as individuals and as groups (Nicolaïdis 2017). Better even, it calls 
for accommodating the different ways in which different national and 
local traditions are comfortable in striking this balance. Call this mindset 
Brexit interruptus!
In the wake of Brexit, sustainable integration could be seen as a tru-
ism:  integration means staying together over time by definition. Except 
that it is not. Integration is only sustainable if it means staying together 
over time by choice. The idea that the peoples of Europe can exercise their 
right to leave democratically if they so wish is a truly good thing. Such a 
right of exit is what makes the EU a Union (whether you want to call it 
federal or not) rather than a federal State. Sustainable integration then 
starts with warding off disintegration, stating loud and clear to the world 
and to ourselves that the EU is here to stay, even if (and perhaps because) 
its peoples, like the UK, are free to go.
As a result, the key to sustainable integration is asking what kind of 
policies and institutional arrangements could make the exercise of exit 
less palatable. If we assume that such arrangements need to be adaptable 
in the face of internal and external shocks, and wholesale uncertainty, 
sustainable integration is about ‘changing the way we change’ within the 
EU. Such change needs to encompass goals and processes that take into 
account the differential impact of a world in transformation on various 
arrays of citizens, groups and countries in the longer term. Emergency 
decision- making can be necessary but it is never sufficient – even in the 
here and now.
This brings us back to the question of legitimacy. Activists and 
scholars agree that the EU is in dire need of more meaningful democ-
racy but disagree on what this means exactly. No solution seems to 
avoid the Scylla of complexity without stumbling on the Charybdis 
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of simplistic mimetism (reproducing state- like institutions at the EU 
level). I  argue that focusing on sustainable integration allows us to 
chart a way through this aporia. First, by accepting that the EU is dem-
ocratically challenged, in spite of all its mechanisms for representa-
tion, delegation and checks on power. Second, by turning this flaw into 
an asset: because it is a sum of governments which cannot be collec-
tively impeached, the EU ought to be about democracy- with- foresight, 
partially shielded from the short- term ups and downs of electoral poli-
tics, yet solidly grounded on participatory networks and attuned to the 
overwhelming desire of the public to confront future threats for the 
sake of our children and grandchildren. To atone for its current short-
comings in collective accountability, the EU must become accountable 
to those who are not represented today.
A number of us have sought to theorise the novel kind of transna-
tional democracy which the EU calls for under the label of demoicracy, 
which I define as ‘a Union of peoples, defined both as citizens and states, 
who govern together but not as one’ (Bellamy 2013, Chapter 24 in this vol-
ume; Cheneval et al. 2015; Lindseth 2014; Nicolaïdis 2004; 101; 2013). 
Accordingly, democratic sustainability is predicated on giving up the idea 
that European democracy can, and should, take the form of national 
democracy writ large. Instead, the EU needs to be gradually perfected as a 
demoicracy in the making – whose credo is based on the belief that since 
its inception, the EU has approximated (and at times subverted) a new 
political form predicated both on the autonomy of its peoples’ governing 
arrangement and on their radical openness to each other.
Does demoicratic legitimacy represent an unstable equilibrium? 
An equilibrium sociologically, because it represents a third way between 
opposing forces  – those who prefer to centralise the management of 
interdependence and those who prefer to minimise it; and an equilibrium 
normatively, in translating for a democratic era the Kantian requisite for 
‘perpetual peace’ as a law- based arrangement between self- governing 
states. This equilibrium would be unstable if the opposing forces of fed-
eral messianism (typically EU officialdom and idealistic pro- European 
movements) and sovereignism (today expressed in new populist move-
ments) pull the project apart. In this context, adopting the overarching 
goal of sustainable integration may help legitimise the novel demoicratic 
form that is the EU and ensure that it stays on a more stable path than 
competing alternatives.
In what follows I explore the implications of a commitment to sus-
tainable integration in a demoicratic polity on the three fronts of institu-
tions, policies and structure mentioned earlier.
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Institutions: democracy of a different kind
While in the last decades too much political energy has been spent on 
discussing decision- making rules in the EU and the balance of power 
between its various institutions, the alternative is not simply to come 
back to a ‘Europe of results’. To ask what a polity is about is to ask who is 
doing the asking and how action is pursued. Output legitimacy depends 
on input processes which set the ambition of collective action. And while 
it is a testimony to the staying power of EU institutions that they have 
hardly been reformed since the EU’s inception, they have nevertheless 
permitted a dangerous drift away from the demoicrat’s attachment to 
non- domination between demoi and individuals – big states overruling 
the preferences of smaller states, the rising coercive proclivities of the 
centre, the technocratic monopolisation of power, and the depolitisation 
of decision- making.
This means, first, that a shared commitment to fostering a sus-
tainable integration culture could go a long way in reasserting shared 
leadership and ownership. The lasting power of EU institutions would 
be bolstered to the extent that they conduct affairs in systematically self- 
reflexive ways, even when emergency action is required (Caney 2016). 
EU actors could pool their different comparative advantages in systemati-
cally assessing short- term actions against long- term goals when bargain-
ing over EU action. This could start by shaping bolder and more political 
versions of such current tools as the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
or Regulatory Impact Assessment, as well as methods involving fore-
sight, horizon scanning, scenario development and visioning. In time, 
the trade- offs and predictions involved would be at the heart of public 
debate across the EU.
Second, sustainable integration requires a much deeper democratic 
aggiornamento bringing about ‘social ownership’ of long- term- oriented 
action. After all, the UN describes the sustainable development goals 
as ‘an Agenda of the people, by the people and for the people’. In other 
words, for an agenda to be politically sustainable, how it is implemented is 
a prerequisite to what is pursued. Years of learning- by- doing have shown 
that such ambitious long- term goals need to be applied through empow-
erment rather than centralisation  – in the spirit of the groundswell of 
‘bottom- up’ climate action pledged under the COP21 fourth pillar (Hale 
2016). If sustainable integration is best grounded in the decentralised 
enacting of transformative strategies by people individually, in groups 
or as national communities, then it must rely on the separate, if overlap-
ping, democratic spaces that constitute the demoicratic polity. This is less 
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about organised subsidiarity as a top- down criterion for refraining to act 
at the centre, and more about organic subsidiarity as a citizen- centred 
concept of EU democratic dynamics. Particularly so as to enrol young 
generations, the EU could do much to mirror patterns of technological 
innovation and harness networked forms of cooperation central to our 
virtual times, including notions of distributed intelligence and adaptive 
learning (Slaughter 2017). And we need to think about the impact of 
political ‘neo- cleavages’ and how the reassertion of place, localism and 
control will affect the sustainability agenda.
Policies: sustainability across the board
Sustainable integration privileges certain policy fields over others. 
It builds on our commitment to sustainability as a goal for our global 
environment, as well as for cities, security, welfare states, agriculture, 
landscapes, cultures or  – in UN parlance  – ‘sustainable development 
goals’ (SDGs). Crucially, the EU is now itself under the obligation to pur-
sue the 17 SDGs spelled out in 2015 by the United Nations, building 
on lessons learned from the previous Millennium goals from which the 
developed world had been exempted.1 The ‘transition to sustainability’ is 
about how all nations are (or should be) repositioning their economies, 
their societies and their collective purpose ‘to maintain all life on Earth, 
peacefully, healthily, equitably and with sufficient wealth to ensure that 
all are content in their survival’ (O’Riordan & Voisey 2013).
Two points need to be made on the relationship between the 
(political) idea of ‘sustainable European integration’ and this (substan-
tive) ‘transition to sustainability’. First, that the implementation of the 
SDGs require a profound change in mindset on the part of European 
institutions, governments and publics which can be best informed by a 
broader philosophy of sustainable integration. Second, that sustainable 
integration is a holistic conception which includes, but is not limited to, 
delivering policies classified under the UN- related sustainability goal. In 
other words, the latter is both conditioned on, and embedded within, the 
former.
Sustainability covers all aspects of living together but calls for 
emphasising the underlying features of society which make such togeth-
erness easier, from equal rights and the rule of law to economically 
reasonable egalitarianism and the provision of equal opportunities. 
A sustainable society is one where economic growth is compatible with 
planetary limitations and distributed fairly among its citizens, the rapidly 
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growing developing nations and the younger generation. In the words 
of Pope Francis, eminently citeable by atheists among us:  ‘Today … 
we have to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a 
social approach; it must integrate questions of justice in debates on the 
environment, so as to hear both the cry of the earth and the cry of the 
poor.’2 There is of course a vast literature about the ways in which growth 
must gradually change in quality with the development of new concepts 
around green growth, natural capital, circular economy, ecosystem ser-
vices or green bonds.3 In this context global spatial sustainability must 
complement temporal sustainability with managed mobilities, whereby 
the deep principle of non- discrimination is made relevant to the chal-
lenge of global integration.4 These debates must become mainstream 
across the political spectrum in Europe and beyond.
In an abstract sense, the policies advocated at EU level seem to 
chime with sustainability goals. But while the 2017 Rome declaration calls 
for a ‘prosperous and sustainable Europe’, the driving narrative occupies 
the defensive end of the sustainability spectrum. However, no matter how 
necessary, an emphasis on ‘resilience’ already assumes that sustainability 
strategies will fail, while a focus on ‘protection’ runs the risk of overreach 
by justifying a Europe with more powers, tools and resources (Nicolaïdis 
2016). Instead, sustainability needs to start in the here and now. Finding 
a lasting solution to the well- known shortcomings of the single currency is 
a prerequisite for investment strategies that sustainability requires. While 
financial integration is desirable in the long term to share risks and spread 
resources across Europe, this does not mean that the EU needs to radically 
centralise its fiscal, regulatory and supervisory functions.
Ultimately, EU leaders need to seek the minimum integration nec-
essary to sustain a common currency among national economies which 
will remain heterogenous for the foreseeable future, not only in terms 
of levels of development but in terms of social contracts and state– 
society relations (Begg et al. 2015; Nicolaïdis & Watson 2015). From a 
sustainable integration view point this means reconciling decentralised 
self- government and greater pooling of resources. On the one hand, 
European officialdom can no longer shy away from dealing with the 
main structural reason for EMU’s failures, namely the tension between 
national ownership and the interdependence of European economies 
and societies. Governing at a distance is unsustainable when reforms 
and policies must be democratically sustainable in separate constitu-
encies. Democratic sustainability requires informed debate on the part 
of national publics and genuine mutual recognition between their poli-
ties (Gatziou et  al. 2016). On the other hand, resources can be better 
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pooled – say if the EU as a whole leverages its capacity to borrow on capi-
tal markets – provided they are not managed at the centre. Sustainable 
growth requires public investment in research and development, schools, 
healthcare and social services, transport and infrastructure and most 
fundamentally a strategic approach to innovation in the EU (Madelin & 
Ringrose 2016).
Finally, Brexit and the populist wave accompanying it have brought 
home the fact that attention must be focused on the long- term conse-
quences of openness for individual voters. A system in which states have 
given up control of crucial aspects of regulation (e.g. banking, food pro-
duction, online markets) to international bureaucrats is not democrati-
cally sustainable. Rather than an exogenous force that is filtered through 
national cleavages, globalisation is a force that can radically change the 
political issue space as well as the institutional opportunities available 
to political actors – and the media have a crucial role to play in this story 
(Farrell & Newman 2017). Sustainable integration is about harnessing, 
but also taming, this force.
Structure: flexibility without fragmentation
Finally, much has been made of the idea that more ‘variable geometry’ 
would significantly help the EU survive its ‘midlife crisis’.5 Beyond the 
irony that ever closer union may require an ever smaller union, there is 
little doubt that the EU can survive only if it embraces the kind of flexibil-
ity required by the widely heterogeneous character of its economies, and 
widely diverse range of social, legal and political systems. This is not an 
original thought, especially when we note that asymmetric federalism – 
whereby the constituent units in the system relate to the whole through 
different degrees of autonomy and status – has historically been the rule 
rather than the exception.
But not all types of flexible arrangements necessarily serve sustain-
able integration. If the cooperative drive has largely been based on dif-
fuse reciprocity and linkages across issues, sustainability implies that we 
learn to deal fairly with the externalities we create for each other over 
time, which in turn calls for more, not less, inclusiveness. Asymmetry 
of the wrong kind can also translate in a sense of powerlessness on the 
part of citizens who are under- represented at the centre (Bauböck 2002). 
Arguably, both versions of structural differentiation – a core ‘federalised’ 
Europe or permanent institutional structures for different groupings of 
states – could be harbingers of fragmentation and divergence between 
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Member States, not least as cleavages among states and actors in the EU 
crisscross possible groupings.
For the sake of sustainable integration we need to imagine over-
lapping agendas and differentiated approaches inside a single frame-
work, rather than concentric circles or core– periphery dichotomies. 
The asymmetry produced by flexible integration should maintain the 
balance between the forces of fusion and fission that characterise the 
Union. Against structural approaches to differentiation, enhanced coop-
eration with flexible opt- in and opt- out clauses can be seen as a form of 
open- ended experimentation with cooperation whereby some actors 
can afford to be trail- blazers. This, of course, requires respecting the 
untouchable core of the EU through constitutional safeguards (Martinico 
2017). It requires also that forms of ‘enhanced cooperation’ are open 
and transparent. Differentiation, moreover, needs to be principled, not 
ad hoc. Arrangements must be sensitive to local and national specificities 
and adjusted to conform to the precept of sustainable integration. For 
instance, the same norm of free movement of labour has a radically dif-
ferent impact in different states and their labour markets, which is why 
states require leeway in their interpretation. Similarly, a European ref-
ugee regime must balance Member States’ shared commitment to free 
movement with the unequal distribution of absorption capacity within 
each of them.
What does this all mean for a country like the UK which claims to 
be leaving the EU, but not Europe? What the British saga over Europe has 
taught us is that if the EU as a whole does not sufficiently take account of 
the unequal impact of its principles and laws, if it does not offer differen-
tiated and flexible approaches, then it is the Member States and their citi-
zens who will take such differentiation in hand, unilaterally. And that, we 
have now learned, can mean walking out and shaking the whole edifice 
in the process. Brexit raises the interesting prospect that a kind of flexible 
integration that could not be worked out with an existing member might 
instead be devised for a third country.
Conclusions
The EU after Brexit needs to heed the British message: we must take what 
is good about the EU while guarding against its own propensity for over- 
reach. We need to reshape a Europe that a majority of citizens in every 
EU Member State, including today’s Britain, would want to be part of. 
It is not anti- European to read Brexit as a warning that political leaders 
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must give up the kind of integration by stealth which has so damaged 
the integrity and popularity of the European project. British Leavers were 
generally not bigoted, racist or ignorant. But they are less educated and 
older than Remainers. Faced with what they perceived as the compla-
cency of the London and Brussels elites, they were no longer ready to give 
the EU the benefit of the doubt.
In this chapter I have argued that only by making the pursuit of 
sustainable integration its raison d’être might the EU most credibly 
sign on for another 60- year stint. This means altering the way negoti-
ated change occurs in the EU, reconnecting the project to its citizens’ 
aspirations and recognising that inter- governmental deals need to be 
sustained by intersocietal and intergenerational bargains. It means 
that flexibility, differentiation and opt- outs need to exist in order to 
serve inclusiveness, because a mosaic EU is more appealing than push-
ing half of its states to the brink of exit, as has happened with the UK. 
Under these conditions, peace in Europe may not be perpetual – but it 
could outlast all of us.
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Losing control
Brexit and the demoi- cratic disconnect
Richard Bellamy
Had the referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU been decided on 
the economic case alone, then in all likelihood the UK would have voted 
to stay in. All the key economic actors, from the CBI to the City, urged 
a Remain vote. That view certainly underlay the government’s strategy 
during the referendum, which stressed the economic risks and costs 
of leaving the EU. However, the debate ended up turning as much on 
politics as economics, and on that issue in particular the Remain cam-
paign offered much weaker arguments, barely mentioning the political 
risks and costs of Brexit. In this regard, the Leave campaign’s winning 
slogan was the claim that exiting the EU would allow the people of 
Britain to ‘take back control’ – at least indirectly, via their elected rep-
resentatives in the government and Parliament (Cummings 2017b). 
The implication was that executive and legislative power over a range 
of important economic and social policies  – not least those relating to 
immigration  – had passed to EU institutions that were largely uncon-
trolled, or inadequately controlled, by British citizens, or indeed the citi-
zens of any of the EU Member States. Leaving the EU would involve a 
repatriation of these competences to democratically accountable British 
administrators and politicians, re- enfranchising the British electorate in 
the process. Indeed, many Remainers had lent this argument a certain 
credibility through having contributed to four decades of criticism of the 
EU’s democratic deficit. Stretching back at least to 1979 and the first elec-
tions to the European Parliament, the critiques of the democratic failings 
of the EU by Europhiles all too often paralleled those of Eurosceptics, 
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and in some cases have been even harsher. The comparative failure of 
the Remain campaign to mount even a negative political case against 
leaving, let alone to give positive political (or, for that matter, economic) 
reasons for European integration, served simply to further legitimise the 
Leave campaign’s democratic argument for Brexit.
In this brief chapter, I shall argue that the Leave campaign’s polit-
ical case was as misleading and misinformed as much of their economic 
case is being steadily revealed to be. From the alleged savings on pay-
ments into the EU budget and the assumption that a free trade agree-
ment with the EU could be negotiated both swiftly and on advantageous 
terms to the City and UK producers, to the failure to take account of the 
inflationary repercussions of a fall in the pound and a consequent rise 
in interest rates, the economic claims of the proponents of Brexit have 
steadily unraveled (Bowler 2017). Nevertheless, a YouGov poll found 60 
per cent of Brexit voters still believed the political gains of Brexit would 
justify any potential economic costs (Gillett 2017). However, the political 
costs are, if anything, even greater than the economic. Far from ‘taking 
back control’, leaving the EU involves the British electorate losing control 
over the global economic and social processes that shape so many key 
government policies. Yet, the EU fosters such control not by subsuming 
national democracies within a supranational democratic system, as many 
Europhiles assume – thereby giving rise to worries about both an EU and 
a domestic democratic deficit – but by offering a framework within which 
national democracies can collectively regulate such global processes in 
fair ways that show the relevant states and their peoples equal concern 
and respect. Outside such arrangements, states will inevitably be domi-
nated by other states as well as by agents and agencies operating trans- 
or multinationally, such as financial institutions, companies and terrorist 
groups (Pettit 2010). None of these can be successfully controlled by any 
single state operating unilaterally. That has proved impossible even for 
the USA at the height of its hegemonic sway, even with the benefit of 
massive military might, a large domestic market and considerable nat-
u ral resources. It certainly lies outside the capacity of a medium- sized 
economic and military power such as the UK, which is heavily dependent 
on international trade.
The basic problem can be formulated in terms of what Dani 
Rodrik has called ‘the fundamental political trilemma of the world econ-
omy’ (Rodrik 2011, xviii), namely, the impossibility of simultaneously 
achieving democracy, national self- determination and economic glo-
balisation  – one of these has to give (Rodrik 2011, xix, 200– 205). As 
he explains, ‘If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have to 
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choose between the nation- state and international economic integration. 
And if we want to keep the nation- state and self- determination, we have 
to choose between deepening democracy and deepening globalization’ 
(Rodrik 2011, xix, 200).
Given most (if not all) people regard national autarky as a non- 
starter, and unregulated free global markets unjust as well as likely to 
be inefficient and prone to failures, most subsequently conclude the only 
answer is to give up national self- determination and subsume national 
democracy and citizenship within some broader scheme for global 
democracy. Many federally minded Europeans adopt this line of think-
ing, regarding the development of supranational democracy at the EU 
level as the first stage in such a process (Habermas 2015). However, 
the concern with the EU’s democratic deficit enters at this point, with 
Europhiles joining in an unholy alliance with Eurosceptics to argue that, 
in many core areas, decisional authority has passed upwards to Brussels 
without adequate democratic oversight. By and large, proposals for 
addressing this alleged deficit have turned on the practicality and justi-
fiability of enhancing the powers of the European Parliament (EP) and 
electing the Commission, be it directly or indirectly, and invariably get 
linked to arguments for further political integration. Unsurprisingly, the 
main counter- arguments have mirrored this reasoning. They come from 
those opposing the justifiability of the integration process on democratic 
grounds. These critics regard the shift of political authority from national 
to European political structures as at best diluting the democratic influ-
ence of each individual voter, and at worst indefensibly undermining the 
self- determination of sovereign peoples. Such arguments suggest that 
the EU could never be democratically legitimate – indeed, that further 
empowering the EP or electing the Commission might deepen rather 
than lessen the democratic deficit.
These concerns are further buttressed by the fact that the EU has 
the promotion of economic globalisation largely hardwired into its con-
stitutional structure (Isiksel 2016). Initially at least, the integration pro-
cess was also deliberately pursued in non- democratic ways, in part to 
avoid potential resistance from the different demoi of the Member States 
(Müller 2011, 128, 142). Meanwhile, the rights that came to be associ-
ated with Union citizenship were largely tied to mobility and the exercise 
of the economic opportunities provided by the single market. As a result, 
they were largely exercised by less than 5 per cent of the EU population. 
Of course, the exception is the right to vote for the EP, but the exercise of 
this right has steadily fallen since its inception and has stood at below 50 
per cent for decades, reaching a new low of 42.61 per cent in the 2014 
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election. It has been a far weaker venue for the exercise of citizen pref-
erences than that offered by EU law to economic enterprises and social 
groups seeking to challenge laws and regulations that have been negoti-
ated at the national level (Isiksel 2016, 143). The transfer of allegiance 
to the EU has been correspondingly shallow. So long as it was associated 
with the post- war period of peace and prosperity, it has enjoyed 
‘output’ legitimacy and sustained a broad degree of ‘banal’ identification 
for the security and economic benefits with which it has been credited 
(McNamara 2015). But that has been sorely tested by the euro crisis and 
the more recent association of the EU in many countries with widespread 
austerity policies and the reduction of public spending, especially on 
social welfare. As Brexit indicated, those opposing the EU, who account 
for as much as a third of the electorate or more in many countries across 
the EU, are typically far more vocal and passionate than its supporters 
tend to be. Again, many pro- Europeans have seen the obvious response 
as being the adoption by the EU of more socially integrative policies – 
such as an EU- wide basic income (Van Parijs 2015) – that might support 
a transfer of democratic political authority to the EU level. Yet, such a 
move begs the question of whether EU citizens desire greater social inte-
gration in the first place. To many, such a move would be yet another 
top- down imposition, with a very real risk of further undermining the 
incomplete but nevertheless far superior social welfare systems existing 
at the national level, along with the democratic systems that facilitated 
their emergence (Streeck 2014).
How might we avoid this impasse? As Rodrik (2011) notes, an 
alternative response to the global ‘trilemma’ involves collaboration 
between democratic states to collectively regulate globalisation in 
‘smart’ ways, as he believed Keynes’s design of the Bretton Woods system 
achieved for the post- war period. From this perspective, the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU lies rather in it strengthening and legitimising the 
democratic systems of the Member States than offering an alternative 
to them. However, that cannot be achieved by treating the national self- 
determination of one state in isolation from that of other states – either 
morally or practically. The democratic decisions of almost all states 
affect, and are themselves affected by, the democratic decisions of other 
states, whether they are formally associated within a structure such as 
the EU or not. To the extent that democratically made decisions of one 
state undercut those of other states, or reduce the options available 
to them, while being in their turn partially determined by these other 
states, all states risk losing democratic legitimacy. Meanwhile, as I noted 
above, domestic democracy is further diminished by its inability to tackle 
BrExit  And BEyond226
  
problems that require cooperation between states, either because these 
problems are by their nature global in character – such as global warm-
ing – or because they involve transnational activities and processes among 
multinational organisations, be they financial movements, migration flows 
or terrorism. Therefore, a domestic democratic deficit exists from the very 
fact of democratic states being part of an interconnected world in which 
autarky no longer offers a plausible or desirable option (Bellamy 2013).
Meeting this challenge requires some regulation of the inter actions 
between states and a mechanism for fostering cooperation among them. 
To achieve that purpose while still retaining meaningful forms of self- 
determination for the peoples of these states, we need to reconceive the 
purpose of supranational bodies. Instead of being superior and inde-
pendent sources of democratic authority to their constituent states, we 
should see them as mechanisms that allow democratic communities to 
co- exist on mutually agreed and equitable terms. As such, these bodies 
have to remain subordinate to their constituent members as a delegated 
authority under their joint and equal control. The problem of democratic 
legitimacy thereby changes from being one of a democratic deficit at the 
supranational level to that of a democratic disconnect between the peo-
ples of the constituent states and the inter- and multi- national decisions 
their domestic representatives make in their name, including the creation 
and control of supranational regulatory bodies (Bellamy & Weale 2015).
This proposal constitutes a ‘demoi- cratic’ solution to the democratic 
legitimacy issue, whereby, in Kalypso Nicolaïdis’s phrase, the peoples of 
the EU ‘govern together but not as one’ (Nicolaïdis 2013, 351). On my 
account, they achieve this result through a form of ‘republican inter-
governmentalism’ (Bellamy 2013), whereby decisions must conform to 
the normative logic of what Robert Putnam termed a ‘two- level game’ 
(Putnam 1988; Savage & Weale 2009). According to this argument, gov-
ernments need both to agree amongst themselves on an equal basis at 
the international level, while at the same time securing the long- term 
democratic agreement of their citizens. As such, within their negotia-
tions they must respect each other as the democratically authorised and 
accountable representatives of their respective peoples (Pettit 2010). 
Procedurally, that means ministers in the Council should be responsive to 
their respective national parliaments. Likewise, parties in the EP should 
be linked more strongly to their national parties, with national parlia-
ments gaining a more direct and collaborative role in EU policy making, 
not simply through being the guardians of proportionality and subsidi-
arity, via the so- called ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ cards, but also by being able 
to propose EU policies via a potential ‘green’ card (Kröger & Bellamy 
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2016). Substantively, it allows for a more differentiated system of inte-
gration – one in which, on democratic grounds, states may collaborate 
more or less than other states, depending on the greater or lesser stake 
they have in pursing collective policies at the EU level; opt out when 
collective policies infringe domestic constitutional and cultural norms; 
and insist common rules treat them as equals by taking into account rel-
evant differences (Bellamy and Kröger 2017). Of course, all states have 
a moral obligation to participate in those collective policies necessary to 
secure such basic rights as are to be found in conventions such as the 
ECHR (Christiano 2016). Similarly, they have to guard against such clear 
collective harms as global environmental catastrophe and to assist what 
John Rawls called ‘burdened societies’ (Rawls 1999, 90, 106) – that is, 
societies so burdened by extreme poverty, a lack of natural resources and 
low human capital that basic rights cannot be secured and they lack the 
means to order themselves effectively in a democratic manner. Yet, the 
vast majority of the EU’s competences operate beyond the morally obliga-
tory. Here, it is appropriate to seek to protect the variety of capitalisms 
and related welfare systems of the Member States (Hall & Soskice 2001), 
while allowing cooperation to ensure greater efficiency and equity in 
their interrelations.
To a large degree, the EU already operates in this way (Bellamy 
2013). After all, the EU prides itself on seeking to achieve ‘Unity in 
Diversity’. Indeed, it derives much of its legitimacy from this fact, ren-
dering many of the criticisms of its democratic deficit simply misplaced 
(Moravscik 2008). The intergovernmental processes of the EU and 
the forms of differentiated integration it produces can and should be 
regarded not as pragmatic compromises but as matters of principle, 
whereby the EU seeks to achieve equality of concern and respect among 
the peoples of Europe (Bellamy & Kröger 2017). Moreover, the free 
movement of persons among these peoples further legitimises the Union 
by ensuring no individual is dominated by such a system through having 
been born in one state rather than another (Bellamy 2015 and forth-
coming, Chapter 5). It gives all citizens an equal opportunity to choose 
where to live and work without discrimination on the basis of nation-
ality, while at the same time preserving the possibility for the different 
states of Europe to pursue and experiment with different social and eco-
nomic arrangements. These opportunities and protections are denied to 
UK citizens through exiting the EU.
Against the Eurosceptic proponents of Brexit, I have argued that 
we can only exercise control through bodies such as the EU; against 
some Europhile proponents of political union, I have suggested that we 
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achieve control through collaboration among European democracies, 
not by creating an EU- level democracy. Both these alternatives involve 
losing control. By leaving the EU, the British government and those who 
voted for this proposal have committed a moral and political wrong 
against themselves and others. They have placed themselves in a situ-
ation where they will inevitably be controlled and dominated by other 
states and organisations and can only respond by seeking, largely vainly, 
to control and dominate them in turn. The Leave campaign’s favoured 
slogan had been ‘go global’ (Cummings 2017a). That represents a more 
accurate description of what they have achieved, contrary to the beliefs 
of many who supported them. In terms of Rodrik’s trilemma, they have 
delivered a formal facade of national sovereignty, symbolised by cer-
tain immigration controls against the poor and powerless that disregard 
their moral obligations to assist those in dire need, combined with a 
total openness to global economic processes over which they will have 
little or no democratic control.
  
VIII: The idea of Europe 
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The heart of the matter
Emotional politics in the new Europe
Uta Staiger
We do not have too much intellect and too little soul, but too little intel-
lect in matters of the soul.
(Robert Musil, Helpless Europe, 1922)
In most theories of contemporary democratic politics, reason looms 
large. For some, individual citizens determine their preferences by evalu-
ating the probabilities, costs and benefits of available options, leading to 
choices which in their aggregation determine political decision- making. 
For others, individual citizens partake in fair and equitable discussions, 
carefully considering competing claims and viewpoints, in order to 
then agree upon the best course of action for the public good. Whether 
describing the decision itself, or the process that leads to it, reason is 
considered central to the very endeavour of politics. Indeed, the suprem-
acy of reason has often been put down as a key stage in our progression 
toward human perfectibility: intellect is what allows us to rise above the 
animal nature in us; what grants us the maturity of thinking for – and by 
extension, fairly ruling – ourselves.
This tradition has left us with a two- fold dilemma. Not only do these 
analytical models disregard a fundamental element of human experi-
ence: emotions. They also hardly correspond to the political realities in 
Europe as we confront them today. Brexit may be the example par excel-
lence  – from the no- punches- pulled campaigning days to the acrimony 
fracturing the Cabinet, the hostilities traded on social media, or the deeply 
held convictions determining negotiations on either side – emotions have 
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loomed large in every aspect of Brexit so far. And political emotionality is 
in evidence across Europe. This may be in formal electoral politics, such as 
with the populist surges in post- referendum French, Austrian, Dutch and 
German elections. Or it may be beyond, as with the anti- austerity move-
ment of the young Spanish indignados (‘the indignant ones’) in 2011, 
their older, conservative German counterpart, the Wutbürger (‘the angry 
citizen’, Germany’s Neologism of the Year 2010), or the interlocutors of 
Stéphane Hessel’s 2010 bestseller Indignez- vous! (English title: Time for 
Outrage!). Politics these days seems anything but a process of measured 
preference formation.
To dismiss the role of the emotions in politics is thus to miscon-
strue the problem of contemporary politics twice over. This is not to 
hail them as an unalloyed good:  unchecked emotions, certainly in 
some circumstances, can clearly be detrimental to politics. But in order 
to begin addressing the ramifications, we need a better understand-
ing of how they are at work politically. For this, we can draw on a rich 
history of political thought, as well as an emerging set of research in 
political psychology, behaviour and theory. This brief chapter reflects 
upon three key roles played by emotions in European politics today: in 
decision- making, in mobilisation, and in political representation.
Emotions and decision- making
The epistemological and cognitive relevance of emotions, to begin with, 
is widely contested. Involving bodily sensations, perceptions, beliefs and 
desires, they may indeed be judgements, as the Stoics certainly held, about 
ourselves and our world – or at the very least contribute to them. But they 
are also considered fallible and unreliable, delivering potentially skewed 
assessments of reality. For Kant, the problem goes further, since it is a 
moral one. He makes an important distinction between the momentary 
flaring up of Affekt, an ‘intoxicant’ which impedes reflection but which 
‘can be slept off’, and the slow- burning passion of Leidenschaft: an ‘insan-
ity which broods over an idea that is embedding itself deeper and deeper’ 
(Kant 1789 [1996], 156– 7). Both of these, Kant argued, corrupt reason, 
since they hamper our individual capacity to decide whether acts are 
right or wrong. Consequently, we tend to agree that in order to make fair 
judgements for the common good we need put aside our sentiments and 
ties – or at the very least, hide them behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls 
1971). In order to quarantine bias and ensure decision- making remains 
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‘unsullied by irrationality’ (Dworkin 2002, 365), it seemingly stands to 
reason that emotions need to be excised from democratic deliberation.
And yet, the empirical and normative supremacy of reason in delib-
eration has more recently been cast in doubt. Neuroscientists and polit-
ical scientists alike now suggest that our ability to decide on a course 
of action is significantly impaired if we are unable to tap into our emo-
tional resources (e.g. Damasio 1994; Marcus 2002). Practical reasoning, 
they posit, necessarily involves feelings. Normatively, too, emotions are 
increasingly held to have a distinct relationship to thought – whether as 
cognitive value judgements involving beliefs and desires, or as a sui gen-
eris form of rationality (e.g. Nussbaum 2001; de Sousa 1987). Emotions 
certainly provide us with additional elements on which we draw as we 
think and deliberate. They may work as intensifiers, drawing our atten-
tion to particular concepts and objects, or they may influence how we 
rank and prioritise them (Freeden 2013). In other words, emotions pro-
vide us with a sense of what matters, what is of concern to us as individu-
als. We ascribe value to one thing over another because we care more 
deeply about it.
Whether we like it or not, then, emotions seemingly have a place 
in individual decision- making. But how exactly? Recent, if pre- Brexit, 
research on national referendums and EU treaty changes offers some 
insights. Singling out two main emotions – anger and anxiety – Garry 
(2013) found that angry citizens were more likely driven by ‘second- 
order’ factors related to domestic politics and deep- seated political 
convictions, rather than by reflection on the precise proposition at 
stake. They were also more likely to support the ‘risky’ option. Anxious 
voters, by contrast, were more likely to seek out information, weigh up 
arguments and focus on the substantive issues at stake. They tended to 
be risk- averse, and opt for the status quo. This may be because anger 
and enthusiasm tend to be driven by long- standing convictions, politi-
cal choices and life experiences which, ‘even if wrongly attributed and 
misidentified, will recruit powerful habits’ (Marcus 2002, 132). They 
emerge when we believe ourselves to have identified the cause of a 
threat and commit to redress it, stymying any further opportunities to 
gather and reflect on new information (Valentino et al. 2008). Anxiety 
and fear, by contrast, often disable customary behaviour (Marcus 2002). 
By making us less reliant on what we previously assumed, anxiety 
increases our tendency to look for new information, consider alterna-
tives, reflect and learn. Kant’s key distinction between a surge of Affekt 
temporarily clouding reflection and Leidenschaft’s deep- seated hold 
over a person springs to mind. It is strongly held and well- entrenched 
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points of view that are particularly likely to shape moral or political 
judgement.
Making up one’s mind about a key political issue is thus not an 
intellectual exercise only, but one determined to a significant extent by 
the way we feel about the implications and repercussions of the issue in 
question. And yet there are limits to this insight. By concentrating on the 
neuropsychological dimensions of decision- making, such research neces-
sarily obviates both historical and contextual elements that might colour 
and generate emotions, as well as the collective, societal dimensions of 
decision- making. The key question – normatively and empirically – is how 
we ensure that deliberation reflects the concerns of all affected. David 
Hume (1741 [1987]) suggested that it is the common concerns – the things 
that matter to us as a society – that are the source of the standards, rules, 
principles and norms by which we live. And we arrive at these concerns 
(and by extension, the relevant norms) through what Hume called moral 
sentiments: reflective feelings which take in, communicate with and con-
sider the viewpoints of others. There are thus at least two further aspects 
to consider if we are to take the role of emotions in politics seriously: first, 
how arguments are framed around common concerns in order to deter-
mine and generate public political action, and second, how the concerns 
of affected parties can, and should, be reflected in decision- making. I will 
consider both of these in turn.
Emotions, motivation and mobilisation
What is it that motivates us to take action, politically or otherwise? As the 
likes of Hume and Montesquieu have argued, reason by itself can neither 
prevent nor produce any action. While passions should not exclusively 
guide our actions, both considered them to be their primary source. This 
is of course not unparalleled. Take Aristotle who, regarding reason as 
supreme, also acknowledged that ‘thought itself moves nothing’ (NE V2 
1139a, 32– 3): it is one’s desire to apply thought that produces action.1 Or 
take Rousseau, who saluted those who ‘do by inclination and passionate 
choice the things that men motivated by duty or interest never do quite 
well enough’ (Rousseau 1782 [1985], 12). Or, for that matter, Emerson, 
who posited that ‘nothing great was ever achieved without enthusiasm’ – 
but nothing terrible either, as Michael Walzer drily noted (Walzer 2004, 
118). Indeed, the lessons of history seem clear:  the dangers of calling 
upon shared emotions as the basis of political action pervade, or should 
pervade, our very understanding of modern politics (Arendt 1951). Yet 
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the appeal to a collective sense of emotion is precisely what drives the 
current politics of resentment.
We thus recognise with certain trepidation how Garry’s sugges-
tion – that actors who are confident that reasonable voters would agree 
with them may be incentivised to use campaigning devices that raise as 
much anxiety as possible in the minds of voters (2013, 25) – backfired in 
the 2016 referendum. Arguably, such a strategy could not compete with 
strongly held convictions, misidentified or not, which had created new 
communities of voters across the party- political spectrum. Whereas the 
Leave side banked on a rousing ‘appeal to the gut, and the heart’ (Hewitt 
2016)  in order to mobilise voters, the Remain campaign, oft- derided 
as ‘Project Fear’, never quite managed to convincingly commend the 
Union of which they advocated membership. UKIP leader Nigel Farage 
actively bolstered this view: ‘People who’ve made up their minds on our 
side of the argument, it’s almost like a conversion. Once you’ve decided, 
you believe it strongly … and you’re more likely to go out and vote’, he 
argued in an interview. By contrast, Remainers ‘might not be bothered 
to go down to the polling station and vote, because there’s no passion’ 
(Aitkenhead 2016). Analyses of voter turnout largely corroborate this 
account, showing higher turnout in the age group with the highest per-
centage of Leave voters. Indeed, Vasilopoulou (Vasilopoulou & Wagner 
2017) has suggested that the adoption of positive strategies – the explicit 
recourse to enthusiasm for the European project – might have benefited 
the Remain campaign in both voter intention and voter turnout.
Normatively, however, this presents us with a conundrum. Can we 
really agree that outrage ‘is more damaging than fear if we hope to foster 
an informed citizenry’ (Valentino et al. 2008)? After all, the history of 
political thought and practice should make us rather wary of how politi-
cal leaders use the public’s fears – in both their affective and cognitive 
dimensions  – in order to focus, (mis)construe and mobilise our judge-
ments. Playing upon our own preconceptions, they all too often aim to pro-
vide explanations of the supposed causes of fear in order to elicit ‘proper’ 
responses to them (Robin 2004). By contrast, outrage and enthusiasm 
should not be all that easily dismissed. It may be true, in Hume’s words, 
that the ‘presumptuous boldness of character’ of the enthusiast ‘natu-
rally begets the most extreme resolutions [and] produces the most cruel 
disorders in human society’. But enthusiasm is equally a ‘friend’ to civil 
liberty and ‘naturally accompanied with a spirit of liberty’ (Hume 1741 
[1987], 77). Where would our civil rights be, had it not be for an infec-
tious enthusiasm for change, a profound outrage against injustice? What 
else truly drives dissent – and the courage to speak up? This is the ‘double 
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truth’, the ‘inherent risk of politics as a purposeful activity’, as Walzer put 
it (2004, 118). Like reason, emotions can be put to just, or to severely 
unjust, ends.
What is interesting in the case of recent political campaigns seek-
ing a decisive break with the status quo is their ingenious use of mobili-
sation’s heart and soul: credibility. It is not those who are most sincere 
who accumulate political capital, but those who perform sincerity 
most credibly. Suffice it to say that the leaders of traditional parties 
and career politicians, rightly or wrongly, tend not to be among them. 
But furthermore, by rounding on the credibility not only of ‘the estab-
lishment’ but that of ‘the expert’ (the ‘voice of reason’ par excellence), 
some of the referendum and electoral campaigns – Vote Leave prime 
among them – very effectively disarmed their counterparts’ focus on 
anxiety by cutting out the very agents (politicians, civil servants, aca-
demics, industry representatives) on which they relied. Endlessly rep-
licated by broadcasters and broadsheets, and spun ever further in the 
echo chambers of social media, personal conviction trumped analysis. 
In the Brexit referendum, what was meant to elicit anxiety was delegit-
imised, constructed as an attempt to belittle Britain – its identity, his-
tory and potential – and consequently turned into defiant pride. It is a 
feature that seems to empower a new radical critique on the fringes of 
the political spectrum: anger that is turned against deliberative prac-
tices and those who command them – and turned against the system of 
representative democracy as such.
Emotions and political representation
Speaking on BBC1’s Question Time on 15 June 2016, one audience mem-
ber summed up the discontent brooding among the electorate:  ‘I want 
my country back’, he warned, ‘we’re all just so frustrated’. Condensed 
into the slogan ‘Take back control’, the advocates for a Leave vote skil-
fully channelled discontent with British political institutions tout court – 
institutions which are meant to structure our participation in the first 
place. In the UK, this played on the acute sense of disenfranchisement 
in a system where class divides are deep and regional disparities abun-
dant, and whose first- past- the- post system effectively disregards all votes 
not cast for a constituency’s winning candidate. The delegitimisation of 
established institutions is, however, a more general phenomenon. Take, 
for instance, the 2017 French presidential and German Federal elections, 
in which visceral campaigns from the far right – the Front National and 
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Alternative für Deutschland, respectively – successfully appealed to those 
disenchanted with ‘mainstream’ parties who had dominated government 
for decades, generating unprecedented levels of support.
Is it too far- fetched to link the resurgence of passionate convictions 
demonstrated by the success of these movements at least partially to the 
very suppression of passion in politics? In his counterintuitive reading of 
the eighteenth century, Alfred Hirschmann (1977 [2013]) influentially 
argued that many of the Enlightenment’s philosophers encouraged the 
private pursuit of economic gain (by the commercial classes) precisely 
in order to curtail potentially disastrous passions (of the aristocratic 
elite), which all too often led to strife and war. His account suggests not 
only that personal interests can make for more rationally inflected polit-
ical behaviour, but also has clear institutional implications. As Walzer 
(2004) noted, it is precisely through channelling interest that liberal-
ism has adjusted itself to the passions. Seeking to exclude visceral con-
flict and affiliation, we understand our political institutions above all as 
facilitators and arbiters of private interests and competing conceptions 
of the good.
But of course, it is precisely the association between private inter-
ests and government that has raised the heat of the debate. Rather than 
a repository of rationality seeking to fairly administer the interests of 
citizens, state institutions have come under suspicion for collusion with 
powerful interests. As a triumphant Farage saw it in August 2016, Brexit 
was the victory of ‘the little people’:  ‘if the ordinary decent people are 
prepared to stand up and fight for what they believe in, we can overcome 
the big banks, we can overcome the multinationals’, he argued (Jopson & 
Sevastopulo 2016). Liberal democracies may strive for adequate proce-
dures, which ensure that citizens’ concerns end up legitimately under-
girding state action, including constitutional principles, fair procedures 
and norms of accountability, access or publicity. These, however, are 
constrained by other factors – in particular, socioeconomic inequalities – 
which prevent some groups from fully participating in political pro-
cesses:  from having their interests weighed, from shaping common 
 concerns (Krause, 2008).
In this context, plebiscites have come to replace elections as the 
democratic mechanism of choice in the minds of many. Reducing the 
complexity of a wide- reaching question to a simple binary choice, in 
which every vote counts, a referendum presents itself as a purer, more 
legitimate form of democracy. By so doing, it fuels distrust in the very idea 
of representative parliamentary democracy  – to which, paradoxically, 
British voters wanted to return ‘control’. The problem here is one of trust, 
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as central to good government as it is to social relationships. Ever since in 
the mid- seventeenth century John Locke described the close relationship 
between (a restricted circle of) citizens and their representatives, parlia-
mentary democracy has been understood as a ‘government of trust’; Burke 
spoke of Parliament as trustees representing, virtually, the whole of British 
society in a ‘communion of interests’ (Frevert 2013). While there are formal 
procedures to withdraw this trust, among the more dismal consequences 
of the referendum has been the sustained attack on anyone – member of 
parliament, Cabinet minister or judge – who, in discharging their role as 
public servant, has been deemed to betray ‘the will of the people’.
Particular ire however has been reserved for the political and eco-
nomic powers that now reside outside national borders, in particular for 
the EU institutions. Where the Leave campaign called for domesticat-
ing control, Marine Le Pen called for a ‘revolution in proximity’. Indeed, 
the EU has consistently failed to bring the institutions ‘closer to the 
citizen’. Its processes of negotiation and compromise seem remote, the 
rights it extends are noticeable above all to those who move across bor-
ders, its attempts at cultivating favourable public emotions appear inau-
thentic. Yet feeling that we  – and our concerns  – are well represented 
politically is essential for democratic politics to work. The yearning for 
self- government may be misguided in a thoroughly interdependent 
world; viscerally felt as it is, it still represents a fundamental challenge to 
our way of doing things.
To support legitimate government and the principle of redistri-
bution, any society needs a minimum of ‘sympathy’ or ‘fellow- feeling’ 
between citizens, as Adam Smith readily recognised (Smith 1759 
[1976]). Allowing us to engage with others – a ‘habit of imagination’ – 
emotions play an intrinsic part in sustaining political communities by 
establishing relationships on terms other than those of difference. 
Usually, these sentiments are managed at the level of the nation, which 
is prioritised as a defining, positively valorised framework that inter-
prets the national community through both territorial boundaries and 
representative institutions. It is commonplace, if oversimplified, to con-
trast such ‘hot’ emotions of national identification with the ‘cool’, reflec-
tive ideal of transnational communities (Nash 2003). Just as we are 
unlikely to ‘fall in love with a Common Market’, as Jacques Delors once 
put it, there may be limits to our ability to invest affectively in a diverse 
community of 500 million. What current political movements teach us, 
if anything, is that too many feel the institutions do not represent them 
politically – that they lack the (ideal of) self- determination that charac-
terises the nation.
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The absence of a self- identifying demos has certainly troubled 
advocates of European integration. True, the recent crises of the EU, 
Brexit more than any other, have managed what decades of semi- 
permissive consensus have not: they have put the EU in the spotlight. 
Issue- based, rather than abstract, discussion has contributed to the 
mobilisation of interest groups and political parties alike across distinct 
national media spheres. People across the continent now ‘talk Europe’, 
if not always in an anticipated manner. Arguably, Eurosceptic move-
ments have been able to tap into a pan- European anti- EU sentiment 
more successfully than their Europhile contemporaries (Usherwood & 
Startin 2012). But at the heart of this mobilisation is a fundamental 
discontent and anxiousness that takes aim at how democracies operate 
nationally and cooperate supranationally in order to address global pro-
cesses and their repercussions. Misguided as the reasoning behind this 
anxiety might be, we need to address, rather than dismiss, its causes.
Conclusions
We live in interesting political times. In such times, the elusive ideal of 
rational deliberation untarnished by the messy, ungainly, and often perni-
cious influence of our passionate convictions holds great appeal. Yet bank-
ing on a form of reason that excludes all sentiment will offer an incomplete 
guide to Europe’s political future. If we describe deliberation infused by 
heightened emotions as fundamentally flawed, we are only likely to fan 
cynicism. It might prove more useful if we acknowledge the fundamental 
role of these deeply held convictions that spill over into anger and enthu-
siasm. In other political times, raising doubts about the validity of a risky, 
if viscerally felt, course of action might have sustained the status quo. But 
in these times, cost– benefit calculations are unlikely to keep the EU – and 
national governments – in citizens’ good books. Rather than playing to the 
gallery, public authorities need to invest in (re)gaining the trust of the elec-
torate. After all, much of the resentment is not only issue- based but fanned 
by the fundamental feeling of not being heard: the emotional politics in 
Europe today is, at base, a judgement on the nature of liberal representa-
tive democracy itself, and the political norms on which it has developed.
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Square peg, round hole
Why the EU can’t fix identity politics
Turkuler Isiksel1
The 1990s witnessed a heated debate among political theorists regard-
ing the extent to which social justice requires the fair distribution of 
resources versus the recognition of group differences (Barry 2001; 
Benhabib 2002; Fraser 1996; Kymlicka 1996; Levy 2000; Taylor 1994; 
Young 1990). While scholars advocating for a politics of recognition 
never underestimated the need for an equitable distribution of wealth, 
they pointed out that unjust social hierarchies do not always track socio-
economic ones. Symbolic, cultural and identitarian dimensions of social 
value can also produce patterns of exclusion. Reducing social justice to 
the politics of wealth redistribution, they argued, made liberal political 
philosophy insensitive to racial, gendered, cultural and able- ist dimen-
sions of privilege and privation.
Something of the dichotomy between redistribution and recogni-
tion is at play in the current debate over explaining support for popu-
list movements and leaders across the West and beyond. While some 
observers maintain populism draws its energy from long- term post- 
industrial economic malaise that has been neglected by mainstream par-
ties (Dreher 2016; Kitschelt 1995; Swank & Betz 2003), others point to 
anxiety over loss of cultural primacy on the part of formerly dominant 
groups (Betz 1994; Gibson 2002; Ignazi 2003; Inglehart & Norris 2016; 
Schain 1988). Still others regard these dynamics as inextricable: while 
contemporary populism typically (though not invariably) manifests itself 
as a form of identity politics (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013), it reflects a 
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misdirected backlash against insecurities perpetuated by the capitalist 
economic order. Still others take a wider lens, attributing the wave of 
populist success to a general erosion of public commitment to democratic 
values and procedures (Foa & Mounk 2016, 2017). The debate sparked 
by the British electorate’s narrow decision to leave the EU illustrates the 
cleavage between identitarian and socioeconomic explanations in par-
ticular: while some view the Brexit vote as a flashpoint for anti- immigrant 
sentiment and, more broadly, as a bid to restore national sovereignty, 
others describe it as a manifestation of socioeconomic insecurities that 
establishment parties have failed to address.
Populist movements have also gained ground in such formerly stead-
fast members of the Union as France, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria 
and Poland. Many, though not all, of these movements incorporate anti- EU 
messages into their platforms. What could and should the EU’s response 
be to the rising tide of populist politics? Are there steps the EU could take 
to allay the concerns that energise these movements? Or are such steps, 
particularly if they require giving greater powers to EU institutions, likely 
to add fuel to the fire? Clearly, the answer will depend on which accounts 
of populism’s rise we find most compelling. Nonetheless, it is worth con-
sidering whether the EU is equally well- equipped (or ill- equipped) to 
respond to identitarian grievances as it is to socioeconomic ones.
At its origins, the European integration project was a response to 
identity politics. Supranational institutions represented an attempt to dis-
arm and sublimate the national rivalries that had riven the continent. They 
were designed not only to order the relationships among member states on 
the basis of rules, to promote cooperation, reciprocity, and mutual trust, 
and generate a sense of shared interest, but also to reduce the appeal of 
nationalism for the masses by generating greater prosperity through coop-
eration. Economic interdependence would raise living standards, establish 
disincentives against autarky and jingoism and defuse the economic inse-
curity and privation that had fuelled extremist ideologies on the right and 
the left during the inter- war period. Writing in 1943 in Algiers as a member 
of the French Committee for National Liberation, Jean Monnet argued:2
There will be no peace in Europe if states rebuild themselves on 
the basis of national sovereignty, which brings with it the politics 
of prestige and economic protectionism. If the countries of Europe 
protect themselves against one another again, the constitution 
of vast armies will again be necessary … European states are too 
constrained [étroits] to guarantee their peoples the prosperity that 
modern conditions make possible and consequently necessary.
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According to Monnet, politics and trade are interlocked in a feedback 
loop that can be vicious or virtuous: when states are goaded by nation-
alist sentiments into a ‘politics of prestige’, they jettison the benefits of 
foreign trade for protectionist policies that leave their citizens worse 
off and which can escalate into armed conflict. By contrast, free 
economic exchange is capable of easing the conflictual dispositions 
of the nationalist frame of mind. Accordingly, a supranational scheme 
that eliminated protectionism and attenuated states’ ability to mobilise 
core industries of warfare would also mitigate the destructive poten-
tial of mass mobilisation (Müller 2011, 128). As Robert Schuman put 
it in his 9 May Declaration of 1950, integration would bring about 
a general ‘fusion of interests’ and ‘a wider and deeper community 
between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divi-
sions’ (Schuman 1950). Inspired by inter- war plans to place the Ruhr 
and Lorraine heavy industries under multinational control (Diebold 
1988), the initiative of a European Coal and Steel Community was 
symptomatic of this distrust of the nation state. The ECSC was hardly 
inspiring to ordinary citizens, but it was not meant to be. Monnet 
conceded that ‘increased coal and steel production is not the basis of 
our civilization’ (Monnet 1955). Rather, his incremental strategy of 
sovereign commitment was meant to marshal instrumentally rational 
calculations to keep nationalist passions in check. Furthermore, it 
supplied a workable framework of supranational governance whose 
legitimacy was based on technocratic competence. Although Monnet 
himself spurned the idea of market integration, the subsequently 
negotiated European Economic Community (EEC) repurposed the 
institutions he had designed. Most importantly, defining the imme-
diate scope of integration in technocratic terms enabled the EEC to 
circumnavigate the jealously guarded shoals of national sovereignty 
on which more ambitious federalist projects such as the European 
Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community 
(EPC) had foundered.
Accordingly, supranationalism was precisely an attempt to resolve 
the conflicts generated by early twentieth- century nationalism by using 
the lure of technocracy. The Monnet/ Schuman prescription was to wean 
European nations off the opioid of identity politics by offering technical 
and economic rewards. Meanwhile, Member States could jealously guard 
their sovereign prerogatives until the imperatives of the market led them 
seamlessly into a fully fledged political union. In sum, the European inte-
gration project represents a socioeconomic solution to the problem of 
identity politics.
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The reason Monnet’s gambit worked for as long as it did is because 
nobody in the two generations following World War II was in danger 
of forgetting that the economic project was ultimately about creating 
a peaceful and stable political order on a congested continent prone to 
radical political movements. The cost of his strategy, however, was to 
depoliticise supranational decision- making as far as possible. By sub-
stituting economic pay- offs for principled support for integration, it 
neglected the long- term need to generate sustained public engagement 
in the European project. Over time and with the expansion of suprana-
tional power, however, this strategy has become unsustainable. As supra-
national institutions have acquired greater decision- making authority 
from Member States, it is proving increasingly difficult to explain why 
those institutions must be so far attenuated from citizen control. Having 
been excluded from the decisions that drew them into an ever- closer 
union, European publics are contesting the arrogance of technocracy by 
supporting irreverent parties and movements. Meanwhile, because their 
legitimacy is predicated on little more than ‘you’re better off thanks to 
the EU’, supranational institutions experience every crisis of competence, 
every economic slump, as an existential crisis.
Ironically, the crises of competence that the EU has experienced 
over the past decade threaten to undo some of the hallmark achievements 
of decades of European integration, not least the relationships of soli-
darity and mutual trust among Member States. The crisis that ensnared 
EMU for the better part of a decade starting in 2009 perfectly illustrates 
this problem. For starters, EMU failed the test of competence insofar as 
it amplified the effects of the global financial and sovereign debt crisis 
rather than cushioning them, impeded recovery and growth rather than 
promoting the same, and brought high unemployment and widespread 
privation to many Member States rather than raising living standards. 
Second, the rigid constraints it imposed on domestic fiscal policies not 
only deprived national legislatures of key levers of social policy, but also 
further attenuated democratic control of policymaking at the domestic 
level. This, in turn, has exacerbated voter disenchantment with the polit-
ical process and fuelled support for anti- establishment parties.
Third and most important, the social and distributional conse-
quences of monetary union have tapped into subterranean veins of the 
nationalist animus, reanimating grievances dormant since Europe’s dark 
century of civil war. The euro crisis has opened up fault lines between cred-
itor and debtor states, the former insisting on fiscal prudence, and the lat-
ter struggling to meet their repayment and structural reform obligations 
while providing basic social assistance to their citizens. Disagreements 
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over culpability, crisis management, and institutional reform have frayed 
the social consensus required to keep the integration project going. In 
other words, the distributive conflict and sense of insecurity generated by 
the euro crisis has reactivated identitarian cleavages in Europe. If socio-
economic anxieties and identity politics are indeed mutually reinforcing, 
then the EU as it is currently configured exacerbates both.
Clearly, the EU has in significant respects failed to make good on 
its promise to mitigate the ravages of global casino capitalism, particu-
larly insofar as its institutional configuration favours price stability and 
fiscal conservatism, emphasises monetary policy over public spending, 
and resists attempts to re- embed the market in a matrix of social protec-
tion.3 The fiscal coordination that allows the EMU to function has steadily 
tightened, along with the disciplinary apparatus attached to it. Member 
states are required to coordinate their economic policy cycles and ensure 
the conformity of their economic priorities, budgetary choices and struc-
tural reforms with strict EU rules. The legislative and constitutional 
adjustments necessitated by the crisis have corralled Member States into 
a protracted austerity zone, forcing them to pare down public spending, 
and with it, the social protections they afford their citizens (Martinsen & 
Vollaard 2014; de la Porte & Natali 2014; OECD 2014). Rather than 
bolstering the capacity of Member States to protect their vulnerable 
domestic constituencies against the pressures of global economic inter-
dependence, the EU has worked to exacerbate these pressures.
Part of the reason for this is that the EU lacks the fiscal capacity 
necessary to provide compensatory or redistributive programmes of its 
own. Although the Preamble of the EEC Treaty expressed the desire of 
signatory states to promote the ‘improvement of the living and work-
ing conditions of their peoples’ and ‘ensure [the] harmonious develop-
ment [of their economies] by reducing the differences existing between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions’, 
it did not create the institutional structure required to further these 
commitments (Maas 2005).4 According to the post- war consensus on 
the ‘compromise of embedded liberalism’ (Giubboni 2006), multilat-
eral institutions promoting trade and financial liberalisation would be 
counterbalanced by strong domestic institutions guaranteeing social 
cohesion and compensating those disadvantaged by international eco-
nomic competition (Ruggie 1982, 379). In the classic formula coined by 
Robert Gilpin, embedded liberalism meant ‘Smith abroad’ and ‘Keynes 
at home’ (Gilpin 1987, 355). In the European Economic Community, 
Member States retain the prerogative of providing the social protections 
necessary to cushion the impact of greater market competition. In the 
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ensuing decades, integration in the social domain has been clipped by 
Member States’ insistence on preserving their prerogatives over national 
welfare provision (Leibfried 2015). With limited power to issue binding 
rules, and lacking any significant redistributive capacity, the EU’s role in 
this area has been limited to benchmarking objectives, articulating best 
practice, and comparatively assessing outcomes. As a consequence, ‘the 
course of European integration from the 1950s onward has created a 
fundamental asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies 
and those promoting social protection and equality’ (Scharpf 2002, 665). 
Although the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon enumerated the building of a ‘com-
petitive social market economy’5 among the EU’s aims, and listed just-
ice and solidarity among its founding values,6 it nevertheless preserved 
the domestic basis of welfare provision, thereby creating a ‘disjunc-
tion … between lofty Treaty proclamation[s] and lack of law- making 
instruments’ (Dawson & de Witte 2012). Similarly, while it introduced 
means for the EU to ‘encourage cooperation’ between Member States 
on social policy, it left it up to Member States to design, implement and 
fund it.7 Although the EU was subjected to a new general obligation to 
‘take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level 
of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight 
against social exclusion’, it was not given any new powers with which to 
carry out this mandate.8 Instead, it was merely enjoined from stepping 
on Member States’ toes as they walked a tightrope between the socio-
economic needs of their citizens, on the one hand, and the imperatives 
of market liberalisation, on the other. Since the 1990s, a growing chorus 
of scholars has expressed concern that the singular emphasis on market 
integration and competitiveness is eroding the domestic social protec-
tions and delicate corporatist bargains that define the European social 
model (Menéndez 2009; Offe 2000, 2015; Scharpf 1997; Somek 2008; 
Streeck 2000). In sum, Social Europe has unquestionably made far less 
headway than Market Europe.
For some, these circumstances doom the European project. The EU’s 
stark pro- market bias, the ever- tightening constraints around domestic 
public spending and social assistance, and the democratic attenuation of 
supranational decision- making have motivated some left- leaning observ-
ers to argue in favour of reverting to the national Eden of social democ-
racy (Davidson 2016; Johnson 2017; Streeck 2014). In his influential 
‘Left Case for Brexit’ published shortly before the June 2016 vote, British 
political philosopher Richard Tuck (2016) railed against the EU as ‘a 
constitutional order tailor- made for the interests of global capitalism 
and managerial politics’. Tuck contends that the EU ‘has consistently 
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undermined standard left policies such as state aid to industries and 
nationalization’. The only way to regenerate social democracy, in his 
view, is to reclaim domestic parliamentary sovereignty. To bolster his 
point, Tuck recalls that Marx admired the House of Commons as the 
only political institution capable of introducing socialism by democratic 
means, without revolutionary confrontation.
If there was one thing Marx understood well, however, it was 
that capitalism is a global force that cannot effectively be countered on 
domestic terrain alone. This insight is more compelling than ever today, 
when the lives of individuals everywhere are increasingly subject to polit-
ical, social and economic forces that elude the control of any one state. 
Although the world is carved up into nominally sovereign territorial 
units, the most formidable policy challenges are transnational. Global 
economic and financial shocks, forced population movements, trans-
national criminal networks, environmental degradation and climate 
change make national self- sufficiency an elusive aspiration. To be sure, 
transnational challenges do not come with obvious global (as opposed to 
local, national or regional) solutions. However, if we are to understand 
society as a ‘cooperative venture for mutual advantage’, then this venture 
no longer follows the contours of the sovereign, territorial state (Beitz 
1999).9 While it is not clear that supranational political units can easily 
re- enact the bonds of solidarity necessary for making social justice work 
(Miller 2000, 81– 96), it is increasingly difficult for a political community 
on the scale of the nation state to effectively address the challenges that 
affect its citizens. Particularly from the viewpoint of economic produc-
tion and consumption, the world already looks like a cosmopolis (Brooks 
2005). The EU’s promise today is that it is an institutional attempt, how-
ever modest, to catch up with that reality.
And the EU has been remarkably successful at resisting some of 
the deregulatory or disembedding pressures occasioned by global eco-
nomic interdependence, even if it hardly gets the credit it deserves in this 
regard. For instance, it upholds stringent public health and consumer 
protection standards over the vociferous objections of its trading part-
ners and against WTO rules. This means voters must either rethink their 
Euroscepticism or alter their preference for hormone- free beef. Similarly, 
many Member State citizens may find a new appreciation for the over-
bearing judges of the CJEU if they value the privacy of their personal data 
in the age of mass surveillance, Facebook and Google.10 On each of these 
matters, the size of its Single Market lends the EU leverage over its trading 
partners and multinational corporations far beyond what Member States 
acting singly could command. These modest achievements suggest that 
 
 
BrExit  And BEyond246
  
the only effective way for states to ‘take back control’ in the face of the 
vicissitudes of economic globalisation is to work within the framework 
of supranational and international institutions. Furthermore, it is only 
through such arrangements that the benefits and burdens of global eco-
nomic exchange can ultimately be shared in more equitable ways. While 
critics like Tuck and Streeck are correct to observe that the EU is far from 
being the optimal vehicle for a fairer socioeconomic order, it has a key 
advantage over better, more ambitious schemes: it exists. However dif-
ficult to achieve, redesigning or re- equipping an institutional framework 
that already exists is a likelier prospect than building one from scratch.
If we accept that identity politics can be defused by addressing 
economic and class- based insecurities, and that nation states are no 
longer capable of upholding generous social welfare provision given the 
vagaries of global casino capitalism, then the EU’s supranational policy- 
making framework might not only be a remedy; it might be the only avail-
able remedy. The EU not only has the institutional apparatus for making 
and enforcing supranational policy, it also has substantial fiscal resources 
that go towards agricultural subsidies, cohesion funds and emergency 
financial assistance. To be sure, it needs a generous expansion of its pow-
ers in the domain of social policy, but this calls only for a repurposing 
of its existing institutional capacity and material resources, away from 
market- oriented goals towards socially oriented policies.
In this regard, Brexit may clear one pesky logjam. In making the 
left case for Brexit, Tuck neglects to note that the UK has consistently 
obstructed the development of a more muscular EU social policy and 
redistributive capacity. Britain’s long- standing insistence on a free mar-
ket model of European cooperation is an essential and long- standing 
reason why European integration has proceeded along precisely the neo-
liberal track Tuck laments (Müller 2016a; Streeck 2016b).11 Insofar as 
there is a ‘left case for Brexit’, then, it is primarily that of removing the 
one hurdle among many that has kept the continental left from correct-
ing the EU’s free market bias.
Sadly, however, even if we accept that only a renewed emphasis on 
social welfare and fair redistribution could redeem the EU in the eyes 
of citizens, this does not mean that such changes will be popular or 
feasible. Hunger is not bread, as Jeremy Bentham quipped. In decades 
past, the project of redressing the EU’s pro- market bias with a stronger 
social agenda would have needed to await an alignment of left- wing 
governments among an influential group of Member States. Alas, such 
an alignment may be a long time coming, and not only because the EU 
is larger and more diverse. The most important reason why a Social 
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Europe remains more elusive than ever is the dwindling power of left 
parties in most Member States. In states like France, Germany, Britain 
and Denmark, populist movements have capitalised on working- class 
hostility to the EU and lured away some of the very constituencies that 
predictably buoyed the left- wing vote (Berman 2016; Rhodes 2013). As 
a result, the pendulum that used to swing between the left and right sides 
of the political spectrum now oscillates precariously between moderate 
and extreme right (Berman 2016, 73).
Moreover, insofar as the fiscal and sovereign debt crisis has streng-
thened Euroscepticism, understood as support for ‘parties and move-
ments actively calling for a reduction of EU competences, if not for a 
simple dismantlement of the institutions’ (Nicoli 2017, 315), it has 
undermined the likelihood of any such major reorientation. Laudable 
though they are, the objectives of redressing the EU’s lopsided reliance 
on market mechanisms and distributing the benefits and burdens of 
European integration more evenly require greater delegation of powers 
to the EU. Paradoxically, then, the very failures that warrant a leftward 
reorientation of the European project have made that reorientation less 
likely to succeed.
It ought to give us pause that the plan for refashioning the EU into 
a supranational social democracy is continuous with Monnet’s strategy 
in one key respect. Both seek to diminish the purchase of identity poli-
tics by improving material standards of living. By the same token, both 
are vulnerable to the same problems of technocracy and democratic 
attenuation. Shifting the EU’s priority from market regulation to social 
justice is politically difficult, but not unimaginable. But social justice is 
not the same thing as social democracy, and it is gratuitous to assume 
that, once created, a supranational welfare state would acquire the 
strong underpinnings of an engaged and invested citizenry. The optimis-
tic expectation of European federalists in the 1990s was that a genuine 
constitutional re- founding would catalyse a vibrant European demos and 
meaningful democratic opinion- and will- formation at the supranational 
level (Habermas 1998, 161). If the failure of the EU’s attempt to stage a 
constitutional moment showed anything, it was that democratic publics 
cannot be summoned by incantation. Similarly, the persistence of voter 
apathy towards European elections despite the amplified power of the 
European Parliament12 suggests that it is futile to adopt a Field of Dreams 
approach (‘if you build it, they will come’) to animate new representative 
institutions with democratic life.
Furthermore, it is far from clear that identity politics can be under-
stood as nothing more than misdirected socioeconomic anxiety. If the 
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appeal of populism is irreducible to a crisis of the relations of production, 
and instead stems from worry over cultural displacement, then nothing 
short of the recognition of identitarian demands can satiate its constitu-
encies. If the latter diagnosis is accurate, moreover, assuring greater eco-
nomic security and a fairer distribution of wealth will do little to boost 
the EU’s popularity. In fact, insofar as the EU fosters a conspicuous new 
cosmopolitan elite that speaks multiple languages and cashes in on for-
eign degrees, facilitates the movement of people and accelerates the 
intermingling of cultures, it exacerbates identitarian anxieties. The fact 
that the Brexit campaign successfully exploited the public conflation of 
intra- EU free movement and the admission of refugees originating in the 
Middle East and Africa to amplify its message illustrates this issue. The 
free movement of persons heightens the sense that European integration 
is a conspiracy to eliminate nation states and makes it less credible as an 
attempt to reinforce their efficacy and to patch up the ‘leaky vessel’ of 
national democracy (Bright & Geyer 2012; Milward 2000). Furthermore, 
if we take the demands expressed by today’s populist movements at face 
value, the EU’s cardinal sin is not that of standing in the way of social 
justice, but of eroding the cultural cohesion and solidarity of the national 
political unit. As political theorists cautioned in the 1990s, redistribution 
is not necessarily an appropriate response to the politics of recognition.
Take Estonia, a country of about 1.3m people that acceded to the 
EU in 2004. According to the 2011 Estonian census, 12.7 per cent of the 
Estonian population consists of first- generation immigrants, with an 
additional 12 per cent Estonian- born persons of at least partial immi-
grant background.13 Individuals of Russian origin constitute a major-
ity of these groups. By contrast, non- European migrants in Estonia add 
up to less than 2 per cent of the total population (Statistical Database 
of Estonia 2011).14 For instance, the total number of Estonian residents 
hailing from an African country of origin counted in the 2011 census 
was a paltry 414,15 while just 32 individuals were from Afghanistan or of 
Afghan heritage (Statistical Database of Estonia 2011).16 Estonia’s popu-
lation growth has been negative for a long time: emigration outstripped 
immigration for 14 of the past 16 years (Statistical Database of Estonia 
2011).17 Despite its relative ethnic and racial homogeneity and isolation 
from worldwide refugee flows, however, 70 per cent of responses from 
Estonia mentioned immigration as one of the two most important issues 
facing the EU in the Autumn 2016 Eurobarometer survey (Eurobarometer 
2016b). (The second most important issue, highlighted in 40 per cent of 
responses, was terrorism, despite the apparent lack of a significant ter-
rorist threat against Estonia.)
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Perhaps those surveyed were thinking of immigration as a chal-
lenge to the EU, rather than to their own country. After all, the 18 months 
preceding this survey had seen an EU- wide spike in asylum applications 
and bitter controversy among EU Member States over apportioning 
responsibility for processing them. While Estonians appeared dispro-
portionately disquieted by terrorism compared with the EU28 aver-
age, they were joined by citizens of Member States such as the Czech 
Republic, Latvia and Cyprus in recording a heightened concern with this 
issue (Eurobarometer 2016b, 7). By contrast, only 20 per cent and 17 
per cent respectively among the EU28 ranked ‘the economic situation’ 
and ‘member state finances’ as one of the top two issues facing the EU 
(Eurobarometer 2016b, 7). For their part, UK respondents were within 
a few percentage points of the EU28 average in terms of their priorities. 
When asked about the two most important challenges facing the EU, Brits 
ranked immigration first at 42 per cent, terrorism second at 26 per cent 
and economic situation third at 24 per cent (Eurobarometer 2016b, 7).18
Puzzlingly, however, when EU citizens were asked about the top 
two challenges facing their own country, economic concerns such as 
unemployment, housing, pensions and rising cost of living took centre 
stage (Eurobarometer 2016b, 11). Although immigration was the second 
most frequently mentioned item across all Member States at 26 per cent, 
the combined share of socioeconomic issues highlighted by respondents 
is 122 per cent.19  And when asked which two most important issues they 
personally faced, most respondents cited the cost of living, pensions 
and financial security (Eurobarometer 2016b, 13). Here, too, Brits were 
representative, ranking rising prices, health and social welfare, their 
country’s economic situation and pensions as the most important issues 
affecting their personal lives (Eurobarometer 2016b, 13).
These survey results suggest that when it comes to their own lives, 
a majority of EU citizens are most immediately worried about their living 
standards. As it happens, economic prosperity is also the EU’s top prior-
ity, given that its core competences relate to trade, competition, market 
regulation and price stability. Puzzlingly, however, citizens associate the 
EU with a markedly different set of challenges – immigration and terror-
ism – which raise anxieties about the intrusion of disruptive, alien ‘oth-
ers’ into their political communities. Apparently, Britons and Estonians 
and Cypriots and Czechs regard the EU less as a sphere of economic 
opportunity, personal mobility and geopolitical security, and more as an 
overcrowded boat floating precariously in terrorist- infested waters. It is 
no wonder, then, that significant constituencies in these countries want 
to distance themselves from a Union they associate with insecurity.
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Of course, how far these distorted optics are due to the EU’s own 
failures of competence and how far they should be attributed to wilful dis-
tortion by political actors for domestic political advantage remains a mat-
ter for debate. However, the EU itself is hardly in a position to mount an 
effective response to the misperceptions. The way that European integra-
tion has been packaged and sold over generations has encouraged popu-
lar estimation of its value solely in terms of euros and cents. Meanwhile, 
European societies are once more in the grip of the kind of identity poli-
tics that decades of carefully constructed economic relationships were 
supposed to obviate. If the EU is ill- equipped to meet this challenge, it is 
not so much because of its bias in favour of deregulation, as leftist critics 
contend, but because the only tools at its disposal for doing so are of an 
economic nature. For this reason, it is unclear whether an alternative, 
social democratic model of supranationalism would do much resolve the 
discontents of identity politics. In fact, since such a project would require 
vesting the EU with even greater power and fiscal capacity, it is likely to 
have the opposite effect, at least in the near term. Trying to defuse iden-
tity politics with redistributive politics at the supranational level could 
be like trying to fix an electrical failure with a monkey wrench. The likely 
outcome is electrocution, not illumination.
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Fair Brexit for a just Europe
Philippe Van Parijs1
When discussing what a fair Brexit would be, one could quibble about 
such issues as whether the UK should pay for the full cost of the relocation 
of the EU agency that was meant to settle in London, or whether it should 
keep paying for the pensions of EU employees who were in service while it 
was a member, in what proportion, and for how long. But one should also 
have more than one eye on the bigger picture. Perhaps the quickest way 
of accessing this bigger picture is by having a close look at an article pub-
lished in 1939 by Friedrich Hayek, one of the founding fathers of so- called 
neoliberalism, and by reflecting on the lessons Margaret Thatcher seems 
to have drawn from it, both while in power and afterwards. Against this 
background, it will be easier to focus on what matters most in the Brexit 
deal for the pursuit of social justice in Europe and beyond.
Hayek’s trap
In his article, ‘The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism’, Hayek 
explains why he finds a multinational federation, much later exemplified 
by the EU, a wonderful idea. Essentially, this is because it combines two 
features. Firstly, there is the disabling function of the common market, 
i.e. the economic constraints on state- level policy that stem from the free-
dom of cross- border movement:
‘If goods, men, and money can move freely over the interstate fron-
tiers, it becomes clearly impossible to affect the prices of the differ-
ent products through action by the individual state.
(Hayek 1939, 258)
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This disempowerment of national governments would not be limited to 
price fixing, moreover. As Hayek goes on to say:
As has been shown by experience in existing federations, even 
such legislation as the restriction of child labor or of working hours 
becomes difficult to carry out for the individual state. … Not only 
would the greater mobility between the states make it necessary to 
avoid all sorts of taxation which would drive capital or labor else-
where, but there would also be considerable difficulties with many 
kinds of indirect taxation.
(Hayek 1939, 260)
Alongside governments, all state- level economic organisations would be 
seriously weakened.
Once frontiers cease to be closed and free movement is secured, 
all these national organizations, whether trade- unions, cartels, or 
professional associations, will lose their monopolistic position and 
thus, qua national organizations, their power to control the supply 
of their services or products.
(Hayek 1939, 261)
Wonderful  – for Hayek! But, one might ask, won’t the diminished 
capacity to act at the national level simply be replaced by a new 
capacity to act at the newly created level of the federation? By no 
means – and this is the second feature that, combined with the first, 
accounts for Hayek’s enthusiasm. For there are two serious obstacles 
to the creation of such a capacity. Firstly, for Hayek, economic differ-
ences are likely to be far more pronounced in a large entity than in a 
small one:
Many forms of state interference, welcome in one stage of eco-
nomic progress, are regarded in another as a great impediment. 
Even such legislation as the limitation of working hours or com-
pulsory unemployment insurance, or the protection of amenities, 
will be viewed in a different light in poor and in rich regions and 
may in the former actually harm and rouse violent opposition 
from the kind of people who in the richer regions demand it and 
profit from it.
(Hayek 1939, 263)
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Secondly, and more seriously, a multinational federation lacks, accord-
ing to Hayek, the common identity and associated disposition to solidar-
ity that nation states can rely on.
In the national state current ideologies make it comparatively easy 
to persuade the rest of the community that it is in their interest to 
protect ‘their’ iron industry or ‘their’ wheat production or what-
ever it be. … The decisive consideration is that their sacrifice ben-
efits compatriots whose position is familiar to them. Will the same 
motives operate in favor of other members of the Union? Is it likely 
that the French peasant will be willing to pay more for his fertilizer 
to help the British chemical industry? Will … the clerk in the city of 
London be ready to pay more for his shoes or his bicycle to help … 
Belgian workmen?
(Hayek 1939, 262– 3)
There is no doubt, for Hayek, as to the answer. Admittedly, he notes 
that
[t] hese problems are, of course, not unfamiliar in national states as 
we know them. But they are made less difficult by the comparative 
homogeneity, the common convictions and ideals, and the whole 
common tradition of the people of a national state.
(Hayek 1939, 264)
In particular, decisions are less difficult to accept if the government tak-
ing them is regarded as consisting of compatriots rather than as consist-
ing mostly of foreigners.
Although, in the national state, the submission to the will of a 
majority will be facilitated by the myth of nationality, it must 
be clear that people will be reluctant to submit to any interfer-
ence in their daily affairs when the majority which directs the 
government is composed of people of different nationalities and 
different traditions. It is, after all, only common sense that the 
central government in a federation composed of many different 
people will have to be restricted in scope if it is to avoid meeting 
an increasing resistance on the part of the various groups which 
it includes.
(Hayek 1939, 264– 5)
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The outcome of the combination of these two features – economic con-
straints on state government and political constraints on union govern-
ment – should be clear enough.
There seems to be little possible doubt that the scope for the regula-
tion of economic life will be much narrower for the central govern-
ment of a federation than for national states. And since, as we have 
seen, the power of the states which comprise the federation will be 
yet more limited, much of the interference with economic life to 
which we have become accustomed will be altogether impractica-
ble under a federal organization.
(Hayek 1939, 265)
Consequently, the creation of such a multinational federation is an essen-
tial, and indeed wonderful, tool for the realisation of Hayek’s ‘liberal 
program’, which became known, much later, as ‘neoliberalism’. Bluntly 
put: ‘the creation of an effective international order of law [in the form 
of a multinational federation] is a necessary complement and the logical 
consummation of the [neo- ]liberal program’ (Hayek 1939, 269).
Thatcher’s plot
If there is one person who understood Hayek’s message perfectly, it was 
Margaret Thatcher. She campaigned for her country to confirm its mem-
bership of the European Economic Community in 1975. When in office 
between 1979 and 1990, she strongly supported both the further uni-
fication of the common market  – particularly through the 1986 Single 
European Act – and later its further expansion, made possible by the col-
lapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In accordance with Hayek’s argument, 
the increased mobility created by the deepening of the common market 
further disempowered Member States, while the increased heterogeneity 
created by the post- 1989 enlargements further undermined the potential 
for the federation to take over the regulatory and redistributive powers 
that Member States were increasingly unable to exercise. This is Hayek’s 
trap: Member States disabled by their immersion in the Single Market, 
combined with a Union disabled by its heterogeneity. This is the trap we 
are in more than ever thanks to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and to 
the relentless defence of the ‘four freedoms’ by the European Commission 
and the CJEU.
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How should we react? As lucidly explained by Hayek, if we exclude 
the possibility of resurrecting thick national borders, with the concomi-
tant economic losses and uncertainties this would trigger, there is only 
one real option: We must build a genuine European polity to encompass 
the European Single Market, instead of letting each national polity strug-
gle with constraints imposed by its immersion in this market and, beyond, 
in an increasingly globalised world market. In particular, we urgently 
need to build socioeconomic institutions that exercise at least part of the 
redistributive function on a higher scale. Such redistribution will foster 
the pursuit of justice both directly through Union- level transfers, which 
are better protected than national- level transfers against social and tax 
competition, and indirectly by protecting national- level redistribution 
against such competition and the ‘race to the bottom’ it induces.
I am leaving aside here the form this EU- wide redistribution 
could and should take (Van Parijs 2013, Van Parijs & Vanderborght 
2017, Chapter 8). What is clear, however, is that its political achiev-
ability and sustainability require a further empowerment of the Union, 
which should be entitled both to tax its citizens and to redistribute 
income across borders to a less negligible extent than it does currently. 
The EU does not need to mimic the American federal state, but it needs 
to do more of what the latter does if it does not want to let its European 
social model degenerate – stuck as it is in Hayek’s trap – into something 
far more pathetic than the American welfare state, so often the target 
of derision by European social democrats.
Such a move, urgently needed to get out of the trap, is of course 
exactly what Hayek’s disciple Margaret Thatcher would have hated to 
see happening. In Statecraft, her 2002 book, she formulates a fiery plea 
against those who want to erect something like the United States of 
Europe:
The parallel [with the United States] is both deeply flawed and 
deeply significant. It is flawed because the United States was based 
from its inception on a common language, culture and values  — 
Europe has none of these things. It is also flawed because the United 
States was forged in the eighteenth century and transformed into a 
truly federal system in the nineteenth century through events, above 
all through the necessities and outcomes of war. By contrast, ‘Europe’ 
is the result of plans. It is, in fact, a classic utopian project, a monu-
ment to the vanity of intellectuals, a programme whose inevitable 
destiny is failure: only the scale of the final damage done is in doubt.
(Thatcher 2002, 359)
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In the aftermath of German foreign minister (and former student 
activist) Joschka Fischer’s famous speech on the ultimate objective of 
European integration (Berlin, May 2000), she did not hesitate to get 
personal:
It is no surprise to me that the strongest proponents of Euro- 
federalism today often first cut their political teeth in the infantile 
utopianism, tinged with revolutionary violence, of the late 1960s 
and the 1970s.
(Thatcher 2002, 343)
As the realisation spreads that this is precisely what we need to get out 
of Hayek’s trap, as pressure mounts to move in this direction, Thatcher’s 
advice to Britain would be today to get out of the grip of this mon-
ster: after ‘I want my money back’, it is time for ‘We want our country 
back’. However, the ‘hard Brexit’ demanded by many Brexiteers would 
not live up to the neoliberal ambition. Rather, to remain in accordance 
with Hayek’s script, it is crucial that Britain should retain full access  – 
and remain fully subjected – to the European market, which the UK and 
Margaret Thatcher herself can pride themselves in having helped deepen 
and enlarge. Keeping full access to the Single Market, while escaping from 
any attempt to do at Union level what the Single Market prevents Member 
States from doing, is the wonderful combination which an appropriate 
‘soft Brexit’ would enable ‘global Britain’ to achieve. In this way, Britain, 
having regained its ‘sovereignty’ can quietly undermine, through tax and 
social competition, any serious attempt to pursue egalitarian justice in 
Europe, whether at national or Union level. In other words: ‘Let us Brexit, 
but “softly”, so as to keep our sabotage capacity intact.’ This is what could 
be called, without too much fantasy, Thatcher’s plot, the conspiracy 
aimed at saving Hayek’s neoliberal programme from the threat of the 
‘classical utopian project’ of a political, social and fiscal union.
Fair Brexit
Hayek himself, however, unwittingly advises us not to give up on this uto-
pian project. Ten years after he wrote the article quoted earlier, in the 
aftermath of World War II, Hayek was in despair about the turn of events 
throughout Europe and North America. With the New Deal, the expan-
sion of social security systems, nationalisation programmes and the 
spreading of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe from Estonia to Albania, 
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‘statism’ was gaining ground all over the world. In an article published 
in 1949 under the title ‘The intellectuals and socialism’, he urged his fel-
low liberals to erect precisely what Thatcher would have dismissed as 
‘a monument to the vanity of intellectuals’.
If we are to avoid such a development, we must be able to offer a 
new liberal program which appeals to the imagination. We must 
make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adven-
ture, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia, … a true 
liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the 
mighty (including the trade unions), which is not too severely prac-
tical and which does not confine itself to what appears today as 
politically possible. … The main lesson which the true liberal must 
learn from the success of the socialists is that it was their courage to 
be Utopian which gained them the support of the intellectuals and 
thereby an influence on public opinion which is daily making pos-
sible what only recently seemed utterly remote.
(Hayek 1949, 194)
Thus, articulating a coherent utopian vision is not an idle pastime. 
It is what enables us to make possible what is currently impossible. 
Had Hayek not thought this to be the case, his neoliberalism would 
not be dominating the world a half- century later. If we do not wish to 
remain forever saddled with neoliberalism, or to leave the field open 
for nationalist and jihadist dystopias, we need to learn from what he 
said he himself learned from postwar socialists. What Europe needs 
today is bold utopian thinking, not least regarding the EU.
But if the utopian projects we need are to have any chance of being 
realised, they will have to be protected against the pressures of globali-
sation, including  – throughout the tough Brexit negotiations  – against 
aggressive tax and social competition from a potential pirate state across 
the Channel. There can be no serious hope for a fairer distribution of 
income between capital and labour, between those with skills highly val-
ued by the market and the rest, without a sufficiently powerful supra-
national authority. For those of us in Europe, only the EU can give this 
hope any credibility. In the ultimate interest of the most vulnerable in 
the EU and in the UK alike, it is essential that the EU should refuse any 
deal that would give ‘global Britain’ the capacity to undermine any future 
European effort to better care for the losers of globalisation, of the Single 
Market and of the single currency. Access to the Single Market by out-
siders must be subjected to any condition the EU may wish to impose 
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on its Member States, especially as regards taxation and redistribution. 
Escaping the grip of Thatcher’s plot would be well worth even the forgo-
ing of all mutual benefits from trade.
Moreover, any reflection on the terms of a fair Brexit must pay due 
attention to the less material, but no less important, public goods on 
which the EU, by virtue of its sheer existence has produced and keeps 
reproducing, not least the taming of Germany’s supremacy and the stabi-
lisation of democracy in Southern and Eastern Europe. Like that of other 
members states with a GDP per capita above the EU average, much of the 
UK’s net contribution to the EU budget can be viewed as a contribution to 
these public goods. Leaving the EU will not prevent the UK from benefit-
ing from these public goods. Nor should it exempt it from contributing to 
their cost. How high this contribution should be, and what form it could 
take – including compensatory free riding, for example, on military pro-
tection – cannot possibly be determined in an uncontroversial fashion. 
But allowing any country that so wishes to free ride on the continuing 
investment made by the remaining Member States is doomed to shatter 
the whole enterprise, and in doing so to undermine the very existence of 
the public goods it produces.
A fair deal with the UK will not prevent it from playing an important 
role in Europe’s future. On the contrary. Along with existing countries 
inside or outside the EU, Britain can be part of a thriving and mutually 
beneficial broader European partnership. But the deal with the countries 
that choose to remain peripheral must not enable them to free ride on the 
public goods produced by the core, nor to block what the core needs to 
do to protect the region’s most vulnerable citizens, not least those among 
them who voted for Brexit.
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Rethinking the futures of Europe
Uta Staiger and Benjamin Martill
Understanding Brexit outside of Britain
It has been the principal claim of this volume that neither the causes nor 
the consequences of Brexit can be adequately understood solely within 
the confines of the British state. This is not to say that elements of the 
Brexit vote were not idiosyncratic, that specific actors, institutions and 
discourses in the UK were irrelevant to the outcome, or that Brexit will 
not have profound consequences for British politics and society, or for the 
British economy. It is, rather, to say that any such assessment is incom-
plete insofar as it fails to acknowledge the context of European history 
and politics within which Britain’s relations with the EU have been inex-
tricably intertwined. Brexit is thus reflective of  – and contributes to  – 
broader issues and disagreements within Europe and the EU, including 
the ‘democratic deficit’, the tension between national sovereignty and 
supranational governance, and the persistent legitimacy crisis afflicting 
the Union.
And, just as Brexit has been shaped by developments in European 
politics over the decades, so too is Brexit of great significance for the 
future of Europe. Brexit will have important consequences across a 
broad range of European institutional arrangements, including the pol-
icy process, the relations between the community institutions and the 
balance of power within them, the forms of governance employed, the 
legal architecture of Europe, and the norms underpinning the ideal of 
Europe and the legitimacy of the EU. Brexit also presages major changes 
to Europe’s foreign policy agenda – and governance – and to the Union’s 
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credibility and global clout, as well as to the crucial bilateral relation-
ships that form the core of the EU. It is towards an understanding of 
these effects that the contributors to this volume have lent their consid-
erable expertise and experience, asking as to the future of a Europe in 
which the UK is no longer a Member State of the EU.
Whilst the authors agree on the need to examine the effects of 
Brexit from a European perspective, they do not all see eye to eye on 
the principal challenges posed by Brexit, nor on the most appropriate 
conceptual lenses through which to understand the consequences of 
Brexit. How, then, to summarise the views of such a disparate group 
of scholars, representing a diversity of theoretical and disciplinary per-
spectives? We suggest here that the best way of drawing together the 
individual contributions in this volume is by focusing on the common-
alities of their endeavour; namely, bringing a plurality of theoretical 
tools to bear on the consequences of Brexit for a troubled Union. Whilst 
there is no consensus on the precise effects of Brexit (and how these 
should be understood) the contributors all agree on two things:  (1) 
that Brexit will have highly significant effects for the future of politics 
in Europe, and (2) that the critical juncture at which the continent finds 
itself requires careful, informed scholarly analysis of the options – and 
possible futures – of Europe and the EU.
By way of a conclusion, we draw several lessons from the contribu-
tions of this book, linked by their shared emphasis on the best means of 
understanding the futures of Europe after Brexit. We begin by defining 
Brexit as a ‘wicked problem’, before discussing how, when taken together, 
the contributions help us develop the tools to think through problems 
such as these. In doing so we make the case for an interdisciplinary 
approach to Brexit, for the value of theoretical and methodological eclec-
ticism, and for the acknowledgement of contingency and the ontological 
commitments this entails. We then assess the present ‘state of the Union’, 
noting the critical juncture at which the EU presently finds itself, as well 
as the importance of political debate and creative thinking for setting the 
continent on the right path in the decades ahead.
Brexit as a ‘wicked problem’
Originally defined in the 1970s’ social policy literature, ‘wicked prob-
lems’ are characterised by having innumerable, complex causes, yet 
no precedent:  each wicked problem is essentially unique. Difficult to 
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define and delimit, wicked problems have no right or wrong answer, 
only a good or bad one – and solutions are generally a ‘one- shot’ oper-
ation (Rittel & Webber 1973). And, as if this were not enough, there is 
not just technical difficulty, but social complexity, to deal with: wicked 
problems tend to include many different stakeholders with radically 
different views, values and priorities. For all intents and purposes, 
and according to the criteria outlined above, Brexit is a classic ‘wicked 
problem’.
Because of their complexity and the sui generis nature, ‘wicked 
problems’ do not lend themselves to comprehension using traditional 
problem- solving theories. In other words, Brexit, as with any problem 
of this kind, cannot be adequately understood or resolved from a single 
standpoint or disciplinary expertise. It needs addressing from a diver-
sity of angles and methodologies. The very orientation toward complex 
problems tends to trigger research that is not limited to discipline- specific 
epistemologies, but strays across boundaries. Indeed, it is when the rules 
and boundaries of individual disciplines are transcended, or coalesce, 
that knowledge production itself is changed (Barry et al. 2008). This vol-
ume, even where individual contributions may remain entirely bound by 
disciplinary traditions, aspires to a form of interdisciplinarity that high-
lights divergences in approach and meaning- making. As chapters trace 
broader, perennial arguments in the social and political science, in his-
tory, or the law, the volume does not seek synthesis, but to keep incom-
patibilities in play. Beyond academic dialogue, however, it also aims to 
show the extent to which extra- academic, societal factors come into play. 
Part and parcel of the ‘culture of accountability’ (Nowotny 2003), which 
marks much interdisciplinary research, the volume’s scope and format 
have been specifically designed to engage with wider public and policy 
audiences.
The worth of the academic toolbox to the study of Brexit 
lies, moreover, in its capacity to draw on a plurality of theoretical 
approaches. Theory, while context- specific, fosters abstract reflec-
tion. It allows us not only to elucidate specific policies, behaviours 
or outcomes, but to problematise these, and offer normative road-
maps. Crucially, theoretical approaches also help us uncover the 
assumptions upon which the various arguments already in the public 
domain are based:  after all, ‘the process of theorising is, to a very 
large extent, a mechanism for the generation and organisation of 
disagreement’ (Rosamond 2000). Harking back to core theoretical 
controversies over the ontology of European integration – the nature 
of the beast – theory helps to highlight the multiplicity of potential 
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scenarios available for the future(s) of Europe, and the methodolo-
gies by which these might be modelled. As such, theory also helps to 
contextualise Brexit both spatially and temporally, linking the pre-
sent day to debates over politics more generally, and to other classes 
of events and processes. It also couches Brexit more firmly in the 
existing social science literature, affording students and scholars 
analytical leverage over Brexit as a phenomenon worthy of, and ame-
nable to, academic study.
Moreover, the acknowledgement of contingency is core to the 
enterprise of understanding ‘wicked problems’. Reflecting that things 
could have ended up differently represents both an important ontological 
claim and an important lesson in moderation. Making space for contin-
gency in our analyses of Brexit requires attention to the three ‘semantic 
pillars’ of the concept (Schedler 2007). The first of these is the notion of 
indeterminacy – the real possibility that things could be, or could have 
been, otherwise. That the Brexit vote, and its consequences, could have 
turned out very differently must feature in our understanding of how 
the event will contribute to Europe’s future. We must acknowledge, in 
other words, that there was nothing inevitable about the occurrence, or 
the consequences, of the decision. A second facet of contingency is that 
social phenomena may be conditional upon prior events and causes in 
ways that have not been anticipated, or as a consequence of unexpected 
factors, interactions, or causal chains. Brexit is no exception to this rule, 
to which the attention afforded novel areas of political study – regard-
ing, for instance, social media and the ‘losers’ of globalisation – readily 
attests. And thirdly, it must be acknowledged that the consequences of 
contingent events cannot be predicted with certainty. The outcome, for 
Europe, of the Brexit vote will be in flux for some time, and will not be 
amenable to (easy) prediction.
All of these semantic parameters matter. After all, the future of 
Europe will depend, fundamentally, on contingencies in the years ahead. 
The actions of those representing Britain and the EU will matter more 
now than they will at other times, making careful scrutiny of policy- 
makers on both sides of the channel ever more necessary. Events, too, 
may come to affect the final outcome of negotiations in ways that are 
difficult to predict. National elections, terrorist attacks, economic shocks 
or geopolitical crises may all come to exert an independent effect on the 
outcome of the negotiations. Theory, therefore, can only take us so far. It 
can help us map out scenarios and tease out underlying assumptions, but 
it will need constant refinement and careful attention to events as they 
unfold. Studying Brexit is like tracking a moving target.
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The future of Europe
If the contributors to this volume agree on one, simple ‘fact’, it is that the 
EU is certainly in trouble. Indeed, the Union has been ailing for some 
time under the pressure of a multidimensional crisis which ‘cuts to the 
core of EU itself’ (Dinan et al. 2017). Be it the migration and refugee 
crisis, the structural problems afflicting the eurozone, long- standing 
concerns about governance and institutions, the rise of illiberalism in 
the East, or the rift between Germany’s economic vision and Greece’s 
economic needs – the credibility and legitimacy of EU institutions have 
taken a severe hit. Geopolitically, moreover, the EU finds itself in a dif-
ficult situation; threatened by a resurgent Russia on its Eastern borders 
and in its ‘neighbourhood’, spurned by Trump’s isolationist posturing 
vis- à- vis the transatlantic relationship, and lacking the coherence of 
alternative rising power centres – like China – in the emerging multipo-
lar order (Anheier & Falkner 2017; Cox 2017). The vote for the UK to 
leave the Union contributes a further item to this litany of problems. As 
Brexit takes centre stage, these structural crises may be pushed to the 
margins of public perception, but their challenge will continue to need 
addressing.
To conclude on something of a positive note, nothing enlivens con-
versation quite like a crisis, and the moment of salience experienced by 
the question of Europe’s future must not be wasted. The Brexit vote has 
spurred conversation across the continent about the purpose of the EU 
and the appropriate place of Britain in Europe. The referendum has placed 
core issues of European integration at the heart of domestic debates in 
the UK and in other Member States across the Union (not to mention 
in Brussels). Choice is back on the table. Proposals from the European 
Commission have varied from ‘doing less more efficiently’ to ‘doing much 
more together’, among other options (although it is evident which of 
these the Commission would prefer) (European Commission 2017b). 
Important questions, moreover, are being asked about what it means to 
be democratic in an age of globalisation, how economies should be struc-
tured so they work efficiently for all, how the future relationship between 
Britain and Europe should be construed, how we define ourselves as citi-
zens of Europe and of our own countries, and how Europe can articulate 
its values within the changing global environment. This re- politicisation 
of the European project, and the opening up of public debate on the ques-
tion of Europe’s future, represent positive developments for European 
politics, wherever one lies on key ideological fault lines.
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The outcome of the Brexit negotiations may not (indeed, prob-
ably cannot) please everyone, but British and European democracy will 
be healthier, ceteris paribus, if the citizens of Europe engage in greater 
levels of political deliberation and understanding. Brexit, in this sense, 
has acted as a wake- up call to decision- makers and the public to face the 
reality of Europe’s problems and to undertake serious action to iden-
tify solutions, given the enormity of the stakes. There is no reason to 
think, moreover, that the UK cannot be a part of this discussion. After 
all, the recognition that Europe is in crisis is ‘apolitical’ in the broadest 
sense. Discussion of Europe’s problems is not to take a position on the 
Leave/ Remain debate, nor is it to identify oneself as a Eurosceptic or a 
Europhile. Indeed, Theresa May acknowledged as much in her Florence 
speech of 22 September 2017 when she noted that the ‘success of the EU 
is profoundly in our [the UK’s] national interest and that of the wider 
world’, and referred to the ‘vibrant debate going on about the shape of 
the EU’s institutions and the direction of the Union in the years ahead’ 
(May 2017b).
Europe, and the EU, thus find themselves at a ‘critical juncture’ 
(Sus 2017, 115); one hastened, for sure, by Brexit, but also reflecting 
broader social, institutional and geopolitical challenges facing the con-
tinent. And yet, it is this very sense of crisis that galvanises both citizens 
and elites alike, and offers the possibility of meaningful reform at the 
European level aimed at improving the lives of European citizens. In this 
new and complicated political environment, carefully articulated ideas 
about Europe’s problems, and their potential solutions, are more relevant 
than ever before, since agency matters more than ever at times of crisis 
and upheaval. The contributions in this volume have all taken seriously 
the question of where Europe’s future lies after Brexit. In offering cogent 
analyses of crucial actors, institutions, relationships and issues, they help 
us to rethink the future of the European project and contribute to vital 
debates taking place across the continent.
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Notes
Introduction
 1. First found in the Preamble to the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(Treaty of Rome), as the aspiration to create ‘the foundations for an ever closer union of the 
peoples of Europe’. A cornerstone of then Prime Minister David Cameron’s renegotiation deal 
of the UK’s EU membership was to exempt the UK from this commitment.
 2. As the exercise is so vast, the government plans to ‘correct the statute book where necessary’ 
without full parliamentary scrutiny, using what are known, after the Statute of Proclamations 
1539, as Henry VIII clauses.
 3. R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2017] UKSC 5.
 4. On 3 May 2017, the European Commission adopted and published its recommendation to open 
the Article 50 negotiations with the UK, based on the European Council guidelines of 29 April 
2017. On 22 May 2017, the Council adopted the Commission’s recommendation. The nego-
tiations will also be conducted with due regard to the European Parliament’s resolution of 5 
April 2017.
Chapter 3
 1. All quotes in the text are to Cummings (2017c) unless stated otherwise.
Chapter 4
 1. This phrase appeared in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic 
Community in 1957, where the six original signatories to the Treaties (France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) – see also Note 1 in the introduction.
 2. Protocol no.  32 to the Treaty on EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU on the 
Acquisition of Property in Denmark.
 3. Protocol no. 35 to the Treaty on EU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU on Article 
40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.
 4. R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, judgment of the High Court of 3 November 
2016 (available at:  https:// www.judiciary.gov.uk/ judgments/ r- miller- v- secretary- of- state- 
for- exiting- the- european- union/ ). The judgment of the Supreme Court on appeal was given 
on 24 January 2017. See the headline of the Daily Mail, 3 November 2016, ‘Enemies of the 
People: Fury over “Out of Touch” Judges who Have “Declared War on Democracy” by Defying 
17.4m Brexit Voters and who Could Trigger Constitutional Crisis’.
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Chapter 8
 1. This chapter is based on a lecture delivered at the School of Public Policy at UCL on 
17 November 2016 and initially published (in French) in the Revue trimestrielle de droit europ-
een (see van Middelaar 2016).
 2. Michael Gove, the former Secretary of State for Justice, famously said: ‘the people in this coun-
try have had enough of experts’.
 3. Commission proposal of 8 March 2016 to revise the 1996 Directive on Posted Workers.
 4. On 14 September 2016, the European Parliament and the Council approved Regulation EU 
2016/ 1624 on the European border and coast guard, for which a political agreement between 
the institutions had been found early July, just a few days later than the deadline set by the EU 
heads of state or government at their December 2015 meeting (European Council Conclusions, 
17– 18 December 2015, point 8).
Chapter 11
 1. In the December 1993 Downing Street Declaration, UK Prime Minister John Major and his Irish 
counterpart, Albert Reynolds, affirmed the right of the people of Ireland to self- determination 
but also that Northern Ireland would only become part of the Republic if a majority of its peo-
ple supported such a change. This provided an important foundation for the subsequent Good 
Friday Agreement.
 2. Interview, Irish Embassy in London, October 2015.
 3. These can be summarised as: (i) remaining in the Single Market; (ii) establishing a bespoke 
Customs Union with the EU; or (iii) negotiating a deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ment (Hayward 2017b).
 4. It is significant in this regard that at its summit in April 2017, the European Council agreed that 
if a united Ireland emerged at some point in the future, Northern Ireland would automatically 
become part of the EU.
Chapter 12
 1. Official Journal of the EU, 2010/ 718/ EU.
 2. TNA, FCO 33/ 4669, Statement Motzfeldt, 2 October 1981.
 3. Historical Archives of the EU (HAEU), Florence, CM2/ 1963, 885, Letter Ben Bella to Hallstein, 
24 December 1962.
 4. HAEU, CM2/ 1963, 885, EEC, Council, G, Rat, Note, secret, 25 June 1963.
 5. The National Archives at Kew, FCO, 33/ 4670, Hatford, British Embassy Copenhagen, to 
Spreckley, FCO, 6 November 1981.
 6. HAEU, CM2/ 1972, 1709, EC, Council, Relations with Algeria, 30 January 1968.
 7. See, e.g., ‘Grønland udskyder selvstændighed’, in Information, 22 April 2015.
Chapter 13
 1. Various experts quoted in Schelkle and Lokdam (2016, 13– 14).
 2. According to Tony Halmos, quoted in Schelkle and Lokdam (2016, 13).
 3. At the end of 2015, banks in the euro area had almost €28 trillion assets while US banks had a 
bit more than €14 trillion, so about half of that. Both are surpassed by Chinese banks, however, 
with over €28 trillion or about €500 billion more than the euro area (Schoenmaker and Véron 
2016, 12).
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 4. Rahman (2015) is a useful source on CCPs.
 5. Source: Select Statistics blog based on HMRC data (available at: https:// select- statistics.co.uk/ 
blog/ uks- major- trading- partners/ ).
 6. An effective exchange rate is a summary measure of a country’s exchange rate vis- à- vis all main 
trading partners by weighting the bilateral exchange rates with each by their export or trade 
shares.
 7. Ring- fencing means that a national supervisor does not allow a resident bank to provide liquid-
ity to headquarters or a subsidiary in another Member State threatened with capital flight. 
Italian banks have accused the German supervisor BaFin of practising this protectionist policy 
and the latter defended it as a protective measure (Arnold 2014).
Chapter 14
 1. There are echoes of this in the writings of Robert Tombs and in the arguments made by 
‘Historians for Britain’. See Tombs (2008) and, for example, Abulafia (2015).
 2. This has been a central feature of Marine Le Pen’s 2017 French presidential campaign. It is at 
the core of many academic studies, such as Kriesi et al. (2012).
 3. The importance of changes in state– society relations for the dynamics of EU integration is being 
captured in recent innovations in EU integration theories. See for instance the work of Hooghe 
and Marks 2008; Bickerton et al. 2015; and Leuffen et al. 2012.
 4. Of all the advanced economies, only Greece has had lower real-wage growth than the UK since 
2008 (Giles 2017).
 5. It is worth noting that this was already challenged by the Syriza government when it tried 
to politicise the Eurogroup discussions. This attempt  – particularly by Varoufakis  – was 
entirely at odds with the etiquette of the Eurogroup and showed how unused its members 
were to principled political disagreements between national government representatives. 
Indeed, it showed that when such disagreements occur the Eurogroup is simply not fit for 
purpose.
Chapter 16
 1. HC Deb (10 October 2016) c55.
Chapter 17
 1. This is a deliberate oversimplification. These are the largest affected groups, but there are oth-
ers who may find that their accrued rights may be at risk, such as those who have previously 
been resident in another Member State, have now moved (on, or back) and may want to return 
to the first host state.
 2. The position of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has been a matter of extensive conjecture, 
but in July 2017 he used harsh language which indicated strong hostility to the particu-
lar model offered by free movement:  e.g. ‘Jeremy Corbyn:  “Wholesale” EU Immigration 
has Destroyed Conditions for British Workers’, New Statesman, 23 July 2017 (available 
at: http:// www.newstatesman.com/ politics/ staggers/ 2017/ 07/ jeremy- corbyn- wholesale- 
 eu- immigration- has- destroyed- conditions- british).
 3. Only in July 2017 was the Migration Advisory Committee commissioned to study existing prac-
tices in relation to the free movement of labour as well as the future needs of the UK economy 
in relation to migration: Home Secretary Amber Rudd’s commissioning letter to the chair of the 
Migration Advisory Committee, 27 July 2017 (available at: https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ 
publications/ commissioning- letter- to- the- migration- advisory- committee).
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 4. Joint Technical Note on the Comparison of EU- UK Positions on Citizens’ Rights. Department for 
Exiting the EU, 20 July 2017 (available at: https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ publications/ 
joint- technical- note- on- the- comparison- of- eu- uk- positions- on- citizens- rights).
 5. See for example the statement signed by Michael Gove, Gisela Stuart and Priti Patel on immigra-
tion policy, 1 June 2016 (available at:  http:// www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/ restoring_ public_ 
trust_ in_ immigration_ policy_ a_ points_ based_ non_ discriminatory_ immigration_ system.html).
 6. The original claim stems from work done by the Liberal Democrats and published in a 
Guardian report in February 2017 (available at:  https:// www.theguardian.com/ uk- news/ 
2017/ feb/ 27/ rejections- eu- citizens- seeking- uk- residency). This was further amplified in 
a Financial Times article highly critical of the permanent residence application process:  ‘EU 
Citizens Face 85- page “Nightmare” Brexit Britain Form’, 1 March 2017 (available at: https:// 
www.ft.com/ content/ 2119a554- fce6- 11e6- 96f8- 3700c5664d30) to which the Home Office 
issued a set of ‘clarifications’ (available at:  https:// homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/ 2017/ 03/ 
02/ financial- times- article- on- the- permanent- residency- application- process/ ).
 7. ‘The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for Exiting the EU: PM Speech’, 17 January 2017 
(available at: https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ speeches/ the- governments- negotiating- 
 objectives- for- exiting- the- eu- pm- speech).
 8. ‘Poll Finds that 60% of Britons Want to Keep their EU Citizenship.’ Observer, 1 July 2017 (availa-
ble at: https:// www.theguardian.com/ politics/ 2017/ jul/ 01/ poll- european- eu- rights- brexit).
 9. Available at:  http:// ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/ statistics- explained/ index.php/ Migration_ and_ 
migrant_ population_ statistics (data extracted March 2017).
 10. ‘Attitudes to Brexit: Everything we Know so Far.’ YouGov, 29 March 2017 (available at: https:// 
yougov.co.uk/ news/ 2017/ 03/ 29/ attitudes- brexit- everything- we- know- so- far/ ).
 11. Case C- 434/ 09 McCarthy v SSHD ECLI:EU:C:2011:277.
 12. Case C- 165/ 16 Lounes v SSHD Opinion of AG Bot, 30 May 2017, judgment pending.
 13. Case C- 135/ 08 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2010:104.
 14. Kuric and Others v Slovenia, No 26828/ 06, [2013] 56 EHRR 20.
 15. Case C- 221/ 17 Tjebbes v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken; for details see ‘The Council of State 
of the Netherlands Sends a Preliminary Ruling Request to the CJEU.’ EUDO Citizenship Blog, 
20 April 2017 (available at:  http:// eudo- citizenship.eu/ news/ citizenship- news/ 1811- the- 
council- of- state- of- the- netherlands- sends- a- preliminary- ruling- request- to- the- cjeu).
 16. ‘The Surge in Britons Seeking a Second Passport.’ FT Brexit Briefing, 21 July 2017 (available 
at:  https:// www.ft.com/ content/ 9a38e93a- 6e11- 11e7- b9c7- 15af748b60d0). This matter 
has also reached the attention of the press in France: ‘Brexit: hausse de 254 % du nombre de 
Britanniques demandant la nationalité française en 2016’, Le Monde, 19 June 2016 (avail-
able at:  http:// www.lemonde.fr/ referendum- sur- le- brexit/ article/ 2017/ 06/ 19/ hausse- de- 
254- du- nombre- de- britanniques- demandant- la- nationalite- francaise- en- 2016_ 5147585_ 
4872498.html).
 17. For a regularly updated review of naturalisation trends and concepts in the UK, see 
Migration Observatory Briefing, Naturalisation as a British Citizen:  Concepts and Trends, 18 
July 2017 (available at:  http:// www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/ resources/ briefings/ 
naturalisation- as- a- british- citizen- concepts- and- trends/ ).
 18. See House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Acquired Rights, 10th Report of Session 2016– 17, 
HL Paper 82.
 19. ‘Dutch Nationals Taking UK Citizenship “Will Lose Netherlands Passports’’.’ Guardian, 17 July 
2017 (available at:  https:// www.theguardian.com/ politics/ 2017/ jul/ 17/ dutch- nationals- 
brexit- uk- citizenship- lose- netherlands- passports- mark- rutte). For details on loss of citizenship 
by acquisition of foreign citizenship, see EUDO Citizenship Modes of Loss database (available 
at: http:// eudo- citizenship.eu/ databases/ modes- of- loss).
Chapter 18
 1. R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin); R (on the appli-
cation of Miller and another) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU (Appellant) 
[2017] UKSC 5.
 2. Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508.
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 3. See in particular the UK Constitutional Law blog (available at: https:// ukconstitutionallaw.
org/ blog/ ).
 4. That was so even in the seminal blog post by King et al. (2016).
 5. Miller Supreme Court, para 65.
 6. Miller Supreme Court, paras 179– 197.
 7. EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017.
 8. Note that in Scotland 62 per cent voted ‘Remain’ – the clearest majority, either way, in any UK 
region.
 9. ‘But it is recognised that the Parliament of the UK will not normally legislate with regard to 
devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.’
 10. Miller Supreme Court, para 146.
 11. Miller Supreme Court, para 148.
 12. Art 48 TEU.
Chapter 19
 1. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is both communitarian in terms of its decision- 
making via the use of qualified majority voting, and justiciable in law on the basis of Article 
3(2) TEU (available at:  http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ atyourservice/ en/ displayFtu.
html?ftuId=FTU_ 5.12.1.html).
 2. The 2017 White Paper makes explicit ‘priority missions [that] have had some notable suc-
cesses’, including ALTHEA in Bosnia (2004), ATALANTA in the Horn of Africa (2008– ongo-
ing), Rule of Law in Kosovo, Policing in Afghanistan, Assistance in Ukraine (2014) to the most 
recent, SOPHIA in the Mediterranean, as well as further civilian support in Georgia, Libya, 
Palestine and Somalia.
Chapter 20
 1. There are disputes over the issue of the effect of immigration on wage levels. Jonathan 
Wadsworth concluded in 2015 that ‘there is little evidence of a strong correlation between 
changes in wages of the UK- born (either all or just the less skilled) and changes in local area 
immigrant share over this period’ (Wadsworth 2015, 9). But this does not address the question 
of the structural power, or lack of it, of labour in relation to seeking a better deal from employ-
ers in the context of high employment. It is also clear that employers are precisely employing 
migrant labour because they cannot get local people to work at the low wages offered. In any 
case Wadsworth acknowledges that public perceptions of the effects of migration on jobs and 
wages are very different from the evidence he is presenting.
Chapter 23
 1. In addition to the 17 goals, there are 169 targets and 230 global indicators. ‘Sustainable devel-
opment’ was put on the UN agenda in 1987 by the Brundtland report.
 2. GOD, A.C.O., 2015. Encyclical letter Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for Our 
Common Home.
 3. Starting of course with the Club of Rome’s 1972 ‘Limits to Growth’ report.
 4. I thank Adrian Favell for pointing this out to me.
 5. The old idea was bottled anew by the Commission in the run- up to Rome, pitted against the 
straw- scenarios of ‘muddling through’, focusing on the Single Market or federalising further. 
For an overview see:  http:// www.praguesummit.eu/ docs/ sustainable- european- integra-
tion:- eu- for- the- 21st- century- 223.pdf.
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Chapter 25
 1. The reference to Aristotle’s work is represented as a ‘Bekker number’, allowing reference to any 
translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Chapter 26
 1. This chapter is an attempt to further develop ideas presented in Chapter 5 of my book (Isiksel 
2016) in light of Britain’s decision to leave the EU (‘Brexit’).
 2. Jean Monnet, Note de Réflexion de 5 août 1943 (available at:  http:// www.cvce.eu/ obj/ 
note_ de_ reflexion_ de_ jean_ monnet_ alger_ 5_ aout_ 1943- fr- b61a8924- 57bf- 4890- 9e4b- 
73bf4d882549.html).
 3. The metaphor of embedding is borrowed from Polanyi (1944 [2001]), who characterises the 
dynamics of modern capitalist society as a ‘double movement’ whereby market forces strain 
against regulatory measures by which the state seeks to contain its deleterious effects on 
society.
 4. This passage rephrases the ECSC Treaty’s preambular pledge to ‘raise the standard of living’ by 
expanding productivity.
 5. Art. 3(3) TEU. Emphasis added.
 6. Art. 2 TEU.
 7. Art. 153(1) and (2).
 8. Art. 9 TFEU.
 9. Charles Beitz was the first to argue (with qualifications) that Rawls’ conception of society as a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage must be global in scope.
 10. For instance, the Court of Justice invalidated the Data Retention Directive of 2006 for dispro-
portionate interference with the rights to privacy and data protection enshrined in the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Joined Cases C- 293 & 594/ 12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and 
Seitlinger and others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, 8 April 2014. Similarly, it held that the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive entailed a ‘right to be forgotten’: in this case, an entitlement to the removal 
of personal data from search engines. Case C- 131/ 12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), and Mario Costeja González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 13 
May 2014.
 11. Although Streeck maintains that ‘the neoliberal revolution, led by the US and the UK, has 
forever closed [the] window’ for building a supranational welfare state.
 12. Turnout in European Parliament elections has declined from 62 per cent in 1979 (the first year 
of direct elections) to >43 per cent in the 2014 elections, even though the powers of the EP 
have been enlarged in successive treaty changes over the same period (available at: http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/ elections2014- results/ en/ turnout.html).
 13. ‘Population and Housing Census 2011.’ Statistics Estonia News Release, No. 80, 21 June 2013 
(available at: http:// www.stat.ee/ dokumendid/ 70026).
 14. This number was obtained by calculating the total number of persons originating in European 
and EU states other than Estonia, and subtracting it from the general population of Estonian 
residents.
 15. The category used in the database search was ‘PC0521: POPULATION, 31 DECEMBER 2011 
by Sex, Place of residence, Parents’ country of birth / Region, Country of birth and Ethnic 
nationality’. Search query included persons of foreign and Estonian birth whose parents’ coun-
try of birth was one of the countries listed in the region of Africa.
 16. Search query included persons of foreign and Estonian birth whose parents’ country of birth 
was Afghanistan.
 17. Based on data between 2000– 16. ‘The Population of Estonia Increased Last Year’, 
Statistics Estonia News Release, No. 8, 16 January 2017 (available at https:// www.stat.ee/ 
news- release- 2017- 008).
 18. Interestingly, in the May 2016 Eurobarometer survey conducted just six months earlier, more 
UK survey responses flagged immigration (at 51 per cent), alongside 38 per cent for terrorism 
(Eurobarometer 2016a). The steep drop in UK respondents reporting worry over immigration 
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and terrorism relative to the EU28 suggests that the British electorate’s decision to leave the 
EU in the intervening period may have assuaged some of the UK public’s anxiety over these 
issues.
 19. Because the survey allows each respondent to give more than one response (respondents may 
choose up to two top issues from a list), the total percentage share of issues adds up to 190 per 
cent across the EU28 in the Autumn 2016 survey.
Chapter 27
 1. Part of this contribution is a slightly revised version of ‘Thatcher’s Plot – And How to Defeat It’ 
(Social Europe, 29 November 2016), itself consisting largely of the final part of ‘Just Europe’, 
the Max Weber lecture delivered at the European University Institute (Florence) on 16 
November 2016.
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